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Abstract 
This study concerns itself with pursuing the remarks 
made by Hilal ("Sociology and Underdevelopment", Durham 
mimeo 1970 ppl-3) to the effect that the 'discovery' of 
the Third * Torld was 
(is) as significant for p ent dp. y ., rer social-theorizing as was that l9th century discovery of 
founding fathers' of industrializzation made by the 1. 
sociology and the classical -politicRl econoýrnists. The 
eluciantion of this claim haýl been effected by the 
preparation of a critical history of the career of 
ldevelopment-ý.; tudiesl in the oost viar period, 1945-75. 
Three 1,1,! I-chools' have been identified, labelled 1positivist'. 1radicals' and Imarxists', by asking how 
the linked matterc 'Of disciplinnry independence and 
theoretical autonomy have been regarded by the practit- 
ioners themselves. Briefly, it is argued that: (l) the 
earliest efforts regarded development as a technical 
matter of the appropriate application of the eetablished 
procedures of economics , where economics was taken as 
a 'positive science'; (2) the efforts characteristic of 
the middle period adopted varieties of Isociologized' 
economics and lodged claims for the independence and 
theoretical novelty of 'development-studies'; (3) the 
marxistsIg the most recent identifiable grouping, deny 
the independence and novelty of Idevelopnent-studies' 
and subsume its questions and concerns within a wider 
historico-economic schema which revolves around the 
idea of a 'world capitalist system'. 
The career of 'development-studies' is seen as an 
emergent series whereby the self-conception of the prac- 
titioners broadens such that a narrowly-technical engag- 
ement gives way to a richer and increasingly subtle 
exercise in social theorizing. The contributions of each 
I-chooll have been considered by means of sociology of 
knoviledge-informed analyses of exemplars. The study has looked at the occasions for theorizing, at the intellectual 
recoutces invoked, and has been interested in display- 
ing their characteristic 'argument forms'. This1fornall 
aspect has provided the means whereby the study as a 
whole has been both integrated as a text t%nd related to 
recent. debate as to the Droper nature of cocial-theorizing. 
vocial-theori7ing is teken to be concerned rith, in the 
Drime case, the construction of ideological(vihere this term 
is used non-pejoratively) schemas serving to order and 
legitimalt-eaction in the world; and, thereafter, with the 
criticism and comparative ranking of such schemas. 
We conclude by insisting upon the fundamental practic- 
ality of social theoretic engagement and suggest that 
theorists must pay attention to what it makes sense for 
them to say given their particular circumstances and 
problem situations. 
Acknowledjements 
T-, r-. --y intellectual and personal debts in respect of this 
thesis are many. !,! rost immediately I would like to thank 
Aidan Poster-Carter, my supervisor over this last three 
and a half yearsi, for his generous encouragement and 
gently made corrections. Thereafter*I would thank tho. ce 
teacherF I had as an undergraduate in the Department. - of 
Sociology and Philo-sophy at Leeds. Bob Lorman and Steve 
MxGilp at Gloucestershire College of Art and Design 
encouraged me when my interests in matters of social 
theorizing first stirred; as did my friends of those days. 
Throughout my time in Leeds my girlfriend Ro-ce has provided 
invaluable support to my efforts. 
f 
Contentc, 
Section One. 
Chapter One: The Ccope and Concerns of the Study ..... pl. 
Chapter Two: The Idea. of Development ................ p2l. 
Section Two: Introduction ............................ p44. 
Chapter Three: The CryFtalizstion of the Positivist 
Orthodoxy, 1943-55 
Chapter Four: The Positivist High Tide: Modernization 
Theory .......... 
S Section Three: Introduction ......................... P139. 
Chapter Five: The Contribu tion of the Neo-Inctitutionalists 
....................................... p142. 
Chapter Six: Diociplinary Independence and Theoretical 
Progressivity ..... o*o***o&o**o@oooooo.. p204- 
section Four. c 
Chapter Seven: Elements of the Renewal of Interest in 
Marxian Scholarship: Treatments of the 
Third World .......................... p265- 
Section Five. 
Chapter Eight: 'S'ocial Theorizing and the Matter of the 
Third lVorld ....... osesoosooooosooooo-P327. 
ITotes ............................................... P379. 
Bibliography ........................................ p425. 
Contents with subheadings 
Section One: Prologue. 
Chapter One: The Scope and Concerns of the Study ........... pl. 
1.0 The constitution of the 'object' of the study 
and the method appropriate thereto ............ pl, 
2.0 Received wisdom: some suppositions of our 
study O. pll. 
3.0 A programme for the rest of the study oooooosoopl9o 
Chapter Two: The Idea of Development *O****o&ojD#oo*oosooe*o. p2lo 
1.0 The origins of the idea of progress oooooso ... op23. 
2.0 The scope of the idea of progress ......... o. o. p26. 
3.0 The idea of development in treatments of 
matters of the Third 17orld ****o*o*@***o##o@#oop29. 
4.0 Concluding note: some criticisms rebutted . '... P42. 
Section Two: The'PositivistsigIntroductory Remarks ... p44. 
Chapter Three: The Crystallization of the Positivist 
Orthodoxy, 1943-1955 ....................... 
: 
OO. P48. 
1.0 T)ynamic of society: the occasion of theorizing. p48. 
1.1 Economic theory and the Keynesian revolution. ý. p4p. 
1.2 The political and economic context for post- 
war thinking about. develo*Pment ................ p52. 
1.3 The economic recovery of Western Europe ....... p55. 
1.4 Summary ....... P59. 
20'0 Dynamic of theory I: the nature of the 
orthodoxy- the notion of 'intervention' ....... p60. 
2.1 Growth theory: - 'intervention' legitimated ..... p64. 
2.2 Planning: linterventionl"organised 
2.3 Aid: the lowest tier, 'intervention' 
implemented ...... 
C! 2.4 Summary 
3oO Dynamic ctC theory II: early practice, Keynes 
exported asoooooooooooooooooooooooooooooo**oooop85o 
3ol The 1951 UTT reDort oooo. oo. oo. oooo. o. o.. o ... ooopM. 
3.2 An early general statement: Arthur Lewis soeooop9lo 
3.3 Concluding-note.,,,., o,,,, o, o*,,,,,,,,,,, *oooooop95. 
Chapter Pour: The Positivist High Tideý'Modernization 
Theory' ooooo*ooooosooooo#sosoooooooso'oososoosoP97- 
1.0 Introduction 00.0.000.. 0.0 ..... 0,,.. o ... oo. o ... op97. 
2.0 Dynamic of society: the occasion of. 
'modernization' ...... *000*0006000000000000SO&OP990 
3.0 Dynamic of theory I: further developments in 
the work of the economists **eo&*o**e##**@***.. plO8. 
4.0 Dynamic of theory II: 'modernization theory19 
a new master scientist 
5.0 Dynamic of theory III: the apogee of 'modern- 
i7, ation' 
Section Three: The 'Radicals', Introductory Remarks ......... P139. 
Chapter Five: The Contribution of the 'Neo-Institutionalists4pl42. 
1.0 Dynamic of society I: an underlying divergence... pl42. 
2.0 Dynamic of society II: greater divergence ...... P147. 
2.1 Dynamic of theory I: decolonization and its 
I legitimating theorem oososoososooooooooooooo0o. p157. 
3.0 Dynamic of theory II: the proximate intell- 
ectunl source of the European efforts ......... p164. 
3.1 71hat is linctitutionalistleconomics? ossssoe oo. pl64* 
3.2 Myrdal and institutionalism ....... s@**s*******pl70. 
3.3 The ptrategic use of the resources of the 
social sciences ... 
3o4 The treatment of 'values': the role of the 
theorist 
3.5 Policy - planning and the 'soft-state' ooooooosplWo 
4.0 Dynamic of theory III: the otatus of neo- I 
institutional social theory ... o. o. PlWo 
Chapter Six: Disciplinary Independence and Theoretical 
Progressivity ......... : ........................ p204. 
1.0 Preamble ............ ooooo*ooooooooooooooooooseep204. 
2.0 Disciplinary independence ....... 
2.1 Form and intent ............... 
2.11 Sociology of knowledge sketch of Idependencyl. p2O7. 
2.12 Furtado and the emergence of the 'dependency' 
theorists conception of a proper and 
fruitful analysis *ooooosooooooooosooosoooooeop2l2. 
2.13 Comparative ideological character s*oooooo***op224o 
2.14 Is 'dependency' independent, is it adequate? *. p228* 
2.2 'Dependency' and the cupercocsion of the 
conventional wisdom: a problem miscons. trued ... p232. 
2.3 Disciplinary independence- a chimera? ..... o... p238. 
3.0 Progress in conceptualization ......... ........ p240. 
3.1 The argument from a sequence ................... p241. 
3.2 The argument from paradigms .................. O. p245- 
3.3 How do we*rank ideologies? ...... 000000000000 ... p251. 
3.31 Introductory note ............................. p251. 
3.32 A. G. Frank and 'underdevelopment' theory ..... j. p251. 
3.33 Ranking eeologies ............................ p256. 
Section Four: The 'Marxists'. 
Chapter Seven: Elements of the Renewal of Interest in 
Marxian Scholarship; the Treatments of the 
Third World .................................... p265. 
1.0 Introductory remarks ............................ p265. 
2.0 Dynamic of cociety: the occasion forthe renewal , 
of interest in marxian scholarship . *o*&e*s*#e*ep267- 
2.1 Pressurev for renewal of interest in Marx I: 
internal/immediate .......... p267. 
2.2 Pressures for renewal of interest in Marx TI: 
external/adoptive ....... 
3,, 0 Dynamic of theory I: New Left theorizing and 
the Third World ... ...... op277o 3.1 Are there significant analogi es? ...... p277. 
3.2 Theorists, practitioners, interpreters: Fanon 
and Debray 
3o3 Summsry note .. Oooooooooooooooooooooosoooo*ooosop294. 
4.0*Dynamic of theory II: Ineo-marxism' ..... o.....,. p296. 
4ol From activists to scholars 
4o2 The contested core of Ineo-marxism' ... oop302o 
4.21 Objections to the moraf critique of capitalismop309- 
4o22 Objections to the historical schema used .%... op3l4o 
4.23 Objections to the notion of 'economic surplus'-op3l7. 
4.24 Objections to the notion of 'development' o .... p319. 
4.25 Objections to the reduction of 'class' to 
'market' 
4.26 An unhelpful politics 
4.3 Summary noteoo.. Oooooooooooooooooooooooooooesooop324o 
Section Five: Concluding Remarks. 
Chapter Eight: Social Theorizing and the Matter of the 
Third World ...... oosoo&@oooosooossoooosessoooooP327* 
e 
1.0 A statement of the concerns of chapter eight.. '*. p327. 
2.0 Political economy ................ s*o*&oo****-; -P332- 
2.1 The style of political economy .. ***oo*oe*o****op333- 
2.2 The character of argument in political, economy.. P336. 
2o3 Implied criteria of explanatory adequacy ... O. -P341. 
2.4 Summary note O.. oooooooooooooooooooooooooo*ooooop350- 
3.0 Critique o... o ... o.. o. o ........ o.. o.. p350. 
4.0 The political economy of dependent capitalism . -P359. 
5.0 Democratic critical engagement .,, .... o .... o .... P368. 
6.0 Epilogue ....................................... p376. 
Notes ..................................................... P379. 
Bibliography ................................................ p425. 
. Abbreviationn 
C 13- Convenýional Wisdom (after'J Y. Galbraith), 
D C- Developed Country. 
12-: ' r, 
- 
CLA- United Nations Economic Commission for Latin Lmerica. 
BRP- European Recovery 'Programme. 
GTTP- Gross National Product. 
G T- Growth Theory. 
H-D - Harrod-Domar. 
ICOR- Incremental Capital Output Ratio. 
TA T- '1: 1odernization Theory. 
T11TC- T'ýUlti-jTational Corporation. 
Njlc', T- "Teo-Inptitutiona-1 Slocial Theory. 
IT 
, 
T, L_ 
le-,,, Left. 
TTLR- TTew Le-Pt Review. 
NS- New Statesman. 
_SD, 
c, '- Students for a Democratic Society. 
SPD- Social Democratic Party( W. Germany). 
STTCC- &Student Non violent Coordinating Committee. 
UDT- Underdevelopment Theory. 
UDC- Underdeveloped Country. 
UITCTAD- United ITations Conferences on Trade and*Development. 
0 UK A 21 - Oftit0- --- -- 
Ic 
6- 
Section One : Prologue. 
Chapter One: the scope and concerns of the study. 
A point of departure. 
We may begin by noting that it has been observed that 
the so called 'discovery of the Third World' is as 
significant for present day social-theory as was that 
Igth. century discovery of 'industrialization I for the 
classical theorists of political economy and the 'foun- 
ding fathers' of sociology. It is towards an elucidation 
of this claim that our study may be taken to be directed. 
It is an underlying assumption that if it is true that 
the discovery of the Third 1,7orld in some way recapitul- 
ates the experience of the l9th. century theorists. then 
it is not unreasonable to suppose that the 'career of 
Idevelopment-studies' will provide a series of unequiv- 
ocal, undisguisedg non-routinizedg lraql examples of 
social theori--ing. in action. The particular 'object I 
of our enquiry is taken as the 'career' of Idevelo2ment- 
-tudies', and this history we treat in the hope of 
uncovering and displaying something of the nature of 
social-theorizing. 
f 
1.0 The constitution of the 'object' of study and the 
method appropriate thereto. 
The matter of the constitution of our lobjectl(l) will 
serve to offer a preliminary statement, an over-view, 
of the way we shall treat the history of the period. It 
will also offer a programme for the study and establish 
the legitimacy of the enterprise. Having treated the 
'object' of study vie will convider the method to be used. 
Its we want to claim tbat. the theorist bestows coher- 
ence upon the period selected by virtue , 
of the questions 
he is moved to raise, then it seems clear that this 
construction of an lobject' is itself n process. The 
,t are lodged within particular interests of the theoris 
the frame of his. discipline, iteelf lodged within history. 
The 'object, of enquiry is a distillate of particular 
- 
i 
interests, dicciplinary con., ý: traints and the common -cense 
of the society of ,, -; hicl-, L the rcholar is a member. Rather 
than cimply announce the 'object' of the study ive will 
review, albeit in a simple fashion, this process. 
In this work the period treated is bounded by two 
ware. This presents the period both formally, ie. two 
dates, and commonsensically. Thus the start is-indicated 
by the end of the Second World Vlar, and the end point - 
by the defeat of the U&SA in Vietnam and the response of 
the community of nations thereto*. Now if this identifies 
the period formally, then the substantive issues/problems 
shaping it -that is, the criteria of selection and 
coherence -are the ch4nges in approach to problems of 
the dev 
* 
elopment 6f the Third World. This aspect we take 
to represent the experience of the discipline of Idevel- 
opment-studies', given our particular interest in argum- 
ent strategies. 
This matter of the changes in approach to aevelopment 
is the key to the constitution of the object' of study. 
It permits our enquiries to begin with the ideas of the 
practitioners themeelves. Thus if we ask to what extent 
is it legitimate to pick out theories of development as 
a discrete realm of discourse, or how much is it a new 
separate discipline, and when did it start and why, then 
we can identify three general sorts of answers. These 
will provide the material , lodged within the dates 
noted, which with the addition of our own questions 
will constitute our 'object'. 
On the question of the independence and theoretical 
novelty of the discipline of 'development-studieslgthe 
three views are: firstg that it is not proper to single 
out Idevelopment-studies' as the whole enterprise prop- 
erly belongs to a positive science of, economic-s; second, 
that it is proper to single out 'development-studies' 
and that, moreover, they have good reason to be regarded 
as the basis of the first adequate econo. mico; and third, 
that it is an error to single out Idevelopment-c-tudieelas 
'hould be subsu-med within these concerns and questions, E 
. 
theAtMtof the historical development of the world cap tali sYstem. 
- 
So firstly it may be argued that it is an error to --ingle 
out Idevelgpinent-studiestas being anything other than 
a Lsub-spedialism of positive econot-Ilic ccience. The purist 
Bauer(2) adopts such a position. He seems to want to 
deny that 
* 
'development-studie---l and theories are espec- 
ially novel in the light of the efforts of colonial 
governments, which he takes to have been pursuing devel- 
opment for many years, and the corresponding intellectual 
reflection upon these matters. Any novelty development- 
theories might have is that of being wrongheaded and 
generally mistaken in diagnoses and prescriptions. Rauer 
is critical of aid and planning . arguing that neither 
are necessary conditions of development. Economics in 
the end is a form of technical assistance. 
That economics is to be seen as a science, and that 
the proper exchange of economics and the problems of the 
Third 'Vorld is one of the application/extension of the 
established, proven, tools of the former to the circum- 
stances of the latter, is generally taken for granted 
by those we can identify as taking this line on the 
matter of the status of 'development-studies'. However 
those who take this line do not, in the main, adopt 
BaueA purism. The 'conventional-wisdom' of ! development 
studieslp established in the immediate post-war period, 
as we shall see is in its initial presentation quite 
clearly Keynesian. It ie this that Bauer rails against. 
It is characteristic of the work in this early 
period of those who would follow the general theoret- 
ical line indicated, that it pursues what we can call 
an ideology of 'authoritative interventionism'. That 
'development' was taken to be a technical matter we 
have noted, but further it was also assumed that the 
experts of the presently developed nations had access to 
the requisite technical expertise. A relationship of 
super and sub-ordination was thus legitimated, and res- 
ponsibility for the future reserved for the technical 
experts of the developed nations and their ag ents. ' 
The second view on the matter of the disciplinary 
- 
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status of 'development-studies' can be seen to be evid- 
enced in the work of a fairly diverse group of writers2. 
In general we can suggest that they would take it to be 
proper to single'out 'development-studies', but it should 
be noted that there would be differences in the stren- 
gth-- of their respective claims. The representatives 
of our second view might be most conveniently presented 
as three groups: together they encompass work on the 
fringe of the economic orthodoxy detailed above , thro- 
C. -e of marxian schemes. ugh to work on the lfrin.,, 
The first may be introduced by reference to Seers' 
1963 article(3). In it he denies that the orthodoxy of 
economics is of any use when treating the economies of 
the Third World. Attention must be paid, on the one 
hand , to the institutional and social context of the 
economies in question, and on the other to their locqtion 
in the world economy. The emphasis on Isituatinglanalysis 
is taken up by Streeten(4), who is not only the most 
philosophically sophisticated member of this group 
but can also be taken as-Myrdafs exegetist. 
Streeten advances the claim that 'development-studies' 
only got going after the end of the Second World War. 
The occasion for this involves two sets of reasons; (1) 
problens of resources and people are taken to be urgent 
in view of the population explosion and soluble in the 
"estern '" light of the success of post-war ý,. Ajuropean rec- 
overy; (2) political change, in the form of the rise of 
the new --tates of the Third 77orld and the start of the 
-he "Jest' for the Cold I. -Yar, increases the concern of t 
tproperl development of these areas. The earlier, Xeynesian- 
derived efforts of the orthodox are taken to be a theor- 
, ed by etically misconceived departure. The concepts us 
Idevelopmbnt-studies' must necessarily be fashioned in 
the problem-situation of the Third 11; 7orld societies them- 
selves. The StreetenAvlyrdal line is resoýutely problem - 
centred, and the wider implications of their efforts are 
not systematically developed. Whether they"take them- 
selves to have extended/revised/replaced the economic 
orthodoxy is-not made clear; indeed the. ir problenni-centred 
- 
I- 
scheme of 'institutional social theory' would probably 
dismiss the issue as uninteresting. Wee will offer an 
answer insofar as it is contained in our estima`tion that 
their work can be taken to be pursuing an ideology of 
Irevised(cooperative) authoritative interventionism'. 
The second strand to be picked out is latgely insp- 
ired by Latin American work., The. theorisý Prebisch makes 
the first break with the orthodox when in 1949 he rejects 
the Ricardian notion of international specialization 
which had justified Latin America's role in the world 
economy. being restricted to that of primary product 
exporter. Prebisch advocates industrialization behind 
protective tariff barriers. The policy change is mirrored 
in theoretical revision: 
, 
the equilibrium model of the 
orthodoxy is set aside in favour of a Istructuralist' 
analysis which takes the putative national economy to 
be a concatenation of 'residues', 'enclaves', and 'para- 
sitic; forms'.. Later the. gradual failure of ECLA reformism 
occasions a reworking of these views. In the middle and 
late sixties the notions used were linstitutionalland 
, structural' economics. According to Girvan(5) the revision 
entailed, (a) adding an historical aspect to structural 
and institutional method and(b) giving the synthesis 
the er: pirical content necessary to generate a full 
theory of underdevelopment. 
From 1741-urtado(6) Girvan draws an interesting point 
vis a vis the status of economics. Furtado comes to see 
the Latin American debate as resolvin-9 the issue of 
whe'ther one or two economics ivere required to treat 
respectively Irichland 'poor'. The answer is that we are 
treating a world-historical system and that consequently 
one economics is needed- and it is to be found in the 
tradition exemplified in Purtado's own career. That 
the school of dependency economics began as a reaction 
against the economic orthodoxy was due to the latters-being 
inapplicable to the circumstances of the Third 'World, 
but now-it transpires that the orthodoxy makes no sense 
in the circumstances of the rich either! If 'development- 
studies' is seen as a product of the post war period, 
then it is surely independent of the orthodoxy of econ- 
- 
rt 
-omics which is now reZarded au chimerical. 
The third group of those who ,,., ould affirm the nov- 
elty of 'development-Studies' are repreccented pre- 
eminently by A. G. Frank, though their vievis in this con- 
text are oddly insubstantial In brief, to the above 
noted dependency line there is to be added an influx 
of marxian notions which serves to produce what Leys(7) 
terms a 'left UDT/dependencyl. The phrasing is deliberate 
and serves to indicate that the theoretical realm, of UDT/ 
dependency is not abandoned, rather a political re- 
orientation takes place. However, in contrast to the 
two above-noted threads, each of which would grant 
IdeVelopment-studies' a measure of autonomy, the marxiet 
infusion is in a sense self-annihilating. It shifts 
from a political radicalisation of common themes to a 
renunciation of its own perspective as being, ultimatelyo 
lbourgeoi--l in theoretical character and liable there- 
fore to Ire-absorption. The most recent messages from this 
group commend the adoption of a thoroughgoingly Imarxist' 
standpoint, 
The third view on this matter of the independence 
and theoretical novelty of 'development-studies' adopts 
the strategy of subsuming its concerns and questions 
within the very much broader framework of the analysis 
of the historical development of the world capitalist 
system. Thi-- view-is exemplified, paradigmatically, in 
the work of those who regard themselves as either marxiste 
or as working in a tradition of social theory which counts 
1,., Iarx as its most distinguished figure. 
The major line of marxian analysis of the Third Wprld 
is usually associated with Baran and the notion of'depen- 
dency', where this connotes the subordinate incorporation 
of peripheral areas in the world economy. But if this can 
be regarded as the 'conventional-wisdom' of the marxists 
then it is also a disputed wisdom. The renaissance of 
marxian scholarship is receht . In the "West' it is 
strongly associated with the iNew Left', and its initial 
engagement with the Third World was via the cooption of 
, liberation struggles' to the efforts of the New Left. 
-7- 
9 
The subsequent exchange between tbis circumStance-opecific 
renewal and*established traditions of theorizing within 
marxism on the one hand, and on the other a dawning 
appreciation of the complexity of debate in respect of 
Idevelopment', has produced if not a theoretical babel 
then at least a highly complex discussion that has,. as 
one centre, the question of the precise nature of a 
properly marxian analysis of the Third World. It is in 
this area of enquiry that we find the moct ambitious 
efforts to theorize the matter of 'development'. 
We have now taken note. of the formal limits of our 
period of study, and have considered the various distin- 
guishable efforts of the practitioners themselves -ordered 
around the matter of disciplinary status, itself called 
forth by our interest in argument-forms. To this technical 
issue we must add a broader interest, both to give shape 
to the enquiry and toacknowledge recent debate within 
social science as to the precise nature of the endeavour. 
We have noted above that we are interested in the idea 
that the 'career' of development-studies might provide a 
series of 'raw' examples of social-theorizing in actiong 
and that consequently it might be expected to illuminate 
the matter of the way in výhich social -theorizing, is to be 
done. Also, vie take the proper centre of such enquiry 
to be located within the ambit of the concerns of the 
marxian renaissance of scholarship that we have referred 
to. 
The 'object' of our study, the 'career' of 'development- 
studies' in the period 1945-1975, is taken(in the light of 
the above report of the practitioners' views) to have involved, 
at least in the earlier efforts, the attempt to constit- 
ute an autonomous discipline; which project collapses 
under the combined weight of events, its own im lausibility C) P 
and its success in occasioning refinement in argument. 
The 'career' of 'development-studies' is not taken to be the 
whole of the. story of the renewal of marxian scholarshipq 
but it might quite reasonably be taken to be a major , 
-8- 
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part of the procesc of re-constituting that tradition 
of critical social enqiry exemplified in the wo-rk, of 
1,11arx. Generally, thelcareerl of 'development-studies' is 
seen as an emergent sequence, such that a narrowly tech- 
nical engagement gives way to a richer and increasingly 
subtle exercise in social-theorizing. 
Having reviewed the process of the construction of 
our 'object' of enquirywe can here indicate the method 
of analysis appropriate thereto. Indeed this method 
has been anticipated in the foregoing: both explicitly 
in the references to the process oflobjectlconstructiong 
where the mention of 'distillates' of various interests 
reveals a sociology of knowledge informed approach; and 
implicitly - as will become clear a little later - in that 
the constitution of thelobject', by the theorist is 
taken to be determined by the resources available to 
the theorist. We claim that presumptions about the 
nature of a proper analysis are integral to the constitu-i 
tion of the 'object' of enquiry. 
Having indicated that the 'objects' of social theor- 
etic enquiry are here taken to be socially produced, and 
having reviewed the process of the constitution of our 
own 'object' in a fashion which reveals it to comprise 
a series of efforts to make sense of the exchange of 
rich and poor nations it will come as no suprise that 
the notion of ideolop, figures centrally in our work. 
In line with the anticipatione noted above, it appears both 
as an analytic technique and as a notion encompassing 
our presupositions in respect of explanatory propriety. 
Firstly it presents itself in the guise of the analy- 
tic stance of the sociology of knowledge. Thus the 
particular elements of the history of 'development-studies' 
are treated by means of the preparation ofý sociology 
of knowledge informed critiques. As our 'object' of 
study was taken as a distillate of various elements# 
so too are the variots distinguishable efforts within 
'development-studies'. In particular we consider 'exemplars' 
taken as representatives of 'schools', and of their 
work ask after: its milieu; the political demands made 
- 
upon it-. and the body of theoretical resources used. 
Clearly thi .s treatment presents these exemplars as 
producing ideologies , as this would be ordinarily 
and pejoratively understood. However, the reconsideration 
of the legacy of Marx within the social sciences has 
also seen a reconsideration of the hotion of ideology, 
and here is our second area of use. 
That we might properly use a notion of ideology as 
the methodological key, to social theorising can be 
established in a preliminary fashion bS, recalling recent 
interect in language. Thus, after YlacIntyre, (8) we can 
argue that if it is true that thinking goes on by the 
use of our coi#only accepted language ('language is 
practical consciousness', as Marx put-- it), then the 
limits of my world equal the limits of the explanations 
available to me. The explanations available to me will 
be limited to those that I do accept, or could accept 
if they ivere spelt out to me. Now if this is my ideology 
then clearly it is not going to be an elaborated scheme 
taken on board as a result of consumer choice amongst 
proferred alternativesq but rather it is a taken, for.. 
granted body of knowledge which expresses some sort 
of structured/constituing relationship of self, social 
location, and explanations. 
At this point the issue broadens in a fashion that 
introduces presently debated topics in social theory. 
The scope of these matters, and the idea of the non- 
arbitrariness of ideology9 can be introduced by referring 
to the work of Giddens(9). 
In respect of the question of the nature of social 
theorizing and its proper method, Giddens approaches an 
answer via the 'debate with positivieml. Three streams 
are run together: (i) hermeneutics, the concern with 
understanding; (ii) phenomenology, the creation of 
everyday'life in the routine detail of social life, 
that is, in interaction; (iii) analytic philosophywith 
its affirmation of the centrality of language to any 
adequate explanation of the social . The thrust of the 
effort is towards the presentation of an elaborated . 
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notion of praxis, where Y larx is taken as an undeveloped 
counter-tr4dition to the orthodox 'Durksonian' scheme. 
This extenzion of the notion of praxis serves to eluci- 
date the 
-claim that men make their own histories and 
lives , but not as they choose. The extension proceeds 
via four steps: (a) it is granted that language equals 
reality; (b) it is noted that realitie-- do change; (c) 
this introduces the process of making structures and 
the idea of the dual nature of structure as product and 
ground of interaction; (d) finally, language as the 
ground and vehicle of action reflects asymmetries of 
power inherent in action. 
Now there seem to be two elements in all this One 
is that ideas about the nature of language provide the 
bac is of an analogy - thus as we have ýiýech/ language, 
so we have action and interaction that is, the produc- 
tion of social life and -an established structure that 
is over and above individuals and is the expression of 
and basis of action. The use of this analogy serves ., 
it seems, to provide Giddens with the means whereby a 
sociological general theory of the construction of the 
social world might be envisaged. In addition to this, 
flanguagel entails pLn ontology. Thus if 'language' 
constitutes the social world then any relationist epis- 
temology- that is. one involving centrally a subject- 
object dualisrk! -is deni. ed: subject and object inter- 
penetrateg and 'explanations' become the central concern 
of social scientific effort. 
Wie now have an lobjectlof enquiryand have presented 
a methodological notion that seems appropriate to it. A 
history of the 'career' of 'development-studies' might 
now be prepared However to proceed thus would be prýs_ 
ently inappropriate. We have constituted our 'object, 
by taking note of the debates, internal to 'development- 
ctudies', in respect of the status of their endeavour. 
This particular 'reading' of their work was occasioned 
by our interest in argument-construction; but these- 
interests are themselves to be lodged within the frame 
of the discipline of learning governing our study. The 
constitution of the 'object' of study is determineatin 
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part, by the resources available to the theorist, and 
these resources represent our reading of that recent, 
debate in social-theory noted with Giddens above. 
Given then that we shall treat the history of Idevelopment- 
studies' in the period indicated with a view to uncovering 
the characteristic argument forms of the distinguishable 
efforts9and moreover do so in the hope of'illuminating the 
nature 010 social theorizing itself., it seems appropriate 
tt Offdr bome' prelilailiary btatements in respect of our 
conception of social'theory... 
2.0 Reciejved wisdom: some suppositions of our study. 
These remarks are offered as an 'introduction to those 
theoretical issues with which we are concerned: it is 
this cluster of problems which constitutes the f9rmal 
counterpoint to the historical material presented in 
f -concern: the study. At the outset vie have three areas oA 
firstly, the question of the nature of the theorists 
involvement with his work; secondly, the broader-issue 
of the natuxe of the exchange between theorists and 
their social surrounding-, -; and finallythe more abstract 
matter of the nature of social theorizing, taken para- 
digmatically as 'ideology construction', and the probl- 
ems of this conception. 
Hawthorn,, in his history of sociological thought, 
remarks that all 18th and 19th century theorists had 
a moral model of'man as a reference point around which 
data, explan, ations, and arguments were organised. Confr- 
ontea. with a given theorist we should proceed, advises 
Hawthorn(, by asking "what exactly did he consider as 
a defensible social, political and moral order? .... for 
it is that which most directly informed analysis 11(10). 
This is interesting for two reasons. - 
In the first place it lets us link, in an intuitively 
persuasive way, theorist and theory; in that an element 
of the self-image-of, the theorist is included as- a 
basic organising element of the theorises product. If 
we regard this as-a piece of 'moral psychology' 
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then we can extend it by looking at the notion of 
integrity '. This we can take to comprise two elements, 
one being the demand for consistency in formulation of 
moral. statements, the other being the requirement of 
continuity of personal identity. The reqirement of consis- 
tency in statemen'ts is general to intellectual discourse, 
but the necessary link to personal self-ima6e would 
seem to be novel to moral discourse. The hoary old 
problem of value freedom is'solved' in that it is denied 
that this is, at base, a coherent notion: that a person 
is thoroughly involved in what is being said is not a 
defect to be regretted and removed, rather it is a 
necessary condition of that discourse being moral 
discourse. Interesting support for this view comes from 
Gellner, who makes social theorizing (though he does not 
use this term) the attempt to make sense of novel and 
disturbing social situations. Thus sociology is seen as 
a 19ýh century invention in the face of the rise of the 
'modern world'. The 'transition' (a continuing and 
pervasive phenomenon for Gellner) is marked by a loss 
of identity; this is, he says, "the very paradigm of a 
moral problem"(11). 
The second point raised by Hawthorn- is the closely 
related question of the manner in which we take such a 
model of man to be inserted into theorizing. How Hawthorri CA 
builds, at the end of his study, what he 
* 
calls a 'typology 
of intentions' derived from those theorists he has 
looked at . The first such 'intention', both logically 
and historically, has been to account for man! s place 
in the 'scheme of things' in such a way as to distinguish 
man from some external realm; or as he puts it, "man 
is in some sense separate from nature"(12). This first 
'intention' is the base of all subsequent' theorizing; 
consequently he argues that "only when one has convin- 
ced oneself of the pro perties anr_1 pos-sibilities of 
human nature can one convince nneself of the 
properties and possibilities of mads relation to society" 
(13). To this we can say that vie want to agree that a 
model of man is central to theorizing, -But vie would 
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deny that this model emerges ex nihilo into the mind of 
of the theorist, or that it can be used as Hawthorn 
rather seems to suggest: that is, first decide what social 
atoms are and then how they fit together,. Hawthorn's 
voluntaristic phrasing invites a slide into regarding 
moral vision as the organising principle of the theoris"A 
effort. But the point we wýsh to urge is that moral vision 
is only one element of the organisation of the theorict'-- 
effort; the other part it., his membership of a community 
of scholars. and here criteria of evidence, insight and 
moral propriety are given . The theorisýs activity is 
expressive within a given (albeit not fixed) frameý 
Reference to the 'disciplinary framel invites the 
extension of these remarks into the vexed area of the 
rel ationship of theorists to their historical society, 
and the 
, 
constitution of the problems they approach. As 
the individual theorist ic to be lodged in his discipline, 
so that community is to be seen as lodged in history. The 
matter of theextuent to which models of man might be 
determined by specific historico-social locations is 
taken up in Chapter Twro. when we discuss the idea pf 
'development'. 
In regard to the question of the nature of the engag- 
ment of the theorist with the wider social world, the 
tripartite scheme of 'interests, presented here by Pay 
must now, one supposes, be widely known. Pay is concerned 
with the relationship bf condeptions of social theorizing 
and political practice: thus he reports that "I am claiming 
that implicit in the theories of knowledge which I examine 
0 ...... is a certain conception of the relation between 
knowledge and actiong and that such a conception, when 
elaborated in the context of social life, is a political 
theory"(14). The three 1varieties9 of reason, with their 
attendant politics, can be presented, in brief, as follows; 
(1) the instrumental knowledge ofnatural science, with its 
positivistic extension into the realm of the social in the 
the guise of 'policy science': (2) the interpretive apprec- 
iatign of the webs of meaning-constitutive social rulesq 
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and its political practice which revolves around notions 
of broken'communication; (3) the critical, lodged firmly 
within the humanist and marxist traditionsq and charac- 
terised by its engagement. Pay takess this line of thought 
to be the only candidate for a plausible social science. 
This tripartite division is reworked in a sociological 
context by Bauman.. (15), who propose. - to distinguish on the 
one hand (1) Durksonian sociology, and (2) the existential 
critiques of that orthodoxy. Yet these two are adjudged, 
to remain the samein this sense; they are both committed 
to a notion of 'truth' as describing things 'as they 
really are' and providing thereby a firm basis for action. 
The 'true description of the facts' is the arbiter of 
debate. In this tradition of social philosophizing such 
a stance is taken as submission to positivism. Horkheimer 
and Adorno(16) have traced the historical/intellectual 
route whereby the open-ended and emancipatory reason of 
the Enligbtenment collapses into a restricted descriptivism. 
The historical base for this is indicated, by Goldmann (17) 
in his essay on the Enlightenment, who argues that a 
triumphant bourgeoisie -d . id not-. need or want critical 
negative philosophy;. what they did need was a positive 
philosophy which affirmed, by its moral dis-engagement and 
technical manipulative mode of reasoning, the emergent 
status quo. To these two Bauman contrasts (3) emancipatory 
reason; it is characterized as not seeking to describe the 
world taken for granted, but rather trying to fracture 
that commonsense. It aims, we are told, to promote 'histor- 
ical' at the expense of 'natural' reasoning, and Marx is 
taken to provide the most advanced example of such 'histo-. ' 
rical I reasoning. 
The nature of the lengagementlof the theorist will 
concern us throughout our substantive analyses,. as we 
observe the various stategies of self-deception on offerg 
and it is a matter we%, shall return to in our concluding 
remarks 
The difference between those theorists'efforts which 
aim, on the one hand, to 'describe the worldl and those 
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-,! ihich, on the other hand , endeavour primarily 
to 
, 
'express a resbonse to the world I has. occasioned 
extensive debate in respect of 'the matter of vcýlidation/ 
authentication. We can take note of this for two reaCons: 
(1) it points up the difference between orthodox and 
critical theory introduced above, and (2) it lets us 
sharpen an hitherto implicit commitment to the notion of 
a critical stance, by introducing a distinction between 
'deployment' and 'grounding'. 
Both Fay and Bauman note that the confirmation of 
the efforts of the critical theorist is, in part, accom- 
plished by the theorist Is product becoming a significant 
cultural object, In the case of the work of the natural 
scientist1the community of experts does the testing in 
accordance with the criteria of validity current in the 
community, and if approved the product is released for 
use by the population at large. But in the, case of*the 
efforts of the critical theorist. testing within the 
community of experts is preliminary to the test of 
historical relevance. Thus Bauman notes, "Authentication- 
becoming true in the process - can occur only in the 
realm of praxis, of which the institutionalized, partial 
disbourse of profession9l scientists constitutes only 
the initial stagell (18). This revision of the orthodox 
scheme of science is indeed radical, ýYut it seems to me 
that it grants too much to the orthodox in that 'grounding' 
a theoretical effort is still taken to be the bucinecs of. 
the expe--t and, more importantly, the initial stage. As 
will become clear in our substantive analyses, vie take a 
more jaundiced view of the matter of building theoretic 
efforts; social theories we take to be constructed, at 
particular times, in particular places, and with specific 
intent. The matter of their 'grounding' is technical and 
secondary. The orthodox interest in epistemology- incl- 
uding the'revisions/extensions proposed by Bauman and 
Fay- is implicitly demotedvand the practical question of 
ranking competing ideologies comes to the fore. This is 
a matter of the plausibility of various efforts at explan- 
ation , and seems to be a wider issue-than, orth6dox 
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schemes usually treat. 
If we return to the familiar area of the matter of 
'grounding' we can approach our conception of the business 
of social theory. ',. 'e do so in the context of academic 
discourse, and we preoent the claim that the construction 
of ideologies, ordinarily understood, is the paradigm 
of what it is to be engaged with society in a social- 
theoretic manner. To put this another way, if we are asked 
what is it to do social theoryq we reply : it is-to-be 
involved in constructing ideologies. 
Hollis and Fell concern themselvess with this problem 
of 'grounding' in their book 'Rational Economic L! an 
They distinguish three sorts of models -predictive, 
programming, and production , -and 
they describe their respe- 
ctive functions. Thus "a production model gives conditions 
for the system to continue, a programming model shows 
how to improve performence, and a prediction model 
forecasts whether the conditions will in fact be met 
or the improvement forthcoming"(19). The models present 
a story-in logical time -a blueprint to which reality 
can be adapted, or by means of which. it can be altered. 
Hollis and Nell go on to point to two areas of debate 
in regard to the career of such a story in logical time; 
thus it will be taken up and used (1) if it is a sound 
theory (and this is made to be a technic,,: jl matter for the 
s6holarly group in question), and(2) if it is recognisably 
a solution to perceived problems. 
The issue of 'grounding' is presented in epistemic. 
guise. Hollis and Nell dffirm a. 'conceptual rationalism' 
and introduce it as follows: "positivism civilized 
logic making it a human invention, but only to insist 
. 
on the utter bruteness of the independent facts. Pragmaticm 
civilized the facts too. A-true belief is triie onlyý 
insofar*an it coheres with-all others vie choose to 
believe at the time"(20). Yet as-pragmatiSn is right to 
say that facts are theory ladengso Hollie and Nell argue 
that we must regard theories as independent. 
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Theoriýs are independent in that they are derived 
from necess nry truths which "introduce central boncepts 
which define the'subject and scope of theories"(21). 
They go on to claim that "a sound theory iC a -system of 
necessary truths whose application is a contingent matter". 
(22). These conceptual necessary truths are 'real defin- 
itions 1; that is, they tell us what a thing essentially 
is if it is to count as that sort of thing. It is to be 
distinguished(i. -! e are reminded)from the usual trio of 
lexical) stipulative,, and-persuasive-definitions. Inter- 
estingly, as an ex, 7. mple of the presentation of a $real 
definition' Hollis cites Lukeslbook, "Power: 'A Radical 
View". 
Setting aside, for the moment, the questions that 
occur in respect of this scheme, (23) vie can go on to 
note that the practical test of such a rationalist theory 
is going to be dependent upon the richness and problem- 
appropriateness of its assumptions. It is pointed out that 
in contrast to positivism(which sayc: never mind the 
assumptions, what about the sucessful predictions), ration- 
alism urges that sound theory depends upon its assumptions. 
In regard to economics Hollis and Nell proceed to 
dismantle the orthodoxy: its empiricist positivist 
prop is useless, and its assumptions fantastic. A set 6f 
assumptions underpinning classical marxian economics 
is advanced instead. 
, ion of If we turn to 11arxwe can extend this discuSC 
rationalism by invoking the work of Rockmorejwho is 
. concerned 
to treat #, he relationship of philosophy and 
science in 1-, '-, arx. In the course of this analyeis lie finds 
that he is able to offer some conclusions on the struc- 
ture of Tilarx's work: thus he takes the effort to be 
constituted by a set of philosophical ideac. R6ckmore 
argues that "three of the 11arxian philosophys distinc- 
tive chatacteristics are monism, a categorical sche=eý 
and philbcophic anthropologyg all of whidh are general 
features of l9th century philosophy"(24). It is the second 
aspect which interests us here. V-srhat is. the character 
of the 'categorical' approach detected in Taarx'? Firstly 
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it ie a matter of pi-ocedure; in the Grundricse, claimls 
Rockmoreg"Marx suggests that there are only two approaches 
to experience: either one can begin with concrete or. 
real existence, th6n progress to abstract relations in 
order finally to reconstitute the real in terms of abstract 
concepts; or conversely, one can begin from abstract 
categories, such as population, in order to reconstitute 
the real directly"(25). . It is the latte: i! procedure 
that is affirmed by Marx as correct. Secondly, as regards 
the nature of these categoriesq they are out of the 
Hegelian school with the important difference that 
they are not permitted to become fixed; "On Marxs view 
categories-correspond to actual social relations . 6. and 
need to be revised as society changesl, (26)Thirdly, 'in 
respect of the deployment of these idess, the categorical 
element continues to be. central and presents itself 
as the land/labour/capital set: of this -Rockmore notesq 
"first it presents a series of categories adequate for. 
the interpretation of any and all aspects of capitalistic 
economy. Second the inner arangement is hierarchical"(27). 
This - hierarchy revolves around the notion of, alien- 
ated labour, derived in turn from philosophical anthrop- 
ology - ?,, Iarxs model of man 
If we now ask just how do we produce a social 
theoretic analysis of some set of circumstancesythen we 
may answer provisionally that it involves the 'deployment 
of a morally informed categorical frame' whose product 
might properlyq and non-pejorativelyt be regarded as an 
ideological scher-a serving to legitimate and order 
action in the world. Now this pitches the matter at a 
general level, one of lbroad'treatments. However we do 
not want to restrict the 'ideological' to this realm. Foý 
Ilowing Giddens(28)9 'ideology' is not taken as a dis- 
crete realm of discourseq rather we say discourse can be 
more or less ideologically elaborated? Social theoretic 
engagement, as we have detailed it here with references 
to 14arx and classical political economy, we take to. be 
the paradigm of ideologically elaborated discourse, 
This view, as will becone clear, informs our substa- 
I 
6 
-ntive analyses of the 'schools' of 'development-studies. t. 
Producing sociology of knowledge informed studýes, 
ordered around the distinction between conception and 
intent, is a critical strategy that derives quite 
obviously from our notion of ideology construction. It 
should also be clear that this is a fairly low level 
use. of the idea of critique. At this point we can intr- 
oduce an extension to our core conception of social 
theoretic engagement: Habermas and the extended notion 
of critique used in that tradition of thought. Here 
the ideas of democracy, critique and ideology-ranking 
come togetherin that the latter pair suppose an ideal 
speech situation which in turn supposes a democratic 
society. 
We can now draw out a wider view of social theori- 
zing; we take social theorizing to be involved with 
the donstruction, criticism, and comparative ranking 
of ideological schemas, 
3.0 A programme for the rest of the study. 
our 'object' of enquiry is the 'career' of 'development- 
studies' in the period 1945-1975, and we treat this 
history in the hope of displaying something of the nature 
of social theorizing. Our approach to this history 
involves the construction of an emergent series/critique 
of the body of work in question. and it revolves around 
the issue of the status of 'development-studies' as a 
discipline of learning. Three general views are ident- 
ified. The earliest regarded development as a technical 
matter of the appropriate application of the established 
procedures of economics9where economics was taken as a 
'positive science'. We have labelled these theorists 
'the positivists' , and their work is considered 
in 
Section Two of the study. The efforts characteristic 
of the Omiddle period' adopted varieties of 
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Isociologised' economics and lodEed claims for the indep- 
endence and novelty of 'development-studies' These 
theorists we have called 'the radidalsland they are 
treated in Section Three of the study. To complete the 
oubstantive work, ýve look at the efforts of the most 
recent 'school', who deny t1' e independence and n, ovelty 
of 'development-c. tudies' and subsume its concerns in a 
wider hiW-torico-economic sche,,., -,,, which revolves around 
the idea of a world capitpli-st system. These we label. 
'the marxists' and their aork is treated in Section 
Pour of the study. 
Throughout the presentation of this historical 
material, which treats the constitution of various 
ideological efforts (29) in a sociology of knowledge 
informed fashion, a series of theoretical issues will be 
taken note of; these revolve around those three themes 
we have introduced. In Section Pive of the study we 
present some concluding remarks on the matter of social 
theorizing itself, and on the more immediate question of 
the nature of the engagement of the 'western' scholar 
xvith matters of the Third World. 
Before we begin this programme there remains one task 
that can usefully be accomplished at this stage. Routin- 
ely, in texts of a general nature treating matters of the 
Third World. there is some self-disclosure on the part 
of the writer of ideological or value positions taken. 
I-Tow in this cace. as we have argued that social theorizing 
is necessarily and crucially engagedtsomething more than 
pro-forma declarations seeme to--be called-for. We will 
therefore present, in Chapter Two, a statement in respect 
of the idea of devclppment that is supposed in this study, 
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Chapter Two: the idea of development. 
Introduction. 
The idea of 'development' tends to be presented in the 
literature of 'development-studies' as a technical notion% 
soldevelopment' is taken as entailing (or, an evidenced 
by) the accretion of some set of characteristics. In 
what is arguably the crudest version of the;. atance, these 
characteristicre are virtually taken as a set of artefacts. 
Thus Imodernizaticn theory', in its undisguised form- 
ulations, sees ýhe process of development as the business 
of the acquisition by the UDCs, of the traits and chara- 
cteristics of the DCs Of course it is true. that the 
orthodox lines in 'development-studies' do not all 
display this transposition of the politico-ethical into 
the technical in quite such a transparent fashion; indeed 
the switch can be made quite subtly. -In the care of 
Myrdalls 'fabianisml,, for example, the issues arising 
from the fact that to affirm a notion of 'development' 
in. to affirm a politico-ethical stance are not dismissed. 
Rathek, they are set aside; a notion of 'crisis political 
is invokedand it is asserted that in these circumstances 
the course we must take-is obvious. One may hazard that 
the Myrdalian claim to the obviousness of the propriety 
of the engagement of 'development-studiee'represents the 
response-of the mainstream of the discipline. 
It will be the business of this chapter, at its most 
general levelq to recall attention to the engagement 
entailed by deploying the notion of Idevelopmentl; we hope 
to make it clear that 'development' is a politico-ethical 
notion and not a technical one. To put this another way: 
'development' is not the simple accretion of some set, 
of artefacto, cultural/industrial/socialg it is rather 
the instantiation of a politico-ethical orientation. 
It may present itself tin reality' as the accumulation 
of artefacts, but it would be naive to reduce it to that 
accumulation. 
There are more particular interests to be pursued. 
Most trivially. we offer an essay in ideological self- 
disclosure. The more interesting questions revolve around 
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two matters. First, as regards social theorizing jDer. ý-! _eq 
we have d-Iclared that the paradigm case of sodial theoretic 
argument is the 
, 
construction of an ideological schema 
where this construction involves the 'deployment of a 
morally informed categorical framel. We take this politico- 
ethical (moral) aspect of theorizing to be given, at 
least in its general outline. So what is this moral core? 
We will here present an abstract treatment focusing 
upon the origins and scope of the idea of progress. 
The notion of '. development' can be tegarded as either the 
discipline ('development-studiesl)-specific instantiation 
of the idea of progress, or( rather more loosely) as a 
simple synonym. As a detailed investigation of useage 
would be required to establish the former reading, we have 
tended to regard 'development' as a synonym for 'progress'. 
Additionally, if we recall Hollis and NelYs discussion 
of 'real definitionsl(and their citing of Lukes'treat- 
ment of power as an example of such a definition), then it 
would seem that our notes might be taken to form the 
basis of a 'real definition' of 'development'. But this 
we do not pursue. 
We do however pursue a matter which flows from the 
above-noted views and is our second concern. If it is 
true that the. politico-ethical aspect of theorizing is 
in some way given, then how should we approach treatments 
of the matters of the Third World: in particular, are we 
not inevitably committing ourselves to'a fixed stance 
and opening ourselves thereby to charges of one-sided 
insensitivity to the views of the people of the Third 
World themselves. We follow up these issues by anticip- 
ating (1) our substantive analyses. Thus we take these 
substantive efforts as exercises in socia 1 'theorizing 
and consequently as morally informed. We can treat these 
stances as variations upon our already identified core 
set of1deas and offer a series of instantiations of the 
notion of progress. The idsue , of the one-sidedness or 
otherwise of our politico-ethical stance toward matters. of 
the Third World is investigated through the various 
instances of the idea of progress. 
- 23 - 
c 
I. 0 The origins of the idea of progress. 
We, begin výith the origins of the idea of prog3ýess in 
inteMectual history and we note two approaches. The 
general ideas will be presented by using Fassmore's philo- 
sophical history-Passmore relates the career of the notions 
involved as a history of ideas; tracing the shifts in 
argument and the various problems thrown up, faced, 
evaded or simply not seen. The context of these ideas we 
will note using.,... -Pollard's sociology of knowledge 
informed history (2), (3). 
The idea of progress is modern., which is to say, it 
belongs to the post-Renaissance period of European hist- 
ory. But if it is a modern notion then it can also be 
seen as one recent manoeuvre in an even longer, argument 
that which Passmore identifies as treating the idea of 
the perfectil3ility of man. It is reported that the 
notions of perfection are based in Greek philosophy 
and are taken up by Christian theologians. We can set aside 
all this period and note simply that the Christian inter- 
vention entailed the-denial of the possibility of 
perfection here on earth in favour of preparation for 
perfection in some after life. In the 5th century the 
heresy of Pelagius argues against this, denying original 
sin and affirming a duty to strive for perfection in 
earthly life. These now'set the terms of the Christian 
debate, but in the 14th century the Renaissance humanists 
present a notion drawn from a re-interpreted Aristotle, 
that of. civic perfection. This is the first-step in a. 
radical change which establishes a third route to perfec- 
tion social action. 
The impact of Renaissance humanism- its ethic, its 
science and-its success-results in a shift of gravity of 
discussions of perfection which Passmore sums up under 
three points. (a) P, erfection come's to be defined in natural 
not neiiphysical terms; (b) it is now seen that it has 
to be gained witb',, th'e' help of one's fellows rather. than 
God's grace or individual effortj (c) there is a shift in 
focus from an unrealisable purity of motive toward doing 
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the maximum of good. Thi2 shift also involves the view 
that the-pontemplative life is that of the sclqolar/ 
scientist and not that of the mystic, and it is the rise 
of science that is taken by progressives of the time as 
the key to subsequent change, 
The idea of progress emetges in the 18th century 
and its emergence can be read in two ways. In the first 
place, as an idea, it may be interpreted as an answer 
to the problem presented by Locke. Thus in the course 
of the theoretical shift just noted the ideas of per- 
fectibility and perfection are divorced. Passmore adds that 
the general doctrine is reformulated such that all men 
are capable of being perfected and to a limitless degree. 
If it is asked how, then the candidate is plain, that is 
education and Locke shows that it can do the job; this 
lays the ground for discussions of education and social 
action in the 18th and l9th centuries. However the 
classic texts of education fail to confront a problem 
that Marx will point up, that the educator needs educating. 
Locke may have established that man can be perfected, 
but the gap between perfectibility and actually being 
perfected has to be bridged. If secular perfectibilism 
lacked the metaphysical guarantor of a God, then the 
position was retrieved by two steps; in the first the 
educator is made subsidiary to a method; in the cecond 
he is abolished altogether, 
The first step was to conceive human history in 
such-a way that it guaranteed that man will continue 
to improve his condition; -, if this is done then the 
occasional errors of educators, law-givers or whatever 
can be set aside as unimportant. We arive at the idea 
of progress. Passmore goes orl to, -relate that this 
idea was argued for in part inductively; for example 
it was pointed out ýhat the optics of Newton were 
superior to those'of Descartes . but the major discovery 
of the early modern philosophers was method. 
The second view of the emergence of the idea of 
progress involves taking note that the focus on method 
reflects the social expectations of the theorist in 
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alliance with commerce. Thus Pollard points out that 
these ideas were not taken up in-. a va-cuum. The. advance 
of science is not a result of its sudden evident super- 
iority coupled with a new tolerance on the part of the 
Church. Rather the advance depended upon the support of 
powerful groups. Pollard's summary is familiar; "it was 
the New Men, of Europe, the merchants and traders and- 
manufacturers ....... whose experience tallied with the 
new philosophy, and whose needs called forth the new 
science" (4). Passmore notes that the Enlightenment 
thinkers were confident that-a science of man had been 
established and would-be used. Why, thio confidence? The 
self-perception of the Enlightenment thinkers involved 
their emergence as a new and distinct social group: 
they were a self conscious community. seeing themselves 
as the natural governors of saciety through an equally 
natural alliance with theýcommercial classes. As Passmore 
puts it 9110vert power to the middle class, actual power 
to the intellectuals"(5). Progress is., evident in historyg 
appropriate to the present and underpinned-by reason. 
This optimism reaches a peak, in the work of the 
philosophe , and the7eafter declines and becomes diffuse. 
The idea of progress is generally-accepted through the 
l9th century but is presented by various groups in 
various countries. The intellectual and. '.. social career-of 
the notion, so to say, is very complex. Greatly simýlif- 
ying matters we can again offer a twofold reading. Thus 
firstly9treating the history of ideas side we egn note 
that as an idea the notion of secular progress lacks 
a guarantor and that the response to this, after the 
unsatisfactory nature of the focus on method is, seeng 
is to. abolish the educator altogether and to invoke 
guarantors in the shape of history and biology. Thus 
we. have theories of progress as natural development. 
With Darwin we can associate a range of evolutionisms9 
but the initial precision of formulation tends, in the 
social, theoretic versionsg to the descriptive general. 
Historical guarantors are first presented by Leibniz. 
Themes of unfolding by meaýs of dialectic present social 
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mechanisms and-are better explanations. A central 
19th century figure here is Marx. If we turn-to the 
second reading, the social responses, then the alliance 
of commerce with science is seen as restrictedly prog- 
ressive given the incompatibility of an open-ended 
progressive-method oriented to the closure implied in 
the establishment of the bourgeois state. The response 
is the search for a new motor of progressýand in Marx 
the endemic conflict of bourgeois and working class is 
grasped in his class dialectic. On the, part of the . 
bourgeoisie the progressiveness of science in respect 
of the social is curbedland classic political economy 
becomes social science. 
We have now traced the origin and career of the 
idea of progress from its inception-in Greek philosophy 
to the forms taken by the 19th century theorists of 
industrialization. ThE range of debate relevant to 
matters social we take to be fixed at this time; on 
the, one hand the marxian classical conceptions of prog- 
ress, and on the other those of orthodox social science. 
The range of subsequent variation, (with national socio- 
logies, particular streams of thought etc. )we do not 
wish to consider. Instead, in regard to the career of the 
idea of progress we shift directly to our own area ofý 
interest; that is, the post-war career of 'development- 
studies'. Before doing that however we-consider the scope 
of the idea of progress. 
2.0 Thescope of the idea of progress. 
have-noted the route whereby the idea of the indiv- 'IV e 
idual pursuit of perfection. was transformed into naturally 
guaranteed social progress. We have also seen that as 
this key idea of the tradition of political thought - 
we inhabit was in point of formation it simultaneously 
assumed two forms: the one pursuing the core, now 
taken as a radical lineg and the other, endeavou#ng to 
fix change either in place by invoking schemes of 
overweening generality or in a mundane realm (of Haw- 
thorno- whexein the USA-in particular progress is equated 
with incre., ýsing. consumption) We can now turn to 
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consider the ethico-political substance of these two 
lines. This will let us treat the issue of the. scope of 
the idea of progress. 
That there are two such distinguishable lines in 
political theory is a familiar claim and there are 
diverse characterizations of their respective subst- 
ance. Berlin, for example, distinguishes 'positiveland 
'negative' 'ideas of liberty, where the former is per- 
nicious and characterized thuse. 11 1 wish above'all, to 
be conscious of myself as a thinking, willing, active 
being, bearing responsibility for my choices and able 
to explain them by reference to my own ideas a: nd pur- 
poses. I feel free to the degree that I believe this to 
be true and enslaved to the degree that I am made to 
realize that it is not"(6). This passage is quoted with 
approval by Macpherson(7) whose work we will here rely 
on. 
The drift of Macpherson's work is that we can 
separate out two traditions oT politico-moral thought 
and argue that the more familiar scheme is unsatis- 
factory and should be revised to meet the criticisms 
of the overshadowed counter-tradition. We can approach 
the argument -which presents itself in many aspects-- 
via the distinction that can be drawn between 'powers' 
and 'power'. 
The use of the notion of power in treatments of 
political conflict is familiar, and Lukes (8) to Whom 
we have refert6d analyses'powet'in this fashion. lukes 
makes the core of the idea of power , 'power over' and 
contrasts this with orthodox schemes which focus on volun- 
taristic decision making? But Macpherson objects to the 
use of what he sees as the restricted starting point of 
political conflict. This- focuse6 upbn the issues of the 
source of powerbut Macpherson wants to claim that concern 
for the purpose of power is a richer orientation and 
one that reintroduces classical notions of developmental 
power: 'power to beIq an eýhical notionland the base of 
the idea oflpowersl-in contrast to 'power', a descriptive 
notion. With this schema Macpherson turns., to consider what 
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he takes to be the justificatory theorem of western 
capitali-sm, that is liberal democracy. 
The justificatory claims of liberal democracy, to 
maximize men's power(s), involves, it is claimed, a 
vacillation between the two notions of power. 1t is 
argued that the democratic notions (that is powers) 
are extra-liberal and attempt to link with pre-17th 
century notions of man which made his activities 
intrinsically valuable: the Aristotelian-derived scheme 
of civic virtue and flowering of natural capacities. 
This is the ethical concept of powers, and includes 
access to whatever external means are needed'for their 
exercise. Limitation of access constitutes therefore 
a diminution. of ethical powers. The descriptive, liberal, 
c oncept of power includes a marls natural powers plus 
whatever gains he has made by controlling the powers of 
others. A mads power is just that which he presently 
has. The conflation of the two concepts of power, the 
one treating man as concerned to develop intrinsic 
skills and valuable thereby, and the other treating 
man as consumer, is attempted in response to intellec- 
tual and social events by JS Mill. Mill attempts to 
introduce the ethical concept, but into. a liberal 
capitalist theory. The descriptive concept of Power is 
used in analysis(of the liberal market economy), and 
the ethical in justifications (of the claimed result 
of maximization of individual and social good). But the 
two notions of power are incompatible, and-the power 
liberal democracy claims to maximize is not that which 
it in fact maximizes. 
In regard to the scope of the notion of progress we 
can , in the light of Ma-cpherson's anal'ysesq identify the 
two limiting, cases that we inherit from the 19th 
century. On the one hand the efforts of a victorious 
bourgeoisie to fix their position produces the doctrine 
of liberal-democracy, taken by Macpherson to bý a fu-ndam- 
entally incoherent conflation of two-mo2els of man% 
the liberal regarding him as an infinitely desirous 
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consumer, and the democratic seeing him as possessed of 
natural, talents and attributes-the development of 
which is his proper nature. On the other hand (and 
in ternis of Pa'ssmores history of ideas representing the 
more plausible central line of reasoning), we, have 
what is now seen as the radical, line, that is the 
democtatic with its model of man as a rational doer 
rather than consumer. 
3.0 Theidea of development in treatments of matters 
of the Third World. 
When the question of sensitivity. to value assumptions 
in the context, of stances adopted toward Third World 
matters usually arises, it does so in terms of claims to 
the crudity of some stance or other. That is to say, 
discussion seems to proceed by-regular steps; first 
the identification of some set of assumptions,, followed 
by the lodging of claims in respect of their impropriety, 
and finally the indication of some set of counter - 
clairas., The central question at issue never seems to be 
confronted directly; that is, the question 'Just what is 
a proper politico-ethical stance' does not appear. 
In the-light of our discussions of the origin and, 
scope of the idea of progress this is perhaps unsurpr" 
ising; and for two reasons. Firstly, the notion appears 
on all occasions(inevitably), in the context of some 
specific practical context, as an element of some 
ideological intervention in the world. This we can 
suppose. suggests to disputants that present consider- 
ation of the idea should treat present instances of 
the idea; that is, focus on the, lines taken within 
current debate in respect of, practical theoretic engag- 
ements. Secondly, it is clear that to approach the 
matter abstractly would involve much very complex argu- 
ment; and, moreover, argument whose major reference 
points within established work would be given by the 
concerns of moral philosophers rather than those. 
of the social theorists. Thus much unnecessary work 
could ensue. 
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We shall follow the routine strategy and approach 
an answer to the core question of the nature of a 
proper stance by offering reasons for the exclusion 
of certain presently affirmed lines. We will, however, 
in the light of our insistence that 'development' be- 
taken as an ethico-pplitical and not a tedhnical term, 
formalize the procedure to some extent so as to take 
some account of the more abstract aspects involved. 
Thus we pffer a definition of what it is to-adopt 
a 'crude' stance, and ask, of identifiable positions 
within present debate, how they stand in respect to this 
definition ; do they come close or do they distance 
themselves? These various positions will be presented 
as a series of instances of the idea of progress. In 
r espect of each of these versions of the idea of pro- 
gress we will ask: does it lie in the mainstream or 
on the-periphery? To put this another way, in respect 
of each instantiation of the idea of progress we ask 
two questions. How does it stand with respect to our 
definition of the 'crude? And how close is it to the 
core of the idea of progress? 
We want a definition of a 'crude' effort, so as to 
be able to order discussion, and we can construct such 
a definition by negating what we take to be a subtle 
effort . Our definition of the crude' anticipates in 
a negative abstract fashion the-theoretical conclusions 
of our study. However this characterization is called 
forth not by any substantive anticipation else a 
circularity of argument might be suspected but by 
running through what we have established as our proper 
method of analysing social theoretic efforts (the 
sociology of knowledge informed scheme of, conception 
and intent) and treating it abstractly. A 'crude I 
effort would in this light be most easily characterized 
as one that was un-reflective in both conception and 
intent, and which. failed to treat the implications of 
the idea of 'the social, construction of social theory#, 
The sociology of knowledge informed terms present 
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themselves in our required-definition ad the notions 
of eurogomorphism and europocentrism. The first we 
can understand. as the affirmation of the priority of 
what are held to be typically European categories of 
thought(9),, and the second we can take to be the affirm- 
ation of the priority of the material and practical 
interests of the 'west'. With this we can now move 
on to treat the broad ýistinguishable instances of the 
idea of progress in the post war 'career' of 'development 
studies'. These instances are given to us'by the progra- 
mme identified in chapter one: 'positivist', IradicalIg 
and Imarxist'. 
The first instantiation of the notion of progress 
we take to be presented by that 'school, we have labelled 
'positivist'. We hold this to belong to what Ehrensaft(IO) 
has-Aubbed the 'pre-Seers consensus' and it may be 
seen to comprise two versions- an earlier UK/UN flavour- 
ed effort, and a later distinctly US schema -of a basic 
idea of authoritative intervention. If we unpack this 
notion of authoritative intervention. which we see as 
analogous to Fays "policy science', we come up with a 
scheme of analysis/engagement which takes the exchange 
of the theorist/world to be in essence the knowing 
manipulation of the latter by the former. Typically, an 
empiricist epi s temology, which holds Itheoryl to be a 
complex summary statement of the correspondences of 
events and reports is used. The methodology of the scheme 
is ihat of modeling. Although the theorists usually 
lodge disclaimers in respect of the status they would 
wish to accord these models, they are( given their 
formaliým, epiricism and technical manipulative intent) 
inevitably more or less scientistic. Theorists adopt the 
role of experts, and the procedure for any practical 
analysio-involves. the disaggregation of abstract models 
to fit given circumstances. 
In regard to the ideological function of this scheme5 
we can identify the legitimation of a relationship of 
super and sub-ordination wherebyýthe 'development' bf 
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the present UDCs is ordered by the experts of the 
DCs and. their agents. 'Development' or progzess is 
understood as 
*a 
technical matterand taken as elicited 
by this authoritative intervention and as presenting 
itself in indices of economic growth. Progress is equated 
with growth. 
In early versions, given the efforýs Keynesian intell- 
ectual roots, this conception occasioned much concern 
for statistical indices (GNP, ICOR etc. ); but in later 
revised versions the economic core was fleshed out by 
social, 'non-economic', factors and the economic statistics 
were joined by indices of non-economic factors, such as 
literacy rates, urbanisation etc. In the elaborated 
US versionsIthe essentially technical character of the 
effort became submerged in a broth of pseudo-social 
science, most famously in VM.. Rostows scheme of the 
'stages of economic growth'. 
That the notion of progress used by the early 
'Positivist' school is, in the light of our treatment 
of the origin and scope of the idea , firmly lodged 
within the(now doninant)peripheral line should be 
clear. The idea of progress is presented in narrowly 
materialistic guise and is to be secured by orthodox 
social science. 
Where then does this instantiation of the idea of 
progress stand vis a vis our definition of what it is 
to adopt a 'crude' approach? Evidently it is close 
enough to be worth noting; the theorists of the orth- 
odoxy would reply to a question in respect of the prop- 
riety of their efforts with a dual affirmation. The , 
present extent of the line Is reflexivity we will treat 
in chapters three and four. Nere we can offer a sketch 
of an answer in the form of notes on its history. (It 
is the English theorists that we have in mind here). 
(1) As regards the issup of'reflexivity we can iden- 
tify a long history of presumption in this regard which 
cuts across a spectrum of issues: from questions of 
participation in government to questions of rationality 
- 33 - 
r 
itself; from regarding colonies as reservoirs of res- 
ources ior the home economy to treating them'as res- 
ponsibilities -to be discharged. Probably the most 
uncompromising general statement appears in the late 
19th century jingoistic themes of the complete super- 
iority of western man in contrast to the childish nat- 
ives. These images are called fo rth not as a result of 
the exchange between people of the Third World and 
westerners, but by the politics of colonialism. Sachs 
points out that the image of the 'native' shifts from the 
time of the philosophes, who used it as d modeýl of man 
untainted by civilization, Is vices, towards the routine 
deprecatory view of the late 19th century. Sachs notes: 
"after the French Revolution of 1789 the noble savage 
ceased to be indispensable to the development of Euro- 
pean ideas, and furthermore the race for the colonies 
resulted in a hardening of attitudes of the part of 
Europeans"(11). As an ideology it assumes that theý* 
colonial powers have a 'civilizing mission' - and if 
we wanted an elaborated, paradigmatic, model of a 
'crude' approach this is presumably the place to start 
gathering material-% 
(2)Subsequently this stance relaxes, and Hetherin 
gton reports that the period 1920-1940 sees a clear 
shift in position from the above exploitation to 
a notion of responsibility, where this entailed ideas of 
eventual independence. Curiouslyq it was German demands 
for return of their colonies which prodded the British 
into action(12). Hetherington notes: "In the 1920's the 
colonies were still*largeýy*ýhought of as an extension 
of Great Britain and collectivist demands were made on 
behalf of British interests. By the 1930's the eventual 
separation of the African colonie-s from Great Britain 
could be envisaged, and there was a fairly general 
acceptance of a new kind of collectivism which involved 
BritiSh Government intervention in the interests of 
Africa"(13). 
(3)There is a further'softening of the position 
in the case o: r-the orthodoxy of the immediate post- 
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war period; and whilst it would be clearly unreasonable 
to link-ýn any very direct fashion those we bave called 
the 1poBitivis 
, 
ts' with-the Jingoistm associated with(l) 
above, there is nonetheless a clear family resOmblance. 
The modern version of this stance, whose character we 
noted above, would deny its effort was un-reflexive 
if by this it is granted that an error of some sort is 
being made. Thus both 'growth' and 'modernization' 
theorists argue or assume that the developed 'West' 
just is the model. and that orthodox economics are 
scientific and thereby applicable generally. It is at 
this point that critics of the orthodoxy become susp- 
icious that what is in progress is a largely verbal 
shift, akin to replacing 'backward' with Ideveloping1v 
and that what we have is a sophisticated reformulation 
of the jingoistic scheme. It is pointed out-that orth- 
odox economics is 
, 
not scientific, - in the-siýnse its 
practitioners would like to claim , and nor-is the 
history of the 'West' a programme for subsequent nation 
states - the idea of 'recapitulation' is taken as a 
nonsense. 
We hold the view that the idea of progress affirmed 
by this'schooll is, of the three we shall consider, the 
most impoverished, Furthermore we take the theoretical 
engagement of this 'school' to be the least plausible 
of those we shall consider, and this we would hope to 
make clear in our subsequent substantive analyses. 
The second instantiation of the idea of progress 
we take to be presented by the efforts of that group 
of theorists we have labelled 'radicals'; they include 
theorists whose work can be characterized by noting an 
increasing radicalism. Thus all begin with orthodox 
economics (Myrdal, Purtado9qLnd Prank are our 'exemplars' 
here) and 3ýeject 'It. for what has been called -Isocio- 
. 
ger associated logised economied-Progress is no lon' 
with economic growth, called forth by the-application 
of the technical expertise of-the economists, but is 
concieved more broadly; it becom. es equated with ordered 
social reform. 
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Por present purposes we can collapse Prank and 
Purtado'into one; that is. read their differen6es as 
being due to PranI? s polemics. This'being so we have 
two schemes to note: MyrdaA,. Iworl. d welfarism' and 
Latin American 'dependency'. Of th4m we may note that 
both are interventionist schemes, seeing the theorisýs 
business as the production of knowledge of an instrum- 
ental kind. Nevertheless it'is also true that their 
conceptions of social theoretic engagement, though 
different, are markedly richer than those of the econo- 
mics dominated orthodoxy. 
We can trace the links and revisions around three 
important points. (l)Problem specificity: the claims of 
the orthodox to be applying or extending a generally 
applicable intellectual(scientific) scheme is denied. 
Thus NIST(14) is piecemeal, sceptical, empiricist and 
insists upon the pursuit of realism in models. This in 
turn attadhes to the key idea that concepts have 
ecologies; which is to say that they only work in 
certain circumstances and, contrariwise, knowledge of 
the problem situation is a prerrequisite of the cons- 
truction of appropriate concepts. The general meth- 
odological dictum is the pursuit of problem -specific 
formulations and not general theories. Similarly Idep- 
endencyl rejects the claims of the orthodox and . through 
a series of steps(which we uncover in the career of 
Furtado) a methodology which treats structuralg institut- 
ional and historical factors emerges. 'Dependency' 
resembles NIST in that it began as an'ýttempt to theorize 
the situation of the Latin American economies9that JE9 
it sought to be- , 
relevant : but paradoxically it ends 
-with Furtado- by claiming to be 
the first generally 
adequate economicsvin contradistinction to the limmited 
scope of the orthodoxy. (2)Valuation: the claims of the 
orthodoxy to neutrality of expert status are denied, 
but in different fashio ne. Both NIST and 'dependency' 
respond to their engagement in the social processes of 
which they write; but their proposals in this respect 
differ, and their 'doing so we may take to reflect their 
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circumstances. Thus Myrdal's efforts lodge within the 
experience of Idecolonization' and concern týemselves 
with reworking long established colonial relationships. 
Power is to be handed over; there is a continuity of 
governmental procedure, and 'development' is to be 
ordered authoritatively. Myrdal writes for the reasonable 
men in charge of the new stateý planning machinery( the 
Bcheme Is implausibility is a6knowledged in the idea of 
the 'soft state'). Ehrensaft rightly calls the entire 
scheme 'Fabian'. With 'dependency' the position is rather 
different: the pursuit of relevance which moved early 
'dependency' work admits of a range of development that 
is different to that permitted by the injunction to 
problem-specificity which informed NIST. 'Dependencyl 
has a more orthodox frame than NIST; and this. when coupled 
with the stance's evidently politically blocked circum- 
stances (for in Latin America, at this time, the reason- 
able men are, typically, not in control of the state), 
issues in a drift to generality, Thus we have the claim 
to have replaced the orthodoxy on a general level. (Frank 
we might note offers here a third version . the shift to 
political activism), (3)Scientism: we-have noted that 
Furtado. -remains close to the orthodoxy, so too does 
Myrdal. Both-: NIST and 'dependency' are empiricist 
interventionisms, though their theorizing is suffused 
with an appreciation of the social character of both that 
which they study and their study of it. Indeed much of 
what is theoretically characteristic of-these efforts 
flows from the tension between the restrictions they 
place upon themselves by their respective acknowledgements 
of the dictates of the or-thodox conceptions of science 
and its extension to the social, on the one hand, and 
their continuing and central urge to practical engagement 
on the other. 
Progress is conceived as ordered social reform., 
ýf we ask where they fit in respect of our treat- 
ment of the idea of progressthen the answer is that 
clearly they remain within the dominant (peripheral) 
line which attaches to orthodox social science. However, 
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that said, we can add that if it is desired to construct 
a policy. science in the area of 'development.., ctudies' 
then these efforts must be regarded as prime candidates. 
In particular MyrdaYs 'Fabianism' can be readily seen 
as subtle, humane and plausible. 
That the orthodoxy could conceivably be seen as 
'crude' was made plausible by offering a series of 
stages; jingoistic, revised, present. With NIST and 
'Dependency' the matter is a little more difficult. 
So, as regards the location of these approaches to 
Idevelopmentlin connection with our definition of a 
'crude' approach then vie may note that in respect of 
intent, both would reject any suggestion of favouring 
the interests of the metropolitan centres; claiming that 
their interest is the establishment of new economies, 
not the reinforcement or sustaining of subordinate 
incorporation. We can note that in neither case has this 
intent been questioned: there is no suggestion, as ' 
there was with the orthodoxy above, that their efforts 
might be taken as (self-deluding) reformulations of a 
narrow and unreflective orthodoxy. Both operate within 
the injunction of 'nationalist developmentalism'. 
As regards the matter of conception and our definition 
of the Icrudel, whereby self-serving categories of analysis 
are blandly assumed to apply generally, both NIST and 
'dependency' would deny-that their schemes could be 
regarded as Icrudel. The replies would be different, but 
both would be rather-ambiguous. Furtado claims to 
transcend and encompass the orthodoxyg which is taken 
to be cleansed and properly established. Myrdal too 
looks to establish a defensible procedure 9 but in 
doing so professes to resolve problems of valuation. by 
lodging appeals to '. obviousness'. 
With Furtado we shallnote (this is presented in 
chapter. 6) a progressio# in his workfrom a scientistic 
pursuit-of a typology of models of economies and their 
sectors to the dynamic scheme of 'dependency' with 
its Istructural/institutionalAiatoricalI method. 
Furtado, having begun with the pursuit of relevance, 
claims that this 'dependency, scheme offers a generally 
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adequate economics, in contradistinction to the un- 
tenable blaims of the, orthodox. That is to sAy9 Purtado 
thus lodges himself within a realm of discoures that tra- 
nscends and encompasses the, orthodoxy, which we have 
taken to be the remote inheritor of the imperialist 
jingoistic view of the superiori. ty of, 'Western' man - the 
paradigmatically 1crudelapproach to theorizing the exchange 
of 'rich' and 'poor' Furtadds denial of europomorphism is 
emergent; 1now we have a generally adequate economics'. 
It seems to be an ambiguous effort, whose ambiguity 
revolves around granting the notion of a generally 
adequate economics; it is this that seems to link 
Furtado to the interventionist orthodoxy. In his work 
4dependencyl shifts from a problem-specific politically 
informed orientation to a general, 'scientific' one: a 
wrong idea of social science and a typically orthodox 
one. We end up with an ideology vie can label 'Reactive 
(Nationalist) Interpretative Interventionism'. 
With Myrdalif we look for evidence of sensitivity 
to the problems arising from concei-ving social theorizing 
to be socially constructed then we can find it, simply 
because matters of valuation constitute a point of 
departure in his work; this is made clear by his exegetist 
Streeten. This evidence of reflexivity is related-to 
the basis of a denial of euro . pomorphism. Myrdal would 
claim that his effort is free of any taint of the wrong- 
ful importation of foreign concepts or dispositions, as 
his epistemic starting point was the idea of concepts 
having ecologies and his procedure was problem specific. 
In terms of the dispositionstthe position taken would 
be ofie of the obviousness of welfarism in crisis politics. 
Once again this is-an ambiguous effort in that the 
epistemology is unpersuasive, as is the idea that appealing 
to the obviousness of courses of action in times of 
crisis is a satisfactory resolution of the problems 
attendant upon deploying the politico-ethical notion of 
'development' Myrdal may thus claim to be free of the 
taint of unreflexivenese, but to the extent that. his 
effort is Fabian (as Ehrensaft jibes )then to that 
I 
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extent the effort must be tainted as Fabianism is evid- 
ently a bircumstance-specific policy science'. However, 
even if we grant this, NIST constitutes a marked distan- 
cing from what is implied by our definition of the 
'crude', and from the orthodoxy treated above. 
We take the idea of progress affirmed by this group, 
in their different ways, to be the most readily accepted 
notion. That it represents the common-sense of much of 
'development-studies' is an immediate suspicion . It 
is a considerably richer idea of progress than that 
adopted by the orthodox, yet it remains within that 
dominant(peripheral) line of the history of the idea of 
progress. As regards the theoretical engagement of these 
theorists, we confront(in NIST especially) what must be 
the common sense of Idevelopment-studies': pragmatic, 
humane and concerned with governmental ordering of 
IdevelopmentI. Its plausibility should not, however, 
blind us to its defects. 
We have argued above that the efforts of the classical 
political economists, and in particular Marx, constitute 
the best model of what it is to argue social-theoretically. 
We have also claimed that the marxian tradition continues 
the main trend from the career of the idea of progress, 
that is, by presenting such notions as democracy and the 
'free development of all' and treating its occasion/ 
realization as having a natural guarantor in the histor- 
ical dialectic of class. We now consider this school of 
social thought as they present themselves in the post- 
war career of 'development-studies'; that is, we look 
at the group labelled Ineo-marxist'. 
We treat ! neo-marxism' in the established fashion, 
taking it as a specimen of social-theoretic engagement 
and not as self-evidently coterminous with a Imarxian 
analysis of the Third Worldl. 'Neo-marxismlconstitutes 
our third instantiation of the idea of progress; it 
attempts to recover the submerged counter-tradition 
of politico-ethical thinking, that is, the radical 
democratic scheme that presents man as a 'doer' rather 
than a leonsumerl. Additionally, Ineo-marxism' seeks to 
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present a scheme of theorizing which is reflexive at 
the leve. 1 of the totality (in contrast to say NIST 
whose reflexi7ity was a partial refinement of tech- 
nique in a generally orthodox scheme), and thereby to, 
locate itself in the social processes it seeks to under- 
stand and effect. 
Generally we take the classical-marxian mode of 
enquiry to be engaged: its value orientation suffuses it 
and requires effective deployment, The notion of the 
unity of theory and practice demands ihat moral engag- 
ment be practically developed and, in regard to this 
practicality, it adopts a categorical analysis. -of its 
social situation. It is thus apparent that it is the 
antithesis of a 'crudeleffort. The self-deluding accomm- 
odation to the demands of the status quo evidenced by 
the orthodox is rejected in favour of an explicitly 
revolutionary praxis. Yet, althoug4 it. may be the anti- 
thesis of 1crudel. it does not thereby lay claim to some 
position from which it can be free of the circumstances 
of its construction and thus general in application. 
It is thoroughgoingly reflexive and therefore locatee' 
itself self-consciously in society and history. It is 
this reflexivity that is the basis of its denials of 
any approximation to the 'crude'. That position is 
turned inside-out. Thus it would claim to be the most 
fruitful mode of analysis and always practical. The 
history of marxian analyses should, in the light of 
this conception of it, appear as a history of 
, 
the 
circumatances of theorizing. Marxian theorizing, we 
would claim, should always appear as circumstance 
specific and problem centred; and if it does not then 
we may suspedt that something has gone awry. 
I 
Palma identifies three major efforts of marxian 
analysis of the exchange of Irichliand 'poorl. (a)The 
efforts of Marx and Engels themselves who, reports 
Palma treat "capitalism as a historically progressive 
system .... which will spread through the backward nations 
by a continual process of destruction and replacement 
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Of pre-capitalist structures"(15). (b)The efforts of the 
originai, theorists of imperialism, schemes p1resented 
in the circumstances of attempts to grasp RussiaAs 
situation-as a 'backward' state. Capitalism is taken as 
progressive, but altered in its effedts by the dictates 
of monopoly, and by the 1920's the emphasis has switched 
to the idea that post-colonial change might be blocked 
by metropolitan monopoly capital and local bourgeoisie. 
(c)The Ineo-marxism1of the*post-sdcond world war'period: 
capitalism is no longer taken as progressive; in the 
metropolitan centres crisis management seems to offer 
to guarantee an irrational longevity, and the peripheral 
areas are condemned to subordinate incorporation. The 
political implications for the 'poor' are of disengagement 
from world capitalism and the pursuit of planned socialism. 
Thus in respect of what Palma identifies as the 
third marxian attempt to grasp the relations of centres/ 
peripheries of world capitalism we confrofit the last 
group of theorists to appear in our reconstruction of 
the post war career of 'development-studies': the Ineo- 
marxists'. In respect of this group we may note that 
we treat the major efforts% that is, the orthodoxy of 
Ineo-marxisml, as it were. Palma distinguishes three 
lines; a Baran-inspired line; a revision of ECLA (he 
cites Furtado), and a third in the work of Cardoso. We 
treat the first of tliese. 
In respect of the idea of progress affirmed by 
the Ineo-marxistsl,, we can report that it is the broadest 
of those instanced in the career of 'development-studies'. 
It is also integral to their analyses. Thus with Baran, 
the 'father' of this approach, a notion of economic 
surplus is used and social forms are ranked according to 
how humane is -its allocation. Monopoly capitalism with 
its militarism, imperialism, and consumerism is deemed 
irrational. The impact of monopoly capitalism in its 
peripheral areas is indicated by noting its misuse of 
economic. surplus: subordinate incorporation results 
and the possibility of an autonomous capitalism and 
thereafter some higher social form is blocked. The 
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whole is an argument for socialist planning as a political 
alternative route to economic and social ratIonality. 
With the peripheral areas this requires dis-engagement 
and in Prank this is read straightforwardly as socialist 
revolution. 
The extent to which this 'neo-marxismy is actually 
marxist is a matter of sharp debate, The critics, on the 
left, tend to suggest that the schemes of the 'father', 
Baran, are those of an 'idealist left wing Keynesian'% 
aggregative economics coupled with the stntiments of a 
liberal reformer. Again, in this line, Palma notes of 
Frank that his effort is orthodox in that it tries to 
build a Imechanico-formall model of the underdeveloped 
areas of the periphery. The extent to which their efforts 
manage to be problem-specific and reflexive is thus 
called into question; there is, it seems, suspicion 
of a retrogressive collapse toward the descriptive- 
general. 
This raises a crucial and difficult issue (that is): 
how close does Ineo-marxism1come to being classical 
marxian soDial theoretic engagement? The question spills 
over from being a simple report on where Ineo-marxism' 
sits in terms of our career of the idea of progresslor 
our. definition of the Icrudel. and raises issues which 
anticipate directly the central concerns of our concl- 
uding chapters. The matter of the precise nature of a 
social theoretic enquiry and the proper limits of the 
efforts of the western academic in respect of questions 
about the Third World we shall leave until these final 
chapters. However for present purposes we would affirm 
that Ineo-marxism, has the riches7t idea of progress and 
deploys the subtlest scheme of analysis as it treats the 
world historical development of the capitalist ayatem. 
4.0 Concluding note: some critisms rebutted '. 
It might be objected that having at the outset of the 
chapter decried the habit of lodging proforma statements 
of values we have proceeded to offer just such a 
statement, and moreover a somewhat grandiose one. We 
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reply that in what is a complex and densely considered 
area any brief treatment of these issues is. liable to 
appear unsatisfactory in this way. Rowever we do extend 
the treatment of the politico-ethical into the substant- 
ive material that is to be our concern, and in these 
substantive histories the issue of the theorist's engag- 
ement recurs. 
In respect of the politico-ethical material presentedt 
it might be objected that we are guilty of an embarrassing 
derivative simplicity and would have done well to have 
left these matters to those whose academic business 
they are. We reply that this appeal to intelledtual 
compartmentalism is typically orthodox and is a pre- 
judice we do not share. Confronting matters of the Third 
World entails a breadth of treatment and thus the sligh- 
ting observation, that we are borrowing from the work of 
others is simply fatuous - of course we are, what else 
is there to do? 
These two lines of objection can come together in 
a claim that our effort here is over-general, and that 
the idea of progress appears in countless forms? This 
last point is true, but we wotld reply that we have tried 
to trace the capeer of the idea of progress and to 
present its scope. We have tried to identify the notions 
available to the classic political economists and the 
founding fathers of sociology in the l9th, century. 
Subsequent variation - national sociologies, or particular 
streams of thought or schools of social theorists - we 
have not treated; rather-we have confronted the matter of 
the instantiation of the idea of progress in the post- 
war career of 'development-studies'. We have est4blished, 
it is hoped, that 'development' has to be taken as a 
poýitico-ethical notion and no*t a technical one; this 
stance entails aknowledging a distinct range of issues in 
respect of-social theory which are not within the usual 
realm of the orthodox. 
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Section Two: ThelPositivists, 
Introductory remarks to Section Two. 
The period we now treat is that which encompasses the 
'pre-Seers consensus' referred to by Ehrensaft(l): this 
'consensus' is the theme which is most prominent in 
'development-studieslup until, roughly, the mid-sixties 
and it may be conveniently termed 'positivist' We take 
it to comprise two distinguishable streams : an earlier 
somewhat general statement, exemplified in the 1951 
U. N. report(2)jand a subsequent rather more distinctly 
US effort that elaborates this line.. Each line is 
presented in a separate chapter. 
Historically9the division of the period treated 
in Section T1wo flows from our view of the behaviour 
of the developed areas to the non-developed areas. 
We can explain, briefly, as follows. From Brookfield 
we draw the observation that aid flows to the Third 
World did not become significant until the mid-I9501s; 
prior to that "international development aidýremained 
quite small"(3). Thus for some ten years after the' 
end of the Second World War the developed nations 
witht in the 'West' certainly, all the experience of 
a remarkable recovery of economic health did littIe 
it seems. That they might have been expected to be 
more active is indicated in grookfield Is observation 
that Idevelopment', had been on the Alliesý 'agenda' 
since 1942 when the Japanese conquered SE Asia and 
promoted locals into 'governmentl(4). Yet if the 4- 
inaction. is perhaps curious, then the occasion for 
activity is illustrative of much of the rationale and 
spirit of the developed areas'involvement in the 
Third World. According to Zeylstra(5)' it is the distrib- 
ution of aid by the USSR in 1954 that provokes the USA 
into raibing aid expenditure. 
Thus in the period 1943-55 aid is largely internal 
to the developed areas and it is only from 1955 that 
the attention of the 'rich' turns outwards. to the Third 
World. Implicitly then in this first period of the 
establishment of the orthodoxy of 'development-!. studies' 
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the demands of nascent Third World nationalisms and the 
few 'new fiations' established in this period are down- 
graded in importance. And historically we have the start 
of the efforts of the Allies to come to agreement about 
the ordering of the post-war economic and political 
world. After the arrival of the USSR on the aid scene 
and after the declarations of the B, ýindung Conference 
the eyes of the theorists turned outwards, and the 
demands of nationalist developmentalism were acknowleqged 
in the doctrines of modernization. 
In--Chapt6-r Three we treat the earlier efforts, and 
from this period we take as a central event the instit- 
ution of Marshall Aid and the European Recovery Programme 
This lets us present what we take to be the essential 
idea of the 'positivistlorthodoxyg that is, 'intervention'. 
This idea we unpack and this permits us to identify as the 
practical core of orthodox iintervention' thi three principleý 
of (1) growth both as theory and as doctrine, (2) 
plannin . (3) aid. These three. we will arguegmay be 
taken to constitute the skeleton of 'positivist' devel- 
opment theory from its inception, in the wake of the 
Second World War, to its 'flowering' at the time of the 
Kennedy administration. The theoretical products of 
this time may be characterized loosely as the response 
of specialists to quickly moving events. Notions of 
1growthl were constructed out of existing economic 
doctrine and used as general theories whereby dealings 
with lelient'states might be legitimated. The period 
i's dominated, intellectually, by 'positive economic 
science'; the other members of the family of the 
human sciences are cast in the role of 'under-labourers'. 
In Chapter Four we consider the circumstances 
surrounding aid competition with the USSR: the . 
'Cold- 
War' bulks large in this period. At this timeg reports 
Brookfield, the economists felt that they had solved 
the problem of growth; and the notion of modernization' 
allows acknowledgement of differences in basic cimumst- 
ances of the . non-developed and, simultaneouslyg affirms 
the pattern of life of rich nations as the model. 
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"Confidence in the inevitability of progress rose 
steadily from 1945 to a peak around 196011(6) argues 
Brookfield. The. time of Kennedy's 'new frontierlis 
taken to mark the high tide of positivist conceit, and 
thereafter the collapse is general. It is observed 
tliat the optimism is now hdrd to credit and difficult 
to see*in context. 
In Chapter Your we treat two main lines of enquiry: 
(1) the revision of the essentially pessimistic message 
of Harrod-Domar by Solow and the emergence of a neo- 
classical theory of growth which identifies the process 
as naturalv self-regulating, and self-sustaining; (2) 
the concomitant relative emancipation of the sociologist 
from the status of 'under-labourer. The treatment of 
'non-economic aspect sl of economic growth broadens into 
something entailing more of a 'master-scientist'role 
for the sociologist with ideas of 'modernization'. The 
themes in economics, sociology and the other human 
sciences are blended by Rostow in a widely influential 
book which we note in order to return from abstract to 
concrete issues. 
In Chapter One we presented the notion of ideology 
as our methodological key to these substantive efforts. 
Here we can indicate how that key is to be used. Thus 
Dobb(7), observing that the history of edonomic thought 
reveals that 'history conditions theories'. asks how this 
is so. He answers in terms of a dialectic between 
current practice and presently accepted theoryq both 
having their own dynamic. Current practice throws up 
problems (8) that are shaped by their social context, 
of which he notes that "this context itself is a complex 
mixture and interaction of accepted ideas and systems 
of tho. ught ...... and the problems(S) presented by 
current events and practical situations" (9). Con7ersely, 
Ithoughtt is not to be taken as a passive recipient of 
problems presented to it: "current problems are some- 
thing created as much by thought-inspired human action 
upon an existing situation as by the given objective 
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(but changing) situation itself"(IO). The-source of the 
medium of, criticism, theoretical language, is the 
body of existing theory re-worked as seems appropriate. 
Qonsequently "new ideas are necessarily shaped in 
part by the antithetical relation in which they stand to 
the old"(11). 
This presents the exchange of theorists and circum- 
stances in a relatively simple sociology of knowledge 
fashion, We make practical-. -. use. 6f the schema by 
organising our substantive analyses around the sequence: 
milieu, those most general explanations available to 
the theoristg thellimits of the thinkable!; demand 
the political and problem-relevant expectations made of 
the theorist ; resources, the intellectual resources 
available to the theorist, namely the constructs of the 
various specialist disciplines; and finally the product, 
the completed effort itself. We may note, finally, that 
whilst this sequence is the key to our procedure 
in respect of our analyses of the distinguishable efforts 
we treatq it is not followed slavishly. And indeed in 
these analyses the sequence is submerged in the looser 
Dobb-derived scheme of the dialectic of the dynamic of 
society(milieugdemands) and the dynamic of theory(res- 
ources, products). 
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Chapter Three: The crystaBization of the positivist 
orthodoxy,, 1943-1955. 
1-0 Dynamic of Society: the occasion of theorizing. 
We will begin with some details of the broad history of 
the period. What we want to. idefitify primarily is (1) the 
backdrop to the pronouncements of the economic orthodoxy 
of the early post-war era. From ' 
this (2) we will go on 
to identify the fundamental structure of that interven- 
tionist schema, treating the notions of growth, planning, 
and aid. This treatment is complemented by (3) notes on 
the initial efforts of the orthodoxy to extend their 
theorizing into the realm of mat'ters of the Third World. 
This 'backdrop, to the emergence of the first-efforts 
of 'development theory' is complex, and our treatment will 
rely heavily on the work of a small group of historians 
and eco nomists. The central historical event is a crisis 
of enormous proportionsq the Secondii7orld Vlar, and through 
this period the rivalrieslof the US and UK are played 
out. Around the figure of Keynes the two sides manoeuvre 
for advantageg until with the abrupt ending of IL. end- 
L. easel in 1945 the power of the UK is curbed andq in 
Kiernan's phraseq "it was America's turn to-be carried 
up to the mountain top and shown the kingdoms of the 
earth"(12). We can identify three elements in this 
backdrop: these are(l) issues of edonomic theorizing 
and the rise of Keynisianism, (2) matters of the mul- 
tiple conflicts of the 'Big Three' and (3) the recon- 
struction of Western Europe and Marshall Aid. 
1.1 Economic theory and the Keynesian revolution. 
From the discussions of the so called 'Keynesian revol- 
ution' we draw three points. First, the inter-war period 
sees the occasion of the Great Depression -an event 
which could not happen according to neo-classical 
doctrine ', ýecondly, there is the impact of the apparent 
contrast of the success of the USSR's planned economy, 
and thirdly, there is the radical overhaul of neo- 
classicism effected by Keynes. 
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The economic historian. and Keynesian, Clairmonte, (I3) 
traces the: history of the disintegration of economic 
liberalism. The point, of departure of his study is an 
enquiry into the extent to which ! British Integral 
Liberalism'. 'Ricardianism', or the 'classical approach' 
might be taken to be a part of the ideological super- 
structure of the emergent bourgeoisie of British cap- 
italism in the wake of the Napoleonic wars. It is taken 
to be just that: 'Ricardianism' is an aggresive doctrine 
of and for the bourgeoisie. This line is familiar: -it 
is detailed for example by Hobsbawm(14). It is noted that 
the actual period of genuinely free trade was brief, and 
that it was the dominant position of the'British economy 
in world trade that permitted the reification of notions 
of liberalism into a self-serving and enclosed formal 
system. 
Now whilst the doctrines of liberalism suited (for 
a while) the situation of the UK,, their relevance to the 
problems of other areas was far from evident. In fact 
the disintegration of liberalism, may be taken to start 
very early. Indeed it is to the strategic requirements 
of the new-American republic that Clairmonte traces 
the criticisms that he makes culminate in Keynes. The 
views of Hamilton with regard to the nurturing of local 
industries are taken to be a formative influence upon 
List, of whom it is observed, that "underlining the 
pitfalls of integral liberalism he emerges'as the 
leading protagonist of purposive policy interventionism"(I5). 
If the fall of economic liberalism is taken to be 
protracted, then its demise in the 1930's is seen- to 
be unequivocal; thereafter, claims Clairmonte "we see 
the mushrooming of every species of restrictionism with 
the concomitant proliferation of'massive aggregatiops 
of, power and increasing state intrusion"(I6). Howevergso 
far as the neo-classical doctrinaires are concerned it 
was-not-the mechanisms of the market that had been 
shown to be at fault; Tather, it was interference with 
them. This illusion is located(on the'part of UK theorists 
at least) by Clairmonte in the familiar mis-apprehension 
of the UK economy in the period 1870-1914: what is 
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taken as a golden age is in fact a period of industrial 
decline ma: qked by receipts from empire. 
To this phenomenon of justificatory ideas parting 
company with reality is added an element hinted at 
by Lichtheim(17): that is the spectre of Bolshevism. 
If the issue for the West and Third World is. now how 
; qather than whether to plan, as Clairmonte would claimp 
thet in his view "it was basically the irrepressible and 
unprecedented tempo of industrial and scientific advance 
in those formetly funereal half-Asian, half-European 
nations of the Tsarist empire within forty years, 
two disas. trous wars, encirclement and unconcealed 
hostilityq which dramatised the viability of the planning 
mechanism .... the seminal fact is.. that the impact of 
Soviet planning left its ineradicable impress on the 
economic policies of many countries"(18). 
This line is confirmed by Kurihara's investigation of 
the impact of-history on Keynesian theory. Two events 
are citedglln. amely(a) the establishment of the first 
centrally planned economy in Russia, after World War 1 
and (b) the Great Depression of the 1930's"(19). Kurihara 
takes Keynes to have plotted a middle course through 
the alternatives of laissez-faire and authoritarian 
intervention. As regards the theses established by Keynesq 
three are identifie. d as flowing from the experience of 
Depression and Bolshevism. They are: (l) the notion of 
depression equilibrium; (2) deficit finance and the idea 
of the multiplier,. and (3) the'compatibility of full 
employment and liberty. 
(1) In the 1930's the economic orthodoxy rested upon 
the work of the 'equilibrium theorists19 men suchý. afj 
Jevons, Marshallq Walrasq and Pareto. Setting marxists 
and socialists to one side, amongst the criticisms 
voiced, Sraffa(in 1926) had argued, in effect, that the 
notion of 'perfect competition' was untenable as each 
firm not merely competes but seeks to differentiate 
itself in the market. Ruling out 'perfect competition' 
denies the possibility of a general theory of equilibrium; - 
, it thus cuts at the heart of the 
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project of the orthodox neo-classical theorists. Attempts 
at repair by Robinson ('imperfect competition'). and - 
Chamberlin(Imonopolistic competitiod)in 1933 are deemed 
by the economic historian Napoleoni to fail. The contrib- 
ution of Keynes to this debate is introduced thus: 
". Parallel with the revision of the theory of market 
forms another criticism was levelled at the theory of 
economic equilibrium. This criticism concerned the 
statement that a competitive economy, left to itself, 
will automatically achieve the fulI employment of resources 
in general and of the labour force in particular"(20). 
Keynes shows that it is perfectly possible for economies 
to go into depression equilibrium whereby factors of 
production were so used that optimum configurations 
were not achieved. The neo-classical scheme argued this 
was impossible. 
(2) The question follows , what conditions if any 
will ensure full employment? The answers to this question 
provide for a new idea of the government Is role in the 
economy. The-laissez-faire scheme had been attacked on 
three points: (a)unemployment, (b) misuse of available 
resourcesland(c)trend to monopoly. Policy proposals 
flow from this view: generally, if the level of total 
expenditure falls below that necessary to sustain full 
employment. then the short-fall is to be made up . by 
government spending. This in turn rests on the two notions 
of the 'multiplier' and 'deficit financing'. Thus the 
role for a government is sharply altered in line with' 
revision of the established conception of the market. 
(3) This counter-cyclical role with regard to 
unemployment does not necessarily alter any fundamen- 
tals in the system. Policy proposals which might flow 
from charges of mis-use of resources or mal-distribu- 
tion of income would involve more radical change. So 
Keynes reassured doubters that full employment pol- 
icies did not entail sign ificant diminution of ordin- 
arily un*derstood liberties(though we might note that 
the political import of Keynes has been regarded as 
deeply ambiguous)'. 
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What we can take from all this is the observation 
that the work of Keynes grows Out of two circupstances: 
first, the situation of protected monopoly capitalism 
working at greatly reduced capacity whilst simultan- 
eously having massive unemploymenti and the concurrent 
manifest theoietical absurdity of the rump of British 
Integral Liberalism; secondlyt the combined encourage- 
ment and awful warning of the apparently successful 
efforts at planning in the USSR(21). To-this we may add 
that with Keynes the economic orthodoxy was very sharply 
over-hauled,, resulting in a style of-government inter- 
vention that for many years after the war was taken to 
have tamed the system's periodic crises. 
1.2 The political and economic context for post-war 
thinking about development. 
Having looked at-the roots of the Keynesian enterprise, 
we now go on to indicate the initial set of political 
factors which gave form to those subsequent efforts to 
make use of it in guiding policy in regard to 'develop- 
mentI. The crucial considerations here revolve around 
the determination of the USA to order the post-war 
world in a fashion acceptable to itself. The gist of 
this element of our study is that the USA, under the 
guise of an enlightened liberalism(22) and couched in 
the internationalist rhetoric associated with(most 
familiarly) the UN organisation, establisheb in the 
period 1943-1947 its economic'hegemony over the 'West'. 
The first schemes of help for developing countries 
operate within this frame, the 'Pax Americanal. ý 
Of the war aims of the-USA Kolko has observed thati 
"In considering world warrII, and especially the years 
1943-45, there are three major issues or themes which 
subsume manygif not most, of the concerns of those in 
Washington who thought about the problems of American 
war and peace aims. First was the question of the left 
which is to say, the disintegration of the pre-war 
social systems and the growth of revolutionary mavements 
and political upheaval everywhere in"the, world. Next 
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was the problem of the Soviet Union, which at times 
appeared very much connected with the issue of. the 
left. Finally there was the issue of Great Britain, 
invariably set in the context of the future of the 
world economy and its present and future relationship- 
to the USII. It is argued that the Americans. once they 
were in the war, quickly began to establish a series of 
economic war aims. This task is. reported as falling to 
the Department of State, under Cordell Hull, a disciple 
of Wilson! s laissez-faire liberalism and a man marked, 
as was Keynes, by the experience of the depression. 
Yet Hull drew opposing conclusions; tariff blocks and 
controls were the road to economic ruin and warand the 
s olution was laissez-faire. Kolko wryly notes. "The iden- 
tification of the interests of the world*and future 
peace with Huli! s doctrines and American prosperity 
looked more and more like the classic pursuit of national 
self-interest in an ill fitting wrapper of internation- 
alist rhetoric"(24). 
It is reported that there were two major elements 
in US thinking, finance and relief/trade. The discussion 
of finance was initiated in 1942 with a British sub- 
mission prepared by Keynesq envisaging the growth 
of world trade with an international fund to smooth 
over deficits and channel investment money through 
the world economy. To this the US replied with the 
White plan (White was no. 2 in the Treasury), and debate 
revolved around the control of these proposed institutions 
and the ground rules of their operation. The debate 
continued right up to July 1944 and Bretton Woods: the 
British eventually agreeing, having removed the most 
blatantly pro-US elements. However the IMF-and IBRD 
were "far closer in their principles to the US scheme 
than any other"(25). Bretton Woods established the US 
vi-ew of the post-war economy; that is, one run by 
business on business Prineiples. 
As regar ds trade/relief, Kolko takes the view that 
UNRRA, set up in late 1943, was seen as a temporary 
necessity and was only ever incidental to the pursuit 
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of US interests. The overall view was that "emergency 
reconstruction and relief programs would exist, but they 
would be temporary and solved essentially as a by- 
product of the creation of'a rational world economy, 
based on liberalism and the Open Door, that assumed the 
general interest of the world was synonymous with that 
of the US11(26). These notes, derived mainly from1he work 
of Kolkb . serve to correct the common-sense view of 
this period which would have it that the US and UK 
were in close harmony and that only the recalcitrant 
behaviour of the USSR prevented the establishment 
of a new world order(27). In respect of the relations 
between least' and-lwest, Flem/ing(28) argues persuas- 
ively, for all his brittle moralism, that the period of 
the 'Grand Alliance' was a wholly untypical episode in 
the history of these relations. Lichtheim too speaks of 
the struggle between "communism and anti-communism which 
had been going on all over Europe since 1917"(29). 
Kolko traces the evolution of US thinking through the 
war and subsequent occupation of Europe, and corrects 
in persuasive detail the orthodox notion of the west- 
ward surge of godless communism. In relating the history 
of the western allies'occupation of Italy (a crucial 
precedent )iFranceg Belgium and Greece ('a brutal example), 
it is clearly established that the western allies. did 
not lend their support to local democratic groups 
(which usually included communist elements) but instead 
imposed governments and leaders acceptable to themselves. 
Trumans later March 1947 declaration of. 'Cold 'gar'. 
effectively fixes the division of Europe into two 
occupied camps. 
By the end of-the war the 'US had commited itself to 
qrganising a counter-revolution: "the old order of 
pre-war capitalism and oligarchy with which the US 
identified .... was dying in the colonial world and a 
dependent China; it committed suicide in Eastern Europeg 
and the US could refurbish it in temporarily acceptable 
ways only in Western Europe" (30). Kolko continues - : "Only 
the US had the power to engage fully in international 
counter-revolution and sustain the forces of conservatism 
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for prolonged periods and it was this militant inter- 
vention into the affairs of literally every area of the 
world that set the pattern for post-war politics-. - By 
1945 Washingtoiýs decision to undertake that role was 
an -qnquestioned postulate in Americas plans for the 
future of its power in the world"(31). The style in which 
the US was later to approach matters of development 
was also clear. Againlolko; 11 AmericA foreign policy- 
at-the end of World War II necessitated the ability and 
desire to employ loans, credits and investments evety- 
where to create a world economic order to its own'desires" 
(32)t' We shall see that 'growth theories' flowing out 
of an authoritative and instrumentali6t stance'were 
clearly theoretically congruent with this dominating 
political need. It is clear that Streeten's choice of 
Marshall Aid as one of the roots of 'development-theory' 
is apposite; the Europftan Recovery Programme (ERP) 
evidently encapsulates a wealth of tensionsand it is to 
the history of post-war Europe that we now turn. 
1-3 The econormic 17ecovery of Western Europe. 
Streeten(33) argues that it was the dramatic*recovery of 
Europe's economy that lent credence to the notion that 
deliberate intervention in an economic system to raise 
its level of activity was possible. Postan(34) confirms 
this reading of the responbe to European recovery; at the 
outset he declares that "the unique feature of the post- 
war economy in the West is growthI. He identifies four phases. 
ýThe-firqt. being Ide-mobilization and readjustment' 
as economi-es are shifted off war footings, during 1945-48. 
postan notes that it was not until 1948 that the majority 
of Eur6pean nations recovered economically to their 1939 
levels(35). The second phase identified is that of 'recovery 
properl9dated from 1948-53, the period when the domin- 
ant economic/political pattern of the post-war period 
was established. Internal factors are cited, in part- 
icular measures to control inflation Turning to external 
factors Postan reveals the orthodoxy of his views: 
thus he says "By far the most dramatic, as well as the 
most effective contribution to recovery was the 
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announcement(, 36) in the summer of 1947 and the subse- 
quent passing by the American Congress of the so-called 
'Marshall Plan1for foreign assistance by which the USA 
undertook to provide economic aid to European countries 
and thus under-wrote the costs of their economic re- 
construction"(37). 
ý The nature of the ERP can now be considered. The 
views of the US government may be approached via the 
views of an academic proponent of the ERP, Seymour 
Harris. In 1948 Harris produced a book with the title, 
'The European Recovery Programme'. At the time he was- 
professor of economics at Harvard. and we may take him 
to represent the Keynesian element in the US establish- 
ment. In the justification of ERPcrisis in Europe and 
fear of communism figure prominently. Thus Harris-says, 
"Self-interest rather than charity inspired ERP. 
Frightened by the onward movement of communisip,, which 
feeds on distress, the American people rallied to the 
support of the Marshall Plan".... -. Americans realized 
also that economic recovery in Western Europe would 
rebound favourably on the American economy"(38). In 
addition Harris notes the pressure of particular US 
economid groups which had surpluses on their hands, 
for example farmers. The mixture of both political and 
economic aspects is evident, 
Politically the ma*jor event of this period was the 
promulgation-of the 'Truman. Doctrine' which was 
presented in--a speech to Congress on March 12,1947. 
Its essence was that political change was to be arrested: 
I'Trum&n- spoke for the bulk of American conservatives 
and allied himself with reaction around the globe"(39)o 
The Marshall Plan followed on from this stance, and in 
Western Europe the aid administratiods powers were 
used, reports Flemingg"to discourage social reformý-.. 
.... the effeat of our economic 
intervention in Europe 
has been not only to oust the communists from the 
governments but to put the socialists out or decrease 
their influence. "t40). 
The second area indicated by Harris is that of 
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economics and economic theory (which Harris treats in 
that he attempts to settle doubts about the propriety 
and efficacy of ERP ). In respect of the economics, 
ZeylstrA following remark is instructivet "For the 
first time the Truman Doctiine contained a concept of 
international aid based on the need to promote a suitable 
rate of growth in the receiving countries, a prototype 
thus of modern development aid"(41). Zeylstra passes 
by the use of 'to promote' and 'rate of growth' without 
comment, his target being-development aid, But as we 
have seen with Keynes, that growth could be described 
theoretically and actually promoted as a, matter of 
policy were the greater novelties. Yet Zeylstra's words 
reveal both the essence of the orthodox notýon that 
specific policy-guided interventions could be made to 
secure a targeted growth rate; and the fact that such ideas 
have become a part of the common coin of1development- 
studies'. 
We can complete this brief review of ERP by taking 
note of the views of those who explicitly run together 
economics and politics. Postan for example tends to 
let the politics take care of themselves% a 'neutral' 
treatment -ERP was a source of finance. Yet we have 
seen with Kolko that the issue of the manner in which 
European re-construction would be effected was by no 
means simply a technical matter of finance. The questions 
of the post-war shape of Europe- and the division of 
Germany were closely bound up with issues of reparations, 
reconstructiontand access for the US'to European markets. 
The US consistently opposed the breaking up of G, etmany 
pr using its industry to supply European reconstruction. 
The US had surplus capacity and finance and needed to 
use it. In., Europeg Kolko reports that the divergence of 
viewslin regard to the nature of the post-war world 
and the role and form of bodies,: such. as_IMF_, or_IBRD9 
between the US and its allies grew progreSBiV61Y 
more acute . By the end of the war there was no agree- 
ment)and the US imposed as and when it could its own 
views. 
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Returning to Postan's history, we can note that he sketches 
the backdr. op and novelty of the posý-war period in 
comparison to the depression years. The story in 
Postads hands is not so much one of design as of a 
dam bursting. Thus he says of the potential for recovery 
in Europe that: 11shortages of goods had been accumulating 
for years, the needs of reconstruction were great and 
urgent, the reserves of unemployed resources were 
immense"(42). It is pointed out that a surge of activity 
was to be expected: "Is it to be wondered at that the 
initial momentum of economic growth'should have been so 
strong? "(43). It is the fact that following this under- 
standable surge growth is sustained that is novel. 
Postan goes on-. "In all European countries economic growth 
became a universal creed and a common expectation to 
which governments were expected to conform"(44). The 
pre war economic policy orthodoxy had stressed financial 
probity; that growth was preferred and that policies 
were fashioned to that end is the novelty of the post- 
war, post-Keynes period. Thus at back of European doctrines 
of growth there is 11 a confluence of tributaries, the 
policy of high aggregate demand and full employment, 
the welfare state, the defence of the west, obligations 
to under-developed countries and American pressures 
and influences"(45). From all this it'is clear that the 
extension of post-war interventionist techniques to 
matters of the development of the Third World was 
something other than th e straightforward exercise which 
studies of that time seem to have taken it to be. The 
extraction from this tangled web of a simple programme 
for development' has been dismissively labelled by 
Brookfield as the pursuit of a "development vending 
machine: you put in the moneypress the button and get 
growth"(46). However whilst the enterprise may have 
'been ill-conceived, even naive, it nonetheless has an 
elegant and deeply persuasive model of explanation at 
back of it. In our next section we will try to draw this 
out. 
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1.4 Summary of section I. 
The above-we take to outline the environment f: rom 
which the early postý-war orthodoxyg subsequently depl- 
oyed in treating matters of the development of the Third 
World, emerged. -The history presents, albeit perhaps 
in an overly general style, the 'structure of the possible' 
for the post-war theorists. The possibilities opened by 
the theoretical work of Keynes are squeezed between the 
twin prffssures of popular(left) demand and US determination 
to hold the line against change. Ordered reconstruction 
and development, is now taken to be within-the grasp 
of governments9 but the ruling factor in any such effobts 
is the overwhelming economic and military power of 
the USA. Interventionist activity is subsumed, para- 
doxically, under the imposed rubric, of economic liberalism. 
The shift from this point to the treatment of the 
Third World can be effected by citing the work of Streeten, 
who argues that the subject 'development-studies' has 
its origins in two general sets of thoughts: problems 
of resources and people are taken to be urgent in view 
of the-population explosion and soluble in the light 
of the success of post war European recovery; secondly, 
political change in the form of the rise of new states 
in the Third World and the cold war increases the co ncern of 
thetWestl for the 9properl development of these areas. 
The Marshall Plan-is thus an appropriate symbol for the 
start of 'development-studiest. More technically we see 
that-out of the set of descriptions/explanations available 
to theorists in the wake of depression, war and cold 
warg the demands of the reform and defence of western 
capitalism crystallize out three novel theoretical 
devices , Thus the explanatory theory, the over-. ý,., 
arching and legitimating construction that permits 
and. guides action oriented to development problems:, 
is found in-Igrowth-theory'. This willbe our first 
concern below; our second will-. be the elucidation of 
-the schemes and techniques whereby intervention is 
organised. - that isq planning. Finally as a corollary of one 
and two, we look at the matter of the execution of, 
such intervention schemes as may be prepared; that isgaid. 
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2-0 Dynamic of Theory I: the nature of the orthodoxy- 
The notion of 'intervention'. 
our treatment rests on the claim that out of the melange 
of theoretical, possibility identified by Keynes, political 
necessity as established principally by the US, and 
example provided by European recovery, the theorists of the 
orthodoxy distil an intellectually coherent and. politic- 
ally relevant scheme. As Zeylstra puts it, "when finally 
the economists made common cause with the politicians in 
world wide promotion of development, this happened 
not only because the latter seized and exploited ideas 
of the former. but also as the outcome of. the economists' 
own course of theoretical thinking"(47). In Shawls(48) 
Gramscian-derived terms these economists were 'organic 
intellectuals'. More familiarly , Zeylstra remarks that, 
"Since Keynes the economists had grown familiar with 
normative theoryq with identifying themselves with the 
problems of the political scientist and the public 
administrator"(49). Thus the distillate, so to'say, of 
the ppriod was a variety of. 1policy science'. 
The term 'policy science' we take from Fay who uses 
it to designate the assumed product of mainstream 
social science, such that in response to the question- 
why have a social science? - the answer is made that 
it permits the rational ordering of decisions in. 
complex modern societies; or more bluntly it "will 
enable men to control their social environment"(50). 
It is clear that our notion of 'intervention' as a 
label summing up the-orthodoxy of this. time is appositeg 
and furthe3r we may claim that it designates the substan- 
ive core of this 'conventional wisdom'. 
If we take the notion of 'intervention' and un- 
pack it, we can make a preliminary identificationlof 
what the idea presupposes and entails. Thus if we 
take any particular occasion of an intervention theng 
commonsensicallyp it might be understood as a 'deliber- 
ate action whose objective is to bring about a partic- 
ular change in some array and thereby achieve or 
approach a preferred state of affairsl. Here we seem 
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to have three basic elements: the suppositions that 
(1) there'is something to be acted upon, an object, 
(2) that it will respond, and in a predictable fashion, 
and (3) the idea that the intervention is accomplished 
by an actor in a precise manner according to some 
clear, set of expectations. 
There are two related points to note out of this. 
Firstly, that the story above requires that the actor 
confront(or constitute for his present purposes) an 
object; that is, there is implicit in the ordinary 
notion of intervention a subject- object dualism. Nowq 
whether this dualism is taken as a moment in some more 
general procedure or as a fixed assumption is a matter 
of. the wider philosophy of science into which a partic- 
ular theorist Is object drops. We can see'this more 
clearly if we go on to look at another element from 
above, that of a predictable response. For 'critical- 
theory' the products of the thinker are finally 'auth- 
enticated' by their being taken up by'groups within 
society. That isq the critical theorist is in the busi- 
ness of making sense, and this being so the element 
of IsubJect-object' is but a moment in a longer all- 
embracing processof theoreticians meditations and 
their dissemihation and translation - or not - into 
practice. On the other hand so far as empiricist 
positivism is concerned the dualism is a fixed assump- 
tion. There is an array of objects and (relatively) 
detached from them the actorwhose intervention alters 
in some way that array of objects. That there are 
objects whose behaviour is amenable to intervention 
such that its result is knowable beforehand entails 
that empiricist positivism subscribes to an idea of 
the exchange ýetween theorists and beality as issuing 
in description in terms of causes, rather than, as 
with 'critical theory', tendencies. The products of 
the empiricist thinker are #validated' by their 
corresponding to the facts@ In general we'can, claim 
that positivism as a variety of empiricism entails-, 
an ontology of things, sepatate from other things. 
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Thus Strawson (53) constructs hie 'descriptive meta- 
physics' ýnd identifies as fundamental elements of 
our ontology two sorts of things, material things and 
persons(a special sort of material thing). 
If the above is true. then clearly the 'interventions, ' 
of the critical theorist are not those of the orthodox 
empi! bicist positivist. Those of the former are 
interpretive-directive(moral persuasion, b: roadly)'whilst 
tho'Be of the latter are causal-descriptive(manipulation 
of objects)9 and in some measure these ideals of explan- 
ation flow from the monistic/dualistic metaphysics 
affirmed. Related to this is the matter of our second 
observation upon our'ldefinition', and this concerns 
the form of explanation required by the demand for/ 
pursuit of causal explanations. It is clear that for 
an intervention to be successful it must be a knowing 
intervention, that is, in the right place, at the 
right time and of the right kind.. Thus manipulative 
intervention demands a general set of explanations 
which will tell the actor or agent how the object 
in question behaves in the absence of intervention and 
in the presence of specified interventions. In ordinary 
parlancetwhat is needed is a 'theory" but it is not 
that simple. The role and status of 'theory' and 'models' 
and so on, on the one hand, and politidal and social 
practice on the other, and the nature of their relation- 
ship are much debated questions. Here we shall be 
content with noting a few views from economists; which, 
as we are interested at present in establishing the 
nature of the set of explanations of the inhabitants of the 
orthodoxy is both appropriate and a legitimate tempor- 
ary evasion of these difficult problems. 
From Napoleoni's history we draw the important 
example of 'deductive empiricism'. Robbins publishes 
in 1932 a book which argues that economics is to be 
seen as a science which derives its propositions from 
a set of particular(obvious) assumptions. These are 
"certain simple and indisputable facts of experience 
relating to the way in which the scarcity of goods, 
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which is the subject of economics, is actually revealed 
in'everyday life"(54). The method follows: "if, thes. e 
premises are accepted as corresponding to reality, the 
generalisations economics achieves by way of deduction 
also correspond to reality"(55). The situation is thus 
of a deductive core erected upon a bed of formally 
expressed commonplaces , issuing in complex descriptions 
of realityg and having remote consequences (deduced) 
taken as true of reality. Napoleoni reports that Robbins! 
, deductive empiricism' was the methodological counter- 
part of equilibrium economics and that it was an in- 
fluential text in the years before World War Two. 
The general drift of subsequent reflection upon 
the grounding and procedures of economics within the 
mainstream would seem to be one of a relaxation of 
this strict line, There is a shift from 'deductive 
empiricism'. to what Hindess will dub 'epistemology 
of models', where realism is crucial. In respect of 
'growth theory' Harrod plays a central role. Of his 
work Robinson notes that he falls into the familiar 
and unhappy procedure of deriving policy prescriptions 
of great -precision from premises of great abstractness. 
Thus she writes: "It is a common vice of present day 
economic argument to jump from a highly abstract piece 
of analysis straight to prescriptions for policy, 
without going through the intermediate stage of examining 
how far the assumptions in the analysis fit the facts Q 
of the actual situation There is a big gap between 
Mr. Harrodls ingenious and instructive manipulation of 
his-three GIs and the conditions of any actual economy"- 
(56). 
In 1953 Friedman(57) publishes a famous text wherein 
he argues that the realism of model builderel assumptions 
is not an interesting question; instead, economists 
should look to the success or otherwise of'the predictions 
made from them. Developing this line with reference to Pop- 
er, Hutchison has. argued (58)that economics can at last 
'grow-out of' its apriorism: the task would become 
the improvement of the predictions routinely made in" 
social lifega collection as it were of extremely 6oph- 
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-isticated rules of thumb. Yet in general it would 
seem that-these arguments are overly subtle:, yvork 
within economics repeatedly collapses into a common 
sense that is straightforwardly empiricist(51), even 
though it might be an attenuated strain. compared to 
Robbins. 
Thus Solow(60) has proposed to regard growth theory 
as a parable whereby typical economic relations may 
be displayed; and it is within the empiricist frame 
that economics, sought to fashion the stratagems for 
intervention demanded by political events. What they 
came up withq and refined to great levels of sophistic- 
ation and politico-social generality. was 'growth theory'. 
2.1 Growth theory: lintervention'legitimated. 
We begin with the origins of growth theory in Keynes's 
work. We have already seen how Keynes effects a sharp 
reformulation of neo-classicism; his effort, organised 
around the pressing need (both practical and intellectual) 
to resolve the problem of treatment of unemployment, 
offers a challenge to neo-classicism at several points 
as we have seen. However, whilst Keynes' analysis issues 
in conclusions distinctly unpalatable to neo-classicismg 
he nonetheless remained within the ambit of neo- 
classicism It is only later (eg. Robinson 1962) that 
the idea that Keynes has re-invented political economy 
is entertained., 
Against this background Harrod produces hisessay 
of 1939 and the fuller collection of 1948, Kurihara 
notes' that. Harrod (with Domar later) ". established 
growth economic. s as a going concern on the foundations 
of Keynes' saving-investment theory"(61), and helps us 
further by offering a summary of the shift in emphasis 
and orientation effected by Harrod. "if Keynes effected 
the transition-from micro-analysis (with emphasis on 
profit maximization for the firm a la Marshallian 
price. theory) to macro-analysis (with emphasis on 
employment maximization for the whole economy a la 
General Theory), then Harrod can be credited with effec- 
ting the post-Keynesian transition from short run macro- 
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-statics to long run macro-dynamics. Harrod emphaaized 
the long tun importance of the growth-promoting, capacity- 
increasing aspect of savingg,, where as Keynes had concentra- 
ted on the employment-impeding, demand-decreasing aspect 
of, saving; Harrod also emphasized investment both as a 
cause and as an effect of capacity expansion, whereas 
Keynes has treated investement mainly as a Lý_ource of 
effdctive demand"(62). 
1. 
It would now be appropriate to look at the H-D (63) 
model in a little detail and to take note of one major 
subsequent change. The influence of the H-D model, has 
been extensive: Brookfield notes that it was this theory 
that "underlay the growth policies actually put into 
effect"(64). Looking at the model will let us grasp the 
narrowness of its origin and form; for example Zeylstra 
describes it9quite accurately, as a "by product of the 
Keynesian revolution in income and employment theory"(65) 
The theory of growth is not an easy area for the. non-, 
specialist to penetrate; for example Brookfield, remarks 
that the division of efforts into two schools is a 
"rather fine distinction .... of greater importance to 
economists than to users of their work"(66). Yet Jones 
notes that from H-D's work "radically different concl- 
usions have emerged"(67)f Thus Brookfield's remark entails 
either his having misread the import of the technical 
debate or his tacit agreement with Zeylstralwho has the 
, politicians' taking what they wanted out of the work 
of the edonomists. He says, "Once confronted with reality 
in the developing countries the economists began arguing 
among themsel*zes about aid theories and strategies they 
prefered leaving to the politicians the opportunity of 
adhering to the most convenient opinionsT68). However 
the results of theorizing have been used., it is the 
case that two Ischobls' may be identified. Thus Kregel 
(69) distinguishes two lines of thought, both revolving 
around H-D9 but with one descending from neo-classical 
equilibrium theory, whilst the other derives from 
classical economics via Keynes ana Kalecki. This reading 
is supported, in emphatic terms, by Jones... -Who reports 
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that the 'Cambridge school' including Kaldor, Robinson 
and Sraff6.. has heavily and persistently criticised the 
neo-classical schemes represented by Solow and 
Samuelson at MIT, at Cambridge, Mass. Jones reports that 
"Few controversies in the history of economic thought 
have been conducted with so much vigour and, at times, 
virulence as the series of interconnected debates between 
the two Cambridges on the concept of capital, and the 
process of economic growth and technical change"(70). 
Earlier it is noted that "theories of growth have gener- 
ated bitter controversy"(71); and when Solow's 1956 
reworking of H-D's problem is looked at it is not hard 
to see why. 
. Harrod's work 
is in the style of Keynesq as regards 
terminologygaezump. tions and techniques, His essay focuses 
on "the necessary conditions for equilibrium between 
aggregate saving and investment in a dynamic economy"072). 
The basic proposition is that Ga=s/v where'Galis the 
actual rate of growth of National Income, lsl is marginal 
propensity to save and IvI is the marginal capital- 
output ratio. This 'fundamental relation' (73) can 
define a growth path if it can be linked'to a statement 
of the entrepreneur's estimations. The notion of 
'warranted growthlis introduced it seemsto fulfil the 
Keynesian role of entrepreneur. The entrepreneur invests, 
and his investment today depends upon his estimation 
of tommorow 
Is possibilities. If he is to be reassured 
that his reading of the economy is correct then Ga 044 
will have to be equal to Gw. In addition to Ga and Gw 
Harrod has Gn. which is the Inatural''rate of growth 
flowing from given rises in population. 
- If these are put together we have the first major 
conclusion to issue from his work. thus; "If, by 
coincidence, the actual rate of'growth equalled the 
warranted ratep which itself equalled the rate of 
growth of the labour force, then steady growth-at full 
emDloyment-would occut. "(75), Harrod thinks it extremely 
unlikely(76)9 and as Jones says "this conclusion is 
thoroughly Keynesian in spirit: there is no reason to 
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believe that full employment equilibrium will be attain- 
ed"(77). This being the case it is noted that all sub- 
sequent growth theory has been aimed at evading Harrods 
thesis(78). 
The second line of thought on growth models comes 
from the USA and falls into the tradition of neo-class- 
icism. It is this line that is most used; it is the 
"dominant method of growth economics"(79). It may be 
taken to begin with a paper by Solow(1956) which was 
aimed explicitly at the first of HarroA 1problems19 
the difficulty of 'getting on target'; but in the course 
of his paper both 'problems' are treated. Solow's 
theory is constructed in the same fashion as Harrod Is 
that is. be begins with a series of assumptions and 
derives a set of conclusions relevant to practice. 
The notable features of his model, for our purposes, 
are the impact his assumptions have on. it in comparison 
to, HarrodIs assumptions. In fact he contrives to by-pass 
all the problems presented by Harrod's * model. 
In Harrod 
the role of entrepreneurial expectation is, following 
Keynesq of major significance as a source of instability 
in the system yet Solow chops out entrepreneurial 
expectation. The other major change concerns the type 
of production function used, the way capital and labour 
are fitted into the model. Solow uses a scheme whose 
import is that warranted and natural rates of growth 
coincide automatically; the 'first Harrod problem' 
thus disappears. (80) 
Soloh model (or parable) inverts Harrod: the 
growth path is not only obtainable but economies tend 
to move towards it. Cigno sums it up. "This model projects 
the image of a well-ordered and stable society, whose 
prosperity depends on the thriftiness, inventiveness 
and technical skill of its members, and where every- 
one is rewarded according to his. contribution to the 
common good"(8I). 
We now turn to some criticisms of the H-D procedure. 
If the foregoing presents the emeftence of the formal 
.- 
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explanatory core of the early post-war orthodoxy, now 
we may asli-(l) how does it translate into practice? 
(in rich areas, in poor areas)and (2) what are the 
fundamental problems(if any) of going about things in 
this way? We- may answer that as regards the precise 
form and associated problems of H-D's extension to 
matters of the Third World2this is a topic for part 
3 of this chapter, and for Chapter Four. The relevance 
to situations of 'rich' we will touch upon in Section 
three when we look at the disintegration of the orthodoxy. 
Here we pursue the question of the use of models as the 
typical frame af. the explanatory-justificatory s. chemes 
governing linterventionl. (82). We want to argue (1) that 
the H-D model not only is not a developed social theory, 
but cannot be turned into one; (2) that the H-D model 
must be regarded as an elaboration of common-sense, and 
as it claims to be something more than this it is thus 
ideological in a pejorative sense. 
(1) That the H-D model is not a developed social 
theory is readily apparent; it does not claim to be 
one.. However(as Brookfie. ldq JoOes, Streeten and others 
note)it doesiunderlie the policies put into effect,, If 
this is so then we can say that it is a poor place to 
start. We can recall our characterization of social theory 
and indicate how, in comparisonkto make sense. Social 
theorizing, it was suggested, can be seen as the 
deployment of a morally informed categorical scheme 
where the categories are (for the theorist) given and 
value-slopedgand the moral involvement is self-defining 
and secondary. Now in contrast to the product we might 
envisage flowing from such an exercise, the H-D effort 
is defective in two areas. It is 'intrinsically'. 
defective in that it is unreflective. H-D theorists 
are making a moral intervention in the world and this is 
not an acknowledged part of their effort. Claims to 
'value freedom' are not credible, and equally un- 
satisfactory are pro-forma statements. The second defect- 
lextrinsicl, as it were-7 of the H-D model is that its 
style compounds the errors encouraged by its un- 
reflectiVeness. We note three points. 
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(a) Streeten points out that the formal mode adopted 
invites a-. slide from the possibly true claim that 
'economic facts' 
, 
are accessiblequantifiable and manipul- 
able to the wholly false claim that 'economic facts' 
are somehow 'objective' in a way that political, social 
or moral considerations are not. It is noted that "though 
logically fallacious this type of reasoning which attempts 
to substitute 'objective' criteria for political choices 
provides an intellectual escape mechanism from difficult 
or unpleasant political decisions"(83). But, it might 
be objected. thus-far H-D are possibly being held respon- 
sible for the sins of those who have used their work; 
is this not ' unreasonable? (b)Howeverthe dominant 
style of economic theorizing out of which background 
th ey came lodged claims to factual adequacy; thus Robbins 
(1932) presents his Ideduc-tive-enipiricism'. The assumptions 
of economics are "certain indisputable facts of exper- 
ience" ... "if. these premises are accepted as cprrespon- 
ding to reality the generalisations economics achieves 
by way of deduction also correspond to reality" .... "the 
admissibility of the premises on which economic science 
is built cannot, according to Robbins, be doubted since 
these are simple and obvious propositions" ... "they are 
the object of our everday experience"(84). (c) The 
tradition of economics as a deductive scienceicoupled with 
Streeteh Is note in respect of the tendency to equate 
quantification with objectivitylplus desire of theorists 
in government to provide policy-informing analyses, issues 
in an environment that can be seen to be conducive to - 
reading H-D models asq if not reporting fact, then close 
to it. or(in the same line but with minimal commitment) 
as helpful in uncovering it. 
(2) What then is the status of H-D? *. Hindess (85) 
points out that in mathematics a 'model' is a precisely 
specified set of rules relating one area of mathematical 
discourse to another. This is allparddigm. case of a 
theory in which the concept of model-has a definite 
and rigoiously defined f unction"(86). From here on 
(thinks Hindess, if we have understood him right), things 
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get worse. 
In Positivist philosophy of science this intra- 
theoretic relation is altered; a model now details the 
relation between theoretical machineries and the real 
world. 'a set of observations. Hindess takes. this to be 
the siibstitution of analogies for models. Indeed, claims 
to the use of models in natural science are taken, to 
be few and implausible. 
In the realm of the social sciences the notion of 
model reaches its nadir. Bauman(I972) and Levi-Strauss(1968) 
are cited. Bauman is quoted as saying "theorising 
consists in modelling reality. Theories are models! '(87). 
Hindess comments: "In these lines we have a concise 
statement of what might be called the epistemology 
of model building. Knowledge of the world is to be 
obtained through the construction and manipulation of 
models"(88). He then delineates, with reference to 
prior discussions of the role of models in mathematical 
logic., the consequences of this view. The precisely 
formulated 6orrespondences of elements of theoretical 
realips in mathematical logic, or the rigour of the 
(eventually unsatisfactory) positivist attempt to 
explicate the relation of theory and observation, are 
abandoned. Citing Levi-Strausshe comments that now 
"theoretical activity consists in the construction 
of models that are similar in certain 'essential' 
respects to the empirical domain in question. But how 
similar is similar and how does one choose amongst the 
multiplicity of possible models? "(89). It is concluded 
that : "at its best the epistemology of model building 
would result in a complex and sophisticated theoretical 
construct resting on. an arbitrary and merely plausible 
foundation'in resemblance"(90). 
Returning to the status of H-D)it seems to be 
-fairly clear that the scheme operates within the ambit 
of what has been called the epistemology of'models.. 
Recalling our references to the procedures of Robbins' 
'deductive empiricism' we can compare them with those 
of the epistemology of models. Of these Hindess notes 
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that "the epistemology of model building is an epistem- 
ology in which scientific knowledge is said to, be - 
produced through. the construction and manipulation of 
models"(91) ..... "models are obtained through a double 
process of abstraction and simplification and they 
may be subject to an lexperimentallmanipulation ........ 
.. knowledge may be produced through the experimental 
manipulation of formal systems"(92). At the end of the 
day models, conceived bog reduce to the status of 
persuasive metaphor. The theorist begins from some 
formalized element of common sense, be it the common 
sense of society or the common sense of the disciplineq 
and thither he eventually returns. 
As a general theory providing legitimation for 
linterventionIq 'growth theory', based on H-D models 
and theories of development derived therefrom, would 
seem to be untenable. However, whilst the effort is 
unsatisfactory in a technical s6nse, its ideological 
role remains serviceable. 
Touching upon the ideological role of H-D we may 
recall-from Postan that governments were caught up in 
a tide of opinion and only then did doctrines of growth 
emerge. What began as a solution to problems of un- 
employment- that is, a relatively specific remedy -was 
extended and transformed into a fully-fledged, if un- 
clearly spelt out, social doctrine. In the Irich1world 
it underpinned 'social democracyl, and with regard to 
the Third World it attained its most florid guise in 
the work of Rpstow with his 'stages of growth'. 
Putting a date to the emergence of the doctrine 
of growth is a little difficult. 
* 
From Brookfield we 
have the following: "The quasi,, religion, -;. of economic 
growth has had its origins in the 'long boom' experienced 
most joyfully in the West"(93). Postan we have seen 
dates-'recovery proper' a's beginning in 1948, and the 
. 'boom' 
takes off with the Korean war. By 1958 Galbraith 
is using Igrowthl in the sense of 'doctrine'. In 1959 
Kurihara publishes an exposition. so presumably the notion 
-- 72 ý- 
itself is earlier. The 1951 U. N. report of Lewis et al is 
cited by Kprihara as the first fruits of the Keynesian 
approach in regard to matters of development. Thus we may 
say the doctrine emerges between 1951 and1958, the period 
(as Postan puts it)of the West's most Irobust'growth(94). 
2.2 Planning: 'intervention' organised. 
Now we move from matters of legitimation to those of 
organisation, that is, planning. The conceptual relation 
is straightforward, in outline at least. Thus, given 
that we have a Itheoryl, based on growth models, we need 
to have an idea of how to go about using the theory 
to achieve those ends it was constructed to help achieve; 
and also to achieve those ends the process of theory 
construction has revealed to us. How do we organise, 
initiateg monitor and control our lintervention'QOOHow do 
we plan?. Indeed, can we?. 
In regard to the theoretical possibility of planning, 
we may begin by noting that it is poscible with the 
notion of 'planning' (as with any other term in the 
social science lexicon) to distinguish a range of 
meanings. To offer even a preliminary exposition of the 
term's conceptual and historical range would be a long 
andq more pertinently, often irrelevant task at present. 
We shall begin where our discussion so far indicates 
that we shouldg that is, with economics and edonomic 
theory. 
The debate about the possibility of planning beginsf 
it has been argued, not with Marx and Engels(who advocated 
but did not treat the notion of a 'planned economy')'; but 
with an Austrian economist, Von Miseswho in the 1920's 
argues that a planned economy could not work rationally. 
The gist of his aiZgument is thatq separating the economy 
from its institutional frameg it is the economy's Job 
to allocate scarce resourdes between competing ends. 
This requires precise indices of scarcity, else choices 
would be'ungrounded. The only w4y to get these indices 
is to allow market determination of price. Thus an 
ec. onomy with no market cannot provide any index of 
scarcity and so cannot rationally allocate scarce 
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resources. 
Unfortunately for Von Mises a reply was to-be found 
in established equilibrium theory. The answer follows 
from Walrasian analysis of 'price'. Commonsensically, 
'price' is the rate at which goods are exchanged; they 
may additionally beeexpressed via a 'standard'.. say 
relative to the price of gold. Walras' system goes rather 
deeper and issues in the entirely non-intuitive assertion 
that, from the general character of the system, lpricel 
can be established prior to -indeed independently of- 
any involvement with the market. Napoleoni, who provides 
this analysisq sums up-his treatment by noting that "the 
price of one good- in terms of another can be determined 
at. least in theory as the rate of technological and 
psychological equivalence of the two goods whether or 
not an actual act of exchange takes place in a market" 
(95). More directlyg "if one accepts that the mechanism 
which determins the choices of individuals, that is. the 
mechanisms that generates relative prices, can be put 
in the form of a system of equations, then one has to 
acceptq at least in principle that given the terms of 
the problem the prices can be calculated without any 
need for a market"(96). 
Subsequent debate revolved around the practical 
possibility of planning. Thus Hayek and Robbins objec- 
ted that the Walrasian equations would take so much 
time and data as to be un-usable for practical purposes; 
whereas Lange and Dobb both defended the notion. Lange 
opposes Von Mises yet grants much of the force of 
the criticisms of Robbins and Hayek. In doing so he 
reproduces, says Napoleoni, a mechanism rather like the 
market. Dobb's line points to a distinction between 
the efficient use of presently available goods on the 
one hand, and on the other to the longer term problem 
of raising the productive capacity of an economy; 
planning is thus conceived as an instrument for accumu- 
lation rather than another style of allocation. 
The history prepared by Turner and Collia(97) of 
notions of economic planning fills out the above treat- 
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-ment in that it permits us to add two further notes. 
Firstly thpy distinguish, both as practical and as 
theoretical efforts, between 'imperative' and 'indicative' 
planning. The former identifies those conceptions 
thrown up by socialist thinkers, and the latter one 
those patterns of government intervention developed 
by the 'west'. The former seeks to replace the market 
whilst the latter seeks to reduce the possibilities 
for market dis-equilibrium; both through monetary and 
fiscal policies and via the reduction of uncertainty; 
that is, the government-acts as an information clearing 
centre. The second note to be made is that the history 
of theorizing on these mattersl(whether imperative or 
indicative)has been marked by the elaboration of soph- 
isticated modelingg forecasting, gaming etc. techniques. 
What this brief sketch establishes for our purposes 
is that the required notion of planning was not wholly 
novelpnor incoherentt- for the orthodoxy; and(recalling 
Clairmonte )it was increasingly an element of the actual 
behaviour of capitalist enterprise in an era of concen- 
tration. Nonetheless, the notion, cutting at the heart 
of the dogma of the market, was not uncontested(98). 
We now consider institutional-change. Above we have 
seen how the Idea oflinterv6ntion' elicits the idea. of 
planning and how that idea was a contested element of 
established economic theory, available for use when 
required for the construction of theories of development. 
We now come at the same issueg. the emergence of planning, 
from a different direction and show how the notion's 
theoretical availability was translated, ambiguously, 
into practice as an element of the 'Keynesian revolution' 
as further shaped by the emergence of doctrines of 
growth. 
Brookfield notes that a contributory factor in 
the rise of the preoccupation with 'growth' was the 
'reconstruction of capitalismIt specifically monopoly 
forms of enterprises and a recasting of the relation- 
ship of state and industry. Writing as some sort of a 
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marxist he properly notes that "there is nothing new 
about the-Partnership between capital and statp"(99); 
what is novel is its respectability and organisation. 
The aspect of 'respectability' is well expressed in 
Clairmonte's work,,, as when discussing the emergence of 
interventionism he remarks that: "By the end of the . 
thirties the Keynesian approach to problems of economic 
stabilisation and full employment had become generalized" 
(IOO). Now this is a bold claim; and whilst with regard 
to subsequently established war. economies it is arguably 
true(IOI), with regard to post-war capitalist economies 
of the-'west' it is very probably false. Indeed Clair- 
monte notes that between 1950-54 there was a stream of 
US government reportýs stressing market principles, and 
Ro binson(1962) notes that Keynesianism was only ever 
patchily taken up. 
That Clairmonte can make his bold, if anxious, 
claim reflects, as we shall see in chapter fourthe 
optimism of the period, Here we can record that legisla- 
tiveAiR88YQ! Hes the emergence of the doctrine of growth. 
The doctrine id itself novel but, says Postan, "even 
more fundamental were the legislative and institutional 
innovations introduced by individual governments in 
their pursuit of economic development"(102). After that 
gesture to theory he notes the practical c. ouxýterpart, 
saying. "If immediately after the war Prance was almost 
alone in trying to work out and to enforce a central 
iplanl,, eventually most governments equipped themselves 
with machineries and policies for the concerted planning 
of economic growth"(103). 
The theoretical basis for these changes from pre- 
war attitudes wasýKeynesian; and in the 'west' these 
new machineries have t aken the form of varieties of 
indicative planning devices. The extent and style of 
adoptýon varies; so in*the USA acknowledgment of a 
Keynesian-style rola of government was, at least' 
ideologicallyg more fraught. Thus Harris talking of the 
ERP notes that it points up an uncomfortable gap* ' 
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between US ideals of market forces and actual US practice. 
Some see this tension as resolved in favour of, the 
status quo; thus Sweezy argues that with the Kennedy 
period the reformism of Keynes is finally extinguished(IO4). 
However any debate about the career of Keynesianism is 
resolved, it remains the case that in matters of respec- 
tibility and organisation the work of Keynes legitimated 
and permitted a reworking of the relatio0ship of state 
and industry, and a reworking of public attitudes 
thereto. Keynesianism, we have tried to point out. was 
the particular intellectual/ideological form in which 
& prior political need to 'intervene' manifested itself. 
11 
2.3 Aid: the lowest tier, 'intervention' implemented. 
Thus far we have looked at the legitimation of the idea 
of 'intervention' in the construction of growth theories 
which serve-(or purport to) the purpose of telling the inter 
-vening agent how a given system might be understood 
to behave.. The 'might' is not unimportantas we noted 
that the claim* of model users and economists in regard 
to the staus of these models was problematic. We intimat- 
ed that even if the claim to deductive-empirical scien- 
tific status was not lodged then it was Very easy to 
slide from regarding:, a model as a heuristic device to 
seeing it as a, maybe imperfect, statement about an 
externalg given, teality. 
Subsequently we pursued the matter of the organis- 
ation of intervention: if we know in principle how our. 
target system behaves then we need as a next step to 
be clear as to how, precisely, we may approach and 
manipulate it. This requirement of 'intervention' 
we took to have spawned the interest we noted, amongst 
theoreticians and practitionersl in planning. The 
planner, our agentv seeks to establish mechanisms for 
the organisation of specific interventions. Th. is role 
is subject to two polar interpretations; the master 
scientist and the under-labourer. Both are out of the 
same school of'interventionism, and thus shifting from 
one to the other represents a change of emphasis withi4 
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an approach, rather than any change of line. Waterson 
plots thisas an historical shift, very well(IQ5). 
Treating the period of the late 160's he argues that 
the style of 'planning from the top down' gives way to 
the inverse style, that is 'planning from the bottom 
up', where the pursuit of straightforwardly given oppor- 
tunities is substituted for the pursuit of more general 
ideologically-derived objectives of development Yet, 
whatever the style and whatever the mix of the above 
two elementslin the end the planner writes plano; 
blueprints for 'interventions'. 
We thus reach the third stage of 'intervention': 
from legitimationg through organisation, to implemen- 
tation. Aid- which generically we can take to be specific, 
piecemeal interventions in the system having the aim of 
contriving a preferred state of affairs- may be in the 
form of 'one-off jobs'. a part of a sequence, a programme, 
a setetc. Here we look at questions , 
of the origins 
and principles of aid, and the extension of interest 
to the Third World. 
The sources of the idea of aid can be placed in.. 
the nature of the ideology of growth; that is, aid is 
a logical consequence of growth models. As regards 
the origin of present conceptions of aid as a practical 
activitY9 most theorists point to the immediate post- 
war period(IO6). The usual conception of this time is 
most clearly expressed by Mikesell when he writes that 
11(i) aid theories provide an analytic framework for 
determining the amount and timing of the aid and the 
policies which must be followed by the recipient 
country for (ii) achieving a given*target rate of growth 
which can be sustained without further external assis- 
tance"(I07). 
Zeylstra identifies two sources of interest for aid 
giving, and these reflect wider differences than he expl- 
icitly notes between US and European interests., - 'Thus - 
we have noted a split between H-D et al and Solow et al. 
and here we may add. an historical aspect to the 
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6ivergence. Mikesell argues that "the vast bulk of 
French and-British foreign aid is directed tow&rd their 
respective community of nations. Unlike the US, Britain 
. and France have not had to develop a special rationale 
in terms of either Free World security of universal 
humanitarianism for obtaining public support for their 
aid programs"(IOS). 
Zeylstrals first source is aid to allies, exemplified 
by the ERP by means of which the US disbursed aid to 
sixteen European nations. V7hite(IOq) in his politically 
sensitive treatment of aid identifies the period 1948-52 
(original ERP programme years) as the time of the first 
'phase in the career of the notion of aid. The second phase 
represents a geographical extension: thus as ERP secured 
allies in Europe,. so aid will secure allies in Asia, 
1952-56. These two periods constitute what we have 
taken as. the period of 'internal orientationlon the part 
of western theorists and agencies. With the shift of 
aid to the A. sian aphere its perceived task is broadened, 
and the notion of development comes to the fore rather 
than reconstruction. The notion becomes diffuse. This 
process is further advanced'when, in the wake of the'1955 
Bandung Conference's advocacy of the claims of the 'non- 
aligned', the USSR emerges as a source of aid. The 
division of the world into two camps is thus broken 
and the Third World becomes a realm of competion. Aid 
is no longer to allies, but is rather a contract; 
demands that recipients become allies are no longer 
tenable, rather a development ideology is propounded. 
As Streeten puts it, "growth according to their respec- 
tive Western and Eastern recipes was held out as the 
reward for keeping. out of the other camp"(IIO). This 
-set of events we take to mark the switch from 'internal' 
to 'external' focus in regard to growth. 
The second. source of interest in aid-giving identif- 
ied by Zeylstra is the Idecolonization' process. This 
is taken to have been split into two periods. The first 
was . the more or less enforced withdrawal from Asian 
anji Arab land. s. The problem of 'off-loading' remaining 
areas, principally in Africa, in an ordered manner 
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is then confronted. The result is that from 1957-to 164(the 
period of-ordered withdrawal) aid flows are linked to 
the transfer of power from colonial to indigenous 
regimes with whom agreements relating to development 
are made. 
The above indicates the divergent sources of interest 
ing, 'and consequent character of, the notion of aid. 
Identifying a core to such an idea is difficult, yet 
Zeylstra attempts this4ln his case it is to fix a measure 
against which practice may be judged; for cur purposess 
it is to reveal the character of the notion ifi the light 
of our idea of linterventionl)o Zeylstra attempts to 
construct his criterial definition out of an examination 
of ordinary usage; thus he says the analysis "needs a 
concept defined strictly according to the purpose that 
is expressed by it"(111). Pive criteria of what is to , 
couni as international development aid are identified. 
Jal"cooperation with a foreign state or autonomous 
political unit"(112)Here he acknowledges the problem- 
atical nature of the state: Le facto authority aver an 
area is a sufficient condition, ýe jRre not a necessary 
one. Zeylstra begins , 
here- not an obvious starting point$ 
as one of his concerns is to locate the idea of aid- 
within the corpus of western categories surrounding 
the 19th century rise of industrial states: the relevance 
of this set of notions he questions. Polemically he 
reduces 'development aid' to a "missionary inspiration 
to propagate the western way of life,, (112a The 
thrust of this critique we have treated in chapter two, 
-when we asked, in effect., what else ? 
(b)"with the object oý assisting that state or autonom- 
-ous political unit in furthering its economic,,. growth 
and social purposell(113). The linking of questions of 
'statehood' to notions of 'progress' is probably 
correct: we ýave intimaýed above that the present form 
of the 'idea of progress' is 1drowth19 understood as a 
doctrine. The ambiguity here,. of which Zeylstra seems 
to be aware, lies between propounding 'progress' (taken 
so - 
as integral to Western thought)and the notion of 
'development' on the one hand, and on the. other 'growth' 
seen as a post-War bastard form of 'progress': an 
'intervention' indeed designed to bpy off conflict! 
(c)"The peoples to be assisted should be completely 
responsible for their countries'economic and social 
development"(114). Here there is a hint at the formal 
aspect of aid: the development aid should be planned, 
assistance is targeted, itis not like flinging fertilizer 
about and hoping. Thus a functioning government machine 
is a necessary condition of receipt of aid. 
(d)"the decision to offer assistance, however, should 
not be dominated by the wish to create ....... advantages 
(nb. for donor)intentionally"(ll5). Aid is not an export- 
credit guaranteeg for instance( as the 'left' correctly 
perc6ived the Marshall Plan). Advantages accruing to the 
donor should be secondary. This is the moral aspect of 
'aiding'. as Zeylstra sees it; the effort ought not to 
flow from an instrumental stance but from an ethic of 
ends. 
1"Insofar as development cooperation refers to econo- Le 
mid developmentg prýesuming, its efficacy presupposes 
that developmentg growth. progress, are not predetermined 
elements of a 'given reality', but subject to human 
effort"(116). Zeylstra talks of'efforý, not control; 
he hedges on extent to which human input to history is 
taken as being effective. A naive view of planning 
would approachg say Fabian/liberal, ideal of replacement 
of politics. The converse would be a thoroughgoing 
determinism. It is the mix of these two and the resul- 
ting claims for extent of human power(both theoretically, 
and as a practical historical possibility for the 
present)that is the difficult question here. Zeylstra 
dodges it. That this is the crucial element Zeylstra 
indeed recognisesq noting that 11 in all social fields 
attention became focussed on the role human effort 
played as a creative , element"(116a),, 
This final criterion, (e), is in fact the basis of 
any aid effort, whilst the other four list in idealist 
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fashion the ordinary-language derived definition of aid. 
That such'a definition may be of use in examining the 
practical record of donors becomes clear when we add 
that this arguably rather empty analysis follows an 
explicit setting aside of familiar political notions 
of aid. For the present we note that Zeylstra offers 
the beginings of a formal definition of aid, what we 
would expect to derive from linterventionl(ý_an d e, and 
a in that it pursues clarity in exchange) and couples it 
with an odd acknowledgement of his status as a west- 
ern theorist(a, b. and d ). The criticisms aimed at the 
notions of progress/state/development are in some sense 
moral, the notions are taken to be problematical in 
some way. That they are not absolutes, we may grant', 
that they are thereby negotiable in any significant 
or immediate sense, seems to us to be a false conclusion 
(as we saw in Ohapter Two). 
The foregoing indicates the practical sources 
of interest in aid and its scope as' a concept guiding 
action. ( It is not a report on how it has been used. 
This is Whitds procedure-, of his own effort he*notes 
that it looks at "the many ways in which the many 
different sorts of resource called laid' have been used" 
(117)) . It'will now. be appropriate to ask how the orthodox 
notion was deployed vis a vis matters of the development 
of the Third World. Here we use the work of White; his 
'empiricist' approach to aid easily reveals the facts 
brute-relative toour present concerns. We ask how does aid 
sit with orthodox economics? The answer, to anticipate, 
is. -very closely, with 'supplemental theories' whereby 
specific interventions are aimed at unsatisfactory 
areas of the recipientý economic system.. 
Whites procedure presents problems, thus his 
tempiricisml, although declared, is flawed. He seemingly 
deploys an aprioristic categorization to types. of 
aid theories.. and entirely fails to see how the most 
familiar type of theory, ifi. his own estimation, flows 
from the fundamental 'intervention' orientation -of the 
10 W1. Thus he says of his first category9tsupplementall 
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11that(it) predominates in most of the literature on aid" 
(118), and. he goes on-. "this in itself is a phetiomenon 
which requires explanation. In principle the four cate- 
g9ries are indeed of equal status11(119). '&E3etting aside the 
question of what this last remark entails for his declared 
'nominalism', we may ask whether his answer to his own 
question is adequate. His answer is that in the 'ideas 
market' supplemental theories were in demand. In contrast, 
Zeylstras effort here is richer: he also shows the element 
of political demandbut goes on to note that the theories 
produced were developed-out of existing economic - 
theory resources. It seems safe to assert that thinkers 
pursue consistency even if they are operating in a 
market for ideas. The failure of White to relate 
supplementary theories of aid to the dominant orthodoxies 
ethos flows, it would seem, from his insensitivity 
to the role of theory in social science. 
. 
White begins his report as follows: "The starting 
point of supplemental theories is the identification 
of some key factor of the development process"(110). 
We can note that * White does not split the interven- 
tion sequence ihto three parts as we have done, conse- 
quently he criticises supplemental schemes for being 
more than descriptions-of how aid works, saying-. "they 
are essentially theories about the role of saVings or 
foreign exchange or skills or institutions in develop- 
mentg not about aid, as such, and it is from a view about 
the role of savings etc. that they prescribe rather 
than describe the role of aid"(121. )If he regarded 
aid as the third leg of an intervention sequence then 
this, criticism. couldn't arisegbecause the wholly formal 
aspect of description is effected by the 'growth model' 
stage of the treatment. A second point . 
from the above 
is that the view noted fits with our examination of the 
notion of 'intervention'. but we may askswhy 'key 
factor' and not 'key factors'? Is this simply an-,. accid- 
ent of intellectual history in the sehae that a theory, 
H-Dp'liable to single-factor interpretation, was avai- 
lable on the shelf when called for? Or might there be- 
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an intrinsic tendency in this interventionist line 
toward identifying a key factor' out of some wider 
preliminary setT If the realm of the social is regarded 
as a field of interactions behaving analogously to 
natural science 'causes', then the possibility of iden- 
fying one element that just is the crucial element is 
open. It follows from the principle of economy in 
explanation, as a logical possibility. However on the 
face of it White's explanation seems more plausible; 
presumably the confidence of the theorists did not 
extend to their being prepared to claim that their 
models were that accurate. If that estimation is correct 
then a sociology of knowledge and/or psychological 
explanation is to be sought for this habit of producing 
'key' factors. 
White notes that in the 1950's and early 1960's 
this 'key factor' was usually savings. He goes on to 
say that by the mid-196O's 'single factor' approaches 
were falling out of favour. Supplemental theories were 
revised. )he tells us, by adding 'transfer of organisation' 
to the development brew, and this was, significant. 
"The emphasis shifted from resources for development 
to institutions of development and to the forms of 
social organisation most likely to stimulate development" 
(122). The significance of this is taken to be two-fold; 
Firstly, lassistancel becomes Ileveragel; and secondly, 
expectations of impact of aid veer from enhancement 
of local trends to effecting of fundamental changes 
in recipient states'social orderd 
. Two points arise from this, First the shift frnm 
thelpl to Ileveragel is non-existent. White takes 
'leverage' to be a late 1960's notion. whereas with 
Harris we have noted its being an element of ERP. It 
also rather goes against what he has to say with respect 
to history of aid. -Thus his phase 11(early 19501s) sees the 
US offering aid to allies in Asia to fight-communism,; 
surely that counts as 'leverage' ?. The second point 
is rather more significant. We may ask whether White 
is, lumping together US modernization theory with Streeten/ 
- 84 - 
r, 
Myrdal 'institutional economics'. Clearly they have 
resemblaneps)yet we wish to distinguish them. Following 
Ehrensaft we take the latter to be 'closer to reality'. 
Ehrensaft does not treat any modernizers explicitly; 
only implicitly, as part of the unexamined orthodoxy.. -A 
little 
light is thrown on this with White's next claim: "The two 
dominant influences in the construction of growth models 
as a basis for supplemental theories have been the HLD 
model , *. oo and WW Rostow 
Is theory of the stages of 
economic growth"(123). Now it is clear that 'institutional 
economists' (if they include Seers, Streeten, Myrdal, etp. ) 
do move away from any H-D/Rostow line. This latter line 
leads straight to the Kennedy 'high tide' period. Thus 
we. may suggest that Rostow (abusing much work on ICOR, 
according to Brookfield) combines the H-D model, as 
adjusted by Solow such that growth is 'natural' and not 
un-likely, with US proselytising, in modernization theory. 
In this cade there are indeed two lines to be aistin- 
guished, and it is not clear that White does this. 
We began this sub-section by asking how the principles 
of-de,, 7elopment 
, 
aid looked at sat with the economic orthodoxy. 
We answer that the relation is close in the case 
of supplemental theories of aid, in that aid is: (l) seen 
as a specific intervention, this assumes the guise of an 
implication of H-D model, though that model is later 
heavily revised in very many ways(see Mikesell); (2) 
seen as being; of short duration, vulgarly Rostowls 'take- 
off'; (3) seen as resultihg in the raising of the economic 
system to a new higher level of activity where growth 
is self-sustaining. 
2.4 Summary of section two. * 
Begining with the notion of 'intervention', we have 
tried to display the nature of the early post-war 
orthodoxy of ldevelopýnent-studiesl. We have argued that 
political demand lodged within the theoretical context 
of the Keynesian revolution, as indicated in Section 
One, called forth the pblicy-scientific notion of 
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ordered growth. 
'Intervention', we argued, required a tri-partite 
treatment. One:. legitimation, a general theorem, and this 
we saw as being provided by 'growth-theoryl,. Two: action 
must be ordered; 'here we looked at ideas of planning, . 
both those lodged in the history of economic debateand 
those called forth by Keynesian recasting of the role of 
government. Three, aid: the final stage in the interven- 
tion±6t scheme, that is, implementation. 
How we have had something to say about these issues 
as they present themselves in the context of treatments 
of matters of the Third World, but thus far only in 
passing. We now turn directly to the question of the 
application of this general strategy and set of assump- 
tions to the issue of the development of the Third World. 
3, ODynamic of Theory II: Early practice, Keynes exported. 
In the earlier parts of this chapter we have looked 
at the preoccupations of the politically dominant 
groups of the 'West' and at the subsequent efforts, on 
their behalf, of economic theorists. Now we must look 
at examples of this orientation at work with issues of 
Third World development. Thus we now effect-the shift 
from historical resume and analytic exegesis to critical 
reporting: we look at Keynesianism in action. 
Kurihara provides the lever when he observes that: 
"The UN 1951 publication 'Measures for the economic 
d evelopment of underdeveloped countries' was an eloquent 
testimony to the new post-war, post-Keynesian hope of 
raising thd living standards of economically backward 
countries through deliberate. action, instead of leaving 
it to the accident of laissez-faire international 
capital povements or to the caprice of old fashioned 
empire builders and colonialists"(I24). This provides a 
starting point, -, but then we are given two specific 
'preliminar; Leg. KuY. ihara remarks: 11that UN report cou'ld 
not, I believe, have been written prior to the appearance 
of Harrod's 'Dynamic Economics' or possibly without 
Joan Robinson's challenging suggestion that Harrodis 
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growth theory should be applied afortiori to capital- 
poor under7developed economiesli(I25). 
Harrod! s work we have already taken note of and here 
we are concerned with applications, so we beýin with Joan 
Robinson. The suggestion that Kurihara. refers to (126) 
is to be found in her 1949 review of Harrod's essays, 
In the course of the review she has occasion to ask 
just what is meant by the notion of a 'warranted rate 
of growth'. The answer involves the'familiar Keynesian 
terms-savings, investmentg capital, etc. The relevance of 
all this to the situation of 'under-developed, countries' 
(UDC's) is the realization that the notion of 'unemp- 
loyment' used in developed areas is not suitable to the 
situation of UDC'smore useful is Imarxian unemployment' 
(127). 
This is of interest to us, not for any purposes of 
economic analysis, but because it clearly leads into 
the central issue for these Keynesian inspired econ- 
omists: that is, how to plot the behaviour of economic 
factors and indicators in a Keynesian-informed way 
when the economies being treated are'so radically 
different to those of the industrialized nations- 
The, line into this area may vary; thus Nurkse . (19; 3) 
for example focuses on, the generation of savings 
where Clarke and Kuznets pursue issues of quantification. 
The major rep(ýrt that follows up Robinson's remarks 
in the sense of centreing the work on 'employment' 
is the 1951 U. N. report of Lewis et al. 
3-1 -The 1951 UN_Re_-Dort 
We may quote, as they do, from their brief from the UN, 
Economic and Social Council; thus'they are instructed 
to prepare "a-report onýunemployment and under-employment... 
[in UDC'q, and the national and international measures 
required to reduce su-ch unemployment and under-employment" 
(128). The authors admit to having problems in 11interpre- - 
I tingthe term 'under-d. eveloped countriesti(I29). But. 
apparently th 
* 
ey find the use of the notions of employ- 
ment straightfor"rd9thus they first list and review 
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the four types of unemployment found in UDCs * However 
there is an implicit appreciation here of Robioson Is 
point, for they re-define their task as focusing on 
"economic development rather than upon unemployment" 
(1.30). Their treatment involves looking at (1) pre- 
conditions of progress; thus they see as a necessary 
condition 'proper' cultural orientations. Here we may 
note that the committee's narrow intellectual background 
is revealed in that what distinguishes UDCS from DCs 
is labelled/dismissed as 'pFe-requisitest. They go on 
(2). and note the role of the government, though here the 
Keynesianism is blurred as its task is presented as 
passive and enabling. The effort rests on the analogy 
of UDC governments facing development and DC governments 
facing depression, 
Now matters technical are treated; thus (3) domestic 
saving is dealt with. and here they offer a tacit defin- 
ition of their assumed goal. They note that DCs rate 
of capital formation is 10% of National Income, whereas 
the rate for UDCs is only 5% of National Income. The 
question is how-to raise the rate of cppital formation. 
In White's pejorative phrase this tends to Igapperyl or 
supplemental thinkingg thus aid is seen to be one way of 
plugging this gap. Several techniques are discussed, and 
what is most interesting is how matters of economics 
and politics are casually, jumbled together. In para. III 
they observe--that '(people of middle and higher incomes. 
in many UDCs are well known for their tendency to 
conspicuous consumption-and there is no doubt that a 
fall in their consumption would be in the public interest" 
(131). The authors neither pretend to be neutral social 
scientists nor do they come out and explicitly argue a 
case, as our notion of social theory requires. ýRather 
they take the role of 'experts' and argue a case against 
a backdrop of unexamined, unacknowledged, assumptions. 
The intellectual link between Robinson and Lewis et 
tiA L-h 1- 0ý ý6ý- %/, t- (11.5 
al's wor4*6'laton 
teLS'e"'e"Ln` most clearly in 
Ve latter's treat- 
ment of deficit financing and inflation. Asking about 
the use of idle resources they go straight on-to -* 
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"considering the possibility of creating capital by 
employing-the under-employed to work for wageson 
public works" ... * .. 
" if this labour were employed on 
public works, capital would be created without any fall 
in either output or total consumption"(132). Having 
presented the rationale, they go on to contrast the 
situation in DCs, where governments can create money 
and lift employment rates and activity rates via the 
multiplierg with the situation in UDCs . Here, they 
say, "the process is not so simple"(133); they note 
a propensity to import and pressure for inflation as 
the system cannot respond to a rise in demand from 
consumers. This is an interesting area and here we may 
cite the work of VKRV Rao, a contemporary critic, 
whose treatment is distinctly sharper. His view is that 
the Keynesian approach breaks down (134). 
ý Rao's critique begins by rehearsing the main points 
of Keynesian theory. -It is noted that Keynes was mostly 
concerned with "the problem of involuntary unemployment 
in the richer countries"(135) and that "the remedies 
he puts forward9viz. cheap money9 deficit financing, 
redistributive. taxationg4nd public investment have all 
become current coin in national economic policies with 
full employment as the major objective"(136). This 
general set of notions, this newly (YLý, )constituted 
common sense of economics, has been applied (as might 
be expected) to various circumstances, in particular 
those of the UDC . Rao notest"unfortunately Keynes did 
not formulate the economic problem of the UDCs .... the 
re'sult has been a rather unintelligent application 
.. thus-it is common ground with most writers on the 
economics of UDCs that what was required-for their 
economic development was an increase in the purchasing 
po wer of the. people Deficit financing and created 
money have figured in practically all the plans.... 11(137). 
Rao goes on to consider the presumptions of the Keynesian 
scheme; that is, he asks in what particular circumsta- 
nces do these concepts make sense? It is then indicated 
how these concepts are inadequate to the situation of 
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a UDC (India is taken as illustrative case). Rao 
focuses his attention on the matter of 'employment' 
and asks what are the conditions in which the 'multiplier' 
will work? The answer is, immediately, 'involuntary 
unemployment'i and thereafter the free market economy which 
this phemomenon presupposes: "involuntary unemployment 
of the Keynesian type is necessarily associated with a 
free-enterprise wage economy where the majority of 
earners work for wages and where production is much 
more for exchange than for self-consumption"(138). 
That the economies of UDC's can be said-to have 'involun- 
tary unemployment' is not obvious. Rao recalls that 
Robinson( I Essays in the Theory of Employment! ) has introduced 
the term 'disguised umemployment' and that this might 
be thought appropriate to UDC's; but this would be wrong. 
Robinsons 'disguised unemployment' flows from a decline 
in demand. whereas UDCs have always operated at a low 
activity level; so 'disguised unemployment'. is normal, 
thus we might even properly speak of 'voluntary unemplo. -T 
yment'. Anyhow, a presumption of the 'multiplier' thus 
does not hold and "the multiplier principle as enunciated 
by Keynes does not operate in regard to the problem of 
diminishing unemployment and increasing output in an under- 
developed country"(138). Of course policy based on theee 
assumptions will not be helpful either; indeed. the simple 
extension of Keynesian ideas is taken to have done a great 
deal of harm. In this Brookfield concurs reporting that 
these early attempts to apply Keynes "proved disastrous 
(140). Interestingly Rao suggests,. finally, that the work 
of the classical economists might prove a more rewarding 
area of intellectual enquiry. 
Returning to the 1951 UN report, (we note that)it 
goeB on to treat (4) planning. We are given an anodyne 
definition of planning as "concerned with the 
proper disposal of resources between different uses"(141) 
That Lewis et al are advocates of planning should not 
surprise anyone. Howeverwe note their 'defence' (for they 
do offer one) - as it illuminates the aside made by Robin- 
son in her review of Harrod, (Where she noted that Harrod 
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executes a familiar and unhappy manoeuvre of argument: 
namely, It is a common vice of present-day pconomic 
argument to jump from a highly abstract piece of anal- 
ysis straight to prescriptions for policy, without 
going. through the intermediate stage of examinimg how 
far the assumptions in the analysis fit the facts of 
the actual situation"(142)). 
The lexpertsl(as U. N. and Ku'rihara 1954 describe 
them) say that economics provides two general princ- 
iples. First, the notion of the margi -. thus "resources 
should be used in such a way that a transfer of marginal 
units from one use to another could not increase welfarell 
(143). Now this is the 'welfare economics, version of 
the neo-classical notion of an optimum configurationg 
and as such it is acceptable. But they go on to make the 
following claim, that the "corollary is that one should 
not think of any single industry or economic activity as 
more important than any other and should not therefore 
concentrate all resourdes in one particular part of the 
economyll(144). The shift from a piece of neo-classical 
formalism to a policy injunction is abrupt, The coroll- 
aryq as thus far reported, is either a simple equiform 
methodological note issuing in the dubiously derived 
conclusion that a wholly unlikely situation ("all . 
resourdes") is prohibited, or-it is the set-up for the 
introduction of a clearly un-related, non-consequentialg 
policy prescription. They go on: "Progress must be made 
on all fronts simultaneously"(145); and this, if it 
means -'balanced growth1q does not follow from the 
simple statement of Paretian optimum. Robinson's point 
would seem to be confirmed. 
The second principle of policy the 'experts' take 
to flow from the substantive difference between micro 
and macro level changes in the system. Thus "large 
movements of resources within the economy will have 
effects which are disproportionately different from 
riarginal movements"(146). The planning dictum apparently. 
derived from this is-that-if marginal adjustments do 
not look promising, try structural ones. The justification 
drawn from theory of this'rule of thumb looks strainedg 
and indeed the rule of thumb we have 
been presented 
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with looks trivial. However, this 'argument' is then 
used as a, hay-maker for neo-classical economics. Thus if 
it-is structural changes we are looking at, then micro- 
economics of marginalism are of secondary importance. 
Further, as quantification is so difficult at these 
aggregative levels and as data differs from one UDC 
to another, it is not possible to offer any general 
rules governing economic planning : "those who are 
responsible must soak themselves thoroughly in the 
facts of each particular case and must then use their 
best judgment as to what will be the most desirable 
directions of movement"(147). This is one of the more 
breathtakingly optimistic sections of this report. The orth- 
odpxy from which Keynesianism sprang is cast off entirely 
and replaced by the planners "best judgment". Indeed it 
calls for nothing less than carte blanche for the econ- 
omic planner. 
There are two further elements of the 1951 U. N. 
report to, note. Thus (5) the repott looks at terms of trade. 
On this they affirm a loose internationalism that is 
in accord with the styl e to be expected of a U. N. study, 
andgmore; pointedlyt fits with American notions of the 
proper development of post-war trade. They affirm that 
international trade is important to all; and as regards 
cyclical fluctuations in the trade cycle, long term 
decline in terms of trade, and protectionist measures 
by the developed, the 'experts' are sure that the DCs 
can sort these problems out. 
Finally, (6) we come to the matter of external 
sources of capital. Here we see two points of interest. 
Firstly they answer the question of the extent to which 
capital is needed from abroad by seeking to indicate 
a quantity. This they grant is difficult, so why do they 
do it? It meets 
- 
the orthodox d6sire-for precision, and falls 
into line. worked by C Clarke and S Kumnets. The immed- 
iate thought must be that they are arguing in the light 
of the experience of Marshall Aid where large sums 
were shifted about. This impression is reinforced when, 
discussing the government's role as provider of infra- 
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-structure, they go on to say: 11we do not suggest that 
aid should-be given unconditionally to UDC's. This 
would not be wise. Each grant should be linked to a 
specific function, and there should be international 
verification that the funds are used only for the purp- 
oses for which they have been granted"(148). Thus aid is 
targeted and monitored according to 'wise' prescriptions. 
This is what we would expect to find: it is the practical 
expression of a 'policy science', and indeed it is. how 
the Marshall Plan worked, at least at first. 
3.2 An early general statement: RcO%ur X-e_wýs 
The above critical exposition of the 1951 U. N. report, 
had as its objective the elucidation of its Keynesian 
inspiration and commensurability with an interventionist 
ideal. It was one of the earliest efforts to make sense 
of the matter of the Third World. We can further ýursue 
the question of the 'export of Keynes' with the theorist 
Lewis, who in 1955 publishes a formal treatise on the 
development of the UDC's. 
Lewis(149) declares in the bookb preface that he 
is not presenting original ideas but offering a frame- 
work for studying economic development. "A book of 
this kind", he says, "seemed to be necessary because 
the theory of economic growth once more engages world- 
wide interestg and because no comprehensive treatise , 
on the subject has been published for about a centuryý, 
The last great book covering this wide range was JS Mill! s 
'Principles of Political Economy' published in 184811(150). 
Lewis begins by identifying his subject as "the 
growth of output per head of population"(151). His 
method is a combination(unspecified) of the deductive 
pursuit of consistency of formulation of statements (the 
familiar. realm of economics, he says),., and what he calls 
levolutionary'study. We must "apply the inductive method 
to historical data"(152). That this empiricism is to be 
taken as inferior to that of the natural sciences is a 
point Lewis makes, and he calls for modesty of conclusion 
when predicting how far''Ichanges which occured in the 
wealthier countries as they developed may be expected to 
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repeat themselves in the poorer countries if they 
develop "(ý53)- 
The level of the enquiry is announced early: thus 
causal explanation is*assumed but not pursued, rather 
a general level of 'proximate cause' is fastened on. 
There are three such 'proximate causes', Lewis tells us,, 
with which we can grasp these matters of growth and 
development. These are first, the "effort to economisell 
(154), which notion Lewis uses*to c haracterize the DOS: 
included. within iý, or as illustrations of it, are 
experimentation, risk taking, 'mobility, and specialization. 
We can take it as straightforwardly descriptive of his 
world. Its liability to criticisms developed with the 
notions of over-simplification, aggregatio4, and value 
insensitivity, are evident. The second cause Lewis cites 
is the increase of knowledge and its application. We 
can regard this as a simple corollary of the first point; 
thus Gellner remarks that "science is the mode of 
cognition of industrial society"(155). Finally we are 
reminded that growth depends upon increasing the amount 
of capital; which is vacuous, except that it reads devel- 
opment as an econoigic matter. 
From these three elements Lewis sketches a procedure 
of un-packing; thus he shifts closer to -'history', asking 
why do these 'proximate causes' 6perate in some societies 
more strongly than in others. He takes this sequence to 
be one of a search for consistency- just what environ- 
ment is conducive to economic growth? These questions 
are then reformulated to focus on the evolutionary 
aspect: how do 'environments' change, becoming more 
or less conducive to economic growth? This is the area 
of historical research and social scientific interest. 
Lewis, it seems, is fixed in the economistIS deductive 
empiricism. The trio of 'proximate causes' are simply 
presented; they are obvious, and with hindsight clearly 
of no greater status than any o*ther groups taken-for. - 
granted assumptions. For our immediatp purposes we note 
that they reduce to an affirmation of the commonr; ense of the 
orthodoxy plus an emphasis on the role of capital. 
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We can go on to look at what he has to say about 
-capital; trýe comments on social/cultural pre-cqnditions 
we will leave until Chapter Four, when we look at the 
rise of the wider social scientific contribution in the 
guise of 'modernization theory'. 
In regard to the issue of capital, Lewis is concerned 
to look at (A)the amount of capital required for 
economic growth, (B) sources of savings and, (C) the 
process of investment. 
(A) Lewis begins with a weak claim-. "economic growth is 
associated with an increase in capital per head"(156); 
and as regards the matters of quantification he acknow- 
ledges the work of Clarke and Kuznets as pianeers. The 
work begins with ICOR, taken as embracing two generally 
accepted generalizations: that ICOR is constant at 
the margin, and that in DCs it is3: 1. The question 
becomes how can this be shifted to situation of UDCs. 
The debate revolves around the issue of whether ICOR 
is higher or lower in UDCs Lewis looks at the debate, 
whidh is couched in the familiar aggregative mechanics 
of economicsv and concludes that "we do not know what 
the marginal capital income ratio, is in any UDC ... all 
the same if for want of anything better we use the 
ratio which has been found for industrial countries, 
it is easy enough to see why income grows so slowly 
in the less developed countries"(157).. Briefly, rates 
of investment as a percdntage of National Income are 
lower that in DCS.; the conclusion is that "this in 
turn raises the question how rapidly-capital formation 
can be accelerated"(158). 
(B) Looking for sources,, Lewis'. begins with the 
claim: "'The proposition which we have established in 
the preceding. section is that investment is necessary 
to economic growth"(159), and. here we may note the 
relation between growth and capital has shifted from 
'association' to-'necessity' via an admitedly inadequate 
route that is, ICOR,,, and the discussion, att 
, 
ached. there- 
to. Lewis-has not established this link, either empirically 
or conceptually; though that is where the link is, in his 
I 
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presumed Keynesianism. However from this claim Lewis remarks 
that"it follows in a passive sense"(160) that. paving 
is necessary for growth because savings have to be 
equal to'investment. Quite what he means by Ipassiv 
,e 
senselis not clear : it follows within the logic of neo- 
classical economics, but the issue which he goes on to 
treat, as to whbthbr and how they are in balance, is more 
particularly Keynesian. He remarks that "we have there- 
fore come to analyse separately the forces determining 
saving and the forces determining investment"(161, re 
Either way the problem for UDCs, as Lewis sees tt at 
this point9is a lack of savings to finance investment. 
Given this requirement for savings9and having ruled out 
deficit financing, he asks about sources, idenfifying 
two: firstly domesticq such as hoards, taxation, banking 
and profits etc. ; and secondly external finance, a 
supplement to local efforts. 
(C)Under the heading 'investment' Lewis discusses some 
institutional pre-conditions of economic growth. He makes 
note of such financial arrangements as 'limited liability! 9 
'flexible bank lending policy', 'easy marketability 
of investments' and so on. The list presented of pre- 
conditions is that of the superficial characteristics of 
a post-war Keynesian-run economy plus descriptions of 
various mechanisms peculiar to the industrial 'west', 
modified where it seems appropriate to 'fit' the UDC 
situation. ' 
Let us now, briefly, consider Lewis's strategy in 
his version of the 'export of KeynesI. Most generally it 
is Clear that Lewis argues out of a IschooT%he writes 
explanation-in-the-light-of-xlwhere x happens to be 
that set of Keynesian-derived ideas treating growth. '. '... 
which Centre on the role of capital. So how does this 
differ ftom, the preliminary notes on'the notion of 'social 
theory' presented in Section One of the Study? (I) Epis- 
temologically the effort is taken to be emPiricistg and 
consequently it gets confused. Much pertinent detail is 
taken note of, but the material lacks any plausible frame 
of explanation. The material appears to be all !. on a levelI9 
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and elements of the text are not distinguished accor- 
ding to role. or at least not in any obvious fashion. 
Consequently the. material presents itself as very largely 
descriptive in character. The general form assumed is 
deductive, and this requires that its start-points be 
taken as facts: high level generalizations, from. which an 
explanatory moUel is made. The model, correctly manipulated, 
will generate remote conclusions and these will be taken 
as drawn from and corresponding to facts where the 
latter set can then inform policy decisions. We have argued 
above that this is an implausible scheme; and when we add 
to this a set of start-points that so resemble common 
sensetthat the resultant material should present itself 
as, orthodoxly descriptive should come as no suprise. 
(II)With engagment, the orthodox take the role of the 
'expert' and conceive their role analogously to that of 
the natural scientist. The class or group they represent 
is consequently not clearly identified and nor, inevitably, 
are the implications of their relation to a social 
group spelt out. Thus the whole 'realm of valuation' is 
sidesteppedgindeed the orthodox is supposed; what we have 
is 'policy sciencel. (III) In the light of the preceding 
two notes we add one on theory. In Lewis's scheme the 
role of theory is, to our mind, mishandled. For Lewis the 
role of theory is passive% it is an assemblage of deduc- 
tions from evident truths, it is a kind of scaffolding for 
getting from familiar A's to unfamiliar and hopefully 
policy-relevant B's. Grounded in social factsthe edifice 
helps uncover others. Contrariwise, the notion of social 
theory we introduced, in our Pro-logue, made theory a more 
central phenomenA. Theorizing we took to be concerned 
with actively displaying the nature of the social-constru- 
ction of explanationj that is, we placed stress on the 
business of 'making sensel. TheDry was taken as a moral 
intervention in the world ; not just an attempt to model 
3.3 Concluding note. 
The work of Lewis we take to be an exemplar of the posit- 
q 
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-ivistic empiricism of orthodox policy science. He begins 
with assumptions of a superficially formal kind. adds in 
aggregated empirical'notions and builds abstract models. 
The return to the practical-empirical is effected by 
the removal of simplifying assumptions. This procedure 
admits of a wide variety of treatments of any particular 
problem. Assumptions may be varied, aggregated. notions 
varied, and procedures of stepping down to 'reality' 
varied. This amount of intrinsic 'slack' in the procedure 
permits the pursuit of a practical problem to be so 
ordered as to produce a favoured 'sort, of answer for the 
theoreticiarls lclýent'. We may note that this is not sciences 
however loosely that is defined. Solow's re-write of the 
H-D model throws up into clear relief the question of 
the precise status of this style of modeling. 
However we should not stress this aspect of the orthodoxy 
to the exclusion of all else. The effort was n ot mono- 
lithic, and nor was it fruitless; indeed the reverse 
is the case. Evidently these theorists were sensitive 
to (I) the difficulties of shifting established tools to 
the Third World and (II) the complexity of the problems 
themselves. Given the demand that they produce something 
by way of a 'development theory', their procedure was 
both what we would expect, thus'their theorSes reveal 
their intellectual roots, and sensible in that they 
apparently began with the world-as-it-was and sought 
to-identify its possibilities. That they misconceived 
their start-pointgor miscast it theoretically, is pointed 
out by Streeten and is a view we would echo. 
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Chapter Four-: The positivist high tide, 'Modernization- 
Theory'.. 
I. 0 Introduction. 
Chapters three and four comprise one section of this 
study and the relationship of these two elements may be 
expressed in the claim that what is at issue is a 
revision of the legitimating theorem of 'intervention'. 
Thus 'modernization theory' replaces 'growth theory' 
as the orthodoxy of 'development studies, and does so 
within the context of cold war competition between super 
powers for influence in the Third World. 
We will begin by taking note of the then current 
political preoccupations of the USA. the principal 
actor in this period. In Chapter Three the historical 
material presented focused upon the pre-war revisions 
of Keynesq the wartime alliancessand the economic 
role of the ERP in European reconstruction. Here we 
must start with the more geneftl c6 unterpart to Marshall 
Aid, that is, the Trum4A Doctrine and the so-called 
'cold warl. It will be our contention that 'modernization 
theory' is the ideological child of the cold war: US 
theoristst operating within the ambit of the notion 
oflcontainment; seek to secure allies for the US within 
the Third World. Competition with the USSR necessitates 
that self interest be disguised; thus the US offers 
'modernization' and membership of the 'free world' as 
against 'socialism'. It is here that we find the moral 
core of 'modernization', and from this point we seek to 
show how this evaluative core is given analytic and 
descriptive substance by-. examining the efforts of 
economics and the wider group of the social sciences. 
Following our note on the 'cold war', we develop the 
line of Keynesian theorizing that we have d1ready 
come across as it experiences further refinement and 
general reformulation vis a vis Third-World development. 
The 'debate with Harrod' is noted as one aspect, of the 
wider process of the emasculation of Keynes and the re-ý 
constitution of neo-classicaleconomics. Specifically 
related to matters of the Third World we observe the 
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continued reliance on growth models9and note that 
they become elaborate in their pursuit of realism. One 
side issue, of note for the future, is the nascent 
rediscovery of political economy associated with the 
'new Cambridge' post-Keynesians. 
The elements of economics constitute one thread of 
theoretical or disciplinary work that carries over from 
Chapter Three. There is another, insofar as it was 
latent in the efforts of Lewis et al (I) and Lewis (2), 
and this concerns the rise in importance of the contri- 
bution made by the wider group of the*social sciences. 
It is here that we can plot the elaboration of the 
'modernization' scheme through theuse of a series of 
dichotomies serving to elucidate the one over-arching 
distinction between 'traditional' and 'modern' societies. 
Following the discussion of the occasion and charac-- 
ter of 'modernization' we go on to investigate the impact 
as a legitimating theorem for 'intervention' of 
, 
the 
work of Rostow (3). We consider the way he uses the 
theoretical resources available to him to fashion, in 
response to political demand, his own widely influent- 
ial scheme of 'modernization' 
Having presented a review of the material via its 
criticsq and a review of the work of Rostow, we take note 
that the career of 'modernization' can be taken to traverse 
a series of 'stages' and that as its gaudiest manifest. = 
ationg in Rostow, achieves widespread notice, so too 
does an almost unremarked line of revision point to 
a reintroduction of the concerns of classical political 
theorizing. 
By this time it is also clear that the world of 
'cold war' is not that of elaborated 'modernization': 
in two senses. First, the ideology of 'modernization' is 
broader and less stridently enunciated than Truman's 
'cold war'; and secondly, the 'reality' of the world 
situation is no longer that of the cold war era. In 
particular, US paramountcy has already given way, even 
if hot yet in the percepti ons of the US government, 
to a more complex pattern. Thus as 'modernization' 
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reaches its apogee in the Kennedy years., its assump- 
tions and*thus formulations become wholly implAusible. 
2.0 Dynamic of Society ý.: the occasion of Imoderni7, ation'. 
The period covered by this chapter, insofar as 'themes' 
attach to otherwise identified, historical periods or 
events, runs from the mid-1950's to the mid-19601s. 
We begin by following White (4) in distinguishing between 
the locus of interest on the part of the theorists. 
Thus ýChapter Three treated the interventionist orthodoxy in 
its internally oriented phase. Here development was 
construed along lines taken as identified in the episode 
of the Marshall Plan,, and we went on to treat what we 
termed the 'export' of Keynesianism to the Third World. 
Now White's secon d phase is the subject of the present 
chapter; here the theoristýs attention is firmly directed 
to matters of the character, dynamics and directions 
of change of 
, 
the societies of the Third World. Whiteg 
whose study is concerned with the politics of aid, 
identifies the Bandung Conference as marking this shift, 
Up until 1953 the USSR is taken to have regarded the 
world as split into hostile camps; hence 'non-alignment' 
was viewed with disfavour. With Stalin Is death there is a 
relaxation in that stance which coincides with a 'thaw' 
in the 'cold war' proper. White records that in July 
1953 the first sign of a new line was the USSR's pledge 
of one million dollars to a U. N. aid programme. This 
shift was reinforced by the Bandung Conference of 1955 
which assertedq on the part of a group of Asian and 
African countries, the notion of 'non-alignment' and anti- 
colonialism. In 1956 Krushchev, in a report to the 20th 
Party Congress(5), announced the USSR's willingness to 
offer aid to 'developing' countries. This offer saw 
practical expression in that in the wake of the USA's 
withdrawal of finapial support for Nasser's Aswan High 
Dam the USSR stepped in. 
As a consequence of these events there opened uD,, 
with regard to aid giving, "a grey area between the two 
camps_which constituted an area of competition 11(6). 
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Henceforth aid, the clearest example of concern with the 
Third 
- 
World on the part of the rich, was not distributed 
solely by the US and on condition of military alliance 
against the Soviets. The situation was now competitive 
and as this political situation changed so too did the 
conception of the precise role of aid. Thus whereas 
Marshall aid had had clearly defined objectives and 
(hypothesised) mechanisms, aid to the Third World had 
neither. Initially, in White's phase of 'US hegemony', 
aid was used to strengthen allies in Asia; so when the 
question was raised as to what this aid was supposed to 
achieve, a foreign policy-derived answer was available. 
As regards the mechanisms of aid-impact upon recipients, 
these issues could be lost in the cold war objectives. 
Yet when the USSR came upon the scene, and when the 
notion of 'non-alignment' was promulgated, justifying 
aid in terms of donors'foreign policy objectives became 
more difficult. The emphasis shifted to the development- 
al aspects, and thus were mechanisms of aid impact 
brought to the fore. 
This competetive aid-giving took the form of offers of 
on the one hand 'socialism' and9on the'othermember- 
ship of the 'free world' with its capitalist free market. 
With the US the latter scheme was presented within the 
ambit of development-studies as 'modernization-theory'. 
Where in Chapter Three we followed the crystallization of 
Keynesian derived 'growth-th6oryl out of the multiple 
conflicts of the 'Big Three', particularly the conflict 
of UK and USA, here in Chapter Four we trace the cons- 
truction of 'modernization-theory'. Broader and blander 
than 'growth-theory') it was, the ideological by-product 
of the globalist stance of 'containment' created by the 
USA in the wake of the disintegration of the wartime 
Grand Alliance. Those who asked after the 'how' and the 
'why' of aid-giving could now be given an answer. -- 
2.1 The history of. the period leading up to and embra- 
cing the business of aid competition and the production 
of 'modernization-theory' may be reviewed at this point. 
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We begin with a sketch of the occasion and immediate 
consequences of the end of the wartime Grand Alliance. 
The story of this dissolution and partition of 
Europe reflects'the fact that the USSR and USA had bec- 
ome pre-eminent world powers. Lichtheim notes that at 
the same time a de-facto agreement between the two was 
reached,.; essentially a realpolitik regard to respective 
spheresswith a corollary that peripheral areas were not 
worth a major war. This being the case such states were 
subject to the disciplines of the alliance leaders. This 
view was established early: Kolko, following the same 
line, notes that even before the 'collapse' of the Brit-: - 
ish in Greece in 1947 and the subsequent establishment 
of bi-polarity, "neither the Americans, British, ýor 
Russians were willing to permit democracy to run its 
course anywhere in Europe at the-cost of damaging their 
vital strategic and economic interests"(7). 
Aron's treatment of the US9 in the first half of his 
work, is aimed at elucidating the nature of its diplomacy. 
Here he suggests the interesting idea that after the end 
of the Second World War the nature of the linter-state 
system', as he terms it, changed,, What had been a Europ" 
ean-style negotiation between states- a sort of diploma- 
tic free market, its theory flowing from Machiavelli-, 
becomes a bi-polar situation where two 'great powers' 
confront and accomodate to each others interests. So 
in this period the style of US linter-state' activity is 
- with regard to its allies - that of generalship. This 
requires the consent or aquiescence of those so organised. 
It seems, on the face of it, that the notion of bi- 
polar diplomacy, if it doesn't actually entail 'inter- 
ventionism', certainly is thus disposed. Ronald Steel 
quotes De Gaulle as remarking of the US, in the late'50s, 
that they had developed "a taste for intervention"(9). 
(Aron cites the episodes of Hungary and Suez as examples 
of great power 'Idisciplineý. 
The career of the orthodoxy7NC6ve subsumed under 
the label of 'intervention' thus parallels, with 
'development-studies' as 'modernization-theory', the 
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period of bi-polar diplomacy and US paramountcy. The dis- 
integration of the US position and( says Aron) bi- 
polarity in diplomacy is reflected in the disintegration 
of orthodox interventionist ODtiMiSM: so it has been 
observed that "as the conditions which gave rise to 
modernization theory have changed .... the flow of new 
'theories' of modernization also. seems to have ebbed"(10). 
Granting this post-war de facto agreement over 
European partition, the question arises as to the precise 
nature of the 'cold war'. Aron presents three readings. 
One flowing from the notion of fundamental and irrecon- 
cilable hostility of the two systems. Fleming we could 
take to follow this linearguing as he does that it 
was only the size of the Red Army that stopped the 
ýVestern allies from seriously considering 'rolling back'(11) 
the Soviets. Nixon, then' Eisenhower's Vice President, is 
cited as advocating 'roll back'. Within this fundamental 
hostility, 'cold war' expresses the situation of there 
being just two 'great powers'. The second reading is the 
common sense notion of war carried out by all means 
short of war; yet Aron, in the end, prefers a third 
notion which takes from both and adds a signigicant 
measure of historical specificity. Thus the 'cold war' 
was precisely that period we so designate, and it repre- 
sented merely an unusual heightening of the tensions 
inherent in what he dubs the linter-state system'. This 
conclusion represents his version of a 'realist' history; 
which is to say that he focuses on the behaviour of 
ruling groups within a system of diplomatic-strategic 
meanings(rather than by explaining their actions in 
terms of economic interests, say). This being the case, 
bi-polarity represents for Aron. a change in style, or 
perception of role, an d 'cold war' hysteria is taken as 
a mask for acceptance of the new perceptions. This line 
is followed by Lichtheim when he argues that 'cold war' 
and 'coexistence' were "two sides of the same coin"(12). 
and that Kennedy plus a general relaxation of tension 
allows 'coexistence' to be publicly acknowledged. 
I One element of both Aron's and Lichtheims treatment 
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is thus the reduction of the 'cold war' to the status of 
a grandiose 1PR joV designed to placate the US public. 
This aspect of the matter indeed seems worthy ;f further 
enquiry, and Caute(13) in his history of the 'cold war' 
indicates that its inception and development owed not a 
little to matters of party politics in the US. Yet to 
implicitly deny the 'cold war' a broader relevance seems 
misleading. Kolko details the economic interests of the 
US during the war and argues that 
I 
it was whilst the war 
was in progress that the US prepared for its global role. 
If this is true then the 'cold war' was more than, 'PRI 
for a change of diplomatic style: it was an integral 
element of a clearly articulated resistance to the 'left' 
in general and the USSR in particular. So it is noted 
that in the wake of war, "only the US had the power to 
engage fully in international counter-revolution.. o.,, ** 
By 1945 Washington's decision to undertake that role 
was an unquestioned postulate in America's pluns for the 
future of its power in-the world"(W. 
1ý 
2. *2. However, this is a debate about proper historical 
explanation which we need not pursue at this time. 
R-ather, )we must focus on what we take to be the back- 
ground to the genesis of 'modernization-theory': that 
is, the rhetoric and practice of cold war, the US 
policy of 'containment', and the results of that policy. 
In preferring this route into these mat ters we follow 
our methodological dictum in regard to 'available 
explanations'. It is here that we must start. though we 
follow Kolko in matters of substance. One other apparent 
-omission may be noted and this is our treatment of the 
USSR. The behaviour of the USSR is not closely examined, 
as to do so would entail our offering a characteriz- 
ation of the USSRjthis is a debate we do not wish to 
enter, and indeed which we are not obliged by our 
material and approach to enter. In terms of the efforts 
of the orthodoxy the USSR appears. as a shadowy 'other' 
against which US ideology, in part, defines, itself. 
US concern- was initially focused upon Europe in the 
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wake of war-time upheaval, both the occupation of 
Eastern Europe by the Soviets and the activities of the 
'left' in Western Europe. Subsequently attention is 
extended to the Third World in a period of disintegration 
of formal'European empires. That the interests of the- 
US, W. Europe, and, Third World are divergent throughout 
this episode, we here take for granted ( this is 
taken up more fully in Chapter Five); a 'modernizer!. 
would not, affirming instead an elaborate scheme which 
collapses divergent interests into those of the US in 
a style redolent of Secretary Hull (whom we met in Chap; - 
ter Three). 
The domestic political background to the inauguration 
of 'containment'. in the announcement of the Truman 
Doctrine, is described by Caute(149. It is noted that 
when Truman came to power "federal and state statute 
books were already bristling with anti-communist legis- 
lation . All that was required, and conspicuously 
lacking under F. D. Roosevelt, was the will to enforce 
it". This politicalwill cýme to be provided in-the 
pe riod imýnediately following the end of the warwhen 
Truman came under increasing pressure from the right 
and gave ground toýit. In 1946 during the mid-term 
elections for the-House of Representatives the Democr- 
ats were reduced in strengthland faith in the efficacy 
of red-baiting was reinforced. Truman's response to this 
is seen by Caute to have been governed by considerations 
of party advantage; thus he sought to steal the vote qat- 
Cher of the Republicans. It, is noted that 11 It was 
Truman and Clark (his Attorney General) who produced 
the loyalty program, who codified the association of 
dissent with disloyalty and legitimized guilt by assoc- 
-iation"(I5). This is important to note in that it indic- 
ates that the periods excesses are not to be laid 
solely at McCarthy's door. By 1947 red-baiting, as an 
integral element of the US political scene, was well 
under-way. 
But all this, it may be said, is simply a matter 
of stylej and indeed it is in a sense. Thus in Western 
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Europe the prevailing political tone was anti-communist 
without there being a witch-hunt. However we can reply 
that our interest is in the manner of production of 
'modernization-theory': with what intellectual raw mat- 
erialsland under what political circumstances and pre- 
ssures. Thus the climate of opinion in the US is of 
interest for more than stylistic reasons. 
Hawthorne(16) offers an illuminating viewpoint on 
this issue. Arguing from the use of a liberal 18tt. 
century constitution for essentially conservative ends 
at the time of the establishment of the Republic, he 
suggests that the equation of dissent with disloyalty 
was latent in US legitimating ideologies; whereas for 
Europeans this was not, generally, the case. This1when 
coupled with what Kiernan describes as a "mystic faith 
in its special destiny" on the part of the orthodoxy of 
US thought, may be seen to have been given expression in 
all levels of discourse(17). Steel offers a slice of 
this ideology in sentimental guise when he posits in the 
'ordinary American' "an instinct to help those less 
fortunate and permit them to emulate and perhaps one 
day achieve the virtues of our own society"(18). These 
sentiments9 when expressed at the level of political 
rhetoric and in the context of a contrast with supposed 
views of the USSR, issue in the following absurdity: 
Truman in March 1947 avers that "the earth is deeply div- 
ided between free and captive Deoples"(19). This stance 
has obvious implications, and these were picked up and 
elaborated by the periods 'organic intellectuals'. Yet 
this was, arguably, a deeply ambiguous service: Caute 
has the liberal intelligentsia collapsing in front of 
'cold war' red-baiting. Not only did they not (with a 
few honourable exceptions)resist the witch hunt and 
maintain their scholard stance of critical evaluation, 
but they contributed their own two-pennorth in the form 
of celebrations of the US as exemplar of modern society. 
In the period of the late 140's and early 150's when 
the first efforts in. the direction of 'modernization- 
theory' were being undertaken, the model of the modern 
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was not merely the image of the US writ large, but an 
image suffused with the demands of the llpatrioýic 
imperative 11(20). It was the business of the US to re- 
construct the world in its own image. And where is the 
ambiguity in this service?. It is identified by Caute 
when he makes the claim that "it was the liberals rath- 
er than the reactionary right ..... who set the US on 
the disastrously interventionist and egotistical course 
that culminated in the horror of the Vietnam war"(21-22) 
Turning to 'structural' matters, we may note that 
the debate about the extent to which US diplomacSr 
flowed from economic interest is one that is pursued by 
Aron in debate with those he terms 'para-marxists'. 
Powever vie do not need to pursue the"detail of this 
debate. Rather we note that the ideology of the US, what- 
ever its precise well-springs$did equate-. (a) the inter.: -- 
ests of the US, (b) functioning liberal market economies, 
(c) resistance to communism, and (d) the future prosper- 
ity of the world. This doctrinal package was labelled 
'the Free World', and as Caute notes "Soviet policy 
challenged America's claim to offer itself, or impose 
itself, as the model on which the future of world civil- 
ization would be based"(23). Peace and stability thus 
required, it seemed, the continuous presence of the US 
as guarantor of the 'Free World'. It was Trumads March 
129 1947, address to Congress that officially launched 
the doctrine of 'containment'; what the US government 
attempted to do was to proscribe any change not agreed 
by it. 
Here Aron distinguishes concept from doctrine: the 
concept was the defensive expression of the competition 
of USA and USSR, whereas the doctrine was its expression 
ih policy. Again Aron's Weberian-derived focus on 'ideas' 
lets him present the antagonism of US/USSR as latent in 
the US idea-system and as being called forth by the 
political activities of the USS4; for example, the 
Sovietization of Eastern Europeor Korea 1950-53 (24). 
This line of argument lets Aron distinguishq against 
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the 'para-marxists', between 'imperial' and 'imperialism'.. 
So the-US-may be imperial in its. behaviour, butit is. not 
imperialis t: its power and sway were extended in res- 
ponse to political vacuum in the inter-state system 
consequent upon the collapse of old Europe and the 
political aggresiveness of the USSR, and not in pursuit 
of economic objectives. This evades the 'paramarxistslsbut 
Aron cannot subtain his case: he goes on to argue that 
revision of the concept opens up a slide in the US pos- 
ition, Thus: "the concept of containment was in fact 
expanded into a doctrine of internationl order, and this 
doctrine was calculated to lead to imperial or even 
imperialist interventioný or to put it another way 
in tervention in order to uphold a government favourable 
to the institutions and ideologies of the US, even 
against its people's aspirations"(25). Aron's Weberianism. 
issues here in anacknowledgement of those brute-relative 
historical facts that are the raw materials for the 
'paramarxistd(26) and the 'given' context for the const- 
ructois of 'modernization-theory'. 
If US domestic politics and the demands of an ideo- 
logy of economic liberalism are two of the roots of the 
promulgation of the 'containment' doctrine, then its full 
development bids us take note of the manner in which 
the initial outlines of the post-war political map were 
drawn. The notion of 'containment' was'at first directed 
to Western Europe and its objelives secured via the dis- 
bursement of dollars; that isq. the Marshall Plan. From 
this point the doctrine broadened, both geographically 
and practically. In Western Europe it acquired a military 
aspect with the formation of NATO in 1949 in the wake of 
the left-coup in Czechoslovakia of the year before. Its 
geographical extent was made general with the onset of 
the Korean war of 1950-53. 
The list of US activities under the 'containment' 
notion is familiar, with the stationing of permanently 
based armies in Western Europe and the removal of left 
influence as far as possible. The US undertook military 
interventions in East and South-East Asia, in Central 
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America, Southern Europe, and Central Africa; covert 
interventions in the Phili'ODines, Indonesia , the Middle 
East, Latin Ame7ica and Southern Europe. The detail we 
need not pursue here(27). 
We may conclude by noting that the ideology and 
practical activity of the US are thus not in doubt, 
insofar as they constitute the climate within which 
'modernization-theory' was to be constructed and devel- 
oped. 
2.3 It is to the fashioning of the intellectual counter- 
parts of the new US expansionism that we now turn. The 
resources available to the theorists comprised-two major 
areasý First, the efforts of the economists: hesitantly 
rediscovering the work of their classical, progenitors, 
they, confront the problems, attendant upon the scale and 
complexity of the macro-economics of growth. S-econd- 
initially a residual group9but subsequently aspiring to 
the status of 'master scientists' of this particular 
area of social science-we have the sociologists, hist- 
oriansg psychologists'and so on. whose efforts constit- 
uted 'modernization-theory'. The work of the economists 
we will briefly review, noting their internal disputes 
and continued optimism. The work of the theorists of 
development who produce 'modernization' we will pay more 
attention tog looking at the genesis and form of their 
central concepts. 
3.0 Dynamic of Theory I: further developments in the work 
of the economists. 
Jones remarks of the history of growth economics that it 
may be characterized as being a sustained effort to evade 
the unpalatable implications of Harrod's work. Thus he 
says that whilst Harrod's conclusion is that "there is 
no reason to believe that full employment equilibrium 
growth will be attained ...... much of the literature 
on the theory of growth in the last twenty years-is- 
capable of being interpreted as a sustained attempt to 
weaken this conclusiorf(28). 
-109- 
This debate around Harrod and the possibilities of 
growth may also be seen-as an element of a wider debate 
around the'implications of the work of Keynes 
ior 
econ- 
omics in general. Two tendencies may be identified. 
First, the 'new Cambridge schooll: (Inewl to distinguish 
it from the Cambridge school of Marshall). 
which seems to have taken Keynes to have re-invented 
political economy, understood as a style of social theory 
And second, the continued neo-classical line, promoted 
by schoýars at Cambridge Mass.; which takes Keynes to be 
assimilable to the neo-classical line2where economics is 
taken to be a matter of the construction of economic- 
analytic calculi. Jones observes: 11few controversies in the 
history of economic thought have been conducted with so 
much vigour and, at times, virulence as the series of 
interconnected debates between the two Cambridges on the 
concept of 'capital' and the process of economic growth 
and technical change"(29). 
With regard to this wider debate, we will not here 
pursue any of its technical aspects; rather, we will 
make just two notes. Firstly, and in anticipation of 
matters to be raised later, we note that the intellec- 
tual roots of the 'new Cambridge school' are to be 
traced both to the work of Keynes and his circle of 
students and to the work of the classical economists; 
particularly., it seemsRicardo whose collected papers 
were edited by Sraffa. This 'broader' vision of the 
school extends to their taking Marx seriously (thus 
Kregel regards Marx as the first modern e6onomist to 
treat the system dynamically), and to a preference for 
what Jones calls 'grand theory': a blend of sociological, 
historical and ecohomic analysis. Robinson sums up the 
impact of Keynes thus@. "The Keynesian revolution has 
destroyed the old soporific doctrines and its own 
metaphysics is thin and easy to see through. We are left 
in the uncomfortable situation of having to think for 
ourselves"(30). 
The second point concerns the "gradual emasculation 
qf. Kemnes. vision to conform with the neo-classical 
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method of thinking"(31). Though, resisted by the 'new 
Cambridge-schoollsthis indeed seems to be the fate of 
Keynesian thought in regard to its general impact on 
thinking about economics. Sweezy argues that whilst 
Keynes looked radical at a time when radical solutions 
were perceived to be required, the post-nwar working- 
up of the formal aspects of Keynes's schemes have perm- 02. ) 
itted the social reformism to drop away. As regards the 
US, Graham (33) argues that with the 'cold war' there is 
a change in the liberal position away from the re- 
distribution of wealth to the doctrine of growth. There 
is a collapse toward the lend of ideology thesis'. which 
is seen as the ideology of an exhausted liberalism per- 
ceiving a political choice of cautious reformism or 
irrelevant so cialism. The choice of 'planning', advoc- 
ated in the 1930's. was no longer mentioned. Sweezy sees 
the post-war development of Keynesianism as being char- 
acterized by absorption: the creed of growth coupled 
with techniques of demand management now enhances the 
stability of that status quo which Keynes criticised. 
Keynesianismq remarks Sweezy, 11 is now used in-order to 
bulwark the system, not to reform it"(34). Others have 
gone further and identified a fundamental political 
ambiguity in the'General Theory I. The stress on job- 
creation 'evoked fascist admiration. Subsequently 
the US Democratic Party has been criticised for basing 
full employmeht on continual preparations for war. 
Critics from the left have advanced the notion of a 
'permanent arms economy'. 
Both these aspects may be seen in the behaviour of 
the Kennedy administration. Sweezy thinks that 11 the 
victory of what I would call the New Keynesianism, often 
c--lled the 'New Economics', came really with the Kennedy 
administration"(35). He goes on to say that the celeb- 
ration of that victory came in June 1964, when Treasury 
. 
Secretary Dillon gave a speech to'the Harvard Business 
School which used the notion of a pro2er level of un- 
employment; thereby removing' the heart from'Keynesianism. 
Dillon is a figure praised by Seymour Harris, an 
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advisor to Kennedy: the ambiguity and emasculation is 
brought out when Harris comments upon-the admipistratiods 
record. Thus he observest "Perhaps the most important 
factor in the lag of welfare programs has been the rising 
demands of the military. Defence, space and related exp- 
enditures accounted for about 75% of the increase of 
expenditures under Kennedy through fiscal year 196411(36), 
Returning to the narrower area of growth economics, 
we shall again eschew any involvement with technical 
detail. We have. seen in Chapter Three that with the semi- 
formal mode of reasoning adopted by orthodox economics 
the possibilities for theoretical novelties are exten- 
sive. It will not help our study to attempt to pursue 
the economists through their labyrinth, for as Brook- 
field remarks 11grov,, th theory quickly become highly 
elaborated and often very esoteric: contact with the 
real world was not often estpblished"(37). 
If there is any simple way of characterizing the 
change in economics between 'growth-theory' and 
Imoderni. -ation-theoryl relevant work, it i's encapsulated 
in Solow's neo-classical model of growth where the 
pessimistic assumptions of Harrod are simply struck 
out. Economic growth is made freely available(in theory) 
to those who would have it. Clearly, in terms of aid- 
donor competitiong this is both more useable (e. g. by 
administrations) and saleable to recipient governments. 
From Mikesell we may draw the observation that from 
their inception growth models underwent a two-fold 
development. Initially taken as presenting an oversim- 
plified model of the growth process, they have "become 
more complex by the introduction of larger numbers 
of economic and non-economic factors and have borrowed 
heavily from theories dealing with the process of social 
and institutional change"(38). So models have become 
both more complex and less narrowly economic. Another 
way of regarding the development of growth models is 
to say that there have been continuing efforts to tran- 
slate into the mould of the economic calculus matters 
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external to that calculus yet transparently relevant to 
the issue, of growth. Thus Mikesell notes of the Cobb- 
Douglas model (4 familiar starting point for neo-classical 
style work) that it "fails to include a-number of 
important determinants of growth such as technical 
progress"(39), He then goes on to report on the work 
of an economist who, looking at technical change, executes 
the following intellectual manoeuvre: 11one approach is to 
assume that technological change represents that part 
of the growth of output which cannot be explained by 
the growth of capital and/or labour"(40). The matter is 
thereby reduced to a relationship between established 
economic concepts, and may be translated into algebraic 
form and then manipulated as one more element of the 
model. 
This pursuit of greater realism in modelling by C) 
means of piecemeal emendation of simliler growth models 
now regarded as unsatisfactory in this or that aspect, 
has produced the vast and obscure literature refered to 
by Brookfield. Indeed the point is that this conception 
of the task of the theorist investigating development, 
and this intellectual procedure, lend themselves un- 
iquely to the elaboration of scholastic detail. With the 
use of a mechanistic logic, coupled with a subtle 
notation, fine distinctions can be made ever finer 
simply by the use of established methods. These thoughts(LO) 
we will pursue in Section Three when we look at the 
work of Streeten. Here we can simply note that within 
economics at this stage the slide from economics under- 
stood as the manipulation of formal machineries towards 
economics taken as actually involved in the world is 
under way. The distinction between economic growth 
theories and theories of social and economic change 
grows ±`ncreasingly blurred; it is to the latter that we 
now turn. 
4.0 Dynamic of Theory II: 'modernization-theory', a new 
master scientist. 
Theories of social and ecqnomic change constitute our 
- 
second area of substantive interest carried over from 
the previous chapter. Now whilst there these mqtters 
were touched upon very briefly and almost in passing, 
here we trace the emancipation of the broad range of the 
social sciences from their early status as 'under- 
lnbourers' to economics. In general we can say that where 
Chapter Three . 
traced the construction and deployment 
of 1growth models', in this chapter we see the resources 
of a wider set of disciplines being plundered for elem- 
ents which might flesh out a theory of 'modernization'. 
We must also note that here our 'thematic' approach 
runs into particular difficulty. It is not easy to 
identify a coherent notion of 'modernization'. Formula- 
tions of what is an intrinsically vague idea differ 
sharply, and this being the case we confront the problem 
of avoiding constructing a 'straw man' as our target. We 
distinguish genesis and form in investigating how the 
modernization thesis grows out of the resources avala- 
ble to the theorists of the time: the resultant version 
of 'modernization-theory' is thus our ownrather than any 
one extant theory or'aseemblage from many such theories. 
4.1- With regard to the origins of 'modernization- 
theory, Tipps makes the very general observation that 
its origins can be placed in "the response of American 
nojitical elites and intellectuals to the international 
setting of the post -Second World Vier era"(42). Indeed 
he goes on to say that this was the first time that 
substantial resources had been deployed in making sys- 
tematic sense of the world beyond the US borders. This 
surge of interest presented social scientists with 
novel demands, and we are offerýa a quasi-Kuhnian explan- 
ation for the variety of conceptual schemes offered. They 
providedý "surrogates for a tradition of inquiry into 
the problems of these societies which was almost 
entirely lackingll(43). Without an established literat- 
ure, theorists plundered their disciplined histories in 
search of a general paradigm. So 'modernization, is 
"deeply rooted in the perspective of developmentalism" 
claims Tipps(44)t citing Nisbet. 
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Further-sociology of knowledge information on the 
genesis of 'modernization' may be found in Tipps, 
ideological critique of the thesis. A resume ok the 
criticisms of 'modernization' is begun by noting the 
charge of ethnocentricity. The modernization-theorists 
talk of 'traditional' and 'modern' where Igth. century 
evolutionists9 from whom comes Imodernizatiorls' theor- 
etical underpinning, spoke of 'civilization' and 
'barbarism'. This is deemed to be a cosmetic change: 
, modernization'-remains a style of evaliiation which 
measures a society's progress/status by 11 its proximity 
to the institutions and values of Western, and partic- 
ularly Anglo-American, -societies"(45). Here we can 
anticipate issues which will be fully aired in Section 
Five, and note that analogously to Lewis(1955), the 
Imodernization-theorists' have grasped the right nettle- 
albeit in, an unsatisfactory and clumsy way. With Lewis, 
we commented on his substantive treatment; here it is a 
matter of evaluative orientation. If we take 'social- 
theory' to be essentially morally-informed then clarity 
and explicitness about one's own stance seems crucial, 
and this is more than a demand for mea-culpa statements 
on, the part of theorists; liberal apologetics seem to 
us to be no. more helpful than conservative condescen- 
sion. -That 'modernization' constructed a moral-evaluative 
schema for treating the Third World. ip. in itself, quite 
proper. What is objectionable is, to put it bluntly, 
the hypocrisy involved in the particular construct they 
came up with. (46).. 
In addition to the use of the model of the modern- as- 
West, plus the use of the dichotomous style of Igth 
century evolutionists9 the 'modernization' scheme was 
shaped by peculiarly American pressures. Tipps notes 
that "the idea of modernization is primarily an American 
idea, developed by American social scientists in the 
period after the Second World War and reaching the 
height of its popularity in the middle years of the 
1960's"(47). He goes on to note that "Two features of this 
period stand out: a widespread attitude of complacency 
toward American society and the expansion of American 
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interest throughout the world"(48). This complacency 
has its c9unterpart in social theory. Thus Hawthorn 
sees US so ciology in the early 1960's deploying a 
familiar mixture of normative functionalism, social 
psychology and empirical survey analysis, but against 
the rather new question of the "possibilities of stable 
change"(49). He goes on to take note that "the answers 
were curiously soothing. Industrial societies, it was 
claimed, were all converging towards a common destin- 
ation dictated by the technical and organisational 
imperatives of adVanced industrialisation"(50). Kerr 
(1960) advances the notion of a 'logic of industrial- 
izationIq observing that 11 Ihe world is entering a new 
age - the age of total industrialization. Some countries 
are far along the road; many more are just beginning the 
journey. But everywhere, at a faster or slower pace, the 
peoples of the world are on the march towards industria- 
lism"(514. The fate of the Third World was one of dis- 
integration and reformation in line with this 'logic'. 
Hawthorn reads this view in the light of US intellectual 
traditions in social thoughtvand current pre-occupations 
and*problems. He notes: 11in such a way contemporary 
history was assimilated to the foreshortened historical 
understanding in American social thought so that the 
diverse peculiarities of other societies and the 
worrying features of America itself could always be 
explained away"(52). A related strand of thought 'establ- 
ishes' the propriety of US style of democracy; one thinks 
of Lipset's 'Political Man' and also Taylor's critique of 
its 'cheating' argument style (52a). 
Tipps notes that the increase of research was designed 
to increase the "flow of information concerning these 
so: cieties in the US, and especially in official circles" 
(53). It'is this demand for what Fay would call policy 
science that is at back of ImodernizationI. However from 
this point Tipps'argument shades off into'confusion and 
ambiguity. It is argued that an 'ideological' critique 
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is not enough to throw over the thesis of 'modernization'$ 
yet insofar as these theorists lay claims to value- 
free work And claim for their results generality, they 
provide the the-lever to topple the whole edifice. As ' 
Fay points out, to uncover the ideological nature of a 
stance that denies such a character in favour of claims 
to the status of (natural)science, is to deal it a 
mortal blow: it collapses into ideology ordinarily 
understood. 
Paralleling these issuesTipps goes on to remark" 
that there is m reason to suppose that the notion of 
'modernization' itself is "inherently incompatible with 
a variety of ethnocentrisms, or that a revolutionary of 
socialist version of modernization theory could not be 
developed"(54). Our commentator, we may assume, ' has 
grasped (albeit unconsciously) the idea we gestured to 
abovez'that isq that 'modernization' as an evaluative 
stance is proper insofar'as it takes a stance. However, 
the conclusion that a 'left-modernization' is possible 
is not helpful . 'Modernization, is clearly 'policy - 
spiencel, and unless we want to construct a positivistic 
'left' philosophy of social development, Im6dernization' 
has no place in it(55). That Tipps can consider the idea 
reflects his empiricist distinction between fact and 
value. To carry over the wholly proper idea of moral- 
engagement and call that 'modernization' would be a 
needless and obfuscating stretching of the notion of 
'modernization', The empiricist frame and narrow notion 
of ideology 'used. lDy Tipps are the cause of his eventual 
confusion. It is claimed of 'modernization' that 11 Far 
from it being a universally applicable schema for the 
study of the historical development of human societies, 
the nature of modernization theory reflects a particular 
phase in the development oý single society, that of the 
US"(56). It is this aspect of the matter, the olearly 
situation-bound character of '. modernization', that not 
only establishes Tipps! thesis to the effect that Imoder- 
niaation' needs replacing rather than adjusting, but 
also provides the staneds continuing interest: that is, 
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it displays clearly the essential character of social 
theorizing, as the business of making sense. Our commen- 
tator misses the point of what his critique of ideology 
provides him with. 
4.2 Thus far we have looked at 'modernization' as being 
a(primarily American) ideology. But what of its character 
and typical mode of argument? In order to discover the 
form of 'modernization'. we will rely upon the work of- 
in the main- recent critics. What follows is a brief 
review, serving only to identify the typical argument 
form of the 'modernization' scheme. 
Brookfield begins his treatment of 'modernization' 
by. taking note of the general matter of strategies of 
explanation; thus he says that he is writing "about 
dichotomies in the theory of developmen, ý11(57). The whole 
eptsode of 'modernization' is taken as characterized by 
its adherence to a dichotomous characterization of the 
issue of development. It is this strategy for grasping 
the exchange of Iridhl and 'poor' that is Brookfield Is 
target. He argues that having conceptuali4ed the 
general circumstances in terms. of the dichotomy Itrad- 
itionallsocietyl / 'modern society%theorists of the 
school then proceed to attempt to elucidate matters by 
deploying a further set of dichotomous constructs. 
Familiarly: dual economy, agricultural and industrial 
sectors9c6mmunity and association, and so on. What 
Brookfield wants to show is that the dichotomies used are 
a linked set and, in toto, an unhelpful set. That th ey 
are linked may be established in two ways: 'analytically'. 
by reporting on work derived from Parsons' 'pattern 
variables'; and lassociatively'lby reporting upon the 
diverse efforts of those seeking descriptive character- 
izations of traditional/modern. That they are an un- 
helpful set is a matter of noting the inadequacies of 
their argument forms. We shall follow in rough outline 
this scheme of Brookfields. 
(I)Linked set: analytic/associative. Brookfield observesq 
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rightly, that 'modernization-theory' is, in contrast 
to 'growth-theory', a broader based effort: it embraces 
contributions from a variety of sources. Four are noted 
in'his treatment: "Thelacculturation' thesis of anthro- 
pology was an important element; others included Talcott 
Parsons' theories of laction I and of social change, 
notions of the plural society originating with Furnivall. 
theory in political science on the evolution of nation- 
alism"(58). Other critics offer variations of such a 
, list'-of contributions to the 'modernization' scheme; yet 
all would follow Brookfield's view that these contribut- 
ions are channe. led through "a particular view of change 
which is essentially dualistic: tradition and modernity 
are seen'as opposed forces, the latter growing at the 
expense of the former ..... Dichotomous thinking thus 
underlies the whole argument of modernization the6ry'1(59)ý 
(Granting this1we can also report that it is noticeable 
that with 'modernization' critics feel free to give vent 
to their scorn, where, other targets do not seem to draw 
this sort of fire quite so readil3ýN, Additiona2lyHuntington 
offers the view of the characteristic termu of debate in 
the late 1950's and early 1601s, tradition' and 
Imodernitylt that "these categories were, of course, the 
latest manifestation-of a Great Dichotomy between more 
primitive and more advanced societies which has been a 
common feature of Western social thought for the past 
one hundred years"(60). So we can note, as do Huntington 
and Brookfield (treating anticipations, of thelaccultur- 
ation' of the anthropologists) : Maine's status/contractg 
Durkheim's mechanical/organicq Tonnies'gemeinschaft/ 
gesellschaft ot WebRrb traditional/ rational. Doubtless 
a'search of the literature would reveal other similar 
orientating metaphors. The argument strategy of 'moderniz- 
ation' has been eummed up as follows: "The bridge 
across the Great Dichotoply between modern and traditional 
societies is the Grand Process of Modernization"(61). 
Of this dichotomy Huntington claims that the 
modern set'of notions attempting to flesh out the 
before/after metaphor originate with Parsons' and Shils' 
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'pattern variables'. "and the subsequent extension of 
these frorp 'choices' confronting an actor to charact-. 
erisations of social systems"(62). The 'pattern variables' 
appear in simple' forms in early 'modernization' work. 
Thus Bernsteing notes that "the participation of other 
social science disciplines in the discussions of devel- 
opment was recognised as being necessary, often being 
expressed in the 'social conditions of economic growth' 
or, tnon economic barriers to economic growth' types of 
formula; lt(63)He cites as an example of "an occasionally 
useful eclecticism"(64) Hoselitz's 1952 work 'The 
Progress of the Underdeveloped Areas", which included 
essays from Gerschenkron, Watnick and Hirschman . In 
Hoselitz's essay, 'Social Structure and Edonomic Growth' 
we'-find a systematised dualism; that is, seeking to 
characterize 'tradition' and 'modernity' the 'pattern 
variables' are invoked. Three out of five are taken to 
be pertinent. Hilal summearizes: "Thus, while developed 
societies are characterized by universalism, achiev- 
ment orientation and role specificity, underdeveloped 
countries have the oppdsite properties of particularism 
ascriptiveness and role diffuseness. Once this is stated 
it becomes easy to see that development consists in the 
acquisition of the first set of characteristics and the 
logs of the opposite set"(65). Here the dichotomies 
which purport to elucidate the nature of the major bi- 
furcation are clearly a linked set, In the instances 
where the 'pattern variables' are invoked they gesture 
to an 'analytical' linkage. B-ut more often than not 
we find thattwhilst the Parsonian scheme is cite d, the 
set df dichotomies are linked only insofar as they 
belong to one group of efforts to produce a descriptive 
and general model of 'tradition' versus 'modern'. The 
linkage is rather 'associative'? 
The pursuit of a descriptive/general scheme of 
evolution had one ready consequence; as Roxborough notes 
it "usually led to the formulation of a series of 
stages of development" (66). In AG FrankIs famed critique 
of modernization' dualism ('Sociology of Development 
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and Underdevelopment of Sociology') the Parsonian- 
derived spheme of Hoselitz using the 'patternvariables' 
is. one of two versions of the general line which Frank 
dubs the 'Ideal-typical index approach.. The other 
is stage theory: here Rostow is cited, and his work 
we treat below. As regards Frank! s "magisterial"(67) 
critique9we find that he identifies three lines within 
the orthodoxy of modernization, and attacks them all 
in turn under the headings of empirical, theoretical, 
and policy inadequacy. Thus he observes that there is 
a "deep similarity in the extent of the three modes' 
empirical inaccuracy, theoretical inadequacy and policy 
ineffectiveness"(68). He argues that this reveals sim- 
ilarities id argument strategy. So the ideal typical 
inaex approach is taken to be concerned with setting up 
the characteristics of development, diffusio#ism with 
how the characteristics of the 'modern' are transmitted 
to the 'traditional', against what obstacles; finally ;.. - 
the psychological approach, a "Freudianised Weber"(69), 
treats the absorption of these stances by groups/indiv- 
iduals withi# the 'traditional' societies. 
- We can move beyond Frankb attacks by noting Ifilalls 
extended version of this critical stance. Here there is 
reference to Parsons Ineo-evolutionism', described 
as a very general scheme which provides "an--assurance 
of stability and a semblance of order in a situation 
of apparent rapid change"(70). Hilal thinkb Parsons" 
scheme. is '? little more. than useless"(71), but ideologically 
its usefulness might be appreciated if we recall Haw- 
thorn-Is characterization of US sociology as being 
concerned above all with the issue of stable change. 
Hawthorn; reports that methodologically US sociology was 
( as we noted above) "still a mixture of normative 
functionalismg pragmatist social psychology and tech- 
niques for analysing survey data 11(72). And their . 
interests? ... "it was of the possibilities of stable' 
change, and once more the answers were curiously 
soothing. Industrial societies were converging towards 
a common destination dicýated by the technical and 
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organisational imperatives of advanced industrialis- 
ation"(731. Extended to the Third World this scheme 
came up with the following: "Non-industrial so; ieties 
.... would if 
, they were not already doing so experience 
a differentiation of structures the more efficiently 
to meet the imperatives dictated by economic develop- 
ment... 11(74). So the 'modernization' schemes reflected 
this reassuring and optimistic view; and as Rhodes notes 
this dualism of 'tradition' and Imodernityl, lodged in 
an evolutionist frame, suited the dispostions of the US 
theorists. The effects of colonialism were ignoredg 
the inhabitants of the Third World made responsible for 
their own conditions, and the possibility of revolution- 
ary change discounted. "Thus the substitution of an 
evolutionary for a truly historical perspective had 
very convenient ideological consequences"(75). The 
convenience of some of these ideological consequences- 
if this is the right way to cast it- can be seen clearly 
in the work of RostQw, explicitly a 'non-communist 
manifesto'. 
It seems clear that what we have in these 'modern- 
ization' schemes is an effort to effect a descriptive- 
general policy science which not only characterizes the 
process and goal of 'modernization' in a fashion appr- 
opriate to the needs of current political demand, but 
also seeks to identify specific points of intervention 
within the 'target' systems. 
(2) An unhelDful set. From the above lines of critique/ 
characterization we can perhaps pick out two areas of 
criticism which usefully relate to issues pursued in 
this study. So we look at the particular issue of 
dualismý in two areas. First economic dualism, which 
attempts to provide a single theory of econ,, )mics-in 
contradistinction to the lelassicldualistswho advanced 
claims for distinct schemes treating Irichland 'Poor'. 
Second. we look at the sociological dualisris of Itrad- 
itionall/Imodern' societies, attacked by many. Following 
this, we add a'note on the more general issue of attempts 
to construct descriptive general models. There we reg- 
ister what for us is the crucial problem with 'moderniz- 
ation' formulations. 
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Brookfield notes that it "is a matter of simple observ- 
ation that the economies of a great many developing 
countries are organised in two parts ....... alm6st as 
though they formed two different societies and econom- 
ies"(76). That this general observation is plausible 
is confirmed by 'Frank. In a critique of the dual society 
thesis he observes that "Evident inequalities of income 
and, differences in culture have led many observers to 
see Iduallsocieties and economies in the uhderdeveloped 
countries"(77). It is the shift from common sense- 
informed observation/description to generalized models 
that purport to explain that occasions the mendacious 
confusion attacked by theorists like Frank or Griffin. 
That the shift is illegitimate is not something which 
it- 
* 
is entirely clear that Brookfield has grasped, even 
though he makes reference to arguments for recasting the 
manner in which the work is conceived rather than simply 
continually making piecemeal revisions. 
The thesis of the dual economy is taken as presented 
by Boeke and Furnivall, both writing before the Second 
World War. It is reported that Boeke, who anticipates 
Furnivallq 
, 
takes 7estern economics to be inapplicable 
in the circumstances of colonial dependencies; and that 
,, two sets of economic princiýles are required"(78)i , 
Brookfield continues by noting that "the central problem 
in understanding a tropical dependency, he [Boeke] argued, 
arises from the contact between the two social and 
economic systems"(79). It is this view which anticipates 
the familiar dual economy-society thesis, but it also 
informs a line of more particularly economic thought on 
these matters. 'Classicldualism is rejected in the 
attempt to condtruct a single economics. 
"The essence of the theory of economic dualism is the 
attempt to combine in one system theory for an advanced 
and for a backward economy"(80)9 where the two 'sectors' 
are characterized in the usual way. "The primitive, 
statement of economic dualism is the ... paper of WA 
Lewis(1954) on 'Economic development with unlimited 
supplies of labourl. Though not formally a dual-economy 
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model, Lewis's formulation concerns two coexistent 
sectors aýid the conditions governing the supply of 
labour to the growing industrial sector from the agric- 
ultural"(81). Now according to Brookfield this type of 
orthodox-formulated investigation of the exchange 
between a 'modern sector' and a 'non modern sector' 
was extensively treated through the 19501s. It is 
reported that these 11 ... models of economic dualism are 
growth models and this characteristic has become more 
pronounced in the 19601s"(82). These efforts parallel, 
it would seemý the more familiar 'sociological' schemes. 
But where is the interest in all this? Clearly this 
note goes no way to elucidating what is evidently a 
comnlex debate within an area of economics. Yet our renarks 
do serve to call attention to this aspect of the history 
of ecoiiomic thinking on such matters; and the debate is, 
of interest in that it anticipates a remark made by a 
rioted 'dependency' theorist, Girvan(83). The latter, 
having reviewed the work of Furtado, observes that here 
the old debate about whether one or two economics are 
needed can be resolved. The orthodox scheme (which 
would embrace an economic dualism) is found wanting, but 
not in favour of the two schemes of economics% quite the 
reverse. Now that 'dependency' has established an econ- 
omics adequate to the dependent economies (Latin America 
in particular) it can also be seen that this scheme is 
appropriate to the economies of the developed areas. 
The orthodoxy is now rejected as demonstrably inadequate 
to its own and the circumstances of Third World economies. 
There is now one economics, 'dependency!. This arguoent 
we treat in a later chapterwhere we will detail the 
confusions between conceptual progressivity in natural 
science and ideology-ranking in the social that give 
rise to it. 
Turning to sociological-"dualisms and the concern 
with "The bridge across--the Great Dichotomy"(-84),,,,, ie 
can codify some of the criticisms that have been brought 
against 'modernization'. We can move from what we 
-124- 
V. 
take to be the more obvious to the rather more subtle 
criticisms. 
We can begin with objections to the characteriz- 
ations made of the two central notions used, 'modern, 
and 'traditional'. As regards the former element of the 
dichotomy it has been strongly argued that the charac- 
terization of the 'modern' is highly dubious. The viell 
known use of Parsons"pattern variables' is critic- 
ised with all the familiar points brought against that 
scheme : thus it is ahistorical, static, neglecting of 
class and matters of conflict and power. Frank, treating the 
'Ideal Typical Index Approach; confronts Hoselitz's 
Parsonian-inspired characterization of the modern with 
a series of rhetorical, common sense fact-presenting 
questions and shows it to be untenable. It is an empi- 
rically uhsatisfactory description. This line is followed 
by Hilal: speaking of the ideal-typological approach 
he observes that "In its dominant version it is un- 
repentantly empiricist"(85). There is, the same author 
continuesq a "distinct tendency to compile check lists 
of attributes"(86). These criticisms apply also tb 
characterizations of 'traditional'. Of this approach 
Hilal quite rightly questions its "meaningfulness"(87). 
There is a-further line of criticism made of the 
category 'traditional'; and if we follow this,,,, Ye can 
open up the issue of residual categories and note some 
of the difficulties associated-with them. We can agree 
that the category 'modern', even if characterizations 
produced are faulty, does at least stand in some, sort 
of clear and direct relationship to the material circ- 
umstances it would grasp. And even, to go one step 
furtherg if we note that abstracting and generalizing 
are faulty procedures we can grant that with 'modern' 
the procedure is at least minimally plausible. This is 
not so with 'tradition'. This concept is constructed 
not by abstraction and generalization, 'but by spelling 
out the particulars in which it is suppoged that the non- 
developed fail to measure up to the model of the 
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Imodern'. This collection of deficiencies presents itself 
as the model of traditional society. As Huntington notes 
"Dichotomies which combinelpositivel concepts and res- 
idual ones .. are highly dangerous analytically. 
In point of fact, they are not properly dichotomies at 
all"(88). It is from this fundamental incoherence that 
the errors flow, because this dichotomous formulation 
has the effect of masking the implausibility of the 
'modernization' theorists I argument strategy. They 
attempt to model the interaction of two specific cir- 
cumstances(objects). But we can see that in the usual 
natural science-aping syntax the argument appears to be 
curiously circular: we have a fairly clear end-point 
in presently experienced modern society, but the putative 
st6. rt-point is merely a 'negative image' of the end- 
point and not actually independent or different at all. 
If, on the other hand, the pretence to the status of 
(natural) science were dropped in favour of an expl- 
icitly argued case then this problem would not arise. 
In the literature of criticism of this specimen of 
'development-studies' this argument is not usually 
pushed through. Thus Bernstein1who sees (as do the 
others) the over-generality of the concept 'traditional', 
writes that "The first objection to be noted concerns 
the methodological procedure b, -, r which the traditional 
is simply defined negatively in relation to the modern 
so that .... differences between empirical societie's 
allocated to the residual category of the traditional 
are ignored"(89). He starts off in the right direction 
and then disappears up the familiar side-street, 
Two related points can be presented here. One 
concerns 'dice-loading' and the other 'collapsing 
arguments'. As regards 'dice-loading' we would argue 
that a dichotomous construct ýhat affirms one category 
and identifies the other as a concatenation of non- 
prime category elements is immediately value-skewed. 
Consider the idea of the 'non-medical use of drugs'. 
This is a term which purports to allow the cool-headed 
discussion of social drug use, in particular recreational 
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use. It is taken to bea. movement forward from simple- 
condemnation. But we can ask, just when and by whom 
was the mo del of medical use established as prime 
case against which other uses might be classified? 
Clearly, when the dichotomy 'medical/non-medicall is 
written in full, then the implicit criticism of any 
drug use that is other than prime case- that is, which 
is not legitimated by an authoritative medical practioner 
for approved use -is revealed. The expression 'non-medical 
use of drugs' is presented as non-judgmental, a basis 
for free and equal discussion. Clearly it is not; and 
generally. if vaýue-skew is either not acknowledged or, 
because the particular skew is clothed in'common sense' 
as with our example, not seenthen vie get simple bias. 
In the case of our example., we move from a situation of 
outright condemnationg which is relatively easy to attack, 
to a situation of disguised condemnation, which is 
very much harder to attack. The point of all this is 
fairly clear: the notion of 'modernization'. as it 
presents itself in its usual scientistic formulations, 
tends, to our mind, to simple bias in the same wqy. 
The. 1modern' is-taken as the self-evidently given, and 
the non-modern constitute so many deviations from it. 
A proper approach to matters of theorizing the exchange 
of 'rich' and 'poor' involves, as we argued in Section 
One, explicitly arguing a case. To the extent that 
'modernization-theory' neglects the reflexive posture 
attendant upon arguing a case it must be judged to be 
flow grade ideology'. 
The second point concerns-'collapsing arguments'. 
We draw this line of criticism from Huntington. It is 
noted that the characterizations of 'modern' and ' 
#traditional' are unsatisfactory9 but in comparison 
with the idea of 'modernization' they are lucid and 
clear. Criticising the scheme for ambiguity in respect 
of claims (are these actual stages or ideal types? ) it 
is remarked that "Inevitablyg alsog the dual character 
of-the concepts undermined the conceptual dichotomy"(90) 
The problem is'that all societies display 'traditional' 
and 'modern' characteristics, which is ho problem if 
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it is static descriDtions that are required. But, 
"Viewed as a theory of history or change, howeyer, the 
addition of a transitional category tended to exclude 
the traditional and modern stages from the historical 
process"(91). The two notions 'traditional' and 'modern' 
come to represent, it is claimed, the start and end of 
history. IBut if all real societies are transitional 
societies a theory is needed which will explain the forms 
and processes of change at work in transitional societies. 
This is just what the dichotomic theory failed to provide. " 
(92). This is surely a crucial attack: the fundamental 
argument-strategy of 'modernization', the elucidation 
of change across a general dichotomy by neans of invo- 
king a series of particular dichotomies, fails when the 
scheme is brought to bear on 'the world'. The scheme 
is unable to grasp change, or transition, and can only 
offer static comparisons in abstract and ahistorical 
terms. This is not just an empirical inadequacy-but is 
rather a fundamental conceptual incapacity. 
Finally, we can add a mention of two instances of 
value-skew in 'modernization'. Thus in respect of _ 
Rostow's stage theory Frank notesthat the scheme supposes 
a 'primitive starting point' from which even the pre- 
sently developed are taken to have emerged. Frank thinks 
this is fallacious, "This entire approach to economic 
development and cultural change attributes a history 
to the developed countries but denies all history to 
the under-developed ones"(93). The presently 'rich' 
have the history of their emergencewhilst the 'poor' 
have yet to move, so to say, and consequently have no 
history. Griffin follows Frank in regarding this as 
ludicrousq observing that classifying Third World 
countries "as 'traditional societies' begs the issue 
and implies that the under-developed countries have no 
history or that it is unimportant"(94). Both Frank, and 
Griffin argue that, far from the Third World countries 
having been 'traditional' and unchanging in a, way that 
could plausibly be taken to leave them with 'no history', 
it is precisely their history that explains their 
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present: in particular, the centuries-long exchange of 
peripheral with metropolitan areas. Again the Imoder- 
nization' scheme is condemned as theoretically incap- 
able of treating what, on any accout, would be taken to 
be part of the common sense, of an enquiry. The form- 
ulation 'traditional/modern, is thus skewed in that 
it rules out consideration-of the part played by the 'rich' 
in-creating the present circumstances of the 'poor'. 
An interesting line on the issue of valuation-skew 
is presented by Rhodes, who argues that the evolutionary 
school (which includes, in the present, 'modernization') 
has enphasised the cultural and psychological in reaction 
to Marx. Rhodes identifies a bastardized Weber, with 
the 'Protestant Ethic' being read as hairing refuted 
Marx, as the well-spring of interest in these lines. 
It is noted that "Two closely related approaches to 
development have emerged as the result of Weber's influ- 
ence, the cultural and the psychological"(95). These are 
criticised for various reasons-in what is a subtle argu- 
i. nent. which concludes that "the evolutionary perspec- 
tivehas provided an ideal conceptual framework within 
which the forces of colonialism can be ignored, disguised 
or dismissed. The fusion of an outdated theoretical 
perspective and lack of historical knowledge with 
certain ideological and institutional forces has created 
a social science which is incapable of understanding the 
dynamics of economic development"(96). 
Finally, in pursuit of the Brookfield-inspired 
claim that the categories of 'modernization' are an 
unhelpful set, we can turn to the matter of descriptive 
general models. The above treatment is a review of 
, modernization' and its critics which rests largely 
within the terms of their debate, and within these terms 
the charges of the critics we would grant. However, in 
order to link with our general interest in argument- 
construction we have to note, that, for us, the trouble 
with 'modernization'- taking it as an exercise in social 
theorizing- is that it has an impoverished(and arguably 
I disingenuous) conception of a proper and fruitful analysis. 
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The scheme takes the proper mode of enquiry to be the 
establishment of policy-scientific general models., 
which descriptively characterize the structure of the 
society in question in such a fashion as to permit 
manipulative interventions governed by an authoritative 
'objective' knowledge. This is the efforts strategic 
errorl thereafter its adherents ar6 liable to criticicms 
which attach to the use of residual categories, skewed 
arguments, and collapsing dualisms which we have 
noted above, Their fundamental strategy is clearly 
grasped by Hilal: first define 'modern'. then in oppo- 
sition 'non-modern', and 'modernization' is the route 
between them. The rest is just detail, which may or may 
not be intrinsically interesting. Smith follows this 
and identifies the same uniform theme at back of the 
various schemes of 'modernization': "Ultimately, the 
various societies with their different cultures and 
modernizing*routes can be analysed in terms of an 
ideal-type of these trends. They constitute so many 
'deviations' from the general direction of these trends, 
so mahy variant patterns on a common theme"(97). 
The 'modernization' scheme is seen by Hawthorne to be 
part and parcel of US sociology, of this overall picture 
he notes: "... contemporary history was assimilated to 
the foreshortened historical understanding in American 
social thought so that the diverse peculiarities of 
other societies and the worrying features of America 
itself could always be explained away"(98). 
5.0_D. Vnamic of Theory III: the apogee of 'modernization'. 
We conclude with a brief mention Of Rostow: a figure 
we associate with the apogee of 'modernization', and 
evidence of the re-emergence of a counter-tradition 
tolpositivistic' social science. We proceed by noting 
that the episode of Imodernizatiorls, 'career, can be itself 
described as a series of Istages', and that Rostow 
appears in the period of the maximum celebration of 
'modernization'. Having taken note of why Rostow's effort 
was so popular, we finish with a reference to what seems 
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to be an almost un-remarked developmentt that is, the 
Irevisionist-modernization-theorist'sI explorations 
in the rea lm of what Gellner(99) calls 'classical 
political philosophy'. 
5.1 What we might call the 'initial phase of moderniz- 
ation' we can make parallel the pre-1955 period of US 
dominance in aid giving. According to White's history., 
it is the occasion of the extension of the Marshall 
Aid doctrine to similarly distressed areas in the Third 
World. It aims to secure allies for the US, and insofar 
as an articulated theory was concerned a version of 
the Harrod-Domar model (as core) plus a range of 'non- 
economic factorsl9was in use. The particular 'factor' 
that linked the Harrod-Domar core to political require- 
ments was what Kolko identifies in US European policy% 
the equation of economic health with lowering of liab- 
ility to communist 'infection'. In practiceg prior to 
1956, flows of aid remained small and what there was 
went mostly to SE Asia where 11 aid policy .... was virtu- 
ally indistinguishable from strategic policy"(100). 
This orientation continues to inform enquiry into the 
matter of the development of the Third Vlorld. But around 
1956 there is a change. 
The second phase, which we might label the 'phase 
of the elaboration of modernization, (1956-6lsay) 
sees the invention of 'modernization'. It 'was in 1955 
that the Bandung Conference affirmed the principle of 
, non-alignment'. Together with the entry (as White 
reports it) of the USSR into the realm of aid-giving, 
this constitutes the political occasion of a shift in 
legitimating theorems. This change in the politics of 
aid necessitates changes in its presentation and thus 
theorizing. The themes of legitimation, in US work , 
shift from foreign policy objectives couched in 'cold 
war' terms, to the encouragement of 'development'. So 
'containment' is revised and 'modernization' within the 
ambit of the 'free world' is offered to counteract the- 
USSR's offers of 'socialism'. The theoretical counter- 
part is a. concern9as we have seen, for the explication 
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of the matter of stable change; and the US'intellectual 
scene produces general, systematicq theories oý the 
emergence and ch 
, 
aracter of industrial life. Systems 
functionalism, as the general paradigmq permits detailed 
empirical work, intermediate level(project) theorizing 
and very general schemes of societal development. 
The third phase, which is notable for its optimism, 
we can label the 'phase of the apogee of modernization'. 
This peak coincides with the Kennedy administration, 
and it declines slowly as the USO sinks into the Vietnam 
quagmire'and as 'development' fails to materialize. 
The first root of the optimistic formulation of Imoder- 
ni. -ation' would seem to be lodged in the Kennedy asminis- 
tration's foreign-policy efforts. Thus the Truman 
Doctrine is re-affirmed in the Inaugural Address, and 
according to Graham(101) foreign policy becomes the 
only area of operation for an administration that is 
stymied at home. After the fiasco of the Bay of Pigs, 
the Cuban missile crisis is taken (wrongly, according 
to Young(102)) as a vindication of 'crisis management'. 
Nonetheless, the chance for Kennedy to recoup his polit- 
ical fortunes layq thinks Kiernan(103)., in Vietnam. These 
'New Frontiersmen' are characterized by Nolting(the US 
ambasador in Vietnam. 1961-63) as bqing "very gung-ho 
fellows 9 wanting to get things straightened up in a 
hurry, clear up the mess. We've got the power and we've 
got the know how and we can do it"(104) . If this is 
one root, then the other is to be found, on White's 
accountq in the shift of ai-d-deba. te to the level of the 
general. 
Here there are two political considerations. At the 
end of the 1950's there was a surge of decolonization, of 
mostly Black African states. This surge of decolonization 
occasioned a reworking of accepted notions of aid, as the 
character of Black African states was evidently more 
fragile than had been the case in the earlier colonial 
withdrawal from Asia. There is a double shift, from 
regarding aid-flows as unusual and transitory phenomena 
to seeing aid as both continuing and proper. By the 
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end of the 1950's White reports that the provision of 
aid and its efficacy were taken for 
, 
granted: it was all 
"self-evidently desirable"(105). The reinforcing polit- 
ical. circumstance was the aid-recipients I response to the 
US/European debate, in the wake of the Cuban episode, 
on 'sharing the burden' of defending the interests of 
the 'free world'. This is taken to have looked rather 
like a 'donors club' and it is recorded that the aid 
recipients responded by trying to shift the debate to 
the UN where they had a voice. White sees this as having 
the effect of wrenching aid-giving out of various 
local and evolving contexts and fixing. debate at a very 
general level. The impact on theorizing was unfortunate, 
thinks Whiteg because "it had to be assumed, falsely, 
that the objectives were self-evident and accepted; 
that-is, that the nature of the development process and 
of the aspirations of those who sought to promote such 
a process was not in dispute'1ý06). It is into this con- 
text of optimism, and non-controversiality, that Rostow's 
work is introduced. 
5.2 We can now turn to Rostow9whose 'Stages, might be 
taken to encapsulrate the theoretical elements looked at 
in Section Two as a whole. Thus the core of the Rosto- 
vian scheme is, it would seem, the Harrod-Domar model. 
Mikesell notes that "Rostow was considerably influenced 
by the Harr-od-Domar model in his definitions of take- 
off in terms of the critical rate of investment requi- 
red for the achievement of a level of income and savings 
sufficient to assure self-contained growth"(107). 
Brookfield would agree with thisýand adds a remark on 
an area of work in economics that we have not treated; 
this is the quantitative work which parallels the more 
formal elaborations of Harrod-lpbmar models. It is 
reported that there was "a spell of quite profound re- 
search-into the ca-oital/output ratio"(108). The sugg- 
estion is that Rostow takes the theoretical position 
of the Harrod-Domar model, adopts the quantitative 
work on ICORt and-comes up with the notion of 'take- 
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Now, if the core of the Rostovian effort ib the 
growth model work of the economists, then its frame- its 
general theory of change. -is a neo-evolutionary scheme. 
Essentially dualistic, Rostow presents five 'stages'. 
The fifth is the model of the US, and the first is a 
combined residual and antithetical concept to set agai- 
nst the model of the US. The remaining three, centering 
on take-off19 treat the transition from 'tradition' 
to modernity'. That this sort of descriptive-general 
dualistic characterization is unsatisfactory as an 
explanation of change has been argued above. 
A detailed exposition/critique of the Rostovian 
effort we will eschew providing: it has been done 
before on numerous occasions, and the bones of this 
particular debate are surely picked clean. We do want 
to make one point, (arising from our interest in argu- 
ment strategies)wLch is not often made in treatments 
of modernization'. But before that, we. can ask: just 
why was Rostow's work so popular? 
Hagen, in a review of Rostow's scheme, notes that 
the "conception of stages of economic growth almost 
immediately captured the attention of laymen..... It 
was given serious though not generally favourable 
attention by social scientists as well"(109). It is with 
the flaymed that we should concern ourselves, noting 
that the term must include primarily government circles 
who wereg after all, involved in these matters. A- 
sketch of an answer to the question of the popularity 
of the Rostovian scheme can be presented in terms of 
, ideological-fitness'. This analogy comes from design- 
problems, where a 'design problem' is a matter of fitting 
functional requirements to the possibilities of the 
materials and the constraints of the environment. So 
we ask: how does Rostow's melange of proffered explana- 
tions sit with the political needs of those embroiled 
in matters of development? We can identify two broad 
areas which serve to illuminate Rostow's peculiar suit- 
ability: the timing and origin of his message on the 
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one hand, and on the other the optimistic generality 
of its con. tent. 
Rostows 'Stages' is the pre-eminent theory of 
development through the early 19601s. The work was first 
presented in a 1956 essay, in the Economic Journal, 'The 
Take-Off into Self-sustained Growth' and 
represented in its familiar form in 1960. Thus its 
initial. publication coincides with the shift from US 
hegemony in aid-giving and subsequent search for an 
elaborated theory of 'modernization' during White's 
phase of aid-donor competition. In the 1960 publication, 
the anti-communist theme and the core message of the 
Harrod-Domar model fit Rostow into the mould of the 
'New Frontierl. It is here that we find the highest 
expression of the notions of 'interventionism'. Rostow 
was a part of this establishment; and as the pronounce- 
ments of the most poweful state on Earth are of under- 
standable interest to others, then the work of one of 
its members may be expected to be studied for clues 
as to that government's likely activities. 
The counterpart is the messages acceptability. In 
the 19601s, as we have just seen, a confluence of fact- 
ors effectively shifted international discussion of 
aid and developnent onto a very general level. Debate 
came to focus on the 'rules of the game'; and this 
being the case, questions about what aid was actually 
for, ho-N it was supposed to work. and what existing 
conceptions supposed and entailed, all dropped away. 
In its place, as White argued, there was a presumption 
of 'self-evidence'. Here the descriptive, un-reflective 
generality of the Rostovian scheme was, we can suggest, 
wholly appropriate.. This point is made, if in passing, 
by Hagen: "Undoubtedly one of the causes of the wide 
popularity of Rostow's book is the perception conveyed 
by it that there is order in this uncertain world; that 
once a certain sequence is entered upong economic growth 
will follow"(IM). Tn addition to the acceptability at 
the level of the general, so to say, we can discern in 
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Thus if we imagine the circumstances of international 
conferences and so on , then we can see that the 
time period for 'take-off' proposed by Rostow(20 years) 
was such as to be (A) conceivable and (b) long enough 
not to be oppressive. Equally the mechanism of 'take- 
off'-, the creation of a rise in ICOR from 5% to 10%9 
which is taken from Lewis in particular -is obviously 
quantifiable; so targets can be set for aid flows, 
growth rates and the rest. Brookfield summarizes the 
sc)aeme's persuasiveness as follovis: "It seemed to give 
every country an equal chance; it 'explained' the 
advantage of the developed countries; it offered a clear 
path to progress -- without spelling this out in detail; 
it*identified the requirements for advance with the 
virtues of the West; it suggested comfortingly that the 
communist countries were in fact following VIestern 
recipes 9 with a difference; it debunked the historical 
theories of Marx"(131). 
The Rostoyian schema we take to be the gaudiest 
manifestation of 'modernization, in the phase of its 
apogee;. - Baran and Hobsbawm speak of a mixture of "coffee 
house sociology and political speculation"(II2). But 
at the same time we find stirrings of a fruitful line 
of revision. We take Gellner to exemplify this line . 
Gellner writes from within the school of Popperian 
liberalism, and-we may provisionnlly label him a 'phase 
four revisionist modernization-theorist'. We can see 
how his treatment of 'social change' is adequate to the 
importance of the debate as practical social theorizing, 
and sensitive to its intellectual complexity and 
disciplinary import. 
We may approach these matters by noting that Gellner 
takes a different line, with regard to the internal logic 
of the various basic metaphors of change, than does 
Rostow. In particular his conception of the ideological 
role of such metaphors is to be noted. Gellner's Ineo- 
episodic' conception of change- where the interests 
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and metaphors expressed by the classical evolutionists, 
treating the broad sweep of history, are reworked into 
a less ambitious theory focused upon a circumscribed 
object, a discrete historical episode- does not easily 
correspond to the evolutionist scheme of Rostow. Thus 
Gellner'S notion is essentially an element of an attempt 
at an explicit moral ordering of the world, which 
procedure is 
, 
necessarily tentative and self-involving. 
The Rostovian pursuit, on the other hand, is of a general 
descriptive scheme; along with other 'modernization' 
theorists, it is 'recipe I knowledge that is sought. 
Gellner begins by noting that 11 ... men generally 
have a view of the nature of their society. They also 
have views concerning what validates the society's arran- 
gements. The two things, image and validation, never 
are and cannot be wholly distinct"(113). Three explanat- 
ions/legitimations are presented, each taken as express- 
ive of a fundamental metaphor of progress. Of these, 
the simplest is taken as identifying "one episode, one 
transition from one bad state of affairs to one good 
state 11(114). We are given thý example of the explanation 
offered by the Enlightenment thinkers, the device of the 
'social contract'. These 17th and 18th century'views, (their 
predecessors are unspecified) are taken to be sociolog- 
ically iitpoverishedýand thus unsatisfactory given their 
demanding role. A richer and enduring schema is gener- 
ated by-19th century thinkers and is the familiar 
evolutionist typeg validating society in terms of an 
all embracing and permanent process: transition as such. 
The metaphorb persuasiveness Gellner locates in its 19th 
century incorporation into common sense as the general 
theory of the(natural) progress(of the West). These 
schemes are objected to on the ground that they tend 
to confuse history and mechanism: thus a period is 
taken (wrongly) to be explained whc-n it is slotted into 
some wider postulated series. Marx is excepted insofar 
as he presents a mechanism of change and thus offers a 
genuine explanation. Gellner also takes exception, -. as 
we might expect, to'the latent determinism of evolutionist 
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schemes. arguing that it tends to squeeze out the moral 
agent. Finally he adds that anyway, as a simple matter 
of fact9 these efforts do not fit*the situation of the 
Third World and'so are largely irrelevant to today Is 
problems. 
GellneA third conception of 'social change' is his 
own and he constructs it from basics. He begins by 
observing that the conditions of the legitimacy of a 
social order are its being (i) industrialized or moder- 
nizing and (ii) non-colonial. This is taken to be both 
a matter of fact and, as it happens, a correct politic- 
al philosophy. He reformulates it thus : "the diffusion 
of industrialismý carried out by national units is the 
dominant event of otr time. This is an lepisodel, how- 
ever large and fundamental it may be"(115). Gellner 
attaches* to his revised, focused, evolutionism the 
practical conclusion of his Popperian liberalism; and so 
as the key to 'the transition' we have the affirmation 
of science and its method. Analogously, in the realm 
of politics(and presumably only for the Third World 
he advocates the rule of the modernizing elite. 
If the foregoing indicates how the notion of 'social 
change' may be taken to be able to encapsulate the 
complex issues thrown up in theefforts of the post- 
war period to grasp this matter of 'development' (and 
does so in a way which reveals the intellectual impov- 
erishment of the run of the mill 'modernization-theorists'), 
then we may note, as a corollaryla general point with 
regard to the matter of social theory itself. Thus 
Gellnerg after presenting the two core elements of what 
he takes to be a presently relevant political philoso- 
phy, goes on to make the remarkable claim that "the 
heir of 'classical' political theory is now sociology" 
(116). The task of political theory is here taken to be 
the formulation of descriptions of society in terms of 
which action is informed; or briefly, the construction 
of ideologies. If it is to be a good ideology then it 
must necessarily take cognisance of how societies fun- 
ction and change, thus it will be sociological. Gellner 
takes the business of sociology in the 19thcentury 
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to have been the rendering intelligible of the novel, 
and morally problematical, process of industri4lization. 
He notes that ". the emergence of industrial society is 
the prime concern of sociology"(117). If we recall 
our paraphrasing of Hilal vis a vis the 'discovery' of 
the Third World, we can note that Gellner goes on to say 
that "when industrialization had happened only once, 
those who had been through it tended to confuse it with 
what may have been accidental or once-only concomitants 
of its first occurrence. Now, the repetitions provided 
by new combinations of circumstances, and the attempt to 
understand and facilitate the process in new places, 
also throws light on its earlier occurence in the West" 
(113). The old problem of political philosophy- that is, 
the 'problem of order'- is now overthrown in favour of 
investigation of the bases of industrial society. 
It is with Gellner that we see how the fruitful 
legacy of 'modernization' may be taken to have been 
established. The line from a narrow Keynesian-derived 
'growth-theory', via the ideological naivete of early 
and elaborated 'modernization'. to this explicit ack- 
nowledgment of the richness and complexity of the 
problem of development is completed. The fruit, 
erroneous formulations aside, is a rediscovery of 'social 
theory', What Gellner calls 'classical' pbl*itical 
philosophy# 
It is our view that particular marxian-inspired schemes 
of social theorizing are the ap-propriate vehicles for further 
enquiry of this sort. These we will come to. At this point 
Gellner's remarks invite a review of the then contemporary 
efforts at similarly theoretically 'rich' treatments of the 
Third Ifforldg but this is an area we cannot here revie,.,,,. 
It must, finally, be noted that if, Gellner points to a 
'better' modernization than the run of the mill efforts, then 
he does so, arguably, because he inhabits a different, Euro-_ 
_p_eang 
intellectual tradition. Quite how iMDortant this fact 
is will become clearer in the course oý the-next chapter 
when we look at Idecolonization' and the work of the theorists 
of Ineo-institutionalism'. 
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Section Three: The 'Radicals' 
Introduction. 
In Section Two we looked at the 'Positivists' within 
the 'career' of 'development-studies', the dominant 
school within the immediate post-war, 'cold warl, period. 
Now we turn to an examination of the contributions to, 
and results of, the partial disintegration of this 
Dosition. Again we*must recall that we are treating a 
web of events in the real world, theoretical responses 
amongst academics and practitioners, mediated by political 
demands and discipliAary traditions. We are dealing with 
themes: andq more particularly, with one theme picked out 
of the web of the history of the sixties. The 'positivist' 
orthodoxy does not simply go away and nor does this 
period of the Iradicplsl end neatly with the resurgence 
of marxian scholarship. The three periods overlap, and 
theorists change their roles as we change our questions. 
The material of Section Two offers our second dist- 
inguishable answer to the question of the independence 
and novelty of the efforts of 'development-studies': in 
their differing fashions the lines treated here would 
claim to see 'development-studies' as independent and 
novel, and as constituting a clear advance over earlier 
work. Thus Section Three confronts two problem areas: 
the independence and theoretical novelty or otherwise of 
Idevelo,,, ment-studies'; and the matter of ranking comp- 
eting efforts. 
In Section Three, the 'positivist C_ý71 is subjected 
to a threefold critique, and we treat each after the 
style of Dobb(l). These critiques have it in common thC-t 
they deny the possibility of separating matters of 
economy oh the one hand from matters of society on the 
other. The familiar calculus of the economists is inad- 
equate to those tasks which are typically those of 
'development-studes'. This denial takes its starting 
point in different places for the three critiques and 
issues in distinctive, though relatedg analyses. 
The 'European line,, -we term Ineo-institutional 
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cocial theory', following Gruchy(2), and take to form 
a distinctive alternative to orthodox lines. In terms of 
noted practioners we exchange Lewis(ch-3) and 
ýostow(chO 
for Yyrdal, Seers and Streeten(whom we meet in ch-5). 
The key to the scheme is expressed by Seers(3) in his 
1963 article when he denies that orthodox economics is 
of any use in treating the typi6al problems of the Third 
World. Attention must be paid to the social and institu- 
tional context'and to the world economic context within 
which these economies function. 
The 'Latin American 'line is taken by Girvan(4) to 
begin with the rejection*of Ricardian-derived notions of 
international specialisation, in favour of industria- 
lization, by Prebisch(5). Girvan argues that in 
the late 1960's the schemes in use were institutional 
economics which we have noted above, and structuralist 
economics the genesis of which we can locate in a 
reaction to monetarist explanations of inflation(6). 
The denial of such monetarist explanations focussed att- 
ention on issues of economic structure. The consummation 
of this trendjargues Girvang"took the forms of adding 
(I) an historical perspedtive and analysis to the 
Etructural and institutional method, (II) ; giving the 
historical/structural/institutiona1 method the kind of 
theoretical and empirical content needed to construct 
a general theory of dependence and under-development"(7-8). 
The third line may be exemplified by AG Frank 
and 'under-development theoryI. In general it may be 
argued that the IUDTI line deals with more or less the 
same phenomena as do dependency theorists with the 
difference that the notion of depezidency is located 
within a functioning world capitalist syptem with the 
analytical str6ss on 'capitalism', that is, criticism 
is couched in marxian terms. Ehrensagt takes this to 
be simply a difference of interpretation of the same 
phenomena, and we may note that the precise status of 
these IUDTI efforts has been a matter of sharp debate 
amongst theorists. 
These three reactions to the orthodoxy will be 
--L4 I- 
treated in Section Three as we have treated previously 
noted thegretical efforts; that is, we indicate the 
genesis of the critiques and then go on to 'unpack' 
them in order to reveal their characteristic argument 
forms. On this matter of the genesis of the critiques we 
may observe that hitherto, in accordance with our meth- 
odologicAl program, we have tried to plot the way in 
which given sets of resources have been selectively 
plundered and reworked in response to particular 
, oolitical demands. But in Section Three the political 
demands are not unequivocally 'positive'; they are rather 
to some extent 'criticall. The clients for whom the 
theorists prepare their efforts are not those of Section 
Two; that is, the nature of the political demand infor- 
ning the critiques is of a different order to that info- 
rming the efforts of the orthodox. The nature of the 
revisions made in the political demands will be a 
matter of no little concern. In addition to this, and 
corresponding to the shift in character of the polit- 
ical demandq there is a re-consideration of thelpositivist' 
orthodoxy because it forms the object over against which 
the critiquesq at least in partgare deýined. Here we 
may perhaps indicate a reason why the resultant critiques 
all partake of a single family of concepts. - 
The program for Section Three will be as follows: 
chapter five will treat the ideology of the Ineo- 
institutionalists'9 and chapter six will treat the vari-r- 
eties of dependency and IUDTI. 
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Chapter Pive: The conlý, ibution of the 'Neo-Institutionalists. 
c 
1.0 Dynamic of Societyj-.. Pn underlying divergence. 
Our particular schema (af ter Dobb) for constructing 
sociology of knowledge analyses, that is the set of - 
necessary elements of a complete treatment, is organised 
around the business of theorizing. We grant the general 
schema of the double dynamic of society and theory and 
order it around the supposed position of the theorist or 
group. Thus we take social-theorizine to be an activity 
whose outline we can describe thus: the theorist lodged 
within a particular historical milieu is confronted by 
political demands to interpret current social change. 
This-he accomplishes by invoking in a 2electively critical 
fashion the intellectual resources of his discipline of 
learning. The product of all this, a theory'ordinarily - 
understoodl we take to be an ideological construct serving 
to interpret, legitimate and order action in the world. 
Here we look at the general milieu within which the 
neo-institutionalists worked. We may begin with a point 
made, by NafziEer in respect of the sources of critiques of 
the dominantl'econonics-positivist's notions of development. 
lie observes that "Fundamental criticism of existing 
conceptions of-reality in development studies originated 
in Latin America and continental Europe, and to a lesser 
extent in Asia and Africa, all with some 'inside' 
perspective on the weakness of dependent economies, rather 
than in the U. S,. '(9). That these criticismsemerC., ed outside 
of the U. S. v; e may take, granting the sociology of 
knowledre as a premise, to reflect differences in the 
situations of the various actors. In this descriptive vein 
we -can record briefly two complex trends running through 
this period. On the one hand we find an economically 
reconstructed Western Europe divesting itself of formal 
colonial empires; and, on the other, we see the 
'interventionist' creed of the U. S. reaching its apogee 
with Kennedy's 'New Frontier', and the subsequent, full 
expression of that, namely Johnson's 'Great Society'. 
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Of this post-war career of the U. S. I land e ], ( 1 0)observes 
that "never in human history has a country exerciýed global 
power comparable to the U. S. at the end of the Second World 
Var. Ro power ever lost absolute supremacy so quickly. 
The 'American Century' did not last tenyears". Citing 
I'Aandel recalls that this discussion might, in contrast to 
the descriptive treatment above, be cast in the form of an 
enquiry in respect of meaning-systems; that is, ideologies. 
Further,, it is clear that the discussion is ideologically 
alive; thus the nature of the relationship of the U. S. A. 
to western Europe and likely changes in that relationship 
are matters of present concern and differing interpretations, 
-The former line is pursued by . 21churmann who notes that 
up to the mid-sixties the position of the U. S. seemed 
secure: "then it seemed as if American economic and military 
power were virtually unlimited"(11). Yet as early as 1968 the 
position is seen as crumbling; inflation, unemployment and a 
weakening dollar are cited. ISchurmann presents all this as 
an introduction to treating the gradual process whereby the 
idealoey Of U-S- supremacy became untenable. lie claims thate. 
lij-'rom the end of World War 11 till 196%1, the vision of the 
American Empire rested on three fundamental assumptions: 
(1) that only America had the strategic military power to 
protect the free world from attack by the Eurasian heartland 
communist nations, Russia and China; (2) that the powerful 
American economy was tlie foundation of all other capitalist 
and free world economies; and (3) that the political power 
of the American Government alone was capable of organising 
regionally the free world"(12). Schurmann then Goes on to 
indicate how these assumptions lost credibility. Ile 
follows Mernan's treatrent, which focuses on "shifts in 
economic strength" C, 13). Tvio of these are noted: the resource 
drain of the'imperial style', and the gradual encroachment of 
western European and Japanese competition. In regard tp the 
formersKiernan notes that notwithstanding that up until 1,972 
the U. G. "maintained a surplus on exchanee of goods and 
services"(14)the drain of maintaining the role of 'world 
policeman' has outweighed this. This outflow peaked with 
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the commitment in Vietnam. In regard to the latter point, 
the effective refurbishment of Vestern Europe and Japan 
under U. S. hegemony has raised up competitors who have 
futced the U. S. -to open up its own economy and have 
competed effectively in the world economy generally. As 
evidence of the ' 
loss on the part of the U. 1"3,. of 
organising power within the 1't, 'est', Schurmann presents the 
refusal of western European nations to send troops to 
Vietnam. 
That there was a divergence in the circumstances of 
the U. S. and western Europe is clearly a claim that our 
quoted sources would make. The plausibility of their 
analyses may be open to question, yet to note this cimply 
serves to introduce the second aspect we noted with Mandel; 
which is- that the relationship of the U. S. and Western 
Europe is a significant part of current political deba'. 'e. 
That this is the case bids us recall that even if we can 
retrospectively, identify what might be taken to be early 
signs of the diminution of U. S. power and the divergence 
of U. &S. and Western European interests, it is still the 
case that this disintegration of U. S. hegemony is far from 
being 'obvious'. The minimum we can safely take from this 
(here unexamined) debate is that there has been a recovery 
of Europ6an economic power; thus Lichtheim notes that "in 
1947 western Europe's share of international trade had 
fallen to less than 34 per cent of the global total, whereas 
by 1965 it had risen to over 40 per cent" (15). In addition, 
U. S. capital penetration has stopped short of establishing 
in western Europe what it has established in Canada. 
FinallY, and most important for our purpose, common 
perceptions of the relationship of-U. S. andYvestern Europe 
have changed sharply and have worked to render problematical 
-that which for most of the post-war period has been taken 
for granted. 
All this historical material, the substance of 
continuing debate, we present in order to indicate the 
: brQad Oivergence of U. S.. and 17estern Euroi)ean interests. 
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That ic, wa are not interested in constructing a detailed 
resume of the post-war history of relationships arid 
comparative performances of U. S. and western Europe; rather 
we wish to indicate that most general milieu within which 
European theorists operated. Further 
, 
than this, it is with 
the issue of Idecoloni. zation' that we meet the Droximate 
cause of the sharp and unequivocal divereence that may be 
observed in the realm of development-studier, between U. S. 
theory and. that of Europeans. ie take Idecolonization, to 
represent a peculiarly European exchange with the Third 
World. It invokes traditions and histories of which the US 
has no real counterpart. For example, it provides (we may 
hazard) at least an element of that moral core necessary 
to any social-theory. So where the U. S. in dealings with 
UDC's invoked the 'patriotic imperative' and presented it 
An the guise of 'modernization-theory', Etiropeans are in a 
position to invoke a tradition of 'stewardship'. This may, 
indeed, be just as hypocritical in the end as the core of 
'modernization theory'; but it is also arguably richer and 
more subtle in its conception of the relationship of the 
parties involvedoand of the possibilities for change 
inherent in those circumstances. 
It is-around this idea that the episode of 
Idecolonization' was a peculiarly'llestern European 
experienceland that as such it called forth distinctive 
efforts of theorizing, that we shall orranise the rest of 
our enquiry. If we ask what it is for circumstances to 
$call forth' a theoretical responce, we can answer in terms 
of our Dobb-derived schema. Thus the problem (ordinarily 
understood) is of withdrawal from formal empire, and the 
circumstances of the problen comprise the espousal of 
notions of democracy and current exploitntion which 
it is desired to continue. The practical solution is 
that pattern of handover, or withdrawal in favour of local 
elites, identified as Idecolonization'. The theoris-es 
problemrunning alongside and informing the practical 
problem, is to grosp/interpret/organise/legitimate this 
practical solution. To do this he not only has the 
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accepted situation (milieu) plus political deman(ý (the problem 
ordinarily understood), but he also has his own intellectual 
discipline with its own dynamic. Thus he tackles the given 
problem with and in reaction to the established notions of his 
discipline. 
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2.0-Dynamic of Society II: Grelater divergence. 
Within the framework of the general divergence of 
interests of U. S. and western Europepwe now focus our 
attention upon those local circumstances which encompass 
the emergence of a European reply to 'modernization- 
theory'. Cur principal claim, or point of departure, is 
that the episode of 'decolonization' was a peculiarly 
western Luropean experience and that, as such, it called 
forth a distinctive effort of theorizing. The corollary 
of this view is that the particular character of the work 
of SeersAýyrdal/Streeten can be illuminated by taking the 
episode of decolonization as formative. The actual 
argument-forms developed and intellectual traditions 
evokeds we can consider below (in part 3). 
In part 2.0, we treat the theme of the dynamic of 
societyl taking Idecolonization' as the 'best' solution to 
the problem of withdrawal from empire. We show how it 
emerges from the experience and routine of colonial 
government. This is accomplished by first noting the 
'fact' of nationalisms, and then abstractly considering 
the response of the colonial*power. 1, range of responses 
are imputed to the colonial power and the ideal is taken 
to be minimum necessary change. Historically we see 
various responses. It is the minimum change effected in 
withdrawal from sub-saharan Africa by the U. K. and France 
that is taken as the paradigm of Idecolonization'. We also 
note that this set of circumstances was subsequently 
accorded the status of a general model of the relationship 
of newly independent and ex-colonial powers. From this 
point we continue in part 2.1 and effect a shi 
, 
ft from 
matters of the dynamic of society to those of the dynamic 
of theory. We consider the notion that Idecdlonization' 
presents the form of a theory legitimating it; that is that 
practic@ leads to the* solution of its own problems. We 
present an argument to this effect by comparing the Xorms that 
the practice of intervention ta)Tes in the U. S. context and 
in the7estern European context. 
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The episode of the decline of the European empires is 
one of the more obvious features of the history of the 
20th century. Lideed Barraclough makes it fairly central. 
He argues that "the history of the present century has 
been marked at one and the same time by the impact of the 
Vest on ksia and Africa and by the revolt of Lsia and 
Africa against the West'ýlý). He goes on to say that "when 
the 20th century opened, European power in Asia-and Africa 
stood at its zenith" ... "sixty years later only the 
vesýiges of European domination remainedlý] 7). Barraclough 
disc%Asses .. 
the revolt of the subject peoples against the 
'West' in terms of European expansionism calling forth a 
reaction - that reaction being organised around what(he note--) 
hos been called Europe's greatest, and most ambiguous, export 
- nationalism. 
With the rise of nationalisms within subject- 
territories the colonial powers faced the problem of 
contriving a response. The general problem for them, we 
can suggest (impute), is of identifying: (i) a creative 
response to nationalist pressure for autonomy, where such 
calls are defined. (at least in part) by the very presence 
of the colonial power; and (ii) a similar creative 
response in respect of the related calls for the 
I 
: i-iiitiation of 'development', where this is taken (at a 
minimum) as being something rather different to simple 
incorporation in a colonial economy. That 'autonomy', 
both political and economic, is so defined by the 
nationalists makes the colonial power's problems of 
evading its demands distinctly awkward. The interests of 
one party are, on the face of it, wholly incompatible 
with those of the other. The most general principle 
governing the entire episode must be, for the colonial 
powerg that of minimum necessary change to the status 
quo. Now in addition to these objectivesq which we can 
plausibly impute to the colonial power, the immediately,, 
available mechanisms and philosophy of response are goin ,6 
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k 
to be that 
. 
principle which informs Covernment practice; 
that is, 'intervention', what Skillen(IS)calls Ii'tatismIj 
the view that it'is the business of government to order 
matters in and of society. 
Can we identify any minimum requirements of this 
response to the pressure of 'nationalist developmentalism'? 
Consider first the colonial situation. At one limit it 
issues in the total incorporation of the subject people, 
both economically and culturally, and at the behest of the 
colonizers. Power will reside with the colonizers and be 
relinquished only when nothing untoward can follow from 
their relinquishing power. Here perhaps is the location 
of the conservative colonists'equation of political and 
organisational sophistication with experience of 
Government and administration; issuing, as Worsley (19) 
notec, in the line that 'the natives are not ready to look 
after their own affairs yet'. But clearly on this view 
the transfer of power can be infinitely delayedland^ 
'troublemakers' can be treated with repression. The other 
limit will be a speedy acquiesceneq to nationalisms and an 
ordered withdrawal-, with in-between a variety of stances 
accoinmodating to the pressures of nationalism. If we turn 
to the end result of withdrawal we find the reverse of 
incorporation, that is, eenuine autonomy - governmental, 
administrativel economicl cultural. Power resides-in the 
hands of the Inewl elite (this is a specific form of 
hand over), and the ex-colonial power is involved only to 
the extent that the 'new' elite from time to time deem to 
be appropriate. Thus we have a symmetrical frame of 
possibility - from repression throueh accomihodation to 
, acquiescence. 
Within that frame of limits, and given our imputed 
problem for the colonial power, we could now sketch out a 
series of theory-derived responses open to the colonial, 
powe3y(20). Ilowever if the questionýgf the minimum necessary 
requirements of response to 'nationalist developyentalism' 
for a particular area, then we confront an empi: bical 
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question. Here the question of 'minimum requirements' is 
a matter of an historically specific set of changes in 
historically specific established relationships. The 
circumstances of European withdrawal from empire provide 
a series of 'answers' in respect of minimum requirements 
of responses. 'il? e can follow Zeylsýha and White in 
distinguishing an early and a late phase of the withdrawal 
(this is, of course, to exclude the issue of 'white 
dominions' altogether). In the first phase, completed 
more or less by 1956 with the independence of Tunisia and 
Morocco, there is accomplished the withdrawal from Asian 
and Arab lands. The second, latpr phase covers the 
withdrawal from sub-Saharan Africa. The early phase 
reveals some of the variety of methods of accomplishing 
withdrawal. One the one hand the U. K. withdraws from the 
Indian sub-continents Ceylon and Burma by January 1948. 
In respect of the withdrawal from India/Pakistan, the 
colonial power at one point declared in advance an 
intention to withdraw by a particular date so that rival 
nationalist groupings would settle. V1hen the U. K. 
finally withdreW)Walter Lippman wrote in the 'Washington 
Post that the withdrawal was "the work of political 
thinking which requires wisdom, maturity and vigour; and 
it has been carried out elegantly and with a style which 
will command respect for the civilised world'( 21). Grimal 
adds that "Both the rapidity of the solution and its clear- 
cut nature astonished international opinion". Cn the 
other hand we can note the forcible ejection of the French 
from Indo-China and the Dutch from the East Indies. In 
both instances metropolitan governments decided after the 
war to re-establish their authority over colonial 
territories. However the war itself had seen their 
essentially precarious holds fatally loosened. Both 
efforts collapsed into bloody wars before returning powers 
were beaten off. Indeed Grimal reports that it was in no 
small measure the wars of independeýce that created 
distinctly national states. where before there had been a 
disparate and maybe only loosely associated collection of 
groups within the colonial territories. 
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The later phase also offers distinguisbable-lanswers' 
to the problem of 'nationalist developmentalismIr thus 
the French in Alreria fight a bloody war and are ejected 
in imch the same way as they were from Indo-China. The 
BelEians and, with a different prelude, the Portuguese 
present another style - that of 'precipitate withdrawal'. 
In southern Africa varieties of colonisation linger. But, 
as for the rest, we note the ordered process of 
Idecolonization'. 
Both White(23)and Veylstm(P4)use the phasel/phase II 
distinction we have thus far followed. Oe oust now ask 
why, and with what degree of propriety. The establishment 
of independent states in this first phase was, reports 
Zeylsim, taken as marking the end of any financial or 
other responsibilities toward ex-colonies by sometime 
colonial powers. This is fairly obviously the case with 
the V. K. and "eylstra indeed - 
makes this clear... However he 
alsowants us to believe that this is Conerally the case 
for all phase I withdrawals - but he offers no supporting 
evidence. White, who also uses this phasing, again 
mentions the U. K. withdrawal from Asia$ but adds in respect 
of the other colonial powers that-. "Further east, countries 
such as Indonesia had won their independence in 
circumstances which had led to a sharp diminution of 
relations with the former colonial power"(25). Iiere is the 
first problem in respect of this phasing: that phase I is 
characterized Cenerally by a cutting off of aid and other 
responsibilities by colonial powers is not established. 
it is true of the U. Y.; but whilst it may be plausible in 
the case of other colonial powers, they offer no evidence 
other than its plausibility. For two empiricists,, this 
is no Good. 
Phase II is established as a contrast to Phase 1. Here 
both dhite and ZeylstraL agree, the withdrawal of colonial 
power was marked by its being orderly and part of a scheme 
. which entailed 
the assumption of long-term responsibilities 
to aid in 'nation building'. Again. we note that this is 
offered as a general characterization. Být this is 
preposterous;. we can shatter this claim by intoning 
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AlCeria, Congo, Angola, etc. Nonetheless, to the extent 
that it i6-possible to pre-sent the withdrawal from Africa 
as being ,, 
in not a few cases ordered and peaceable and 
entailing long term commitments to new nations, it is 
evident that White and Zeylstrahave hit upon something 
worth noting. 
In the arCuments and histories presented by Zeylstrk 
and lvv'hite there is thus a double failure. This issues in 
the conclusion that the distinction they aimed to draw 
between phases I and II, in terms of the nature of the 
post-independence relationship of new nations to their 
old colonial masters, is not tenable. There is no such 
distinction to be drawn. How important is this for their 
f-, eneral views? In our opinion, not very. Both writers 
fail to secure their points, simply because they adopt an 
empiricist approach and try to present perfectly sensible 
theoretical notes as being derived from reading history. 
ýjhite's "nommokkstn ' fails him in that his effort to 
derive his theory from the facts results in a ludicrous 
misrepresentation of those facts; and Zeylstra? s effort is 
a hopelessly transparent attempt to make the U. Y. 
exanple serve all cases, which clearly it does not. 
dowever, given our abstract sketch of the possibilities 
for re-wprking a challenged relationship and the imputed 
wishes of the colonial powerwe can measure history, (the 
'facts') arainst this ideal of a ProE: Lr-ammed response of 
minimum chanre. ZeylsIrtin fact presents this 
proC. ramme as it was manifest in withdrawal from English 
and French 'Black Africa'; yet failing to see how the 
procedure flows from the unhindered 'logic of the 
situation', he takes it to be an adventitious bit of 
history needing interpretation. Ve are able to take, 
then, the ordered withdrawal from Anglo-French sub- 
Saharan Africa as being a classic accommodating response on 
the part of the colonial pý-, wers. It is this style of 
withdrawal for which we reserve the theoretical- 
descriptive termq 'decolonization'. That we take 
Idecolonization' to be a particular variety of withdrawal 
is both reasonable (in the 1i6ht of our above 'abstract' 
arguments)and banal in the light of history. Who would 
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wish to use the same term to designate the withdrawal of, 
say, the Dutch from Indonesia and the British frbm Africa? 
The former power'ejected; the latter installing what 
Ilargreaves might call 'collaborators'. 
The distinction drawn between phases I and 11 is thus 
unhelpful and unnecessary. That the withdrawal from 
Anglo-French sub-Saharan Africa entailed a peculiar sort 
of relationship we can Grant. It is both the 'best 
solution' and the paradigm from which other withdrawals 
more or less diverge. In place of White and Zeylshra! s 
two ', phase-s' we substitute two catefrories of response, 
the 'best' and the 'rest'. 
lie can bring out the particular character of 
Idecolonization' by quoting from White and Zeylstr&. While 
using the distinction we have criticised, White ol)serves 
that "In Africa the transition for most territories was 
less abrupt. Administrative structures remained intact. 
There was an expectation of a continuing flow of 
communicationg and of resources. The need for external 
resources to develop relatively backward economies seemed 
ruch clearer in Africa than it had in Asia! '(26). Zjeylsim, 
concerned with the relationship between withdrawal and 
provision of aid, argues that only in one area were 
development pr6grammes initiated prior to indepeDdence; 
this was in sub-Saharan Africa. His desire to let 
geoEraphical and chronological differences serve as a 
basis for an emergent characterization of development-aid 
programs. leads him to this obfuscating looseness - 'sub- 
Saharan Africa'. What he means is the Anglo-French 
withdrawal from Black Africa. Yet he clearly picks up 
the essential novelty. He observes. ', "Assistance to 
colonies was integrated in a systematically planned 
decolonization. Tbere, assistance became identical with 
preparation for the acceptance of responsibility for 
one's own country's destiny -a long term process, in the 
course of which at some time or other sovereignty was 
being transferred as a necessary condition for its 
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completion. This kind of decolonization- [i. e. 
withdrawal] ... cannot be imagined as resultint only 
from a loss of political power and prestige. On the 
contrary it rust IJ,, ave its roots in a colonial policy 
includingýconcern with the welfare of the subject peoples. 
Historically seen it must have been a logical consequence 
of-an idea enbedded in the rationale of colonialism"(27). 
We observed aboye that our point of I 
departAre was that Idecolonization' was uniquely European, 
and might be taken as formative for Seers et al. That it 
is unique we bhould have established prima facie above 
Tie must now turn to the 'formative' aspect, for this is 
our principal concern- and toý, as might be supposed 
from the length of these reflections, the elucidation of 
a theoretical history of the process of withdrawal from 
empire in general , 
and 'decolonization' in particular., 
Prior to that, ho*ýJever, there remains one final task. 
This is to note, with White, that the pattern of inter- 
state relations made manifest in the withdrawal of 
decolonization is , by the end of the 1950's, taken as 
the norm. White reports , after noting the particular 
character of aid to his 'phase 11' recipients, tbat 
"from the late 1950's onwards first the nCWlY independent 
countriesq and then other; -developing countries as well, 
came to expect aid, which thus became more diffused, more 
diversified, and more closely integrated into long-term 
policy rzaking"(28). 'White presents this as simply a, 
'generalization' of the 'phase III African situation, 
thouCh he is not specific; presumably he would argue that 
the behaviour of one colonial 6overnment toward its client 
would be enough to establish a precedent which might then 
be invoked. If the precedent was set thus, the general 
expectation he takes to have been reinforced by Nixon's(1957) 
reception in Latin America when he was abused, in part, because 
+, We, U. S. 'had 'neglected' Latin 1-merica. The model established 
in Africa was most visibly and dramatically brought out in 
the Indian exchange crisis of 1957-58. Here the Indian, 
development proCram ran into finance problems and 
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was bailed out by Vie Aid India Con. r. ortium of rich 
trading partners. White observes: "The India Cdnsortium 
was the first and perhaps nost ambitious collective 
attempt by a group of donors to underwrite a national 
development strategy, [he ndds].. "rhe precedent had an 
almost immediate impact on aid to Pakistan, for which a 
similar consortium was established in 1960" (29). Nhether 
this bit of history should be reCarded simply as a result 
of 'accidents of history' (as Vhite rather suspects )or as 
some sort of 'unconscious' realization on the part of the 
#new nations' that their precise status was close to the 
model of decolonization and that this was the appropriate 
starting point for their relations with the rich, is not a 
matter wevill, pu'rsue - though it is the obvious question 
in the light of the above discussion. Ratherwe shall 
content our--elves with noting that the relationship 
inherent in 'decolonization' did in fact become the norm. 
Vhite goes on to note that it was fixed in the period 1961- 
65, when a combination of U. -S. and Third Jorld pressure 
invited all concerned to take for Cranted what had thus far 
been established. 
Given that the pattern of 'decolonization' became the 
paradigm of the exchange between rich and Poor nations, we 
may turn to Zeylstra and pick out its pr-rticular 
characteristics; and in observing these we nay see how 
close they come to a speculative 'cashinr' of the 
$argument from colonial interest' we noted above. In this 
respect we ray say thatriven the presumed interest of the 
colonial po, %-4, er, then within the African context it is clear 
that withdrawal could be reduced( in line with 'statist' 
ideology)to a'transfer of sovereignty' that would be a 
sham: simply a replacement of role incumbents within a 
continuing frame of practice bnd expectation. 
We can detail the characteristics of Idecolonization' as 
follows: ' U) the withdrawal was accomplished in an 
ordered maann&rT that is., within the ambit of existing 
resourcess both intellectual and orf--anisational, - (ii) the. 
withdrawal was legitimated by reference to the notion of 
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stewardship, which war, available to the African elite for 
transformaiion into notions such as 'father of the nation'. 
(iii) the withdrawal was taken as an element of a longer 
term process of 'nation building'. 
'"Putting all this another way, what we may claim-is 
that there are certain resources available within the 
actual experience of the colonial episode which may, in 
concert with the colonial powe3! s intellectual tradition 
and present world economic/political situation, be taken 
to have contributed to the form of the process of 
Idecolonization'. Ve can order the resources and 
opportunities which the colonial episode itself presents 
to the decolonizers according to the schema of 
'intervention' we have presented; thus we may fuse theory 
and practice and present this exchange in an historically 
specific guise as the response of realpeople to real, 
practical problems. 1, V'e are thereby able to indicate, how 
a characteristic orientation to problems of development 
is generated. In sum, the situation expresses the form of 
its appropriate theory. 
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2.1 Dynamic of Theoryl-. Decolonization and its legitim- 
ating theorem. 
We now turn from presenting decolonization as the 
'best' form of withdrawal from' empiresand ask how we might 
establish our claim that the process calls forth its own 
theory. We look at the 'dynamic of theory' - or, at least, 
the, preliminary intermediate stage. In order to show that 
, the, situation expresses the form of its appropriate theory 
w* ith the persuasiveness necessary to convince a sceptic we 
would have to write a 'fine-grained' history of the period 
detailing the circumstances, behaviour and utterances of 
-the main actors. This would be the basis of a fully 
developed sociology of knowledge treatment, and is beyond 
our scope. A weaker. demonstration of our claim, and one 
that adopts a more immediately intelliCible strategy, 
-would be to offer a comparison. In part 2.1 we compare 
the form the practice of 'intervention' takes in the U. S. 
context with 'modernization-theory's and in the western 
European line with Ineo-institutionalist' social theory, 
and attempt to show how the Given problem shapes the 
articulation of the invoked theory. To put this another' 
way: by contrasting 'modernization-thedryl and Ineo- 
institutiopal social theory' we can see how the two problem- 
situations I impact on the use of theoretical resources. 
In scholhrly terms these resources are in many respects the 
113arie; what 
is different is the European tradition of 
involving theorists in liberal state reformism (particularly 
in the U. K. ). and the context of Idecolonization'. 
Crudely, 'neo-institutionaiist social theory' evolves out 
of an on-going situation whereas 'modernization-theory' 
is cobbled together in response to a developing situation. 
Part --2.1 is therefore transitional between 2.0 which 
dealt with the dynamic of society and part 3.0 which will 
treat the dynamic of theory. In sumlvje have three 
elements: (2.11) the possibilities 
, 
inherent in the colonial 
situation, or experience,. itself; 
(2'el2) 
. 
the possibilities 
inherent in the established mode of g, overnment, 'statism'; 
'(2*. '13)- the resultant practical form/theoretical 
explanation of the process of decolonization. This we take 
to be exempli f ied in the ef f orts of bSeers Streeten and Myrd al. 
We elucidatý'these three aspects in contrast to U. S. 
efforts. 
2.11 HavinC. cast the start of part 2 of our. paper in the 
form of asking after the colonial powers' View of the ' 
pressure for withdrawal from, empire, it is appropriate to 
focus on their established colonial practices as the first 
source of resources available to then, in fashioning a 
response. 
IJIe can identify an available moral core for any 
response to 'nationalist developmentalism' in the notion 
of 'stewardship'. We can follow Grimal in granting that, 
in generall "the colonial policies of the European 
countries were not deliberately directed towards 
emancipation"(30)and add that nonetheless within their 
relationship was the possibility of invoking, if need be, 
a proCressive scheme(31). The various European colonial 
powers took different lines; but in the case of the U. K., 
the liotion of leading dependencies toward independence was 
established in the cases of the 'white dominions', and then 
taken as Ceneral. Cooption of locals to colonial 
eovernments clearly placed a transfer of power-on the list 
of possibilities. Grimal notes that this was all ordered 
by the U. K.; thus "progress towards autonomy had to be 
cautious and controlled, leading towards a solution that 
could satisfy both the principles of self-determination and 
the interests of the home country'ý32). This Inoral dualism' 
IIs reflected in the behaviour of the other colonial 
powers-According to their espoused 'democratic' principles the3 
were obliCed to talk in terms of colonialism 
benefitting subject peoples. They nevertheless searched 
around for ways of protecting-tbeir interests in face of 
calls fDr self-government. The French vacillated between 
the policies of assimilation and associationg and the 
-he froral policy' -Dutch after rather belatedly introducing 
4W 
in 1902)invent the doctrine of 'synthesis' in 1922. This 
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sui I Tosedly involved fusinC. 'the best of the east' with 
'the best of the west' - though Grimal notes thaf it was 
never clear just what this meant. 
Very f-enerally then - and arFuably very much as an 
incidental to straightforward exploitation - the Europeans 
did acknowlede, e the minimum notions required by their 
putative ideologies of democracy. A slow movement 
towards some sort of emancipation was envisa(red, and this 
conception was available when, after ý, orld Idar Two, 
demands for independence became pressing. Thus we ray 
observe that the moral core of this European style of 
'intervention' is not that which informed U. S. efforts. 
The-noral core of modernization theory lay in the cowed 
response of liberals to red-baiting politicians; the 
result was a florid celebration of the 'patriotic 
imperative"(33). The moral core of -', uropean efforts we can 
take to invoke the colonial episode - 'stewardship' - and 
a notion of 'proper development' which issues out of the 
long exchange between colonial power and subject people; 
in comparison we can presume it to be richer and more 
subtle than anything flowing from a relationship struck up 
under the banner of the 'free world' and the 'fiCht 
against international communism' (34). 
'P 
1hat the i, uropean exchange with colonial areas was 
more immediately rich in usable notions and data we may 
take to be a simple function of social exchange over a 
period of time. The colonial authorities and subject 
people will necessarily cone to share some ideas through 
shared experience. Thus it is usually suf,., gested that the 
result of this interchange is evident, for example, in 
political and social ideas of the new elite. We have 
above noted the case of Inationalisin'. Macpherson argues 
that deVelopment-ideoloCies have been constructed largely 
from European intellectual resources and often may be 
characterized as a blend of 'early' Mlarx plus Rousseau(34a). 
More generally, as Grimal puts it, "the district officers, 
who maintained the peace and subjected the inhabitants to 
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such measures as the taking of a regular population census, 
the levying of taxes ... served in the long run to build up 
a'communal identity'(35)- and that 'identity' served not 
only subject peoples but also colonial power when it came 
to re-working their relationship with their dependencies. 
Ifere we nay recall White's work and draw out another 
difference in the European and U. S. experiences. ',,, hite 
observes that when the U. S. endeavoured to extend aid and 
containment from western Europe, where it worked well, to. 
the Third World - in particular S. E. Asia -w- two factors 
militated af,, ainst success. "Firstly the status of the Asian 
allies as client states was far plainer to see., Secondly 
and more significantly the irmediate task of the aid was 
harder to identify ... 'Aid had become a form of generalized 
support, the purpose of which was described slirhtingly by 
its critics as being to 'shore-up' weak regires"(36). If we 
recall White's'four proximate causes of the success of 
Marshall jýid- (a) volume of aid, (b) clear task, (c) 
political congruence of objectives, and (d) shared culture- 
then we can see that in S. E. Lsia the U. S.. was short of 
(b)q (d) and arGuably (c). In ccntrast, for huropean and 
colonial areas (b), (c) and (d) were less obtrusively 
problematical. 
Tinally we may note a third resource 'which the actual 
experience of the colonial episode made available when 
Idecolonization' had to be programmed and theorized. 
This is the simple practical experience of the territories 
on the one hand, and on the other the habit of liberal 
reformism. A U. S. counterpart to the practical experience 
is difficult to identify from their involvement with Latin 
American states, and flawthorn, (364does not identify any 
habit of refornism in U. -S. governi; ient/academic relations. 
2.12 If the above represent the resources immediately 
available within the situation of moves to withdraw from 
the colonial relationship, and if they are clearly , 
available to Europeans and not to the U. S., then the prism 
- -J_oJ_- 
through which these lines are focused is common, to both. 
This is, thb government habit, or style, or ontological 
mode, of 'intervention'. S)killen identifies it as 
'statism', and takes it as the typical pattern of a 
capitalist-state, as , re above. 
2.13 Here we indicate how the resources of the situation 
present themselves in the exchange with theory. Theory is 
treated below, as is the fully developed product of this 
episode, 'neo-institutionalist social theory'. 
The available notion of 'stewardship' and the partial 
incorporation of subject people in terms of ideas and 
material interests issues in the legitinating. notion of 
Itransfer of sovereignty'. For the colonial. power this is 
the logical consequence of the notion of 'stewardship', 
and for the indigenous 'replacement' elite it is the 
assumption of that role of 'stewardship' in the guise of 
the leader as 'father of the nation'. r-Phis all represents 
a loose summation of historical events: abstractly, it 
reduces to the minimum change desired by, the-colonial 
,., ower if we present 
it as being simply a chanGe of role 
incumbents. The extent to which the 'transfer of 
sovereiFnty' is other than this simple change of political 
personnelis a matter. for empirical observation of the 
various cases(37)As to the U. &C., the alien nature of its 
'intervention' was noted by 11. iernan when he observed that 
the host nation's armed forces often were seen as the-mo', -t 
'progressive social formation'. Hence, ., as a resulý 
supplies of arms became equated with 'nation building'. 
The notion of transfer of sovereignty is riot an option for 
U. S. theorists. 
I 
The legitimating notion of transfer of novereignty, 
with its consequence for the role of the new Eovernment 
being that of 'building a nation'. couples up with the 
practical experience of territories and liberal-democratic 
reformism to present the organisational principles of neo- 
institutionalism as 'obviously' appropriate to the task. 
Here* recalling Dobb, we must introduce the exchange of 
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the theorist with the 'conventional-wisdom' orthodoxy; 
for it is týis, in the light of the above noted constraints 
and demands, that-fashion the new stance. These matters 
we treat below in part (3). Here we may hazard the outline 
that the established patterns of colonial and metropolitan 
administrative activity are broadened and deepened into 
Ination building, and the social theory of neo- 
institutionalism presents itself as uniquely suited to the 
task. Administered national development requires the 
possibility of translating economic rodels into 
I circuristance-re levant' progranmes, and systemic analysis is 
ideal. Both new elite and colonial power can agree that 
their task is largely one of 'system construction' -a 
technical task. Subsequent matters of implementation are 
piecemeal: projects, prorrams, plans and so on. Thus theory 
and procedure 'grow out of' practice for Europeans where for 
the U. S. this was not possible. 
We can summarize as follows: with 'neo-institutionalists' 
the -Dolitical content of the calls fo3Z 'intervention' has 
shifted from confronting expansionist communism, as was the 
case with modernization-theory, toward the project of re- 
working established colonial relationships. The effort as a 
whole istnot unexpectedlyt informed by a different set of 
ideas. As regards the moral core of modernization theory$we 
noted that it was formed by cowed liberals in the 
situation of red-baiting and presented in the context of 
donor-competition with the U. S. S. R. - The moral core of 
European efforts is formed in response to pressures of 
'nationalist developmentalism', and invokes traditioin of 
#stewardship' integral to (if latent within, for the most 
, uropean part') the colonial situation. Generally the j. 
theorists invoke a moral tradition of social reformism; 
thus Myrdal, for examples is described by R: hrenssA as 
'Fabian's and Seers and Streeten clearly fit the cateGory of 
'establishment liberals' identified by Hawthorne. The sets 
of resources used by the two'groups of theorists can also be 
distinguished; where modernization theory had recourse to 
structural functionalism and an emasculated Keynesianism, 
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the Ineo-institutionalist social theoristsl, have recourse 
to the expe7rience of the colonial episode, and a distinct 
European tradition of social tbought: the latter being 
characterized with reference to a relationship with 
rovernment that disposes them to practical policy making 
rather than the elaboration of formal schemes of Cr eat 
generality. To put this another way (this point we may 
call the methodological context): the U. S. theorists 
pursued, if not quite a 'general theory'Ithen a set of 
policy-relevant pieces of work presented using that syntax. 
The Europeans, using essefitialy the same sociological and 
economic ideasl within the same empiricist epistemology, 
produce piece-meal studies. This we may take, following 
Hawthorne, to be a function of the relationship of the two 
C-roups of theorists to their respective government 
machines. 
It is for these reasons that we take the episode of 
Idecolonization' to be formative for Europeans. 
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3.0 Dynamic of Theory II: The proximate intellectual 
source of'the European efforts. - - 11 
T he-foregoing remarks indicate from whence arose 
the impulse to a neo-institutionalist informed critique of 
the 'conventional-wisdom' of development-studies, 14here 
this is taken to encompass those efforts constructed around 
that area of economics dominated by the Harrod-Domar model. 
(It thus includes not only the early efforts to use Harrod 
- Domar in the context of an extended/exported Keynesianism, 
but also subsequent efforts which took the LmAse of more 
general proeTammes of 'nodernization'). It is now 
appropriate to ask-twhat is the character of this critique? 
We turn then to matters of the structures of sets of ideas 
and their hisl. -Pories. Ue begin part (3) by asking after the 
general origin and character of institutionalist theorizing; 
-er looking briefly at 1--yrdal's version, we go then, aft 
0n to consider in detail some characteristic argument-forms. 
5-1 What is 'institutionalist economics'? 
Institutionalism we take to be a particulRr approach 
to economics; in brief, it is a 'sociologised economics'. 
That is, notions drawn from economics are considered with 
reference to their social assumptions. Cconomien, as 
functioning social systems, are considered, rather than' 
the elaborate calculi of abstract models. We take 
institutionalism to be reformist in character, and carefully 
non-in, arvittan; _ 
here we may cite flyrdal and Galbraith, but the 
line traces back to Veblen. It is, by and large, a 
European tradition, though it has received its nost 
elaborate and familiar presentation in the work of the 
theorists, of the New Deal. We will present our exposition 
of the origins and preliminary characterization of 
institutionalism through the work of Gruchy, who (falsely) 
assimilates all institutionalist thinking to a single, 
U. S., school. ; v'hat is criicial in all this is 
institutionalism's character as a loociologised-economics' 
and its association with economic and social crisis. 
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Here we look at 'institutionalism' in its most 
prominent, Aew Deal, guise. Otis Graham'(38 )Ln a history 
of planning experiments in the U. S., establishes that within 
U. S. government and acadernic worlds there has been pressure 
for the establishment of some sort of 'directed capitalism'. 
Graham cites Roosevelt's Vew Deal as the response/solution 
of one variety of liberalism to the catastrophe of the 
Depression. This history is presented as the story of a 
conflict between government, bir, business and academics on 
the one hand and, on the other, an alliance of sTnaller 
business, miscellaneous pressure groups and Congress pressing 
to maintain the status quo. In*ouce , Graham's thesis is 
that whilst Capitol Hill needs planners, unfortunately all it 
has got are interest groups, lobbyists, and power-brokers; 
that is the 113roker 2, tatel, as he clubs it. 
This there is familiar: thus in the post-,, "ýecond World 
War period the names of Galbraith and Myrdal come readily 
to mind. Yet their criticisms and those of the 'Vew Dealers' 
are by no means novel. Gruc! Ay sees Galbraith and IAYrdal (and 
others) as 'neo-institutionalists', invoking an older pre- 
Lecond ýIar tradition of linstituional theory'. Thi's inter- 
war, period is characterized by Fbjrdal as requiring, practical 
theorizing. He observes. "'The Great Depression and the 
practical problems raised in its wake rescued me from my 
critical philosophy and restored my scientific productivity"(40). 
It is at this juncture that Myrdal coincid,, ep most closely 
with the pre-war U. &Ej. institu. tionalists (notwithstanding, that he, 
is at some pains to distance himself from this. tradition 
. and to recount his intellectual biography in terms of 
Swedish scholars, as we shall see below)j, We can take the U. S. 
tradition as the 'rain stream', and as such this line is 
older than Crucýy makes it. 
Dorfrran arrues that the background to institutional 
economics involves "a slice of the whole development, of 
rivilisation in the U. S. since the end of the Civil (41Y. 
He, traces the evergence of the school out of the 
conflict engendered by the rapid U. S. industrialization of 
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the last thýrd of the 19th century. Tracing the flux of 
the debate(4 2)11e observes that at the turn of the century 
the "narrow practicality(43)of the business community 
found its champion in Jevons and the 'marf,, inalist 
revolution't subsequently developed into the neo-classical 
larshall. This was the target against which line by 11 
Veblen "launched his barbs"; Dorfman adds "it was at this 
point that institutionalism, as we know it, reached 
maturity"(44). 
If the key figure in the pre-First World War effort 
was Veblenthen it seems that through the 1920's and 1930's 
there were a series of American theorists following similar 
lines of enquiry (including, according to Grucby, Rexwell 
11'ugwell who is cited by Graham as a key figure of the 'Rew 
Deal' and the 'father' of U. S. planning). A number of 
economists are noted who have it in common that "the 
economic system is analysed within the framework of the 
total culture of which the economic system is a part"(45). 
Methodologically they subscribed to a general evolutionary 
paradigm, and their relations with the other bocial sciences 
were eclectic. Gruchy goes on to say that the "intitution- 
alists of the 1920's and 1930's were mainly interested in 
how to prevent depressions and how to stabilize economic 
activity at a full employment level ... the nain issue was 
the 'social control of business"' (46). 
Gruchy is at some pains throughout his lengthy study 
to apolorise for the 'radical' tone of the theorists he 
treats, and he disavows on behalf of Veblen's later 
followers the marxian 'flavourl of that theorist's work. 
Indeed Dorfman notes that "the view of Marx and his 
disciples as 'pre-Darwinian' - to use Veblen's term - is a 
major negative characteristic of institutionalists and 
serves to differentiate them from most of the critics of the 
dominant economied'(47). This is both rather ambiguous'and, 
recalling Myrdal on 1-! arx, interesting. It is ambiguous in 
that it does not say anything about these other critics of 
the 'Conventional-k-lisdom' - and the context of the remark 
is not such as to lead us to suppose that he has marxist 
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critics in mind. This being so, that the institutionalists 
felt obliCed, to attack Maw rust indicate that thby saw 
affinities between his work and their own, and that they 
wera anxious to deflect an obvious line of attack from, the 
orthodox. As rerards Hyrdal's sensitivity to Narxian 
critique we =ay note that its anticipations Co riCht back 
to Veblen. Further than this Cruchy observes that the U. L. 
theorists never fully developed their evolutionary schema 
of economics; and GoNon, after proposinC Schumpeter as the 
theorist who actually did proceed to 'fill-out' the 
institutionalists' programme, suCrests that J1. 
institutionalists would hesitate to accept Schurpeter as a 
co-worker is precisely the extent of his critique. Thus 
Gordon observes that he "took the entire stoM of capitalist 
evolution and possible decline as his province. American 
institutionalists, I think it is fair to say, have not been 
willing to go this far in their institutionalism"148). 
If'institutionalisrq had a Europeaz) tbearetical input to 
a U. S. situation, then that imported aspect was rapidly 
domesticated. Thus Veblen's narxian elements-are quickly 
struck out and replaced with a Deweyite pragmatism (49). 
Institutionalism is thereby taken into the U. S. university 
scene which, says Gruchy, "provided Triore academic opportunity 
for the dissenination of the economics of dissent than was 
the case in Vestern Europe"( 50). 14ow this is a misleading 
remark: 'institutionalism' is the 'economics of dissent' and 
has been prQsented as specifically i-nerican. L'onetheless it 
lets us see how GrucIny makes his tacit clair, that 
institutionalism is the only dissenting economics. 
, Western European critical lines are represented by the 
Fabians on the one hand and E'eynes on the other. The former 
are taken by Gruch), to resemble the institutionalists but 
are disrissed as'secondary to Veblen; and Ee, nes is 
presented its 'depression-relevant' and subsequently just 
irrelevant. The post-war eriasculation of E'eynes is not 
treated and, nor is the work of the 'new Cambrid(re EF-chooll. 
Gruchy simply equates the work of Reynes with the Keynes- 
I sm. of orthodox government rerulction of the 
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economy. Partly, we nay hazard, this flows from a desire 
to separate'. the institutionalists, who were cdnce-rned as 
Gruchy noted above with full employmen t, from Keynes - just 
as the institutionalists themselves have been anxious, to 
eschew any connection with the Harxian tradition- -nd ý 
partly we could take it to be a reflection of the fate of 
Keynes in the U. S.. But, more interestingly, it derives we 
can surgest from Gruchy's apparent haste to 'de-radicalizel 
his radicals. - Thus he presents the exchange of event and 
theory in a simplistic manner; he observes "Keynesian 
economics. and economic policy proposals have come to have 
diminishing acceptance as post-World War Two problers have 
core to the surface". All of which makes theory a simple 
response to event. In the case of Keynes, this ignores the 
element of the active 'killing-off' of the reformer, 
detailed by S, weezy (in V. Early), and in the case of 
, 
the 
neo-institutionalists it permits the presentation of Plyrdal 
and Galbraith as neutral scientists. Gruchy wants them to 
have it all, ways - the richness and relevance of a 
developed political economy and the 'untainted' status of 
a natural scientist(52). Grucjiy1s apology for the radical 
roots of the ideas he propounds is captured in his 
observing of the neo-inEtitutionalists that they differ 
from Veblen, in that "whereas Veblen looked forward to the 
demise of the private enterprise system the neo- 
institutionalists think in terms of preserving this system"ý53)- 
In the end the drift of Grucky's effort coincides with 
that of Graham in-regarding the options open to the 
government of a developed state as being limited, and the 
choice - for reasonable men - as a foregone conclusion. A 
return to laissez-faire is taken as nonsensical, the Broker 
Ctate is out-moded, and the only remaining choice is of a 
centrist-plannii, G ideal; a IreLmlated capitalism'. 
The foregoing has presented 'institutionalism' in an 
historical guise as the response of reform-minded liberals 
to the various problems thrown up by the developing 
industrial society in which they found themselves. The 
institutionalists have often, it seems, been dismissed as 
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$generalists', and thus either not suited to or alternatively 
rather difficult for scholarly treatment. Clearly their 
disposition to Igeneralityl flows from their construction of 
an ideology of planning. This we take to be based upon 
eit)ier (as, say, in case of western Europe and the U. K. ) the 
Cradual accretion not of government powers of intervention, 
but of established areas of intervention, or (as, say, in 
the case of the U. S. ) upon fewer areas of intervention and 
a more clearly arFued case for these patterns of activity. 
The tradition is resolutely problem-centred, and the core of 
the stance is picked out by Gordon. He notes that the 
institutional line is not easy to define and offers a set of 
criteria: "the term 'institutional' economics surgests to 
me a series of propositions which, taken toeether add up to 
a particular way of approaching the study of econonics"(54). 
lie offers the following: that economic behaviour is 
I'stronCly conditioned by the institutional erivironment"(55) 
and that the "process of mutual interaction is an 
evolutionary one"- (56). Gordon introduces 'conflict' in 
several ways, thus in a criterion which seems to echo the 
circumstances of depression he notes the key role of "the 
(largely conflicting) conditions impnsed by modern 
technolo&Y and by the pecuniary institutions of modern 
capitalism"(ýW). Conflict is the business of economics 
rather than any harmonious equilibrium, and that this is 
indeed the case opens the door to the requirement of 
11social control of economic activityl(58). The principle of 
#rational economic action' is denied . He concludes his 
summation by noting the arf-7ument that "Granted the 
preceding assumptions, much of orthodox economic theory is 
either wrong or irrelevant because it makes demonstrably 
false assumptions and does not ask the really important 
questions"(59). 
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5-2'llyrd4l and institutionalism. 
Gruclqy claims Myrdal for this (essentially U. S., so 
far as he is concerned) tradition in quite unequivocal 
terms. Thus after observin_F- that "among European 
economists none is better known today in the U. ký. than'the 
eminent Swedish economist Gunnar I-iyrdal", he goes on to 
characterize his work as follows: I'Myrdal's main interest 
h9s been in the analysis of the developinC economic 
process and the rovement towards more fully interrated or 
plýLnned economies in the western world and elsewhere"(6.0). 
Vow whilst we can easily grant a general resemblance, it is 
not clear that Gruchy is not being comewhat misleading. 
J, yrdal describes his intellectual roots as &'-'wedish, 
recalling that his early intellectual milieu was dominated 
by Wieksell and the analysis of dynamic economic processes. 
Myrdal also notes Cassel's influence: "There was, I 
felt, a healthy realism in his approach to economic problems, 
a desire to avoid metaphysical speculation and get down to 
facts and figures"(61). This 'practicality' is emphasised. 
flyrdal distinguishes his Feneration from the preceding_ one 
by noting that they were familiar with crises, the Great 
War, inflation and recession, so he notes that "when they 
faced undesirable situations, such as unemployment, they had 
fewer inhibitions than the older reneration to think 
constructively about measures which would mitirate them"(62). 
Arl this contributes, we Eay; hazard, a retrospective 
reading of his own career, But in addition to these 
intellectual sources there is one seminal experience. 
After recAlling that his work was running into the sands 
over the issue of 'values', he records "Neanwhile the 
happy 'twenties had ended. The gathering, Great Depression 
and the practical economic problems raised in its wake 
rescued me from my critical philosophy and restored my 
scientific productivity. My outer life had already placed 
forcefully before me that important phenomena: Social 
Crisisq and I'have remained, with the rest of the world, ' 
under that sign ever eince"(63). Ilrom what Myrdrnl has to say 
in his bioCraphical postscript it seems as if hiswork 
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comes to resemble that of the 1). S. institutionalists only 
insofar as there was a common practical orientatiýon. 
Myrdal notes that. he received the work of Keynes with 
pleasure but no great surprise.. As for the U. S. 
institutionalists, he reports coming into contact with them 
and adds that their -aalve empiricism helped him clear up a 
few points in respect of 'value'. The core of the 
resemblance is the treatment of social crisis through 
government intervention, with the disciplinary corollary 
of practicality in research. itround this convergence, 
called forth by the historically common experience of the 
Depresviong the various theorists take their different 
stances. Thus whilst there is undoubtedly a family 
rese. mblance, the precise nature of those resemblances is a 
matter requiring detailed comparison. GrucV's assimilation 
of 1ýyrdal to a U. S. school must be denied. 
The substantive material we can briefly note. Myrdal's 
writings are very extensive and often apparently repetitive; 
and as we shall not treat them in any detail here, we offer a 
sketch to show how his style and line do coincide-with the 
institutionalists we have noted above. Nyrdal is taken by 
Grucby to react against the equilibrium theory orthodoxy of 
1900-1929 in favour of "a new economics of inter-ration 
oriented around the concept of a cumulative process of 
development"-(64). The motor of the social dynamic is derived 
from Wicksell. Where Wicksell uses the notion of a ImovinG 
equilibrium' such that divergence on the part of the 
economy from its 'ideal track' was self-correcting, Nyrdal 
on the other hand - rather like Harrod - sees a continuing 
divergence. Once some given direction of social change is 
instituted, a process of I circular cumulative - causation 
I 
tends to reinforce that disposition to change. In addition 
to this general theoratical revision Mlyrdal introduces 
people and groups into his schema, treating them 
naturalistically: they become causal agents of change. On 
the most general level an evolutionary schema is invoked, 
whereby the present result of the process of cumulative 
causation is the modern organisational welfare state, 
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perfected in the 'West' as a series of national welfare 
states. Tlýe next, 'logical', step is tierefore the 
establishment of "the world welfare state"ý(65)- 
In respect of the states of the Third dorld, Myrdal 
applies his notion of cumulative change to their 
particular situation vis a vis the world economy. In 
regard to internal institutional structures,, his 
conclusions are notoriously pessimistic. The Third World 
states are locked into a debilitating position in the 
World economy and are internally crippled by 'outmoded' 
social forms. The remedy - if there is one - is to use the 
weapon of nationalistic planning to shift the economy into 
an upward dynamic; as he says, "what in fact we all mean by 
development is the movement upward of the whole social, 
system"(66). Thus we come to Nyrdal's focus on the state and, 
in view of the manifest inadequacy of h4. s identified arent 
to meet his theories' requirements, the 'soft state'. 
To pursue Nyrdal through his voluminous writings would 
be exhausting and unhelpful. Rather we may recall our 
characterization of institutionalism as the crisis - 
occasioned ideology of the planner and ask after the nature 
of the method of analysis used by 11yrdal, taken as our 
representative neo-institutionalist. Three issues present 
thenselves: (1) the use of social science resources by 
theorists of neo-institutionalism; (2) the treatment of 
Ivalues's, that is, of the role of the theorist; and (3) 
the related policy line, that is, planning and the 'soft 
I, tj TI I-ate Our trealent of these issues will focus upon the st 
work of Paul Streeten, who may be reg-arded as the principal 
hnglis" exponent of the work of Myrdal. Additionally his 
own work falls within the ambit of neo-institutionalism, and lie 
helpfully adopts the Cuise of a philosophically 
sophisticated empiricism. To put this another way, we can 
say that Streeten's work both interprets flyrdal to us and 
is, of itself, too sophisticated to ignore, 
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5.3 The strateric use of the resources of the social sciences 
Nikesell'(67)has noted that the early efforts' of the 
economistsl built aroundthe core of 'growth theories', 
have undergone a twofolý c! hange: the models have become 
more comDlex as more variabTes have been introduced, and 
there has been a greater use made of the resources of the 
wider circle of tQe socialý sciences. There has been , in 
r a nutshell, a pursuit of C. ý'qater realism in modelling 
In this context we can recAl the institutionalists' 
concern for realism and empýrical researchin contrast (as 
Gordon areued) to the 'metaphysics' of the neo-classisists. 
16yrdal, in his intellectual biography, compliments an 
early teacher by noting that"'there was, I felt, a'healthy 
realism ir. his approach to economic problens" (6 8 ). Hoie. ever, 
rather than continue with a general style of exegesis, we 
can turn to Streeten for specimens of work revealing the 
use made by institutionalists of the resources of social 
science. Allis substantive conclusions are not cur concern 
here. 
L'treeten presents no Cene'ral theory. In contrast, 
the theorists of 'modernization', deploying their 
conceptual arnoury of dualisrs. to Vie "Grand Process of 
Y, odernizatioi! (6? )did to a Exeater or lesser extent couch 
their efforts in such terms. 8treeten evidently feels no 
obliC, ation to present a 'Ceneral theory' or to couch his 
contributions to 'development-studies' in that syntax. 
', -, Ihether LStreeten ref-ards this pursuit of 'the general' 
as properly empiricist and as amerjuble to full elaboration 
and presentation(given time), or whether he 
. 
takes-it as a 
forlorn hope like flikesell - "I do not believe that a 
realistic Feneral model of economic, and social development 
is possible, at least one which would be worth very much 
from the standpoint of prediction ujid control! (70)-. is a 
matter that need not concern us now.. Here we may simply 
observe that Streeten works out of týe institd: ionalists' 
framej takino it for granted. Thus liis work is piece-mealg 
sceptigall empiricist and concerned, wýth realistic N 
modellingi and whilst he does not present, or pursue, a 
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Ceneral theoryhe uses the data and inore particularly 
the concepis of social science in order to Cet c1ear the 
outlines and character of the economy he happens to be 
concerned with. Given Vae Eyrdalian project of 
'development', Streeten is thereby able to identify the 
nature of the chan6es that can be initiated given the 
existing institutional frame, and subsequently identify 
the necessary conditions of further, more radical change. 
He exemplifies Gordon's observation of institutionalism: 
that is, that in the end it adds up to "a particular way 
of approaching the study of economics" (71). 
Streeten's empirici ýM and institutionalist line are 
confirmed when he observes that "the bitis in our view of 
economic and social reality enters before the model 
buildinC begins, at the level where concepts are formed"(72). 
And in this respect concept forTation is taken as the 
bringing together under a concept of a mass of data. Aggreg- 
ation_ancl isolation of data, says Streeten, let us separate 
out sets of data(con*depts) o. ')treeten reveals his C., eneral 
orientation ro theorizing thus: "All thought presupposes 
implicit or explicit morlel building and model using. 
Ri-go, rous abstractiong simplification and quantification 
are necessary conditions of analysis and policy"(73). 
Clearly. Streeten subscribes-to what 11indess has called the 
@epistemology of model building'(74). 1n this sense we have 
a sophisticated empiricism confronting the naive efforts 
of the early orthodox schemes. As Streeten puts it, "it 
is of the essence of what is sometimes called the 
institutional approach to probe into the psychological, 
social, political and cultural justification for the 
formqtion of certain concepts" (75). 
We consider first a general stntement on the 
formation of concepts ýP, the essay entitled "'The Use and 
Abuse of Nodels in Development Studies". In this essay, 
it is claimed that model buildinC typically reveals four 
'systematic biases'. The first of these concerns the 
decision as to what counts as a variable and what-counts 
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as a parameter. 
Streeten obPerves that "the separation of parameters 
from variables in Western orthodox models is partly 
determined by what is appropriate for advanced. industrial 
nations, partly by ideolop, 7 and vested interest, and 
partly by convenience of apalysis"(76). He develops this 
poi. nt- in terms of spelling out the functional conditions 
of any economic concept being a realistic concept. In 
contradistinction to the orthodox myth of the (inaCined) 
world of laissez-faire constitoting a universally 
relevant ideal, Streeten bids us focus on the context of 
whatever problem engages us. The problem will reveal what 
is. to count as parameter and what as variable. From these 
points he derives the moral of specificity; thus he says 
To be useful models will have to be, at least initially, 
much more specific to individual cases and much less 
general and 'theoretical"' (77). 
Using this distinction parameters/variables - &.. 'ýtreeten 
Coes on to characterize and counterpose to his own position 
the views of the orthodox and of the msrxists. The 
orthodox treat economic variables (orainarily understood) 
and eschew meddling with 'attitudes'; the marxists suppose A 
such meddling is urýcessary. Thus these two very different 
analyses are taken to manifest a convergence-in-neglect of 
the 'social aspects' of development. This is a curious 
argument. In construction, it seems to involve tho 
conflation of two distinct matters: (1) that of the habit 
of the orthodox of preferring inherited and now irrelevant 
concepts to the nore difficult job of f&shioning their own 
(the notion of the 'conventional wisdom'); and (2) that of 
the manner of treatment of parameters (which is the key to 
-his critique of that orthodoxy). Tn point this argument 
rather seems to be designed both t6 draw the sting of his 
critique of the orthodox and to diqtance himself from any 
marxian line by means of an almost reflex side-swipe. 
Streeten's second source of bias invokes the notion of 
fashion(78). His reference lets him jjýxtapose the pursuit of 
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various putative 'strategic' factors of growth with an, 
(unspecified) problem-relevant and catholic analisis. 
That one factor has been picked out of complex reality at 
sone time or other and peddled as Ithe' answer to 
development is justly ridiculed; but that the pursuit of 
a single strategic factor is in itself a risconceived 
endeavour Streeten does not establish. He observes: "Ti 
soon became obvious however that DUTIerous otiier conditions 
both account for past growth in advanced countries and are 
required for development in But instead of 
embarking on a careful analysis of the necessary direction 
and coordination of policies in particultir cases a new 
-or analysis has tended to replace the old" (79). one-fact 
-Again, it rather seens as if two iss-ues are being 
ccnflated. The first is the orderinC of explanatory 
principles: do we necessarily do this hierarchically 
(reducing., in the extrene, to the priority of one notion);, 
or, at the other limit, are all explanatory concepts of 
equal weight? The second is the habit of disciplines of 
having 'fashions'. Running these together, Streeten 
jppli2s that explanatory equality is obviously the line to 
follow, but in no sense does he establish this. R-atherhe 
rielicules the former - hierarchical - view by invoking 
academic fashion (80). 
Streeten's source of bias resembles the above. 
He presents it as the habit of shiftinE from rerardinE zone 
facet of the development situation as being a necessary 
condition to seeinE it as a sufficient condition. He NO 
this 'illegitimate ifoldtion'. Aus from the stance of 
propriety of analysis of the system-as-a-whole, he is able 
to indicate the foolishness of aid missions descending, 
investigating and then reporting in terms of proposals to 
treat this or that aspect in the expectation that the rest 
of the system will then respond fayourably. 
Streeten's f6inth rource of bias in modelling vip can 
take to indicate another- use of social science - that is 
its data. This third error represents a more in-nediately 
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recofrnivable institutionalist point; tbu., -, lie observes-. 
"Almost afl concepts forried by aggregation suitable for 
analysing Western economies must be carefully 
considered before they can be applied to under developed 
economies! '(81). Ile does not, of course, object to 
aggregative concepts Iýer PP,. but to the use of such 
concepts where thpir functional preýrequisites are ab. sent; 
or in brief, where they do not make sense. This u-se of 
familiar notions in unfar-iliar and unsuitable situations 
entailsq so Streeten clains, a Icategory mistake'. This 
is Gilbert Byle's notion, and is usually tak. en as 
indicating a particular quality of 'wronF-ness' in the use 
of a concept. Thus Lor Streeten, to treat the lacl: of 
'regular gainful employment' of sore Third World peasant 
as a ratter of unemployment would be to conrit a 
catefrory error. 
Of this notion of 'caterory error' we ray note two 
tbinrs. Firstly, that it is very suggestive and seems on 
the face of it to be a logician's analoFue of familiar 
ideas of ideological-stance. Here a plausible question 
can be shown to be foolish when all its presuppositions 
as to what is the case are displayed. In terns of 
'ideologies', this is familiar to social sciencez indeed 
divining the ideological stance of an author is virtually 
a reflex habit in this area. W)iat is noted ingeneral is 
that as ideologies 'order' the world they alro establish 
that some questions are sensible and others necessarily 
foolish. The borrowing from kyle seens to repent this 
strategy/situation at an abstract level of arCunent form. 
Ro-, --evor, and this is our second point, philosopýbers 
have 
looked rather askance at the notion. So what does Streeten 
add to his discussion of the functional requisites of 
empirical concept deployment by invoking the notion 
$category error'? 
Streeten's imaFe of empirical concepts in nodel 
building entails then beinr attenuated replicas of reality. 
The concept is a model in itself. Given this schema of 
concept construction, then it-seens obvious that whilst an- 
attenuated version of some aspect of 'reality A' nay be 
useful in 'reality A', it will not be in 'reality B1. 
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Streeten's analysis of 'unemplo"ent' presents this 
strateU of. argument. Yet a shift of concept from 'hone' 
to 'foreign' context where it simply will not work seems 
to, be just an error in the use of a concept: a misuse- 
of a notion flowing from empirical iGnorance of the novel 
situation. There does not scem to be any reason to regard 
the misuse of the notion 'employment' in some Third World 
country as being a 'category error'$ where this is some 
peculiarly philosophical type of error. 2treeten's use of 
the term does not, then, seem to advance ratters. 
We can-now try to summarize the uses made of the 
resoirces of social science by the institutionalists, via 
-, -he. particular work of Streeten. Streeten tzakes empirical LO 
concepts to be simplifving abstractions of raw data - 
aggregative isolations from e3Oerience. -Thus a subtle 
grasp of the data of economy A, B or C is a necessary 
condition of concept formation and subsequently model 
m3ldng. A poor Crasp of data will result in a (--, reater 
likelihood of the construction of inadequate concepts. 
ýhus , 
facts discipline concepts. F-pistemoloCicallyfine- T 
grain social science data is thus necessary to Streeten, 
so as to be able to (1) construct concepts; it jr, also 
used to (P) check concepts. Here Streeten's notion of 
'bias' indicates errors of irhich he is familiar. His. 
identification of these is sociology of knowledCe-informed. 
T1111s the use of the notion of 'unemploy-ment' in a. poor 
economy A, B or 0 is a mistake -a Taistake in modelling, 
urhich flol's fror. ignorance of the facts of the situation. 
This 'checking' use is presented, by Streeten, as being in a 
sense 'formal' - Ryle is invoked. But these are not 
philosophical objections; rather t1hey seeia to be it variety 
of ideologically-SensiýiVe- objection. Thus he reports that 
the concepts of the orthodoxy are i. nadequate in respect of 
nodel-6onstruction, yet they are fulictionally adequate in 
the sense that they serve the interests of the status quo. 
Thus at the level of concepts, ot lorical reography, 
Streeten deploys a style of criticisiq often used in social 
science to attack ideological stances. 
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Methodologically, as he takes empirical concepts to be 
abstractions from particular concrete situations', he is 
able to ask of any concept: just what is the empirical 
situation from which it abstracts? Re'phrased, we see that 
as his economics are lodged within an institutionalist 
frame, then his concepts 
(insofar 
as they are 'social' and 
not just 'economic') are borrowings from the conceptual 
store of social science. Social science data establishes 
the possibility of realistic concepts, whilst social 
science concepts provide the governing frame for concept 
formation. All this follows the institutionalists' 
problem-centred empiricism, in contrast to the 6strarL_ýormal 
style of-the neo-classical orthodoxy. Coupled up to their 
ideology of planning, this reveals the source and impetus 
in their work to the construction of realistic models. 
There is a related procedural/methodological point 
here. Since social science( concepts and data)provide a 
technique of testing the adequacy of data and as Streeten 
takes economies A9 B or C to be intimately lodged within 
some institutional framelthe habit of thought of social 
science is used to generate criticisms. It both orders 
the data brought to bear on concepts suspected of being 
un-realistic2and is the point of departure of critical 
speculationsl a source of questions to put to otherwise 
#innocent' data. Thus the thoroughgoingly sceptical 
nature of social science is used. Rather than accepting 
that which is 'taken for grantedl-or 'obvious' etc. 
social science is invoked. There is a final note to be 
made, a corollary of the scepticism Just noted, and this 
is the habit of reflexive criticism. Streeten, and the 
institutionalistsl regard their own discipline through 
the eyes of a sociologist of knowledge. 
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Myrdaldescribes Streeten as "a friend of mUch 
intellectual affinity"(82)and it is through Streeten's 
exegesis that we shall approach this matter of 'values'. 
'As regards the role of the-theorist, Streeten presents 
11yrdal as posing a threefold question: "can one be at the, 
same time objective, practical and idealistic? ". To this 
he adds, revealingly, that klyrdalls career "looks almost 
like a series of attempts to extort from concrete 
problems ... the replies to these and similar fundamental 
questions" (83). 
liyrdal reports that the issue of 'values' arose in 
the-context of academic work in Sweden. The orthodox 
preached - 'value-neutrality' whilst clearly having an impact 
in the realm of practical politics. These early efforts 
Myrdal comes to disavow; Their relevance is overtaken by 
the'Depression and concurrently he comes to regard his 
critiques of the orthodox as wrong-headed; simply a naive 
empiricism resting on the principled strivings after value- 
neutrality of the theorist. It is through his experience 
of the U. S. institutionalists thAt this is brought home. 
myrdal records that "By their naive empiricism which was 
flagrant they forced me to become aware of the need for a 
rational method of introducing value premises into 
economic researcVI(84). He cannot, he reportsl resolve the 
issue. However, the Depression presents a solution in 
that its demanding urgency shrinks such critical problems; 
and in fact the value consensus of 'social crisis' 
provides the answer. Myrdal sums up the matter thus: 
"The crux of the matter is, of course, that when the old 
liberal postulate of harmony of interests is renounced, 
political conclusions - and ultimately theoretical 
research - must be founded on explicit value premises which 
must be concrete and take into account the actual conflict 
of interests between different social groups. - However in 
a situation experienced as crisis, it is a matter of I 
empirical fact that interests converge and that conflicts 
of'valuation disappear. Political conclusions-can then be 
drawn from value premises which are homogenous and defined 
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in concrete terms"(85). Thus is Myrdal's dilemma resolved 
by practical-activity within the context of social crisis; --- 
this is a. 'solution' Myrdal has hung onto- It is out of - 
this 'practical' orientation-that the dis; inctively 
Myrdalian treatment of 'values' is constructed. Streeten 
reports that in 'An American Dilemmal(begun in 1938) 
ITIVrdal draws a distinction between 'programmes' anct 
Oprognosis"l and adds that"Ithese two key concepts open 
the door to-his approach to the whole problem of value"(86). 
Streete4 defines a programme as "a plan of intended 
action ... it consists of certain objectives or, ends, and 
rules about-the manner in which these objectives are to be 
pursued! '(67). The complementary concept is that of 
prognosiss de , 
fined thus: "B y prognosis is meant a forecast 
of the probable or possible course of events" (88). Here we 
can see how the Myrdalian solution to the fact/value 
problem flows-out, of the positi , 
on of centrality given to a 
certain type of practical activity. Streeten notes that' 
the distinction is "related to the more familiar one 
between analysis and policy"(89). It is also like the split 
between means and ends, but it is not the same. Where the 
means/ends split lets the practitioners of the conventional- 
wisdom shunt off matters of 1valueO. into the given ends 
and thereafter treat means as a technical issue, Streeten 
sees-the programme/prognosis split as preventing such an 
escape manoeuvre He observes, "This complex of desired 
endst means and procedures. '.... all of which is conditioned 
by valuationsq one may call 'programme "ý 90). The core of 
this Myrdal/Streeten line as regards the practical efforts 
of the theorist is a denial of the orthodox means/ends 
split in the context of a certain sort of theorizing- 
activity. The programme, by definitions includes both 
means and ends. It is thus a counter-stance that rules out 
the 'conventional-wisdom' lines rather than any direct 
criticism of that line. The style of validation that it, 
would have applied to itself are the tests of realism and 
relevance. Realism becanee it claims to produce a better 
model of what in fact is the cases in contrast'to 
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$conventional-wisdom'; and relevance because the whole 
I effort takes as its point of departure a reading-of some 
problem inlierent in social crisin(as opposed to matters of 
the formal elaboration of now irrelevant equilibrium 
notions ). 
The relationship of programmes and prognosis is 
dialectical: "Aý. programme without a prognosis is an 
impotent utopian dream. On the other hand, a prognosis 
without programmes is necessarily , 
incomplete. Prognosis 
depends upon programmes in two distinct ways. First and 
obviouslys the programmes of others are data for the social 
observer and theorist" (91). T his is a fairly trivial point 
requiring theorists to note that group beliefs are causally 
effective (. a naturalistic treatment of 'meanings' ). He 
goes on: _, 
1ý3, econdj and perhaps less obviously, the observer 
and theorist himself has something like a programme which 
determines his analysis and prognosis Here is the 
acknowledgement that the theorist is a 32ersonj -thus the' 
theorist is bound by the discipline of learning, rules of 
evidenceg procedures for bringing data under concepts, and 
problems of bias. In sum, all these are areas where the 
claims of the orthodox to 'value-free' endeavairs break 
down. Ve may note, however, that the necessity of which 
Streeten speaks is not that of Dobb. Where Dobb sees theory 
as necessarily linked to practice via the specified aeent 
of the theory's executiong Streeten sees theory linked to 
practice via the truth-degrading chains of person-hood. 
Streeten sees the link to practice as essentially 
problematical and not - as with Dobb - enabling. 
Streeten observes that "In social analysis valuations 
enter not only at the ultimate (or initial) stage in 
decisions about sets of given ends, but at every stage. 
Feople do not attach value only to ultimate ends ... and 
they are not indifferent between the means which promote 
those ends"(93 )Indeed this may well be true, yet, it ill- 
ustrates once again the fact of Streeten's orientation in 
all this discussion. We want to say that 'valuation' 
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enters f rom the moment that we actually speak 
- language is 'value-sloped'. Streeten's actors; 
bestowing or attaching 'value', are working in a moral 
market place. This is a restricted view: what Streeten 
is talking about are the ideologically-informed 'lines' we 
take on issues. If we recall his starting point for all 
this exegesis% that is the relationship of fact/value, 
then we can see that his empiricism is untouched and the 
disjunction between 'is' and 'ought' is affirmed. What is 
being done is that the related notions of analysis/policy 
and means/ends are being re-organised within the model of 
the essentially unproblematical activity of the crisis- 
theorist. 
If Streeten is affirming the disjunction between fact and 
valuelthen how does his subsequent discussion of 'values' 
ir social theory differ from that of the 'conventional- 
wisdom's or from that we might get from critical-theory? 
It seems that he takes the 'conventional-wis'doml to be 
splitting fact/value and thereafter separating them. Thus 
there are statements of fact and there are statements of 
valuationi . the 
two sets are distinct, and particular 
statements of fact can be linked with any statements of 
value that you choose. But we have seen that this is 
untenable in chapter two, "The Idea of 
Development" )and issues in moral nihilism. Streeten's 
course rather seems to entail thatl after granting the 
split, the two sets of propositions be taken as closely 
rel ated. Thus valuation inevitably adheres to factual 
description. The relation is not a necessary one - rather 
it is contingents but a general fact. If Streeten is a 
consistent empiricist then presumably these ladherences' 
are regarded as the products of habit. Fact and value are 
thus splits but then paired. For critical theory the 
position is different again: fact and value, properly 
regarded, are simply fused ,. 
Thus people do not go qround 
habitually attaching value., ýather, they'just inhabit a 
value-suffused world ) and statements of fact are 
'bruýt- 
relativelto some context. 
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None of all this denies the obvious fact of day to 
day living, which is that we can and do distinguish between 
judgments of fact and judgments of value, rather the 
issue is how this commonplace is taken up into theory and 
what conclusions are then drawn from it. Presented thuswe 
can suggest that Streeten is taking the 'conventional- 
wisdom' to bB adhering to an ideal of value-neutral study. and 
as wilfully refusing to acknowledge what the routine 
practice of theorizing reveals.. That is,, that a value- 
neutral study is impossible - Valuations just do keep 
getting caught up. Streeten then seems to be saying that 
far from resisting this and the subsequent job of making a 
list of deviations from the ideal, as brute reality forces 
itself upon the observert the list of deviations should be 
systemized and embraced. Thus a new conception of the job 
of the observer and theory is posited. To this end 
Streeten follows Myrdal and constructs a sophisticated 
scheme of 'value-Seepagell endeavouring to minimize the 
seepage in some places (for example by advocating 
#reflexive' theorizing); and at others granting it; for 
example, theory is 'value-relevant' because it has a 
purpose and we had best declare it at the outset. 
What we would want to dog affirming the notion of 
*social-theory' as the deployment-of a wwreMy informed 
categorical frameg is to go further than Streeten-and deny 
the proprietY (and efficacy 
4) 
of the conception of 'ideal 
plus list' and nake-value-suffused practical activity the 
paradigm of the exchange of theorist and his world. 
Uhatever rules-of-thumb governing the construction of 
theories we are to establish - and Streeten's list is just 
that, in the. end - the unavoidable nature of Isocial-theory' 
is that it is a morally informedq moral intervention in the 
world. Indeed if we recall our approval, of Gellner's (95) 
idea of the rediscovery in ldevelopýent theory' of classic 
political philosophylthen we can see that the moral core of 
$social theory' is not something to be reeretted, rather it 
is the well-spring of the whole effort. 
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Streeten continues his exegesis in a revealing way 
when he askýs, given all this 'value-seepage's whether or 
not we can continue with social science or must we "plunge 
at once into valuation and ideologies"(96). He answers in 
terms dismissive of the study of 'ideologies' and in line 
with his interventionist disposition. Thus he says : "To 
be useful and truthful, the social scientist, and in 
particular the economist, should start with the actual 
political attitudes of people, or groups of people, not 
with their rationalizations and pseudo-theoretical 
ideologies" (97). The task of the scientist is to grasp the 
form-of-life of Broups. Streeten seems to advocate a 
psychological lierme-yieuil%ts; thus such an effort is not a 
matter of the elaboration of formal systems, "it is more 
like the exercise of artistic imagination and sympathetic 
understanding"(9 8). In sum, we may says the social scientist 
perfects a mechanics of social inter-action. With - Myrdal 
this is slotted into an evolutionist frame which takes the 
present task of society to be the construction of a 
rationally managed system. The whole is evidently the. - 
ideology of a planner: authorl. tative rule by the reasonable 
in the interests of the general good-Much of what is said 
in reeard to the execution of practical research (i. e. 
engagedq or familiarly empirical study) is eminently 
sensibleg but the whole is deformed by the refusal to 
acknowledge that the effort is fundamentally ideological. 
As regards the 'institutionalist" treatment of the 
related issues of valuation and the role of the theorist, we 
can summarize thus . 
(I)Iffe. have seen that whilst Myrdal 
poses the 'Problem of values' in theoretical termsq derived 
from a debate with his intellectual mentors, he fails to 
resolve the issues . 
(2) He goes on to offer a 'parallel 
solution whereby. he-resolves the matter practically, in 
'crisis politics' - the nature of 'crisis politics' is 
taken to be such as to obviate any great problem with 
$values' (3)What' he now has to say about 'values' flows 
from his practical activity; that is* 'crisis political 
lets basic values be assumed. and thereafter the problem 
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is simply of removal of idiosyncratic valuations, or bias, 
or Iseepages.. (4)He adopts the stance of a 'reasonable 
man# and takes his procedure , with its element of mea 
culpa and various rules of thumb,. to be fundamentally 
sound.. (5)'The. whole is an empiricist schemes not a naive 
empiricism, and equally with Myrdal not, perhaps, very 
sophisticated either.. Y. et with Streeten the effort becomes 
indeed a. highly subtle approach. 
5-5 Policy - planning and the 'Soft-state' 
Myrdal, like the other institutionalists, argues out of 
reac tion to the 'conventional-wisdom' of neo-classicism and 
the experience of the Depression-to the rationalmecessity of 
'planning'. 
-As 
Gruchy noted, .t hd issue for institutionalist, - via 
the "social control of business"(99 )and the agent of . 
control was to be the state. Myrdal reveals this as the 
core of his theories' practical engagement when he observes 
that "what a state needs, and what politics is aboutj is 
precisely-a macro-plan for inducing changesl simultaneouslys 
in a great number of conditions, not only in the economic, 
and doing it in a way so as to coordihate all these changes 
in order to reach a maximum development effect of efforts 
and sacrifices. This may, in popular terms, be a definition 
of what we. should mean by planning" (100). 
Observing that the situation in the Third World simply 
does not measure up ýo these requirements of his theory, 
Myrdal invokes the notion. of the 'soft state': an 
encapsulating term for the extent to which reality diverges 
from the requirements of theory* It is explicated thus: 
"By that. term I want to characterize a general lack of 
social discipline'ý101). He then presents a detailed list of 
the failings of the typical (102 Third World state, and 
concludesthat his observations "should rightly lead up to 
an investigation of the policy Issue of by what means the 
Isoft state' , can 
be changed into more of a'strong state' 
... This isl in my view, the most important task to be 
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fulfilled in order to make possible rapid development"(103). 
Without all'this, planning for development is fufile. 
However, we should, not be downhearted-. "To begin with the 
problem must be discussed honestly and effectively, as a 
problem of Planning"(104)(my emphases). 
Myrdal is rather pessimistic about the chances of the 
Third World putting its own house in order.. He has reason 
to be,, since his policy proposals take the form of a 
vague injunction: "the under-developed countries have to 
struggle on a broad front to make their states less soft"(105). 
But the agents of this reform are never clearly identifiedg 
much less openly discussed. The role of the presently 
developed is ambiguous - the use of 'leverage' to press 
for more 'social discipline' is advocated, yet this in turn 
rests on the assumption of power of liberal-progressives in 
the governments of the developed nations. In respect of the 
Third'World states Myrdal has observed that little can be 
dolie before "the power structure has been changed by 
evolution or revolution"(106). The reiorm. of the political 
and social structures of the under-developed, plus changes 
in orientation on the part of the developed, are made the 
pre-requisites of plannilig the development of the Third 
Worldp And it seems that it is the 'planners'. the 
reasonable ment who must press for these reforms. 
We can make a series of objections to this: 
(1) Perhaps the most familiar objection to be brought 
against this line of argument is the one we can dub the 
'tactical'. Such critics ask why a part of the problem 
- the present nature of the state - should be made into a 
vehicle of the solution of these problems. They add that 
this 'mystery' is not to be resolved via the internal 
renewal of the state through the gradual extension of the 
area held by 'reasonable men'. This line of criticism we 
will not pursue. 
-' 
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(2) An alternative line of criticism can-be generated 
if we recall the work of Dobb. We noted above his 
argument that theorizing is incoherent without-aii 
identified agent of the execution of the theory. Analysis 
thus entails prescription, in that a 'complete' snalysis 
necessarily involves some suppositions and suggestions as 
to mechanisms for the execution of the solution presented 
in analysis. Theories are not simply constructed for 
somebody: they involve as necessary assumptions 
#somebody' acting as the theory supposes/suggests. With 
no'identified agent the theory simply does not touch the 
ground. 
So who, or what, is Myrdal's 'agent'? We can approach 
the identification of his 'agent' via his stance on 
'values'. Myrdal-does not pursue 'value-neutrality'1(107) so 
much as a 'virtuous non-Rartisanship , 
1. Two techniques 
support the pursuit of this goal, On the one hand Myrdal 
w'ears his 'values' on his sleeve, which, claiming these are 
both general and obvious, he seems to take to deflect 
criticism of ideologiual taint (which it does notof- 
course) 
,- 
On the other hand. , the elimination of anything 
that militaýes against , 
realistic modelling of development. 
This latter aspect is the elimination of 'value-seepage', 
which quasi-medical metaphor is wholly appropriate. This 
pursuit of technically rational social knowledge, free 
from ideologyt and his tacit granting of the need to 
identify an agent - which he does in affirming the value- 
principle 'development' - issues in the identification of 
the state as the agent of execution of his theory. But 
what sort of a commitment is this? Can we call this an 
unsatisfactor. 7 minimum commitment? 
Let us recall Bauman's ý08 bibe at Berger and Luuýmann; 
their 'actor's around whom they display their sociology of 
knowledgel is not a human but an epiatemic being, 
established as the minimum necessary link with reality for 
that exercise in idealistic theorizing which they are 
disposed to present. The essential histor cal and social 
specificity of any exercise in the socioloa of knowledge 
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is ignored, and we have an idealist abstraction from 
common-sense whose only acknowledged link with reality is 
an actor devoid of any characteristics. The 'actor' 
serves as the necessary condition of their theorizing, 
but plays no role in it, The lactor's' presence simply 
satisfies a technical requirement of the logic'of 
theorizing. 
So, is, 11yrdalls 'state' an epistemic phenomenon- 
called forth by the demands of the logic of theorizing, and 
thus to be taken as satisfying a technical requirement - 
or is it any identifiable state in the real world? What 
then is the nature of an adequate analysis of the state? 
Forour part that must be answered in terms of a marxian 
analysis - but for Myrdal? It is claimed that his 
methodology is essentially the pursuit of realism in 
modelling; the facts come first. Thus in respect of the 
'state', we should expect the discussion of, and around, 
the state to be predominantly concerned with how it is, 
But the reverse is the case, here Myrdal's treatment of 
the state is dominated by his notion of the 'soft-state' 
- where this is transparently a measure of the divergence 
of reality from the requirements of theory . Thus his 
analysis is dominated by how the state ough to be. In 
considering 'his treatment of thý issue,, of state, it 
seems to be the case that Myrdal, having just established 
by moral and practical reflection how the world is and how 
it ought to be, then proceeds to search for an agent. The 
agent he invokesis made in his own image. It is the 
embodiment of the pursuit of the general public good;. 
and, as we have notedt the 'soft-state' is to be discussed 
as a "problem of planning "ý 109). Myrdal does not begin his 
analysis of the state froms as we would expect, how it is 
rather he begins from how it has to be if Myrdalian theory 
is to be executed. 
The'reforming state is a necessary condition ofIthe 
deployment of the Myrdalian scheme; Myrdall 'state' is 
the minimum necessary acknowledgement of the logical 
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requirement to identify an agent of theory-expectation, 
This agent of Myrdal's derives from the requirements of 
the logic o, f theorizing in the particular context of 
Myrdal's pursuit of a 'virtuous non-partisanship', and 
not 
, 
from. any historically specific analysis of, the nature 
of the state in Third World society. 
The_Myrdalian scheme thus touches the ground only in 
a technical sense. Whether this invalidates the entire 
effort- that isl whether there is a requirement in 
theorizing for the 'agent' to be realistic ( so to say)- 
we have not asked. Clearly the use of a technical 
grounding only must reduce the plausibility of any policy 
proposals that are stronger than tentative; and as hyrdal 
makes the 'state' the core and key to the implementation 
of his effort, then this technical grounding seems to be 
insufficient. His 'state' does not seem able to carry the 
weight the general argument requires it to. What we are 
saying , then., 
is that the 1,11yrdalian 'state' must be taken as 
insufficieht to carry the argument; and therefore, as the 
basis'of practical policy making, unsatisfactory. The 
prior question of whether or not the Myrdalian 'state' is 
enough to properly meet the demands of the logic of 
theorizing we do not know. We can notes however, that if 
the F17rdalian state is a device for the evasion of 
political commitment, which is a jibe made by some (and 
not only pa, rxists), then this would seem to entail that 
klyrdal is pyisuing a theory which is not grounded% that is 
to sayl a perfectly irrelevant theory,. 
_And 
that notion 
certainly does look, incoherent. 
(3) We can construct another approach to these matters if 
we recall -Passmorelsolo)remarks on the pursuit of knowledge 
and the manner of its dissemination and useq in the light 
of the ideal of progress. 
The notion of the perfectibility of man comes down to 
ust so Fassmore argues, from the ancient Greeks. Prior to 
the Renaissance ouch discussions of perfecýibility were 
couched in metaphysical or theological teriýsjand concerned 
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the puMsuit of a goal- that is, the , 
state of perfection. 
Locke transforms the idea, arguing that men are. capable 
of being improved by moral. education, that is social 
action. This is the idea that is influential in, the 18th 
and 19th centuries: 'the focus is on the role of 
education,. and the process, of improvement. However, a 
damaeing ýriticism of this line is to point out that the 
educator is a member of corrupt society and presumably 
corrupt also. Narx will accuse Locke and his, followers 
of forgetting the matter of the education of the 
educator. This opens up the search for a guarantor - if 
Locke has established the possibility of the moral 
advancement of the citizens and their societythe question 
becomes one of Pecuring the fact. 
Two lines of-argument flow from this point. The 
firstj presented by the Iýhilosophe's ( very much aware of 
their own novel social status) argued for the rule of the 
best -a version of the Platonic 'philosopher-king' idea. 
Thus Passmore observes that "Helvetius, a convinced 
Lockiang is the founding father of modern governmentalism'5' (111 
and that he gocused on the role of the state. But this 
does not meet Marx's question - the matter of control is 
not here resolved. Passmore presents this line as moving 
via Bentham and J. S. Mill (who were experienced in 
government) unlike the phiiosophe's) down to the Fabians 
and their stress on legislation. The second line, on the 
other hand, has recourse to the model of the natural 
sciences. Here the need for a guarantor focused upon a 
method. The extension of the method of natural science 
into the realm of the social was entailed, as was the 
dissemination and use of the resultant knowledge. The 
notion of 'progress' is presented,, and progress is taken 
to be normal insofar as it is not blocked by sinister 
partial interest. However this line fails also; for the 
dissemination of scientific knowledge is problematicalas 
is the expectation that ! mny knowledge will be acted upon. 
The method of natural science is no guarantee of progress 
in society. .( 
The further extension of thý argument 
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involves taking the question of a guarantor completely 
out of the, -hands of anybody: thus we have deteiminist 
schemes, the social determinism of rationalists from 
Leibniz down to klarx and the natural determinibins of 
Darwinian evolutionisms. We need not persue these ). ' 
What then of Lyrdal? He refers to himself as "a 
student in the great liberal tradition of the 
Enlightenraent"(212)and cites the state as theagent of 
progress. If we follow Passmore's argument-then clearly 
Myrdal follows the Locke-Helvetius-Mill line down to 
Fabianism, Indeed Ehrensaft(113)dismissively labels him as 
just thatl a Fabian. If we allow Passmore's arguments 
then it is clear that Myrdal's use of the state as agent 
of development is unsatisfactory in that it cannots in 
theoryl meet the demands of recurring progress. , 
Variations on the idea of. the. 'philosopher-king' have in 
the main been rejected. In addition to this, there is 
also discernible in Myrdal an element of line two; that 
is, the invoking of the method of science. Not only is 
this evident in the relatively unsurprising sense that it 
is entailed by his rejection of the centrality of the 
notion of ideology, and his constant harping on the 
question of. the elimination of bias; but it is also 
revealed - if we follow Passmore - in his appeal to the 
progressive mindedl reasonable men. The idea that there 
is an ever growing reservoir of knowledge that is free 
from ideological taint represents the direct and obvious 
argument from the model of science. Myrdal invoking the 
steady, diverse$ broad-fronted pressure of the reasonable 
men, represents the corollary, which is the argument from 
the supposedly self-evident propriety and superiority of 
properly transmitted scientific knowledge. Myrdal'B 
belief in, the power of reflexive institutional theory 
echoes the, belief of the philosopher in the power of 
rational argument - and this is the most optimistic aspect 
of an argument from science, Aý 
are run In Myrdal these two elements(we noted), 
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together; ip that the state, invoked as the agent of 
development (that is, progress )is also the locu s of 
(social) scientific method. The state is served and 
staffed by reasonable men bent on the p6rauit of the 
general public good. Thisla revealed in the quotation 
we have noted already: "What the state needs,. and what 
politics is about, is precisely a macro-plan for 
inducing changes ... This may in popular termas be a 
definition of what we should mean by planning"(114). But 
the state as guarantor of progress is unsatisfactory. The 
explication of the role of the state reveals the failure 
to secure 'progress'; and the method of science as 
guarantor is equally unhelpful. The adoption of this as 
key does not secure 'progress'. 
In summary, we note that above we argued that the 
myrdalian 'state' is an epistemic device to secure a 
grounded theory; and that., as such, it represents a 
minimum response to the demands of the logic " of 
theorizing. We argued that the Myrdalian treatment of 
the state conflicted with the avowed method 'of the pursuit 
of realisTb in modelling. and that the notion was too weak 
to carry the load the general argument required it to. 
(Ye further suggested at this point that here was the site 
of a possible collapse into incoherence for the entire 
effort - but we did not try to secure this argument). To 
these points we added that, even setting aside doubts as 
to the adequacy of the Myrdalian state, ' the state 
combined with the method of sciencewas insufficient 
to secure 'development' (for reasons 11assmore has 
presented), 
These notes are about Myrdal's arp. -ument-stratefries. 
Proln our criticisms it does not follow that anything 
by way of statements of (brute relative) facts made by 
Myrdal are necessarily fýalSe (or uninteresting). Whether 
or not Myrdal's 'facts' are right is a matter of 'checking 
the facts'. Our point is that even if he has got the 
facts straightl his argument is deeply flaweds as we have 
seen, and thislis a reason for doubting any derived 
policy proposals 
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Lý10`, Dynamic of Theory III: The status of iNeo-Instit-btional 
Social The*orv, 
In the introductory remarks to this Section we made 
reference to the broad context of enquiry into, which this 
particular effort slotted. Hoting that the 
institutionalists have lodged claims to the effect that 
their endeavours constitute an independent and adequate 
development-studies, in contradiction to the' products 
of the leonirentional-wisdoml (where this comprises both 
'growth theory' and modernization theory'), we indicated 
that we would consider this claim. In the light of our 
above researches we are now able to redeem this promise. 
in-part Jý, ýV- we treat the question: to what extent 
can neo-institutional social theory be taken as 
establishing an independent development-studies? In 
part I+-? - we esk to what extent can neo- 
institutionalist work be taken to represent a theoretical 
advance over the raterial of the 'conventional-wisdom'. 
.,. 
I+; I. We can introduce our analyses by asking whether or 
not neo-institutional social theory can be taken as 
establishing an independent development-studies. This 
seems to be roughly the burden of Streeten's work.. It is 
partially granted by Ehrensaft in his history, when he 
distinguishes a 'pre-Seers concensus', static and wrong- 
headedl from subsequent movement towards an adequate 
theory of development. Streeten observes that "Awareness 
of'a problem of development is remarkably recent. The 
academic literature, the public debate, voluntary and 
official agencies and institutions and policies are not 
more than twenty years old'ý115). He goes on to locate 
the source of this rise in interest in two related sets 
of circumstancesi (1) problems of resources and poverty 
are taken to be urgent in view of the population 
explosion,, and soluble in the light of the success of 
post-war Etýropean recoveryl (2) political, change in the 
form of the rise of 'new nations' of the Third World 
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within the context of 'cold war' occasions concern for 
the 'proper' development of these 'new nations'. ' 
Streeten goes on-to remark that "The psychological, 
political and even military origins of our interest in 
development have coloured the approach and-the. content 
of development studies"(116 ). Streeten makes these remarks 
in line with the 'reflexive' aspect of his general 
orientations. In addition we have seen that the 
orthodoxy of neo-classicism forms a theoretical object 
against which Ineo-institutional social theory' is 
defined, and the Keynesian-derived growth models are 
assimilated to that orthodoxy. The method of neo- 
institutional social theory entails the pursuit of 
realistic models of developing economies; bias is to be 
purged, and in this light the early efforts of the 
'conventional wisdom' are taken as a theoretically 
misconceived departure. 
Yet, even if we grant all this* precisely what 
follows is not clear. Let us then pose the question in 
regard to career of development studies; in what sense Is 
an institutionalist scheme independent? If we ask whether 
the practitioners of neo-institutional social theory are 
independent of orthodox economics . then we have to report 
that in regard to neo-classicism they take themselves to 
6'noompass and surpass that scheme. The result is that 
they re-constitute a general political economicswhich is 
distinct from both Marxian radicalism and orthodox 
narrowness. But for us the question of their relative 
independence reduces to a question of intent and style of 
analysis. We have noted above, with both Gordon and 
Gruchyq that neo-institutionalism is a style of 
approa6hihg economics that lodges the economic system 
within an institutional framework. It is thereby more 
immediately-plausible in the context of the Third World, 
but nonetheless any genuine theoretical'novelty must be 
restricted. Following on from this, we can say that even 
if the mode of analysis is richer (which it must beto 
the extent that it treats institutional aspects) then the, 
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intent remains the same. That is, just as 'conventional- 
wisdom' is an economics designed to legitimate/drganise 
intervention by an authoritative state to protiote 
development, -then so too does neo-4nstitutional social 
theory aim to leeitimate/orf; anise authoritative state 
intervention. Further, in the-light of the refusal of 
neo-institutional social theory to acknowledge its status 
as ideology, it must be accounted (along with the growth 
and rodernization theories)as itself ideological in the 
pejorative sense; that is, blind to significant. elementsý, - 
of its-own nature. In the light of our interest in the 
elucidation of the nature of 'social theory' (a morally 
informed categorical frame))neo-institutional social 
theory, for all its greater subtlety, remains firmly 
within the framework of the orthodox. 
But what would the theorists of nev-inBtitUtionalý 
social theory say to this question of ours? It seems 
likely that they would both deny that the question, is 
especially interesting(in that their ideology disposesý 
them to affirm a practical bent., thuE3 implicitly eschewing 
what could be seen as academic-departmental scholasticism), 
or that it is particularly difficult to answerin that 
they would affirm their orientation to these matters as 
being manifestly more adequate to the novel problems of 
the post-war world than the efforts of the 'conventional- 
wisdom'. 
If political-economics is an empirical (indeed, - 
problem-centred) science conceived in an empiricist vein, 
then theirs is at least potentially an adequate political 
economics in contradistinction to the efforts of the 
orthodoxy. Yet this self-conception to our mind lodges 
them firmly within the realm of the orthodox, even if we 
grant their greater plausibility. Can we then take neo- 
institutionalism to provide the basis for an independent'. 
development-studies? It seems as if the question does not 
make very good sense because, in sums we have to say that 
neo-institutionalist social theory is a problem-centred 
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European line of thought, within social scierfce, whose 
intent is the legitimation/organisation of authoritative 
interventioiýs. If the exchange of the rich and-poor 
nations is properly conceived as a matter of 'intervention', 
then neo-institutional social theory does have claims to 
be the most subtle intervention to date. But to our mind 
that relation is improper and, in the end, untenable. 
Again, if we take developmentý-studies to be about the 
pursuit of a 'science' of 'Third World society, then neo- 
institutional social theory has claims to some approximation 
to that idealq but to our mind this goal is absurd. 
i 
Setting aside the matter of the independence of an 
institutionalist development-studies. we turn to the major 
questioný which is: Can wo take neo-institutional, 
t; hqor_v to represent a theoretical advance ove3z modernization- 
y and arkv Harrod-Zomar informed orthodoxy? theor 
This question raises the prior issue of theory. 
Can we, having indicated that we take neo-institutional 
social theory and modernization and the early orthodoxy 
built around Harrod-Domar to be ideologies, rank ideologies? 
If ideoloCies can be ranked, then how? Here we offer a 
brief answerlbefore going on to consider Seers and 
Ehrensa. -Lrt and the relative positions of the ideologies we 
have thus far met. 
, Bernstein offers an answer to the question of ranking 
ideologies which focuses on the aspect of argument. (This is in 
contrast to, say, Goldmann, who takes e2Mlanatory, scope; - 
thus the better' ideology is the one that explains the 
narrower one. Or again in contrast the Mannheim. who 
focusses on the relativism of points of view). Bernstein 
observes that "ideologies are based on belipfs and 
interpretations which purport to be true or' valid. These 
beliefs and interpretations are consequently subject to 
rational criticism"(117). How these Iration6*1 criticisms' 
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are to be ordered, or how we might judge between one 
ideology and another, becomes a complex-is sue t6 be 
treated via a distinction between validation and 
authentication; between the discipline the community of 
scholars imposes, and thereafter the significance that 
comes to be attached to any cultural objects they may 
construct. Here we can note that our task is apparently 
easier, since all of the theories (ideologies) we have 
thus far looked at claim to be both (1) empiricistt that 
is modelling themselves on the natural sciences and (2) 
aimed at legitimating/organising/implementing 
authoritative interventions, where this requires a model 
of the world and a measurement/intervention technology; 
together these permit the theorist to 'go to work on the 
world'. Sol out of the ideologies we have. so far 
assembled, whicJ2 is the best in regard to this essentially 
technical requirement? 
. 
W'ith regard to those efforts which are built around 
the Harrod-Domar model, that is, the 'export-Keynes' and 
'early modernization theory'. we have to say that the 
neo-institutional social theory line does indeed constitute 
an advance. If we note the papers of 'C'eers and Ehrensaft 
we can illustrate this - probably widely accepted - view. 
Both Seers and Ehrensaft operate within what Hindess has 
called the 'epistemology of nodel building'; that ist both 
conceive their task as the realisation of realistic models 
of reality. We can see with the work of Seerb that the 
instiýutionalists' line is strong. He argues the orthodox 
are simply 'out of touchll and his explanation of this is 
an amalgam of observation on the teaching and career 
pattern of economists whic)i reduces to the claim'that there is 
an incapacity of vision on the part of the orthodox which 
renders them incapable of seeing the world straight. The 
specific. area of conceptual inadequacy follows the line we 
have noted with Streeten: - the 'conventional-wisdom' is 
inadequate to its object and objectives, in that it 
represents a set of intellectual tools fasýioned for use in 
the rich world and not the poor. Ehrensafý treats this in 
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terms of a contrast betweenon the one hand, the claims to 
generality'on the part of the orthodox; and, on the other, 
the fact of their claims being situation-bound. The 
upshot is to open up the basis of a familiar line of 
criticism-. . "when these assumptions are scrutinized, it is 
readily apparent that they describe conditions contrary 
to the typical case of world i3ocieties"(118). We can 
suggest that, according to the criteria of adequacy that 
would be proposed by the 'conventional-wisdom',, that the 
Harrod-Dormar informed theories of growth and of 
modernization are inadequate; and that, in addition2 the 
efforts of Ineo-institutional social theory' are an 
advance. Henceforth the question of the 'best' ideology 
so'far is lodged in respect of neo-institutional social 
theory and revisionist-modernization. 
U'hen we turn to a comparison between revisionist- 
modernization and neo-institutional social theory, the 
problem of ranking becomes rather more problematical. If, vie take 
Gellner as a representative of a sophisticated revisionist- 
modernization and compare his work - insofar as he 
presents a general theory of process of d4ývelopment'(119)- 
wit)i that of Myrdal, then we can observe a number of 
'strategic' resemblances. 
We have seen that Flyrdalin the course of the pursuit 
of progress( in the guise of development) invokes the state 
and(secondarily)the method of science as agents and 
guarantors of progress. The particular agents of change 
werel upon observation, found to be the diffuse efforts of 
the 'reasonable men': it was in these people that the 
possibilities inherent in the conjunction of social 
scientific knowledge and state intervention were lodged. 
We indicated grounds for scepticism in respect of this 
schema. Now if we turn to Gellner we find a similar 
conception of the possibility of progress. I ellier 
regards the intervention of the social theoriýt as 
constrained by the dual circumstances of, on t, helone handq 
the ten 
. 
dential yet overwhelmingly strong moyemeit of 
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industrial and science based development (a world historical 
phenor. enorr,. and on the other hand, the restriction of the 
nature of any thporetically-informed grasp of the process 
to the limits set by natural scientific method. The 
'transition', as Gellner calls the whole process, is to be 
accomplished with critical reason as. the guide towards the 
goal of 'being, developed'. 
. 
Thus where Myrdal takes the state to guide the social 
dynamic of 'cumulative causation' toward the goal of 'world- 
welfariem', Gellner sees an essentially opaque process of 
transition, illuminated (from within, as it were) by the 
possibilities inherent in scientific method and a very 
good, if rough, idea of the end-situation of transition. 
Where klyrdall describing himself as an Enlightenment 
liberal, identifies the effective locus of human 
intervention in the social science-informed intervention 
of the state in the hands 
- 
of the progressives, Gellner 
sees the locus of human intervention in the 'transition' as 
bounded by, the development-orientated deployment of 
icritical-rationalism'; a Pbpperian liberalism whose roots 
are essentially 17th century. As Myrdal's effort fails, so 
too does Gellner s; the method of science is no guarantor. 
, 
Both theorists are pessimistic. Gellner attempts to 
make this a virtue of his stance; whereas Myrdal, 
notoriously, expects little in the way of developmentl, The 
-strategies 
resemble each other in this reneral form: thus 
(a) both affirm, a notion of progress in the guise of 
developments, and (b) both seek an agent to act as 
guarantor. That is, they both fall short of accepting the 
only cogent guarantor-strategylwhich is to make progress 
lnaturaý by involving notions of determinism. In terms of 
their 'meta-theorieslit is difficult to identiiy any means 
whereby they may be, generally, ranked as development 
theoriec vis a vis each other. 
There is another line of argument which beEii-s upon 
this issue of ranking, ýnamely. the issue of progress in 
conceptualization. Here, with Ehrensaft, we can I 
'take note 
of one 
, 
way in which our. question about rankingl'and more 
narrowly technical adequacy, can not be answereý. 
I 
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z, hrensaft's article sets out an exercise in "economic 
sociology"and he declares his objective thus, "the 
purpose of this essay is to explain why semi- 
industrialization occurs in Third World capitalist 
regimes rather than full industrialization"(120). Prima 
facie it would seeia to be the case that Ehrensaft takes 
himself to be telling us something about how things are-, 
an empirical matter. lie also seems to adopt an empiricist 
frame-, thus in referring to the recent history of 
economic sociological formulations, he notes that "each 
succesive step brings us closer to approximation to actual 
social relationships". In addition he goes on to say: 
"I will review these steps one by one, showing how'each 
5 
succe Ive analysis builds intellectually on the ones which 
preceded"(121). Ve seem to be presented with a scheme of 
increasingly accurate approximations to reality: which 
scheme echoes the familiar idea of the progressive 
character of natural scientific conceptualization. 
Ehreiisaft adopts the stance of some sort of dependency 
theorist, and reviews the post-war history of development- 
studies in the light of such theory. This, of course, is 
his privilege. The error seems to come when he elects to 
relate his history of theory in the mould of the natural 
sciences'progressiveness of conceptualization. It may be 
argued that'natural science conceptualizations are' 
progressive to the extent that they approximate more 
closely to reality than their predecessors. But with the 
social sciences there is no reason to expect, or look for% 
V -ory of this progressive tendencm; and with the hist 
dependency-theory, or any other distinguishable effort 
within the social sciences, there is no reason to cast the 
history in this natural science-echoing style. If we 
recall Lobb's schemal then we see that the dynamic of 
theory is but one aspect of theory (ideology)-construction 
(not evolution), along with the dynamic of socie I 
ty. Indeed 
we can move further away from the analogy of natural 
science-by noting that it is this second aspect of the 
basis of elaboration of ideologies which ist arguably; the 
principal determinant. In the schema presented by Dobb 
there is no pursuit of a general-theory qua natural science 
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general theory - and no reason therefore to look for any 
analogous progressiveness of concept. Ehrensaft's 
puxsuit of a progressive evolution of concepts towards a 
realistic economic sociology is, so far as we can 
determine, a misconceived project. There is no reason to 
suspect that such a progressive sequence ' 
exists; indeed with 
Dobb, there is reason to suppose that it does not. This 
_seauence 
of )Fhrensa-ft's cannot serve as the. basis-for 
cl. aims to : the primacy of neo-institutioiial social theory 
oYer t he 'conve4tional-wisd om', or for that matter of 
dependency over neo-instituional social theory. 
Yet with Bernstein we have noted that ideologies can 
beranked; '' Ehrensaft'n effort would perhaps have been more 
helpful if it 'had been restricted t6 an exposition of 
the benefits to be derived from payine attention to the 
institutional context of economies, thereby showing how the 
original notion of relevance-of-context could be fruitfully 
deployed in several areas. If E-hrensaft's effort is 
anything other than an idiosyncratic introduction to 
- is precisely an examination 'dependency theory', then it 
of the realms of use of this seminal notion. However, this 
is-not developed5and Ehrensaft's contribution to the 
elucidation of theory does not transcend Girvan's 
question-beegine formulation - "historical/inBtitutional/ 
structural method" (122). What r'enains un. clear-is 
just how these bits fit. toE. ether. The answer is not to be 
found in anysequence of concept refinement from the start- 
point of the pre-Seers concensus. 
In reGard to the matter of the theoretical priority of 
neo-institutional social theory in relation to 
modernization-theory, Ehrensaft's work offers few clues. 
He simply rdcapitulates the view that institutional 
sensitivity advances the realism of modelling -, a point 
established by fSeers and Myrdal - and goes on to-jocate 
this iii an untenable schema which reduces Myrdalýand neo- 
institutional social theory to the status of a p, reliminary 
'step in the. riGht direction', namely towards 'dependency 
theory', 
. 
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Are we now in a position to answer our question vis a 
vis the relative sophistication and problem - a6equacy of 
neo-institutional social theory and modernization theory? 
If we mean , an 
advance in terms of practical efficac. 79 in 
the sense of the deployment of a more subtle set of 
conceptsl or more adequate concepts in the light of some 
controlling idea of a 'science of (Third World) society's 
then the answer must be yes. We have argued for this 
above: the experience of withdrawal from empire as 
Idecolonization' and the European intellectual/ 
governmental tradition provided resources which lent 
themselves more readily to a project of authoritative 
interventionism oriented to 'development' goals than did 
the resources of the U. S. theorists of modernization. The 
crucial difference was identified as concerning ýhe 
theorists' pocial milieu and the nature of the respective 
political demands; that is, the dynamic of society rather 
than the dynamic of theory. Indeed)these straightforwardly 
theoretical resources were largely shared. The European 
effort was thus adequate to its task. If we mean an 
advance in terms of the nature of theorizing,, in the sense 
of a movement towards a notion of socinl-theory as the 
'deployment of a morally-informed categorical! fram. o- and 
away from notions of social science as poor relation to 
natural sciences then the Ceneral answer has to be no. 
There is no theoretical advance. Both neo-institutional 
social theory and modernization-theory are ideologies, 
which are in conception empiricist and in intent 
authoritative-interventionist. 
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Chai)ter Six: Disciplinary Independence and Theoretical 
Progressivity. 
1-OPreamble. 
In the Introduction to Section Three we notea that 
the material of the section presented us with two stra- 
tegic issues. These were, first, the matter of the 
putative independence of "development studies 11 from 
the body of the social sciences ihgeneral (and in 
particular from economics ); and second, the related 
issue of the progressive theoretical status of those 
intellectual schemes consider6din this section. As 
these two issues have not been resolved thus far in 
this section (ke. in chapter 5 ), the logic of the study 
as a whole bids us acknowledge them here. Chapter 6 will 
be organised around these two theoretical issues. 
Evidently this represents a change in our proced- 
ure from the more straightforwardly sociology of 
knowledge line followed before, but we can 
, 
advance 
reasons for this. Thus, in addition to invoking the 
dictates of the logic of the structure of the study as 
a whole we can offer two points. Firstly , if we recall 
that a sociology of knowledge treatment would require 
us to relate the dynamics of the exchange between 
historically conditioned political demand and relevant 
theoretical traditions, then it is clear that the results 
if such an analysis have been most competently anticipated 
by more than one writer, (qg. O'Brien 1975, Booth 1975, 
Girvan 1973). This being the case there is little 
point in our presenting yet another variation on this 
relatively-well worn theme. Secondly., we can note that 
our study is of "western"theories. This raises the 
issue of the manner in which clearly Latin American 
inspired theoretical departures are to be incorporated 
in our text. In the absence of a fully prepared sociology 
knowledge treatment, it seems appropriate to observe that 
within the general ambit of an interest in "development" 
there seem to be some important shared concepts. Thus 
Girvan, treating the Caribbean school of "dependency 
theorists'. 1., refers to the "historical/structural/instituti- 
onal m ethod"(1). Our interest then, gi-anting this note and in 
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the light of the interest accorded these Latin American 
efforts by., "westerd' theorists , may therefore, be 
pitched quite reasonably at an abstract level. 
In-'sum: we invoke the fact of the established exchange 
and (more particularly) the conceptual similarities 
of Latin American and "western"work on the one hand, 
and on the other the fact that sociology of knowledge 
treatments have been executed in major respects already, 
as the basis of a decision to pitch this chapter at 
an abstract level and organise it around the related 
issues of disciplinary independence and theoretical 
status, as demanded by the logic of the study ao a whole. 
Having thus declared an intention to simplify the , 
tasks of this chapter we will add one further simplif- 
ication., and this refers to the substantive attach- 
ments of the chapter. We noted in the Introduction - 
to Section Three that our thematic treatment of these 
complex issues of the nature of the exchanges between 
theorist and world required that theorists change their 
roles as we changed our questions. That remark is nowhere 
more apposite than in the present context. The debate 
we endeavour to capture for pur: study ranges over a 
wide arealfrom the structuralist reformism of ECLA to 
the marxian-style polemics of AG Frank. The simplification 
we adopt here is the association of 'dependency' with 
Furtado and-*Iunderdevelopment.. theory, with Frank. This 
lets us organise our questions /material thus: when 
we treat 'disciplinary independence1we will focus upon 
Idependency'and Furtado; and when we treat the matter 
of 'progressivity in conceptualization! we will focus 
upon "underdevelopment theory' and AG Frank. 
A distinction between these two lines is fairly often 
drawn , though the status of the distinction remains 
problematic. In particular the issue of whether or 
not the IIUDT" line is properly to be taken as marxist 
has to beacknowledged. The manner in which we have 
-206- 
proposed to treat our material, that is by "focusing" 
first this-. way and then that, implies that we are iden- 
tifying two aspects of the same one thing; and that con- 
sequently 11UDT11 is not marxian , because the "dependency" 
of Furtado surely is not. However, implications asiae, 
we can reasonably ask whether this simplifying schematism 
actyally commits us to any view . one way or the other, 
on the status of AG Frank's work and 11UD'T11 . It seems 
not; we are simply associating one question with one 
distinguishable line of work and-the other qyestion 
with another line of work. That is, our engagement 
with this material is , at present, to be taken as 
fairly narrowly technical and investigatory; and not as 
flowing from, or subsumed underany general estimation 
that the two lines are (or are not ) sharply distinct. 
A final note may be appended to this preamble; which 
is to observe that, having involed the "logic of the 
study as a wholell. it might also be recalled that the 
study bas a dual nature. Thus we enquire into the nature 
of the post warcareerlof "development studies" with 
a view to elucidating the nature of social theory . 
Put simply, Chapter Six, after a series of substantive'- 
analyses of elements of thelcareerlof "development 
studies", recalls our attention to our overarching 
interests in social theorizing. Thus if the Prologue 
to the study-established theoretically the poscibility 
of regarding efforts in 'development studies' as exercises 
in social theorizing (ie ideology makingý then the 
substantive sociology of knowledge analyses may be 
taken both as illustrative confirmations of that view Is 
plausibility and as further investigations of its in- 
herent explanatory richness. Chapter Six , treating 
"disciplinary independence" and "theoretical progress- 
ivityll, is thus intermediate between our preliminary 
theoretical arguments for taking "social science" to 
be, properly speakinga matter of social theorizing 
(ie ideology making)and the eventual fuller presentation 
of the case promised for Section Five. 
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2.0 Disciplinary Independence. 
Wlý can recall that Chapter Flueltreated , ampngst others 
the questio n- does NIST(2)establish an independent and 
adequate development studies ? After noting and setting 
aside the practitioners'self imagesgand considering 
the intent and form of thier efforts, we answered that 
the question made little senseland that rather we would 
wish to say that INISTIestablished the most sophisticated 
scheme of "authoritative interventionismllto. date. A 
similar issue may be phrased as follows: does "dependency" 
establish an independent and adequate development studies? 
Anticipating a similar pattern of reply (3) to that just 
noted, we can break down this question into two parts: 
2.1 what is the form and intent of "dependency"?; and 
2.2 does "dependency" supersede 'MVeconomics ? 
2.1 Form and intent. 
If we argue that NIST11 aimed at establishing a subtle 
and cooperative "authoritative interventionism" whose 
function was to legitimate and order a withdrawal from 
formal empire, and which subse. quently became the model 
of the exchange of rich and poor nationsq then precisely 
what does "dependency" function to legitimate and order? 
At first glancegand adopting the manner of "ideology 
labelling" we have used above, the answer would seem 
to be "reactive(populist)interventionism". This line of 
argument we now consider (4). 
2.11 Sociology of knowledge sketch of Idependencyl 
,, 
-Resting on already existing work (Brookfield, Ehrensaft 
Girvan, Oxaal(ed), Furtado, DiMarco and others ) we 
may present the circumstances of the emergence of 
"dependency 11 in terms of the invocation of available 
resources within a general milieu in response to particular 
political demands. Now if we are taking Furtadp to 
exemplify the "dependency" line, then 'our presentation 
of the position needs must be sequential in form. 
Furtadds work encompasses (i) the critical revisions 
to the orthodox views, initiated by Prebisch and 
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developed by ECLA, (ii)the concern to rebut monetar- 
ist vievis with structuralist analyses of inflation, 
and(iii) the lodging of claims on behalf of ldeýendencyl 
to have replaced'the orthodox insofar as that school 
represented a truly adequate economics. 
, 
(i) Prebisch's early work grows out of the experience 
of the Latin American economies after the crisis of 
1929 when their traditional economic mode, that of 
exporting primary products, was severely curtailed 
by the-contraction in world trade. The measures 
initiated by governments to mitigate the impact of 
this loss of export markets had the inc-. ýdental effect 
of initiating a process of import substituting 
industrialization. After the end of the war, with a 
revival of credit lines to Latin America and of world 
trade, the now established process of industrialization 
was in need of a legitimating and ordering explanation; 
and Prebisch and ECLA provided it. The principal 
theoretical object over against v1hich Prebisch 
developed his views was the claim of traditional 
theories to the effect that international specializ- 
ation conferred benefits upon all those involved . 
Clairmonte locates the establishment of this doctrine 
in the heyday of what he calls British Integral Liberal 
ism - through the middle part of the 19th century. 
Against it Prebischutilizes a version of the centre/ 
periphery notion, v1hich was a long established motif 
not only 1, n liberalism and marxism but alsoln indigenous 
Latin American anti-imperialist and anti-marxian 
writtingS. H. e argues that within the ambit of the 
orthodox theory, and pre-1929 status quo, Latin American 
economies were condemned to a secondary and relatively 
declining position. The solution was to pursue 
industrialization behind protective barriers. In the 
first instance the advocated policy was via import 
substitution : precisely that pattern which had grown, ' 
up in the wake of the crisis. In addition to this 
, re-working of the conception of the position of Latin 
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American economies within the-world economy. there is a 
concurrent., re-working of explanations of the nature 
of these peripheral economies. Here the equilibrium 
model of neo-classical orthodoxy is rejected,, in favour 
of an empiricist-flavoured, pragmaticand problem- 
oriented approach, namely structuralism The structur- 
alist effort takes off from an attempt to model the 
local situation. -it thus present a scheme whereby the 
putative one national economy is seen as split into 
a very loosely integrated set of quasi-autonomous 
Isectors'S each of which represents either a residue 
of the historical process of the expansion of European 
capitalism, or a present requirement of the newly 
dominant capitalist centre (that isq the USA). The 
distinctively 'autonomous national economy' simply 
does not exist save as a concatenation of "residues', 
'enclaves', and various 'parasitic forms" . As OlBrien 
puts it, "An underdeveloped country is underdeveloped 
precisely because it consists of different structures 
each with a specific type of behaviour"(5). 
(ij)"The reformist structuralism propounded by ECLA 
belongs to the first of what Furtado calls "three easily 
identifiable periodsT6)in the economic history of post- 
war Latin America. The first is characterized as one 
of rapid growth based upon favourable terms of trade, 
accumulated reserves from the war years, and currencies 
strong enough to be able to withstand gradual 
devaluation in the face of already active inflationary 
pressures . By the end of the early 1960s the position 
is changed2and the policy of industrialization via 
protected import - substitution is apparently failing. 
Furt. ad6` (7) -not*es a sharp deterioration in the terms of 
trade'and a "marked slackening" in the rate of gro,, xth. 
On top of this, the experience of the Cuban revolution 
provokes widespread questioning pf the "real significance 
of the region's economic development 11(8) . The deteriorating 
situation presents itself to the RCLA school in the 
form of concern for market size and international 
exchange. As Girvan puts it: IIECLA thus puxsued a 
two pronged strategy of pressure and persuasion in the 19601s: 
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the first, on IjRtin American government. - in favour 
of regional integration, the' secondq Dn governments 
of the developed countries for more liberal trade and 
financial policies"(9). 
Setting aside matters of integration and trade we 
can focus on the topic of finance. Here the question 
of inflation provides an issue whereby we can sees 
-in the work of Furtado, a clear example of the 
. progressive re-working of the theoretical 
resource established in the ECLA line. This change 
is anticipated . as Brookfield points out, in the 1965 
work published by Furtado in the wake of the 1964 
coup in Brazil Here Furtado writes of the "dialectic 
of capitalist development", where in his 1950s essay 
collecti-an he presents a "theory of underdevelopment"; 
and the whole expresses a shift from a simple additive 
treatment of social aspects attendant on economic 
changes, towards a richer conception of structural 
-change 
in the process of industrialization (10). The 
debate around the matter of inflation enables Furtado 
to counterpose to the financial orthodoxy of 
monetarism (which regards inflation as a matter of 
the poor functioning of money flowsland which diagnoses 
either demand or cost inflation) a structuralist analysis. 
Thus Furtado insists that ý-ven if these familiar patterns 
of inflation did occurthen "they were nearly always 
responses to more deep seated pressures, or rather 
they reflected an adaptation effort within the 
framework of more complex processes , whose main 
ingredients were structural inflexibility and the 
determination to press ahead with a development 
policy"(11). This argument is unpacked in terms of the 
various responses contrived by the sectors of the 
economy in endeavouring to avoid the burden'. qf- 
financing the government's deficit. Thus Furtado deploys 
(not entirely consistently) notions such as 'basic 
inflationary pressures', 'propagation mechanisms'-,. 
and -'decision centers'-, where these latter are the 
financial authorities and the point at which the 
monetarist arguments get started. In this debate with 
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the orthodox, over a pressing practical problem, we 
see Purtado. developing that which was latent in the 
reformist ECLA line into what might be dubbed an 
"oppositional mean ing system". 
(iii) It is out of this debate around the issues of the 
exchange between the Latiff American countries and the metro- 
politan centres, within the context of continuing* 
failure to achieve the establishment of autonomous 
economies, that the notion of 'dependency' as that 
which characterizes most fruitfully the situation 
of the Latin American economies crystallizes. 
Brookfield notes thýit"Furtado Is disenchantment with 
the ECLA industrialization policies became in time 
complete"(12). His original approval wac replaced by 
a view which explained the failure of industrializatio. n 
policies in terms of the position of Latin American 
economies within a dual frame of external dependency 
and internal fixity of social and economic structures. 
In a 1976 work Furtado observes that "there can be 
no doubt that development based on exports of raw 
materials and import-substituting industrialization 
has reached the limits of its possibilities, at least 
in the case of the region's largest countries. 
Similarly the institutional framework inherited from 
the colonial period9or established shortly after sep- 
aration from the mother countriesiseems to have 
exhausted its possibilities of adaptation to 
development needs. It is understandable. then . that 
problems relating to structural reform should have 
become the regiods foremost concern" (13). Having said that, 
Furtado goes on to list matters of international 
relations first - with the USA . with NUTCs, and with the 
world economy generally - after which he turns to questions 
of the economy and society of the peripheral. 
economies and presents familiar structuralist and ECLA 
notions. 
This represents the point at which the 'dependency' 
line fully emerges. Familiar structuralist. themes 
are firmly lodged within an explanatory frame which a 
locates crucial elements of the local problems beyond 
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the underdeveloped state Is immediate control. 
2.12 Furt ado and theemergence of the "dependency' 
theorists conception of a proper and fruitful analysis. 
. Girvan has been quoted earlier a-- observing of-ýLatin 
American work that "the development in thought, 
generally, took the forms of (I)adding a historical 
perspective and analysis to the structural and 
institutibnal method, (II*)giving the historical/structural 
/institutional method the kind of theoretical and empiric- 
al content needed to construct a general theory of 
dependence and underdevelopment"(14). "Y7'e shall pursue the 
matter of the "dependency" theoristSOconception of 
useful and proper analysis with this passage in mind. 
We organise our questions thus: 
(i)VIhat is Furtado's epistemology? 
(iiýVlhat is the nature of Furtado Is early formulations? 
(iii)'Yhat are the post-1964 coup revisions? 
(iv)What is the nature of his late 160s work? 
(i)Furtado! s epistemology and methodology. 
Furtadds early study 9"Development and Underdevelopment" 
(1964), begins with a chapter on "The theory of development 
in economic science" which treats the issue methodo- 
logically and in terms of the history of ideas in economics. 
The chapter is revealing in several waysand in 
character most strongly recalls Myrdal 
Is style of 
enquiry. The handicap of using what Hindess dubs 'the 
epistemology of models' is again demonstrated. 
Furtado begins thus: "The theory of economic develop- 
ment endeavours-to explain, from a macroeconomic point 
of view9 the causes and mechanisms of the persistent 
growth in productivity of the labour factor and the 
repercussions of this growth on the organisation of 
production and on the distribution and utilization of 
the social product"(15), This isTurtado's reading of the 
work of the Classical School, and the presentation of 
his own area of enquiry. He continuest. "That explanat- 
ory task is projected here on two planes. The first, 
-213- 
in which abstract formulations prevail, COMDrises 
analysis of, the actual mechanisms of the procesz of 
growth ... 'building models or simplified schemes of 
existing. economic systems ... models based on stable 
relationships between calculable variables deemed to 
be relevant and important"(16). Thus the Clasevical line of 
treating the realm of the economic as 'determinate in 
the endlis here ac. knowledged, and simultaneously tran- 
sposed into the post-war, neo-classical informedg 
language of the precise elucidation of mechanisms. 
Additionallyothese elucidations are taken as exercises 
in modelling reality; though it is at this point that 
we encounter the first of those disconcerting lurches 
that seem to characterize this style of analysis. 
The phrase 'deemed to be' is unexpected and intriguing. 
It would seem either to introduce the space for Furtado 
to distance himself from those technical efforts that 
he might want to disagree with, or to permit the poss- 
ibility of referring intellectual schemes to the pos- 
ition of their producer-whether in the style of Seers, 
or after the style of those who invoke the notion of 
ideology. 17hatever the reason for Furtado Is remark, the 
'deemed to be' phrase sounds voluntaristic and is not 
the phrase to be expected from a writer who took econ- 
omics to be 'about the facts. '. 
. Furtado continues. - 
"The second, the historical plane, 
comprises critical study in the light of a given real- 
ity and on the basis of the categories defined by the 
abstract analysis"(16a). Three points arise here. Firstly, 
we have Furtado saying that historical analysis is in- 
formed by categories 'defined by the abstract analysis', 
But if we recall that these analyses are exercises in 
modelling 'existing economic systems', then it seems as 
if Furtado is about to present a singularly un-historical 
analysis. Unless, that is, he lodges some claims to un- 
iversality on behalf of the abstract categories. This 
1- 
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he does: there is, he says, "some degree of universality 
pertaining to the definitions of broad basic concepts 
whose explanatory v, -nliditythough limited, has undeniable 
practical bearing"(17). Abstractions from the present are 
taken to have universal relevance. This would seem to 
recall the a prioristic line of Robbins, the formal 
Ispokesmanlof the neo-classical school. Thus from basic, 
'obviously true' generalizations, models can be built 
from which, via deductive argument, other 'facts' are 
generated. This formalism sits uneasily with Furtadds 
disposition to affirm the Droblem-centredness of econ- 
omics . 
The second point is similari Furtado argues that 
'history' is to be used to test the model. It is not 
enough, Furtado argues, to build an abstract modelt" it 
is just as important to demonstrate the explanatory 
effectiveness of such a model as applied to histo--, ic 
realities"(18). This lets the model be'tested and reworked 
as necessary, a routine part of this epistemology of 
models scheme; but to what end? Purtado rejects the 
habit of resting content with generality of the abstract- 
only to pursue, it seems, a generality of the concrete. 
In contrast to the problem-centredness of Myrdal, Furtado 
seems forever tugged at by the neo-classical 
pretensions to scientific status; that is , generality 
in formulations is taken as the essence of the truly 
,,, 
and consequently the adopting of this style scientific CD 
of argument . is taken to secure claims to scientific 
status. It is a spurious argument; but in this early 
work it is one that Furtado has not yet purged himself 
of. 
Our third point again indicates Purtados npparent 
confusion as to the nature of the exchange between 
theorist and world. We are told that all this model 
testing is neccessary 11 in order to make it valid from 
the point of view of a given reality"(19). It is the phrase 
f point of view of a given reality 'that is odd. Is this 
use'of lpoint of view of a given realitylthe same as the 
earlier 'critical etudy in the light of a given reality19 
(my emphaebs). Are we. to take 'reality to be a simple 
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given for the theorif7t, or something that in shaped 
by ideological orientation? Does Purtado vacillate C) 
between the two stances? 
Prom this plane of epistemological reflections 
Purtado descends to the level of methodolot-gy. Here 
amongst a series of pertinent and acute points, the 
image of the natural sciences continues to sow confusion. 
This confusion revolves around the dilemma of the 
effort to integrate the pursuit of generality in 
statements(which Purtado evidently takes to be 
properly 'scientific') with the implications of the 
conflicting tendency of regarding economics as 
problem-relevant, and thereby specific - in terms of 
its explanatory mechanisms and content - to 
parti-cular historical and socio-economic circumstances. 
We can follow Purtado through one effort to resolve 
his dilemma . Thus after making reference to Ricardo 
10 
viork, with its late concern for the matter of production 
in the light of the growing system of factory based 
mannfacture, Furtado presents the following observation*. 
"The question of the abstract or historical nature of 
the method used by the economist is not then independ- 
ent of the problems concerning him"(20). 'This, claims Purtado, 
permits the following split: a concern with production 
neccessitates an historical approach$whereas concern with 
distribution permits the formal elaboration of general 
statements. This simple division of economics into two 
halves, each with its appropriate method, evidently 
makes Furtado uneasy for he promptly retreats. Thus: 
? 'economic development is a phenomenon with clear cut hist- 
orical aspects"(20a). Or againg whilst Furtado will grant 
that there is no complete and 'problem neutral' economics, he 
asserts (as we have seen) that there is. an established body 
of basic truths; there is "some degree of universality 
pertaining to the definitions of broad basic concepts 
whose explanatory validity, though limited, has 
undeniable practical bearin8l'(21). 'Having thus secured econ- 
omics as unitary and fundamentally scientific by virtue 
of a core of generally true propositions, he proceeds 
to make these claims otiose by rehearsing a point usually 
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associated with Seers: "It is because we are often for- 
getful. of the limitations of that validity when approa- 
chino, problems in concrete historic situations that vie 
pass'surreptitiously from the field of scientific spec- 
ulation into that of dogma"(22). It seems that economics 
is either scientific, general, and of no practical, use; 
or it is useful, historically specificand not 'general' 
in-the way science ought to be. Clearly the effort to 
encompass the scheme treated with Dobb's double dyna- 
mic of society and discipline of learning within the 
framework of an empiricist episte mology of models is, 
in the end, only productive of confusion. 
(ii)Early formulations in Furtado's work. 
First vie consider problems of the pursuit of pro-priety. 
The tension between the goal of ge*nerality and the 
fact of problem-centredness is evident in the programmatic 
statement made in the Preface to Furtado's earliest 
collection of essays. These are from the period of the 
1950's when he was on the staff of ECLA Furtado observes 
that 11 ... the most necessary effort to be made on the 
theoretical plane at the present stage consists of the 
progressive identification of factors that are specific, 
for each structure. That effort will subsequently serve 
as a basis for establishing a typology of structures"(&- 23). 
It is the notion of the specificity of structures that 
seems to be the key to his efforts. Thus he notes in the 
Preface:. "The need for diagnosing the the problems of 
national economic systems in various stages of under- 
development led him [nb. Furtad 01 to bring economic anal- 
ysis closer to the historical method. Comparative study 
of similar problems on an abstract plane, within , 
variants conditioned by different historical situations 
and dissimilar national contexts, progressively induced 
him to adopt a structural view of economic problenc"(24). 
Now-, Irel. evance of context 'in economic formulations 
is an idea we have met beforetand in matters of treating 
the Third World it is probably most readily associatea 
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with Seers'1963 article. Others use the ideatwe have looked 
at Streeten Myrdal and Ehrensaft. It is within this 
tradition of a Isociologised economics' that Pu'rtado 
is working . It is a tradition that breeds confusion: 
while the sociology of knowledge line let. - us discuss 
the exchange between society'a demands and disciplinary 
resources in the process of the production of 'a theory', 
the present sub-tradition casts the effort within the 
shadow of-a routine conception of 'natural science'. 
Hence Furtadds dilemma between 'problem relevanceland 
'scientifically proper generality!., which he attempts 
to resolve by on the one hand invoking some (unspecified) 
set of fundamental concepts, and then, on the otherv 
arguing that these must not be taken as a basis for a 
supposedly general economics (in the way-the neo-classical 
writers did with the concepts pertinent to the 
marginalist analysis of an unregulated market). The 
affirmation of the idea of 'relevance of context'. 
subsumed under the style of the natural sciences, results 
in the pursuit of relevance being undertaken in the 
nanner of disaggregation of models. The economic model, 
informed by these general concepte, is tailored to fit 
both local circumst ances and local problems. These early 
efforts of Furtado remain within that empiricist and 
interventionist schema of the relationship of 
knowledge and politics that we have already met. 
Furtado, at this, stage, is pursuing technical rational 
recipes for development. 
. 
We can further elucidate the character of Furtado Is 
work by introducing the idea, invoked and referred to in 
previous chapters, that a given form of argument makes 
its own demands. That is, that a particular conception 
of logic of explanation will help fashion the substan- 
tive explanations given. In respect of Furtado we would 
want to claim that, once the idea of 'models of reality' 
is affirmed, then a particular sequence of theory 
elaboration follows. As an introductory comparison, let 
us recall the subject of Chapter Two and the orthodox 
arguments of the economists. Here we saw that their 
4r 
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form of arryument -that ic, quasi-formal, combining 
technical notions and the use of mathematical notations- 
lets them ýroduce vast quantities of elaborate and 
arcane material almost mechanically. So if the raw 
material of their efforts is given by ideological C" 
notions and common sense 'facts'Ithen the general formal 
characteristics of the elaborated theory are a conse- 
quence of their conception of the proper manner of 
explanation. Similarly, if 'we recall the efforts of Myrdal and 
Streeten then vie can see that their notion of adequacy 
of explanation -realism in models - involved a 
characteristic use of the resources of the, social scienceEý 
both in the construction of concepts and in the ordering 
of those concepts. The upshot was a problem-centred 
empiricism compatible with their-ideological pre- 
dispositions and work interestse 
. 
In an analogous fashion, we can indicate how the 
construction of the structuralist scheme is conditioned 
by the epistemology of models approach and the ideas 
of specificity of structures and tyPolocy of structures. 
Here the conatruction of a model involves generalizing 
about, or simplifying from, some given situation: thus 
the idea that a model is inevitably specific to that which 
it is a model of is a ready deduction. Equally ready 
is the response to this limited applicability: a set of 
models may be prepared, both of differing present econ- 
omies and of these same economies thýrough time. This 
historical set aspect requires a general meta-theory 
in order to provide the means of constructing these 
models of the past, and so as to provVe an integrating 
frame for all these models. Thus we see , for example, 
this sort of manoeuvre: "The foregoing discussion reve, 91s 
the close interdependence between the evolution of tech- 
nology in industrialized countries and the historic 
conditions of their economic development", (25). The simple 
logic of the notion of model gets Furtado this far, 
and routine historical ideas provide the substantive 
resource. Thus a series of models can be built; but 
what of present comparisons? The two dimensions 
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are needed in order to be able to generate any appropriate 
model. A full set of models must be possible, as we operate 
under the dictates of the image of natural sciehces and 
the shibboleth - of generality in formulation. Purtado 
builds in this aspect by generalizing from the observation 
of the dis-integrated nature of UDC economies in contrast 
to the. integrated nature of the DC economies. (Brookfield, 
let us noteihas remarked that even if 'dualism I is 
difficult to grasp in theory, the fact of it is most 
obvious). This observation of the UDC economies as 
comprising disparate and quasi- autonomous elements 
is presented using the notion of Istructuret. Economies 
have structuressand these are epecific to time and place; 
the Dr. s have such and such a structure and the UDCs 
have another. Here is the vehicle for comparing prese. nt 
economies. 
Thus we have a way of making models of circumstances 
through history(a sequence) and of models of circumstances 
existing now (a collection). These two aspects are then 
integrated to generate the full set of models , by 
invoking the available resource of the notion. of 'Centre 
Periphery'- giving the one total system. 
If we now ask just what does all. this produce by 
way of a Itheoryl, we get with Furtado the following 
scheme. "The advent of an industrial nucleus in 18th 
century Europe disrupted the world economy of the time 
and eventually conditioned later economic development 
in almost every region of the world. The action of that 
powerful dynamic niicleus proceeded to operate in three 
directions"(26). First in Europe, second in the 'empty 
lands' of the USA and Australia, dnd third"towards the 
already inhabited regions, some of which were densely 
populated, whose old economic systems were of various 
but invariably pre-capitalist types 11(27). Furtado con- 
tinues: "The effect of the impact of capitalist expansion 
on the archaic structures varied from region to, region, 
being conditioned by local circumstances" (28). Furthermore 
"the result was almost always to create 'hybrid structures" 
(29). This notion is finally unpacked in an exercise 
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of historico-formal exegesis which details the nature 
of, the presently underdeveloped areas (in Latin America). 
"Thus, thr6e sectors. came to coexist within the 
economy: one was the 'remnant' economy .... the second 
comprised activities directly connected with foreign 
trade ; the third consisted of activities directly 
connected with the domestic market"(30). Thus the 'theory' 
presented by Furtado is elaborated as a series of inter- 
related models. 
So far we have noted the way in which Furtado has 
pursued his objective of working towards a 'typology 
of structures',. and we have seen how this flows out of 
the 'pursuit of relevance' within the frame of the model 
of the natural sciences. This is clear insofar as the 
'typology' is concerned. But what of IstructureI9.2he 
notion would seem to be for Purtado expressive of the 
level of analysis achieved when the general economic 
model is tailored to fit specific circumstances. That 
records the matter epistemologically/methodologically; 
however, we can further elucidate the nature of Furtado 0s 
effort by considering the origins of the term. 
In this case, it would seem that the term 'economic 
structure' is designed as a revision of the orthodox 
style of analysis so as to fit the situation of a UDC 
economy. Thus an 'economic structure' is taken as a 
set of sectors in just such and such a relationship; 
so Furtado can speak of "simple underdeveloped structures" 
having one or few dynamic sectors, and 11mo. -e complex 
underdeveloped structures" 'having multiple dynamic 
sectors (31). Yet the use of the terms 'sector' and 
'structure' are at this juncture fluid. Speaking of 
UDCs, Furtado notes that their situation is not 'basic 
or 'original' but is created by the "penetration of 
nodern capitalistic structures into archaic structures"(32), 
This penetration may be simple, as with enclave devel- 
opment, Or it may be more complex, thus: "The most complex 
situation as in the Brazilian economy at the present 
time, is that in which there are three sectors in the 
economy :a subsistence structure, a structure oriented 
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mainly towards export and an industrial nucleus 
connected with the domestic market.. "(33). Here it seems 
as if we have a different notion of what 'economic 
structure' involves; it is not now a set of sectors 
in relationship but is rather something each sector 
has . If we were to be pernickety at this point we would 
have to write off these passages as hopelessly confused; 
yet mor6 charitably (and interestingly) we can read them 
.. -, s marking the process of 
the transformation of an orth- 
odox notion of sector into a form useable in analysing 
a UDC economy( which is seen as dis-integrated), and 
presenting thereby the issue of the manner in which 
quasi-autonomous sectors interact; hence structural' 
analysis. (34). 
(iii)Revision in the middle period. 
Thus far we have considered the notion of a structure 
having a specific character given by its location ing 
and career withing the world Centre-Periphery system. 
In addition we have seen that Purtadds acknowledgement 
of the familiar image of the natural sciences leads 
him to couch his enquiries in the style of a puýsuit 
of a typology of structures. Thus comparative and his- 
orical enquries enter Purtadds work at an early stage. 
We have seen also that they , enter 
Purtadds work in 
the course of his effort to model realistically -the 
economies of the UDO's The term 'institutional' now 
enters this exegesis. In Purtados early version (1964) 
the term was not in evidence, though a turn in this 
direction entails no sharp change in the analytical 
machineries thus far constructed. As wesaw in chapter5,,, 
the neo-institutionalist line was concerned, in certain 
aspects, with the pursuit of realism in modelling. 
with Purtado working in this same general area of 
tsociologised economics', it is not very surprising. that 
he should come'to consider the institutional natures 
of given economic structures. That Purtado should move 
in this direction is also unsurprising if we recall 
the above sociology of knowledge presentation; which 
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recorded that the early 1960s threw doubt upon the 
then ECLA line, both in regard to its technical points 
and in regard to its assumptions about Ideveloiment'. 
In addition it was in this period that the neo- 
institutionalists began to establish their stance. 
. 
The introduction of the term 'institutional' occurs 
within the post-1964 coup context of a revision, by 
Furtado, of his position vis a vis the assumptions of 
the orthodox line in economics . Thus he is able to 
commend a marxian notion of dialectic, and see in it a 
notion of 'development' which can order efforts to 
grasp the movement of social change Quite what sort 
of method Furtado ends up with is debatable: hie own 
developing version of what Girvan will call the 
Istructural/historical/institutional method' seems to 
be equated with the core of a rehabilitated IMarx. This 
in itself seemss implausible; yet ve may recall a 
similar discovery of I. Sarx's notion of 'development' 
by Kregel, who observed that the work of Marx constituted 
the only genuinely dynamic treatment of economic growth 
and change. 
This broadening in Furtado Is conception of the process 
of developmentg and consequent adjustment in his notion 
of the model required, is evident in the passage that 
Brookfield finds so significant: "Economic development, 
being fundamentally a process of incorporating and 
diffusing new techniques, implies changes of a structural 
nature in both the systems of production and distribution 
of income The way in which these changes take place 
depends9 to a large extent, on the degree of flexibility 
of the institutional framework within which the economy 
operates. And this flexibility is dependent on the 
greater or lesser capacity of the ruling classes to go* 
beyond the natural limitations of their ideological 
horizons"(35,36). Purtado goes on to sketch the history 
of the development of the IlVest', and rehearses the 
view that the presently underdeveloped were created by 
the irruption of capitalistic enterprise into their 
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archaic social forns. (This chapter, we may note, is 
entitled "The Dialectic of Capitalist Development"). 
In this chapter we see how Purtado has 'broadened' 
his conception of what counts as a plausible explan- 
ation of development; and how he has plundered 
classical political economy and marxian lines(37) in 
order to produce a distinctive scheme which presents, 
in outline, the now familiar 'dependency' argument. Thus in 
respect of the UDCs he notes the historical manner of 
their incorporation into the world capitalist economy 
(whose nature he characterizes), and concludes that 
"since the grovith of these economies is basically dep- 
endent on the activities of the groups responsible 
for the accumulative process, the historical conditions, 
under which these groups emerged, and those under which 
they operate, must be considered in each specific case 
if we are to distinguish the possibilities for growth 
in a particular society with an underdeveloped 
structure within the capitalist dynamic". (38) 
(iv) The later work. 
The 'dependency' theme is fully present in a 1975 work, 
"Economic Development of Latin Americallwherein we find 
a more precise and formal statement of the thesis that 
the economic structure of Latin America is a result 
of the manner of that continent's incorporation into 
and present role within the world capitalist economy. 
The nature of Girvýý, ns 'historical/structural/institutionalI 
method is exemplified in the thesis presented. 
Thus that which admits of a description (or disaggregated 
modelling informed by generally true economic propositions) 
in terms of economic structure also admits of a compl- 
ementary description in terms of a functionally 
necessary institutional framework . Historical analysis 
provides dnta for examples and the construction of a 
seqpence of models ; and furtherg borrowing from classical 
economics and marxian traditionsg an over-arching frame 
which firmly locates the Latin American economies in the 
dependent- peripheral area of the world capitalist 
-eeq- 
economy. Problems of 'development' are then treated 
in terms of the lack of fit between, on the one hand, 
the possil5ilities for development proVided by technolog- 
ical levels, -and,. on the other, the restrictions and 
possibilities attendant upon a given structural arrange- 
ment and institutional circumstance. 
Furtadds 1975 work ends with a chapter summarizing 
his argument and identifying the necessary conditions 
of any future advance. Here.. he observes: 11 here can be 
no doubt that development based on exports of raw materials 
and import substituting industrialization has reached 
the limits of its possibilities.... Similarly the 
institutional framework inherited from the colonial 
period ... -seems to have exhausted its possibilities of 
adaptation to development needs". 09). Volith that analysis 
he notes it is not surprising that "discussion has focused 
increasingly on the means to be used for a structural 
reconstruction" (40). 
These matters are listed in two sets. Firstly, 
reference is made to matters of external dependency. 
Thus we have: 'Ire-entry of the regional economies into 
the expanding lines of the international economylt(4i), 
"reshaping of economic relations with the US "(42), and 
'Ire-shaping of relations with the big international 
consortia"(43). The second set of matters treats the 
internal characteristics of the Latin American 
economies, and here Furtado presents a list of tasks 
appropriate to the state's oxdering of the necessary 
transformation of out-moded institutional forms and 
economic structures. At this point Purtado has emerged 
to present the familiar outline of tdependencyl theory. 
2.13 Comparative ideological character 
The foregoing discussion was designed to 61u. cidate, 
through looking at Furtados work, the 'dependency' 
theorists'conception of what counted as a proper and 
fruitful analysis; that is, we were concerned with 
the form of their arguments. Now we must turn briefly 
-225- 
to the substance of these efforts in the sense of asking 
after thei, r intentions. Just why did they prepare these 
distinctive views? Iviuch of the answer to this question 
has been given durring the course of parts 2.11 and 
2.12- so here we will add a'simple comparative summary 
of the ideological character of 'dependency' vis a vis 
those efforts that vie have thus far treated. 
In chapter 3 we treated the conception of development 
theory which was instantiated in the early Keynesian- 
derived 'growth theoriet'. We stressed the priority 
of Keynesian ideas, looking at them set against the 
historical period of the Idepres--ion' and their 
theoretical sources in neo-classicism. We noted their 
implications for the role of government and then went 
on to consider their extension, via the work of Harrod, 
to the circumstances of the Third 37orld. The notion of 
the development of the Third Vi'orld was, in its turn, 
seen as a particular and secondary version of the general 
doctrine of growth; which notion saw its gen&sis in the 
needs of the 7ests elite to combat 'the left' in general 
and the USSR in particular. Formally. we argued that the 
1growth models1were conceived within an enpiricist 
epistemology and that their function was to legitimate 
and organise an 'authoritative interventionismI(viewed as 
knowledgeable manipulation of a subject economy in the 
light of the science of economics, essentially a technical 
matter). This is the effort's self-image. We can label 
it: Basic Authoritative Interventionism. 
Following this, in chapter 4, we treated the con- 
ception of development theory produced by the circum- 
stances and perceived interests of Cold War America: 
that is, 
-'modernization 
theory'. The political demand 
at back of the production of 'modernization theory' was 
two-fold: the doctrine of containment provided the 
moral core, b, ut aid-competition. with the USSR 
necessitated a disguised presentation of this pursuit 
of self-interest. Thus we get the notion of the 'free 
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worldI. Given thece demands, theorists had recourse to 
two areas of work: firstly an emasculated Keynesianism, 
and secondly structural-functionali. -, m. There is a clear 
move from treating economic growth and its social aspects 
(as in chapter3 ), to treating the matter of the growth 
of industrial society (as in chapter4 -ý- 11-11-odernization 
theory' provides a revised and elaborated legitimating 
theory of authoritative intervention. Knowledgesble 
manipulation of a subject cociety in the light of the 
social sciences, this is its self-image. 71e label it 
Elaborated Authoritative Interventionism. 
In chapter 5 we looked at the efforts that the 
Ineo-ipstitutionalists, made in attempting to 
comprehend Idevelopment'. In the case of the Ineo- 
institutionalists', the political context of calls for 
'intervention' has shifted from confronting a supposedly 
expansionist communism- as was the case with 'moder- 
nization theory' and, to a lesser extent, with 'growth 
theory17 toward the project pf re-working long 
established colonial relationships. The resources 
invoked by thelneo-institutionalistslinclude: 
the actual experience of the colonial episode, a 
distinct European tradition of social thought, and a 
relationship with government that disposes them to 
practical policy-making rather than the elaboration 
n of formal schernes of great generality The product, 
Ineo-ins-titutional social theory', is characteristically 
problem-centeredo piecemeal and sceptical. It constitutes 
the effort to theorize the withdrawal from Black Africa 
which subsequently becomes the model of the exchange 
of rich and poor. Its self-inage is of the pursuit 
of realistic models of a development process to be 
ordered and implemlented by government direction6 Ve 
label it: 
, 
Cooperative Revised (Authoritative) 
Interventionism. 
, 
So what of the school represented here by Furtado; 
that is, 'dependency'? We may begin by noting that the 
'dependency' effort is to be located in the context 
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of Latin American efforts at industrinlization and 
problems qttendant thereon. Furtado's effort resembles 
that of Myrdal ; there is (i) a pursuit of realistic 
models, though Yurtado in his earlier work lays very 
much stress on the goal of a general set of models 
where Myrdal focuses simply on problem relevance; (ii) 
a similarity in methods of analysis; and (iii)agreement 
in granting the centrality of the role of the state 
in any UDCS search for development. Yet, where MyrdaTs 
'reasonable men' are in nominal control of the state, 
those to whom Furtado would 'naturally' turn are either 
not in control of the state or, if they are, their grasp 
on the levers of power is apparently tenuous. Thus 
rather than there being 'liberal democratic I states 
there are typically right wing, probably military, 
regimes. 
. 
'We can pursue this aspect of the agent of execution 
of Purtado Is work as the key to uncovering its 
differences in character from previously treated lines. 
This apparently politically unfavourable situation 
results. in Purtado detaching himself from any direct 
identification with the 'reasonable men I in the way 
that Myrdal does. Recognising the precarious position 
of the reasonable men%, he couches his analyses in 
more neutral terms; he affects to illuminate the nature 
of Latin American economies generally. 
The natural agent of execution of a stance like 
Purtadds is*the body of reasonable men in control of 
the state; and in the absence of any plausibility in 
this claim Purtado retreats into a more non-committal 
posture. Myrdal confronts the matter of the implausibility 
of his work by invoking the notion of the 'soft-state 
his agent is required to 'pull itself together' . 
- Even if there is no agent of execution identified 
by Purtado, nonetheless' the outline of the Idepen(lencyt 
stance may beý.. noted. Thus as the national economy ic 
in-tegrated'. into the world economy , tand moreover 
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operates at less than its potential capacitythe 
solution is the pursuit of autonomous and efficient 
economic aevelopmeni. This position is unpackeZI into 
a series of reform proposals. Furtado Is work*ic, then, 
certainly in its early form, another variety of 
, 
authoritative interventioniom; and whilst the political 
aspects of the situation do come to the fore in later 
workthis frame is not changed, though it is subtly 
re-emphasiW-ed. Thus whilet the early work affirms a 
rather routine empiricism, there nonetheless remains 
a considerable tension between this adopted frame and 
the demands of specific, practical analysis. 'Uhen this 
is coupled with his awareness of being, so to say, 
politically blocked, then the whole effort changes 
character and takes on an interpretive aspect. Tle can 
catch this in the Preface to the post-, 1964 coup 
"Diagnosis of the Brazilian Crisis".. Here Furtado 
propounds the thesis of the supra-rationality of the 
of the intellectualwho is thereby morally obliged 
to present analyses which are free of group or class 
loyalty. This looks at first glance likean extension 
of the Myrdalian position, or Fabianism gone mad; 
but it might be more fruitfully regarded as flowing 
from the particular circumstances of Brazil, and Latin 
America generally. This non-class-specific theorizing 
we can take as nationalist, insofar as the entire effort 
is a reaction to the theoretical and practical 
dominance of the"West'; and latently populist in that 
in its developed form it both presents a general non- 
class-specific recipe for national progress and calls 
for the removal of present elite groups. We label it 
Reactive (Nationalist) Interpretive Interventionism. 
2.14 Is 'dependency' independent?. Is it adequate (44) 
In the literature which tr 
, 
eats Idependencyl there 
are two areas of debate which bear upon these issues, 
(that is. if we exclude all the multiplicity of technical 
points)*Between 'dependency' theorists and putative 
marxists there is a confused debate around the matters of 
the proper nature of a marxian analysis of the Third 
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World;, and the concomitant matter of the development 
of a marxian line in a novel (45) situation, which pre- 
sents itself as a problem of-lup-dating' Marx., This 
area of debate we shall for the moment set aside, 
and instead look at the argument between proponents 
of 'dependency' and those workers who are content to 
remain within the ambit of the orthodox. 
In the case of this second debate there are two 
related questions. On the one hand there is the 
manner of''dependency I sl construction: that is, do we 
take Ide-pendencyl as growing out of the structuralist 
scheme. or as established over and against structur- 
alist positions ? The other concerýs the issue of the 
extent to which 'dependency' can claim to be novel 
vis a vis the orthodox economics. 
The first point revolves around the following claims. 
(i) 'Dependency, is a reformulation of that which was 
inherent in the first structuralist effort . Here, as 
we see in the particular case of Furtadds intellectual 
evolution and as Pinto and Knakal argue (cited in Girvan 
(45a) ),, "recent 'dependency' formulations can be accom 
odated within the terms of Prebischs Centre-Periphery 
modell's (ii)'Dependencyl is a new departure. Here the 
structuralism of the ECLA position is taken ýts. a theo- 
retical object over, agdinst which-the new position-is 
developed in response to changing circumstance. In this 
instance O'Brien provides our example. "The theory of 
dependency is the response to the perc6ived failure 
of national development through import substitution 
industrialization and to a* growing disillusionment 
with existing development theory"(46). Related to this is 
O'Briens view of the debate about Idependencyland the 
orthodox economics; he observes, "In brief it is an 
attempt to establish a new paradigm" (47). - 
The second question is exemplified in the 
exchan, ae between Girvan and Cumper. Girvan highlights C. 2 
the novelty of 'dependency' (somewhat inconsistently, 
6 
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perhaps, given h'is approval Pf Pinto and Kn, -ikal! s paper 
and his observing of Prebisch Is Centre-Periphery model 
that "the- 
, 
idea of the economic dependence of the Periphery 
is evidently implicit in the conceptualization'l)(47a). But 
Cumper is at some pains both to deny that 'dependency' 
supersedes orthodox economics, and to establish that 
it is properly to be taken as the self-serving ideology 
of a post-independence intelligentsia. 
To our mind, both these debates - the manner of the 
es tablishment of Idependencyl, and its nature once estab- 
lished-can be taken as occasioned by the practical 
effort to establish an 'oppositional meaning system'; 
that is, to theorize the situation of Latin American 
economies and societies in a theoretically autonomous 
and progressive form. Flowever, this effort is presented 
at the meta-theoretical level as a debate about discip- 
linary independence and adequacy, The proponents of 
'dependency' lodge their claims in conventional (that 
is . disciplinary)terms. This opens them up to the, 
range of criticisms of their stance and objections from 
the orthodox lodged by Cumper. ITeither party to these 
related debates is right. 'Dependency' is neither 
(treating the practitioners' claims). on the one hand the 
baý, is for an 'adequate general economicsl; and nor is it, 
on the other hand, distinct from structuralism. Yet as 
against its critics, it is not a worthless by-product merely 
of self-aggrandisement. 
So what is it ? Let us re-work the discussion and 
return to our point of departure at the beginning of 
part 2-0. Given our resume of the establishment of 
'dependency', our explication of its argument form, and 
the comparative exercise in labeling; does all this 
tend to establish 'dependency' as a candidate for the 
descriptions of 'independent discipline' or 'adequate 
development studies' 9 The second term of description, 
which on the face of it would seem to entail the former, 
is often applied by commentators who simultaneously 
invoke a notion of theoretical progressivity in 
setting UD dependency, over an orthodoxy which encom- 
il- 
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-passes terowthl and 'modernization' theories. Yet to 
our mind, just as the question was inaDpropriate in 
regard to INISTI versus IMTI so it is inappropriate 
here. 'Dependency' can only be read as an ideology'. 
.. 
"When we treated Myrdal and the neo-institutionalists, 
we asked if they had prepared a scheme which was 
superior (in terms of its grasp on the world) to the 
efforts of 'growth' and 'modernization' theory. 'Growth' 
theory was dismissed, for the present issue, as crude. 
The comparison of 11TISTI and ITrTTI revealed that, in 
terms of practical efficacy, INISTI was superior to IMTI 
in thaýits background provided for the establishment 
of a more subtle scheme, even though intellectual 
resources were largely common. As regards conceptual 
advance, we felt there was none. Both INIS STI and IMTI 
remained in conception empiricist and in intent 
authoritative internentionisms. They were both exercises 
in what Fay would call ýpolicy science'. 
But what of 'dependency' 9 If we measure it against 
a notion of ideology as the result of the deployment of 
morally infor-ried categorical frame, then vie can note 
two issues. One is the matter of reflexive consistency; 
that is, at its simplest, does the stance in question 
grant that it is an ideology and shape itself accord- 
ingly? (morally informed) Second. what is the scope of its 
core ideas (categorical frame)? Dothey fit the job they 
are required to do? T*his is a vast question-, but here 
we simply want to see if problems call forth theoretical 
forms.. 
., 
Wie have already seen, in discussing Furtado 18 
epistemological ideas, that Idependencyl does not 
regard itself as an ideology and indeed in many respects 
tries to ape the natural sciences . In addition3ldepend- 
enc I fails to specify any agent of theory execution* y 
like Myrdafs effort it floats uncomfortably above the 
world. Thus far 'dependency' looks like more policy 
science. However, if we ask after the core ideas of 
6- 
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'dependency' the position changes somewhat. With INISTI, 
as we presented it through the work of Streeten, the 
key idea ýad been that of a conceDts having anecology; 
that isq it was 
, 
argued that a concept only worked within 
the context of jubt such and such a set of institutional 
circumstances, and that realistic models needs must be 
pragmatic, piecemeal, sceptical efforts. All this fitted, as we 
saw, 
_the 
ldecoloniýationl episode. If we ask whether or not 
there is an*analogous fruitful and novel core to 
Idependencyllthen we are bound to pick the idea of econ- 
omic theorizing being situation specific . Thus the 
orthodox economics is judged irrelevant and it is 
proposed that answers to Latin American problems must 
be prepared with the peculiar characteristics of 
Latin American economies to the fore. Evidently this 
line of argument bears no little resemblance to that 
of INISTI, yet the context and manner of its emergence 
make it difficult to regard as straightforwardly policy 
scientific. Interventionist- yesq empiricist- yes; but 
also sensitive in its formulation to its own 
circumstances, (48) even if (measured'against our ideal 
definition of ideology) the political sensitivity 
remains more or less latent. 
In sum, we can say that 'dependency' no more es- 
tablishes an independent and/or adequate development 
studies than did any of its predecessors. It too is an 
ideology, an exercise in social theorizing; and its 
nature can only be properly comprehended via an 
understanding of its milieug occasion of construction 
and intellectual resource base. 
'Dependency' and thes-upercession of the Conventional- 
Wisdom :a problem misconstrued. 
Above (2.14) we made reference to the debate of 
Girvan and Cumper in respect of the putative. indepen- 
dence and theoretical superiority of 'dependency' in 
regard to the 1CW1 of economics. In respect of this 
debate we observed that it was occasioned by the project. 
of propoiinding an 'oppositional meaning system' using 
the syntax of orthodox social science. That issGirvan 
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did not present his exposition as the why and 
wherefore of a novel ideological departure. Rather, 
he claimed to be revealing the manner in whicli the 
orthodox notions of a discipline came to be 
rendered liable to supersession. Here we consider this' 
debate; not so much because we take Girvan and Cumper to 
be major figures in all this work but rather because 
their exchange 'presents an accessible vehicle for treating 
the theoretical point at issue. 
Girvan argues that the school of 'dependency' 
economics established not only an economics that was 
adequate to Latin America, but'also an economics that 
could be taken as generally adequate(48a), This was 
in- contrast to the hitherto unchallenged economics of 
the developed world, which was now to be seen as 
generally inadequate (which entails its- being inad- 
equate to the economies of the rich natijns themselves). 
This claim raises three issues that we wish to pursue. 
-1. This, is on the face of it a narrower issue 
than that treated in part 2.1; or, to put the matter 
another way, there seems to be a continual ambiguity 
in treatments of 'dependency' in regard to its proper 
disciplinary location. Are we treating economics, or 
some effort derived from the wider set of the social 
sciences? In tile present situation Girvan would seem 
to be firmly locating 'dependency' within that tradition 
of thought called economics. If the conception of 
'dependency' is thus restricted,, then the issue of 
fdisciplinary independence' becomes that much more 
acute. In the above discussion 2.19 we approached 
these matters by asking: just what did 'dependency' 
function to legitimate and orderý We still take that 
approach to be appropriate; but here Girvan Is treatment 
has to be seen to open up the p6ssibility of debating 
the issue of 'dependency' versus IGNI on a technical 
level. We find this to be an unhelpful level of debatej 
yet it is the terrain chosen 
- 
by Girvan and'Cumper. 
Technical debates within an agreed ideological frame 
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make sense; teclinical debates across the boundaries 
of ideological frames produce nonsense. 
2 'We are presented here with an example of 
intellectual expansionism . Girvan, having mis-read 
or mis-reported his ideological departure as scientific 
advance, goes on (in the light of the notion of generality 
of formulation )to claim for his effort an area of 
broad application(ie. replacing the orthodox). Such 
a claim would be seen to be nonsensical if he had 
properly grasped the nature of his own effort as 
ideology. In addition it is obvious that such a claim 
invites reply from the proponents of the orthodoxy in 
orthodox terms ; that is, the fundamental points at 
issue, namely the disputes of the two ideologies, are 
missed. or may be ignored. 
3 Girvan adds a final element of confusion 
in that he presents his views with reference to an 
established debate within economics, That is, Girvan 
takes the 'dependency' effort as resolving the issue 
of whether or not there is one general economics or 
two, one for the rich and one for the poor (49). 
Thus we can see that the issues of disciplinary 
independenceg intellectual expansionism, and the 
matter of the number of the sciences of economics, 
come together in the claims presented here by Girvan 
to the effect that 'dependency' has set economics on 
its feet. But rather than pursue these three questions 
for their own sake, which would involve us in much 
maybe : Crrelevant and unnecessary work, we will -approach 
these issues only insofar as they are made manifest 
in the debate between Girvan and Cumper. This should 
ensure that our writings remain relevant to the 
job in hand., whilst at the same time acknowledging the 
importance of the matters presented by the dispute. 
In respect of the debate, our point of departure is the 
observation that the central axis of confusion is that 
between natural science(ordinarily understood) and 
ideology (understood as social theory). 
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If we firs$ consider the ivoi-lk of Girvan, we can 
report that, building on the efforts of Sunkel and Furtado 
he argues' as f ollows. Out of the ef forts to produce an 
indigenous economicsithe notions of1dependencyl in 
fact present a solution to the issue of whether . 
one or two . economics are needed; 
in that compre- 
hending the nature of the dependent sub-system must 
involve the comprehension of the entire system (50). 
Thus for this is arguably trivial: we have simply 
re'-discovered the concept of ,a 
'world economy' that 
was present in the notion of'imperialism%from which 
Prebisch derived the original 'Centre Periphery' motif 
(51). Where the matter becomes other than trivial 
is in the claim tbat 'dependency' itself makes a 
distinctive (and implicitly seminal) contribution to 
the establishment of the proposed one economics of 
global capitalism. Uiis is troubling for several reasons. 
First, the intellectual expansionism of the Idependencyl 
ideology entails that the efficacy of the 'structural/ 
institutional/historical' method be affirmed. One can 
envisage the establishment of a project to generate 
a setof. -models of economies, the whole being subsumable 
under the premier concept of the capitalist world 
system. In reply vie would want to argue that the trio 
of concepts, fruitful as they are , is not enough to 
generate a general economics (whatever that might be); 
and that rather we should begin . philosophically, to 
build a political economy around the notiofi of production 
, (51a). Second, Girvan continiies to use the syntax of orthodox 
social science; which matter is our present concern 
insofar as it is productive of confusion. In addition 
it grants sense to the notion of a 'generally adequate 
economics', "relevant and valid"(52) for rich and poor. 
But vie may askt just what counts as a 'generally adequate 
economics"(53). 
- 
If we now move-on to consider Cumper's reply to 
Girvans paper, we can see that Girvan's synthesising 
generality is confronted urith detailed criticism. 
There are broadly three lines of attack . 
CUMDer observes that Girvan's separation of 
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of 'dependency' into distinct Latin American and Carib- 
bean line_- is untenable Girvan is charged with ignoring 
Seers, miýrepreeenting Lewis and forgetting about the 
impact of the collapse of the I'Vest Indian Federation and 
the Cuban Revolution. This mishandling of the detail 
setves to establish the distinction between Latin 
American and Caribbean schools. This is all on the 
face of it pertinent; but then Cumper destroys its 
critical force by noting that all that rests on this 
for Girvan is "the scheme of his paper" (54). Thic is 
trivial: Cumper is objecting to the simplificatione 
Girvan makes in order to be able to present a readily 
assimilable scheme. MoreoverCumper adopts precisely 
the same sort of simplifying manoeuvre when, in respect 
of. the orthodox economics whose rejection Girvan urges 
Cumper observes that "within modern Western economics 
one can distinguish two broad schools, which for con- 
venience we can label the Continental and the Anglo 
Saxon" (54a). 
The matter of the rejected orthodoxy is pursued by 
Cumper . He presents a series of orthodox analytical 
techniques and asks, rhetorically do the 'dependency' 
theorists reject this, or this, etc. As an argument 
strategy its unconvincing. Even within the misleading 
syntax adopted by Girvan, the proposed supersession of 
orthodox cannot be taken to entail the wholesale 
rejection of the particular technical constructs of 
the 1MV1. In adaition, if we consider that Cumper goes 
on to lodge a sociology of knowledge critique of Girvan, it 
must be open to the speculation that Cumper knows full 
well that what Girvan wants to do is reject the orthod- 
oxy qua ideology. This. line of attack from Curiper seems 
to be disingenuous. 
Finally, Cumper 
* 
launches a critique 
is informed by the notion of an'ideolog 
taken in'the fairly narrow sense of the 
of a self-serving schema. It is suggested 
is the ideology of an intellectual in a 
of Girvan which 
Y. where this is 
presentation 
that 'dependency' 
post independence 
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state, wishing to secure his position as an 'organic 
intellect. uall at the expense of other intellec. tuals 
and groups generally. The general points about the 
status of the intelligentsia in newly independent states 
may well be true, but Cumper undermines any force the 
attack might have by making ideology the same as bias. 
Claiming that Girvan et al are unprincipled careerists 
is an ad-hominem argument that leads nowhere. Cumper 
grants this 
, 
when he. acknowledges adistinction between 
origin and validity, such that the former does not entail 
anything by way of truth or falsity for the latter. 
Cumper retreats. at this point into claiming that he 
is simply interested in sensitising readers to 
'ideological distortion'. 
Against Cumper we would argue that bias cannot 
flow from an ideological stance. Bias flows from prej- 
udice, and that this is to be regretted and extirpated 
is a trivial observation. If bias is present in Girvan 
or his fellovislwork, then it is unfortunate. It is not 
enough to overturn their ideological stance. 
The equation of ideology with bias crops up when 
Cumper grants that his stance could be called ideological. 
He answers that to go beyond this ideology-spotting 
routine requires a pragmatic test of what is or is not 
objective truth, Cumper proposes a crude notion of 
consensus; thus the more who accept an idea, the greater 
its likelihood of being objective. He further 
proposes 'track record': -. 'the more an analysis has been 
used operationallythe more we can take it to be 
objective. Evidently these both beg the question; 
orthodox views will be preferred and used by people 
whose views are orthodox. That a view is orthodox says 
nothing, on Cumpers own terms (origin/validity), about 
the truth of tha-ý view. Additionally we may observe that 
invoking the notions of consensus and trach record when 
treating a line which deliberately opposes the orthodox 
seems singularly inappropriate. The observations which 
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Cumper makes in the light of the notion of ideology seem 
to run into the sand. The attack finally has no point 
and no force. 
We can now summariýe this exchange. The essential 
tentativen'ess of the project in respect of which Girvan 
makes his explicatory report (that is, in our viewthe 
construction of an ideology), and the particular 
unfortunate syntax chosen (that is, a quasi-natural 
science revision of a discipline's concepts )combine 
to present Cumper with a ready opportunity for 
'missing the point' and launching a thinly disguised 
counter-attack. on behalf of the orthodox Girvan Is 
presentation of the matter permits criticisms to be 
couched in orthodox vein - it does not require the 
orthodox to confront the fundamental(ideological) issues 
at stake. The upshot is that Cumper is able to dismiss 
Idependencyl as a novel orientation, and condemn Girvan's 
paper on and espousal of 'dependency' as slip-shod, 
untenable and self-serving. 
In generalg it is our view that the matter of the 
relationship of 'dependency' to the IC771 is a matter 
of comparing and contrasting the form and intent of 
-two distinct ideologies Their comparative ranking is 
a difficult taskjand the way in which such an analysis 
might be accomplished will exercise us through the rest 
of the study. 'What is clear is that to cast the matter 
in empiricist termspand pursue an argument in respect 
of the supposed*supersession of a technical scientific 
discipline's notions by a new set of concepts, is to 
invite confusion (as we have seen with Girvan and 
Cumper). 
2.3 Disciplinary Independence 
, We began part 2-of this chapter by 
or not 'dependency' could be taken to 
independent and/or adequate developme, 
Recalling the views in respect of the 
theorizing propounded in the Prologue 
a chimera? 
asking whether 
establish an 
nt studies. 
nature of social 
to the study5- 
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we began a pursuit of an answer to our question by 
asking w4at is the form and intent of 'dependency'. 
At the end of that treatment, our disposition to regard 
'dependency' as*an ideology was seen to be entirely 
plausible In regard to the exchange between practition- 
ers of 'dependency' and their orthodox predecessors, 
we saw -in the context of the Girvan-Cumper debate 
that the issue of ranking the disparate efforts was 
couched in terms of the dictates of the model of the 
natural sciences. The particular metaphor borrowed to 
treat the process of advancing this or that ideologically 
informed set of claims in respect of development was 
that of a 'finally adequate theory', in contradistinction 
to some orthodoxy or other. The model of the natural 
sciences was borrowed and disparate ideologies were 
compared as though what was at issue wasthe construction 
of some set of concepts adequate to an external, given 
objcct. An independent and adequate discipline was 
taken to be one that had both a particular object 
of study and an agreed and effective investigatory 
proceeaure. We argued that this was a total mis- 
apprehension ofthe nature of the exchange between 
theoretical lines in development studiec, and that 
consequently all subsequent --debate in respect of 
'disciplinary independence' could only be sterile*and 
misleading. 
In sum, it is our contention that the issue of 
'disciplinary independeneg I is a chimera that is 
occasioned by a fundamental misapprehension of the 
business of the development theorist. 
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3-0 Progress in conce-ptualization? 
Thus ýar we have treated the matter of Idiiciplinary 
independence' -in the company of an exposition of 
'dependency theory'. The upshot of these discussions 
has been th&t 'dependency' is to be properly taken as 
an ideology - like those efforts we have looked at in 
earlier chapters - and that the issue of 'disciplinary 
independence' is a chimera. The debate about all this 
can only get off the ground if the social theorist 
involved invokes the model of the natural sciences. But 
as we argued in our Prologue, social theory is not a 
variation on natural science; consequently the debate 
is sterile. Having thus resolved this issue and rejected 
the model of the natural sciences, we are left with the 
sciences of the social as, properly regarded, being 
concerned with the construction and analysis of 
ideologies. The question which is-raised in this part 
of the chapter is that, if social theories are ideologies, 
then how are we to 
, 
rank competing sChemas? We pursue 
this question in the company of 'underdevelopment 
theory'. 
- We first present two arguments which are familiar 
in the literature: the argument from a cequence, and the 
argument from the identification of paradigms. 7e shall 
deny that these arguments help to establish either 
that there is progress in conceptualization within the 
history of social theorizing, or that there has been 
progress in conceptualization within the ambit of devel- 
opment studies. Furtherwe shall argue that these lines 
of enquiry(albeit informed by a genuine issue, viz. 
ranking ideologies) are misconceivedin that they begin 
with the model of the natural sciences and search for 
social. science analogues. They fail to secure their 
objectives for precisely the same reasons -as those 
who pursue 'disciplinary independence': their goal 
is illusory (55). 
After treating these two arguments1we go on to 
confront directly the issue of ranking ideologies and 
through the medium of a presentation of Frank's 'under- 
development' work we offer a series of preliminary and 
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tentative remarks. 
3.1 The argument from a sequence. 
We have seen in the case of Furtadds intellectual 
career how the establishment of the 'dependency' 
view can quite properly be regarded as an emergent 
sequence ; that is from the initial Centre -Periphery 
notion presented by Prebisch the 'dependency' position 
may be derived (56). As Girvan puts it , noting the 
Prebisch formulationg "The idea of the economic depen- 
dence of the periphery is evidently implicit in this 
conceptualization"(57). In addition to this observation', 
we can note that latent within the typical (favourable) 
commentary upon Idependencylthere is often some sort of 
reference to this sequence, and the claim is implicitly 
lodged that the mere existence of this sequence testifies 
to the truth of the final product. Vle have then two 
elements to consider: on the one hand the sequenceand 
on the other the claims made for it or in the light of 
it. What we take to be the typical and erroneous fusion 
of these matters is most accessibly presented by 
Ehrensaft. 
. 
Ehrensaft begins by observing that "During the 
last decade a diverce stream of analyses emerged which 
taken together do much to update and correct our Percep- 
tionzof the Third World"; and he goes on to declare that 
, 'my intention in this essay is to give an initial syn- 
thesis of some of this new thinking .0 . "(58). Already 
the phrasing (with our emphases) points up the plausib- 
ility of our general claims in regard to Idependency'st 
expositors; and Ehrencaft goes on to display quite 
unequivocally the typical resolution of the matter 
of sequence and truth status. Thus he declares: 11 The 
central proposition of this essay argues that the . 
struct . ural position and interests of national bourg- 
eoisies in Third World capitalist regimes block them 
from undertaking and carrying out these tasks of econ- 
omic 9 political and cultural mobilization. This 
-242- 
proposition emerges in five steps from the new writings 
on Third Vorld political econonies. Each successive steT 
brin! 7s a closer approximation to actual socieial 
relationships 11 ......... "I will review these steps 
one by one, Showing how each successive analysis 
builds intellectuallyon the ones which preceded. 11(our 
empliasis)9(59). 
Ehrensaft here declares himself to be some sort of 
'dependency' theorist: a stance that he reduces to a 
'central proposition', which he states. The history of 
the post-war period is then reviewed in the light of 
this orientation. This procedure is familiar, legitimate, 
and entirely his own affair. But to our mind in making 
his'presentation he commits a familiar and pernicious 
error, and this is of general interest. The error seems 
to come when he elects to relate the history of the 
establishment of his preferred vie-N in the mould of the 
supposed progressiveness of conceptualization of the 
natural sciences . 17hen Ehrensaft writes that his purpose 
is to "explain why semi-industrialization occurs"(59a)., 
we can note that it would seem to be the case that Ehren- 
eaft takes himself to be telling us something about 
how the world is; that is, reporting on an empirical 
matter. This reading is reinforced by his treatment of 
the sequence of notions which issues in , dependencyl. 
Of his history he says that "each succe$ve step brings 
us closer to approximation to actual societal 
relationships" (60). This presentation seems to invoke 
the model of the natural sciences, as they are ordinarily 
understood. We are presented with a scheme of increasingly 
accurate approximations to a reality independent of the 
theorist's engagement. 
Now whilst it may be argued that natural science 
conceptualizations are progressi've to-the extent'that 
they approximate more closely to aft independent reality 
than their predecessors(and presumably Ehrensaft would 
affirm this), we should note that this formulation of the 
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process of natural science work is both (a)commonsensical 
and (b) in terms of the debates within the philosophy 
of scien6e, naive. Just what is going on . vith±n the 
ambit of the natural sciences, how they may be demar- 
cated, and what ontological or epistemological 
commitments attach to any one proposition of the natural 
sciences,, are all matters of vigorous debate. Ehrensaft 
thus makes two assumptions: (i) that the history of the 
formulations of the natural sciences is one of increas- 
ingly subtle approximations to an independent reality; 
and (ii) that the history of the formulations of the 
social sciences is analogous to that of the natural 
sciences. ITowv without reference to the debates within 
the philosophy of science, it can be granted that assump- 
tion (i) is at the very least open to question; and that 
assumption (ii) is widely denied. These remarks, let us 
noteg attach to the idea which informs and structures 
Ehrensaft Is entire argument, and from where it draws' 
its force. If they are called into question then so is 
the entire Ehrensaftian project. It seems to us that 
Ehrensaft 0a argument can be reduced to the status of a 
covert appeal to common sense to support his schema. 
lle can offer 'an alternative. .v 
In contradistinction to what is seemingly assumed 
. 
(setting aside by Ehrensaftvie would wish to argue 
matters of the nature of the natural science effort) 
that with the social sciences there is no reason to 
expectq or look for, this pro3ressive tendency; and 
that within the history of 'dependency'. theory or any 
other distinguishable school within the social sciences, 
there is no need to cast expositions in this natural 
science-echoing style. 
If we recall the schema presented by Dobb, then we 
see that the dynamic of theory is but one aspect of the 
production of social theory (ie ideology); the other . 
being the dynamic of society. It is within the ambit of 
this second element that Dobb locates those societal 
conflicts and changes that issue in the demands, made 
r. 
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of theorists, to produce useful explanations. Quite 
what the. practical significance of autonomous.. 
developments in theory might be we have not asked. Sbme 
role must be granted to such intra-disciplinary 
developments if we are to give the theorist a role 
broader than that of an apologist responding, ýssentially 
passively, to the demands of whatever social group he 
may feel beholden to. However, it is clear that(whatever 
the solution to this question)the idea of the double 
dynamic of social theory and social problem presents 
a sharply divergent picture of the nature of social 
theorizing to that of Ehrensaft Is natural science- 
informed commonsense. More particularlyif social 
theorizing entails some measure of 'social practicality' 
then it is impossible to conceive of any progressivity 
of conceptualization on the model of that supposed to 
be present in the natural sciences. The notion of 
progressivityl is at least plausible in repect of the 
natural sciences, but seems wholly improbable in the 
realm of the social sciences. In this latter case, the 
only 'progressivityl would be within the frame of some 
, social problem'-that is, a specific exchange of 
theorist/world- and such 'progressivityl would be of 
a different sort to that which would be invoked in 
respect of natural scientific-type movement toward an 
ever more subtle grasp of a fixed and given reality(61). 
In sum, we have to say that: (i) Ehrensaft is pursuit 
of a progressive evolution of concepts towards a realistic 
economic sociology is, so far as we can determine, a. 
misconceived project; (ii) there is no reason to suspect 
that such a progressive sequence exists; and (iii) there 
is reaso, n, in the light of the arguments of Dobb, to 
suppose that it does not exist. 
It is not enough for proponents of. 1dependencyl 
to point to a sequence of concept development and claim 
thereby that the present end point of the sequence is 
true, coherent and useful. Indeed the reverse is the 
case; the identification of a sequence in a concept'S' 
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history establishes nothing in respex: t of that concept's 
truthfulness, and to argue that it does ic to wrongly 
draw upon a particular model of the natural s6ie*nces. 
3.2The argument from paradigms. 
We have noted and discussed above the notion that a 
sequence of argument, ECLA-Furtado-Prank, may be ident- 
ified such that the end point may be regarded as some 
sort of theoretical consummation of this progressive 
sequence. We have dismissed that argument; but there 
is an analogous and related argument which treats 
the same material using a notion of 'paradigm shiftI9 
drawn from Kuhn, such that the complex and confused 
debate which lies between a start-point of ECLA and an 
end-point of Frank is taken as an instance of a 
'paradigm shift! We can take this to be used as an argument 
for theoretical progressivityin that th. e notion 
'paradigm 'ahift' claims to encompass and render intell- 
igible an intra-disciplinary process whereby a failing 
orthodoxy is super0eeded and replaced. How are we to 
regard this argume nt for theoretical progressivity? 
With reference to.. Bernstqin's work we can review 
both the Kuhnian notion itself and the use made of that 
notion by social scientists. Kuhn is tagged by Bernstein 
as a 'post-empiricist', one of a number of philopophers 
of science who have attacked the (commonsense) idea of 
science as the incremental accumulation of facts which 
are subsequently ordered by theories. Kuhn's work- 
endeavours to capture science as a social activity and 
as a set of procedures for apprehending the nature of 
their given object. Thus the Kuhnian notion of a 'paradigm' 
has two related senses. In the first, it denotes that 
set of very general shared assumptions whereby the 
scientific community constitute their activitiee; and 
secondly, it denotes a particular practical exemplif- 
ication of their practices. Kuhn later revises his, 
terminology such that the former sense is presented as 
'disciplinary matrix' and the latter as 'exemplar'. 
Bernstein notes that whilst these revisions of termin- 
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ology help clear up come confusions, they do not help 
with one-crucial issue. As he says "What is 
frequently forgotten or neglected is that a. primary 
aim of his book is to help us understand what is 
distinctive about science"(6Ib). Bernstein thinks that 
what Kuhn has to say about 'paradigms' can apply 
quite happily to any other discipline of learning. 
T hus he remarks. -IThat he has to say about paradigms, 
their acceptance, the ways in which they are impbsed, 
is just as true for the history of schools. There 
are many disciplines such as philosophy -which Kuhn 
distinguishes from science - where what Kuhn says about 
science is perfectly applicable"(62). If there is nothing 
distinct about the nbtion of a 'paradigm' when it is 
supposedly applied to the natural sciences, then to 
invoke it to illuminate events in social science is 
to present a vacuous explanati 
, 
on. The conceptual link- 
up with the natural sciences turns out to be non- 
existent, and all the talk of paradigm shifts and normal/ 
revolutionary science advances the analysis of intra- 
disciplinary change in social science not as extensively as 
assumed. Additionally, we may note, it does not provide 
the long sought for route to scientific respectability 
for the social sciences. In all these arguments 
reference to 'paradigms' entails using an unstable 
metaýhor. 
So much for Kuhn himself; his work, Bernstein 
argues, is too ambiguous to be of any direct and 
immediate use. What then of the use made of Kuhns 
by social scientists? Bernstein discusses two 'main- 
stream social scientists', and after criticising their 
misuse of Kuhn -. which it is argued takes the form of 
reading the notion of 'paradigm' so very generally.. 
as to lose all contact with Kuhn's efforts (63)- suggests 
that a fund, ýmental question is being begged. He 
observes that. "what is at issue is not only whether 
political science is or is npt in a 'pre-paradigmatic' 
or 'paradigmatic' phase, but whether this very way of 
speaking is appropriate and illuminating ....... if one 
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thinks that political science is in a pre- paradigmatic 
stage, this suggests that surely a scientific 
. 
paradig- 
matic stage must arise if we are patient and work 
toward it. But there is absolutely no warrant for 
such an inference on Kuhn'O ground or any others"(63a). 
In other words, to argue thus is to beg the question 
of the precise nature of social science. In all these 
debates reference to paradigms entails the obfuscation 
of crucial issues. 
What are the implications of these remarks for the 
use of the notion of 'paradigms' in the social sciences? 
If we regard their use as either metaphorical of obfus- 
catory then two lines open up. In the first case, we can 
treat the use of the term 'paradigm' as marking the 
effort to express and give preliminary shape to the 
participants I (and commentators) sense of the theoretical 
novelty and importance of those new departures with 
which they are concerned. Thus, simply. it is one way 
whereby the totality- of the ECLA. -Yurtado - Frank 
line may be grasped/presented. Clearly, if we could, 
establish a suitably cautious (andlin particularnon- 
natural science-referring )use of the terminology, then 
this would be unobjectionable; -if only because it would 
not be any different in import from the way we ordinarily 
talk about new I. schools'. The other, second, use remains 
objectionable. -Here we may hazerd that the term in ques- 
tion simply serves as an obfuscating not -ion whereby an 
essentially theoretically empty effort may be passed off, 
as coherent and/or novel. As regards the 'novel' reading, 
we could end up close to H. Bernstein's view of the 
tradicals' of development studies, which has it that 
they reduce to bourgeois orthodoxy plus moral outrage. 
The 'coherent' reading might attach to those familiar, 
scientistic efforts of orthodox social science whereby 
underdoveloped ideologies are loosely disguised as 
efforts of science; that is, as being properly scientific 
The foregoing discussion can be integrated into our 
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preceding remarks on the influence of the natural 
sciences. Thus if we consider the familiar debates within 
social science we can interpret them in two ways: as 
inevitable ; as transient. 
Kuhn opts for transience -on, we may suggest, the 
analogy of the established natural sciences - and then 
re-works the history of the natural sciences on the 
model of the social sciences. Thus he. has 'pre-paradigm' 
debate (from the social sciences ) issuing in eventual 
'paradigm' agreement (from natural sciences). There is 
one story, a sort of 'unified theory' for the natural 
and the social sciences. Reconstructing the argument 
strategy, we obtain the following picture. Trorking one C"> 
way, the empiricist! s model of incremen'tal science is 
denied in favour of suggestions drawn from the inage of 
the social sciences; thus natural science is seen as 
a social activity. Working the other way, debate. within 
the social sciences is not taken to 
, 
be endemicand 
nor is social science taken to be hopelessly polluted 
by bias and ideology. The core of the natural-, science 
effort, the agreed apprehension of a unitary truth of 
an external worId . is made available to social 'science. 
All social science has to do is sort out its agreed 
paradigm and thereafter get on with it. 
, 
In regard to the search for an agreed paradigm, it 
is observed that parties to debates (i) sketch out 
differing and incompatible positions (this is routine 
in the social sciences); but-(ii) only bother to do 
this in the natural sciences when there is debate or 
recourse to philosophyand that this is extremely unusual 
in the natural science. The Kuhnian 'unified theory' 
then presents us with the nption of pre-paradigm debate 
occasioning the critical identification of. hitherto 
taken for granted paradigms. These exercises in the 
critical identification of the presently assumed serve 
to permit, or enable the construction of the new a nd 
superseding paradigm. 
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If we now return to our start point and take 
debates within social science to be inevitableg and 
if we also affirm that these endless Squabble; are not 
evidence of the futility of social science, then we are 
bound to ask for an explanation of the nature of social 
-nowledges and integrates into explanation science that acl,. 
that which is routinely observed of social science, 
viz. endless debate. Let us therefore embrace the notion 
of ideology and see what that entails. On the basis of 
arguments and discussions presented in preceding chapters 
we c3n report that this leads to a position like Dobbs, or 
similar. Here the business of social science is the 
aotivity of making sense; and the history of social 
science efforts is the history of the various resultc 
of the double dynamic bf s6ciety and discipline . 
In regard to the particular exercise of constructing 
a theory. we can see that the theorist is (i) confronted 
with a problem presented by society (ie. 'make sense of X 
and (ii) has available a given set of disciplinary 
resources. The 'new theory' is developed out of a debate 
with existing theory according to the particular demands 
of the present problem. Thus established theory is 
revised in the light of the new problem; it is not simply 
extended. 
It is at this point that the two lines coincide; 
so, -paradigm shift in the social sciences and theory C) 
invention look to be the same thing. 
To conclude, we can note that the treatment of 
intra-disciplinary change which uses the notion 
'paradigm Shift' represents, to our mind and in line 
with the observations of earlier parts of this chapter, 
the influence of the model of the natural sciences 
It is our view that recourse to Kuhnian terminology 
does not advance our understanding of how 'schools' 
emerge and how they are constituted.. Indeed, it obscures 
investigation of the more plausible view that revision 
of a set of concepts (within the realm of the social 
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sciences) flows not from an improved apprehension of 
an independent realityq called forth by the lanonalous 
behaviour' of that reality, but rather from the 
advancing of the claims of a novel ideology by a 
particular group-in response to or in the light of 
chanzes within their social world. (Z' 
The argument to theoretical progressivity is not 
secured by using the notion of paradigm shifts. That 
an established body of theoretical resources has been 
transmuted into a. novel ideological form does not, of 
itself, establish the progressivity of that transmutation; 
and the question of the ranking of ideologies remains 
open. 
To anticipate sqme questions which might be raised, vie 
n. ote that there are. in addition to the lines seen: above, 
a whole set of versions of one familiar argument to the 
effect that progressivity entails you ditching your 
ideology in favour of my science. This is routine inter- 
ideology debate amongst the practitioners of the early 
efforts vie noted in the preceding chapters. We can 
safely ignore this style of argument. 
Also, related to this is the Bernstein/Leys/(Frank) 
argument to the effect that they have transcended simple 
radicalism by adopting marxism. On the face of it this 
argument partakes of all the devices. examined above. Progress 
in conceptualization is effected through transcending 
radicalism, where 'transcending' implies both a prep- 
aratory sequential movement and a distinct break. We 
are presented with what could be called the 'take-off into 
marxism'. Yet this must be regarded as largely a matter 
of biography, as the marxian line just is distinct 
this debate, just what counts ass a marxian line we 
leave to Section Four. 
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3.3 How do we rank ideologies 
The foregoing discussions issued in'a rejection 
of the notions -of sequential conceptual development 
and paradigm shifts as means whereby the adequacy of 
differing explanations -could be judged. So how can we 
compare the theoretical status of various efforts? Thus 
far we have argued that all the substantive efforts 
we have concerned ourselves with are to be taken as 
ideologies. How then do we rank ideologies? 
'With Bernstein in Chapter Five, we contented 
ourselves with noting simply that they c ould be ranked. 
We went on to observe that the efforts thus far treated 
(Keynesian IgrowthI9 IM-TI, 11TISTI ) were all empiricist 
in conception and authoritative interventionisms in 
in intent; that is, generally speaking the same. This 
made questions of ranking fairly straightforward; that 
is, in line with simple(internal to the set)criteria of 
technical efficacyeven if theEe measures are illusory 
33ut what if the ideologies are not generally'the same, 
in the sense used; how then do we rank ideologies? We 
will pursue this question with AG Frank and 'under- 
development theory' (UDT). 
3.32 AG Frank and 'under-development theoryt. 
If we present a sociology of knowledge sketch of 
Frank'S work, using our scheme of 'demands', 'resources' 
and 'product', then the picture -;., e obtain is as follows 
(64). Out of a general milieu of long-term foreign and 
in particular U. S. dominance of the area and the experience 
of the Cuban revolutiont Frank conceives the task of 
contributing to a revolutionary critique of orthodox 
theorizing and expectations. Brookfield speaks of 
Franl2s "most rapid conversion to radical ideologies" 
(65) 
, _. 
The available resources are threefold. Firstly 
the orthodox economics of the neo-classical dominated 
Imodernization'theories provide an object over against 
which the new departure may be defined. Secondly, the 
analytical machineries are largely provided by the 
structuralist line associated with ECLA. These cons- 
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titute the principal theoretical resource used by 
Frank, whilst the political reformism associated with 
ECLA provides another negative defining element of 
FranA stance. 'Thirdlya simple strategic metaphor 
is boirowed from the marxism of Baranj that is, the 
notion of the debilitating metropolitan extraction of 
surplus from long-integrated peripheral areas. The 
product of this effort we here designate IUDTI(66): the 
situation of Latin American economies, and indeed those 
of the Third World generallyare to be explained in 
terms of their subordinate incorporation into the world 
capitalist -ystem. 
This productq Frank Is 'manifesto', is expresed in 
a-1963 work thus: "All serious study of the problems 
of development of under-developed areas and all serious 
intent to formulate policy for the elimination of 
underdevelopment and for the promotion of development 
must take into account, nay must begin with, this. 
fundamental historical and structural cause of under- 
development in capitalism. Indeed, all serious study 
of development must take into account the fundamental 
relation the development of development has had, and 
continues to have, with the development of underdevel- 
opment. All serious study of capitalism, of its manif- 
estations in the development of the metropole and of 
that in the underdevelopment of the periphery, and 
especially the study of the contemporary single world 
capitalist system and its development in the past and* 
future, must begin with capitalisms unity and its 
fundamental internal contradiction, Which has always 
and everywhere expressed itself in diffusion and expl- 
oitationg development and, underdevelopment" (67). 
Ehrensaft labels Franles effort Isatellitization'. 
and remarks that "Substantivelyg the'satellitization 
approach deals with the same phenomena as does the 
structuralist. The difference consists largely in the 
interpretation given to these phenorienall (67a). 
Translating this observation out of its empiricist 
style, we can see that Ehrensaft 
'is making 
the point 
-253- 
61 
that in conception Franko effort resembleg that of the 
structuralists (Idependencyl), whilst in intent it doec 
not. 
As regards Frank3s conceptual equipment in these 
early works, "Zhrensaf-es view appears to be correct. 
Ehrensaft quotes Frank from the essay 'The Development 
of Underdevelopment' to the effect that where he, 
Frank, differs from some other structuralists is that 
he is not ideologically blinkered. The implication 
being that, in respect of conception of analysi--tthere 
is a very much greater convergence of view than might 
otherwise be expected. Turning to this text we find 
that it is indeed close to the 'dependency' style of 
analysis. Vvithout going all the way through ? ranks 
work to establish thisvie can quote, him directly. Thus 
he says, after considering the character of Brazilian 
economy and societythat "the same historical and 
structural approach can also lead to a better developm- ý6RAY 
ent theory and policy . such product must be made 
by the peoples of the dependent states themselves. Frank 
goes on, "to change their reality they must understand 
it. For this reason I hope that better confirmation of 
these hypotheses and further pursuit of the proposed 
historicalg holistic and structural approach may help" 
(69), In addition, -, and at a more general level, Frank IS 
approach resembles that of the Idependencylline; in that, 
couched in the syntax of natural science, both efforts 
are conceived in, lepistemology of models' fashion(70). 
Turning to the matter of the intent of Frank's 
work, it is clear that Ehrensaft is right in pointing 
to the ideological differences between Frank and 
'dependency' (71). However it also seems to be the 
case that Ehrensaft, bound up in his pursuit of theor- 
etical progressivity, entirely fails to grasp that 
the crucial novelty of Frank's line resides precisely 
in his overt political commitment. Frank Is work is read- 
-ily contrasted with previous writers noted in this 
atudy. What i-s strikingly evident in the Frank,, line 0 
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is its political engagement; Frank makes his work IS 
political-engagement not simply obvious, but central 
to his effort C72). Thus he declares "These essays 
were written to contribute to the Revolution in Latin 
America and the world" (73); and again, he argues that 
problems of underdevelopment can be resolved "with the 
only true development strategy: armed revolution and 
the construction of socialism" (74). 
In respect of this centrality of political engage- 
ment in Frank's earlier work, we can ask (in the light of 
our notion derived. from Dobb, of a theory requiring an 
lagent'of execution'): just how is Frank's effort Cupposed 
to fix onto the world? With Mlyrdal we identified the 
reasonably acting state as agent of theory execution, 
and the notion of the 'soft state' as the apology for 
this views implausibility. With Furtado we. saw a simil- 
arly free-floating theorythat required an enlightened 
nationalism from unspecified quarters. 'What is the 
position with Frank? Prankýs early work is, it may be 
suggested, best regarded as that of a political 
pamphleteer (75); rather than as'sociologyeconomics, 
p9litical science. or whatever. If we read Frank as a 
pamphleteer then two points seem to follow. 
First, in contradt to earlier writers considered in 
this study, the agent of theory execution has a differ- 
ent status or presence in Frank'S work; that is the idea 
of revolution enters Franles work very early on. 
In thus having a clear political aspect Frank's agent 
of theory execution becomes omni-present, rather than 
being just one more element in some wider general 
scheme. Myrdal. however has a neo-institutionalist theory of 
Third 'World society; ad4itionally, affirming the 
value principle of Idevelopment', he is obliged to 
identify a political agent of theory execution - thus 
we get the 'reasonable statel. lAyrdals agent is-called 
forth by the logic of theorizingand is a minimum 
commitment/engagement whi-ch is incapable of carrying 
the weight the overall Dlyrdalian scheme requires of it. 
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Frank in this early work does not, to our mind, come 
armed with a general theory of Third Toorld society; 
rather hý'comew- armed with a radical political COMMit7 
ment which presents him with a ready-made agent, viz. 
the political activist, just as soon as he begins to 
sketch out his model of the situation (76). Prank6 
agent is intrinsic rather than additional to his scheme. 
'Whether the line is any more plausible than preceding 
efforts is another, albeit related, question. 
The second point is related to the first. It con- 
cerns moral/political commitmentland the syntax 
of the natural sciences. Frank, we want to saypresents 
his moral/political enSagement as an empirical matter(77). CA 
That is to say, he offers a programmatic statement 
in respect of thi exchange of rich and poor and takes, 
this to be liable to confirmation/disconfirmation in 
the light of future research - empirical research. 
Yet to our mind Frankb orientation does not admit of 
empirical analysis; rather, it informs study and action. 
That Frank chooses to present his political stance in 
terms which do not invoke political philosophy pr 
ethics, but instead in terms claiming to be routinely 
descriptive of how things are in respect of rich and 
poor. is simply an error. As Franks agent was intrinsic, 
so his politics are taken for granted. Recalling our 
notion of social theorizing as the deployment of a 
m. orally informed categorical frameit is clear that 
Frank has time to acknowledge neither aspect; but he 
instead proceeds straight to the fray with a Schumpeterian 
? vision' (78), the refinement and explication of which 
-er of empiri- he thereafter (virongly) takes to be a matt 
cal research and ap2ropriate adjustment. 
In sum, it should be clearly noted that Frank does 
not develop. a scholarly treatise nor even a half way 
systematically presented piece of social science(79); 
he does not try to . Given this, the criticisms of the 
limited. nature of Frank Is early efforts rather 6eem to 
miss the point. A political pamphleteer is not to be 
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judged as a political philosoplierg an economist or a 
sociologist, though he may well have recourse. to the-, 
work of all three. The pamphleteer presents a critique 
and we can regard this as an elementary exercise in 
ideology making. 
3.33 Ranking ideologies 
Franl& work lets us pres 'ent, unequivocally, one 
characteristic of all the various efforts we have thus 
far considered: that is, they are ideologies. Following 
Bernstein, who has pointed out that as ideologies claim 
to be pertinent to action in the world then they are 
liable to rational criticism, we can now askijust how 
is such an examination to be carried out? 
. 
We may begin by offering a proximate answer to this 
question, based simply upon the procedures we have - 
either invoked or supposed in the course of our foore- 
going discusions. 7e can then look at some of the inter- 
pretations of critical theory and ask whether we can 
accomplish any preliminary revisions of our schema. 
If an exercise in 'social theorizing' comprises the C) 
'deployment of a morally informed categorical frame' 
(which proceedureq regarded ideally, moves from the 
rationalistically conceived 'general' to an empirically 
relevant set of 'Particulars'), then the resultant 'ideol- 
ogy' may be analysed in terms of the notions of 'concep- 
tion' and 'intent'. The former line is how vie have 
argued ideologies are constructed, and the latter line 
is how we have analysed completed products. If we now 
juxtapose these two approaches1we can develop and extend 
our manner of analysing completed efforts by invoking 
our slogan in respect of the manner of constructing 
ideological efforts. Thus as regards 'conception', we 
ask how is this notion to be extended in the light of 
. our slogan -'morally informed categorical frame,. 
'S imilarly as regards lintentl, we ask how it might be 
extended. This is to read them as ideologies-But also 
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they are exercises in argument construction, and liable 
therefore to the usual rules of intellectual discourse 
in respect of formal consistency and so on. This'proced- 
ure generates what seens to be a set of criteria whereby 
an ideological effort might be evaluated. Ile precent it 
as a 'check list' . 
As regards conception: 
A. Does the effort in question display 'reflexive 
consistency'; that is, does it acknowledge that it is an 
ideology? There seem to be three sorts of reflexive 
consistency'. 
(a) Reflexive Consistency I (Internal) Does the effort in, 
question acknowledge its own value engagement? Does" it 
demonstrate an awareness of being a value-suffused 
product?. Claims to the status of natural science 
objectivity are simply fatuous; similarly, pro-forma 
declarations are not enough. On the other hand,! v'. 1annheimian 
style claims to the relativity of all value schemas 
are unacceptable. 
(b) Reflexive Consistency II (External). Does the stance 
in question specify an agent of theory execution wheraby 
the effort can latch onto the world? This agent of theory 
execution is understood to be integral. to the stance-, 
thus an agent that is simply an addendum designed to 
meet the requirements of the logic of theorizing will 
not do. Crudelyv the effort has to be engaged. The 
plausibility of the schema, which will rest in part on 
the agent chosen and its supposed role, is another 
question. 
(c) Reflexive Consistency III (General). Does the line in 
question explain itself? Is the effort itself compatible 
with the claims lodged in the effort? -04or example Giddens 
reports5in respect of Habernas's treatment of the notion 
of ideology, that "the concept of ideology9 Habermas 
argued, did not just come into being with the rise*of 
bourgeois society; it is actually only relevant to the 
conditions of public debate forged by that societylt (80). 
Thus Habermas inserts his concern for ideology into 
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an hivtorical schema which explains the occasion for 
his interest. 
13 Does the stance in question display formal or con- 
ceptual consistency? This is the routine demand of all 
intellectual efforts, so we need not pursue it. 
C As regards the exchange between conception/intent. 
Does the effort in question have recourse to a categor- 
ical frame whose explanatory scope is commensurate 
with the demands for explanations flowing from the decl- 
ared intent? That is , 
is the set of concepts used rich 
enough to cope with the ordinarily understood worldq 
the practical starting point of the effort'S engagement? 
Two examples will serve : Girvan seemingly invokes this 
when lie says; "The structural and institutional method 
came to be two of the most important characteristics 
of the veritable revolution in economic thought in the 
two regions in the middle and late 19601s. The develop- 
ments in thought, generally, took the forms of (i) 
adding a historical perspective and analysis to the 
-tructural and institutional method, (ii) giving the 
historical/structurall/institutional method the kind of 
theoretical and empirical content needed to construct a 
general theory of dependence and underdevelopment" (81) 
(our emphasis). The second example is of a failure: thus 
in respect of the Great Depression it is argued that 
the conceptual apparatus of the economic orthodoxy 
was incapable of treating the events. It was not a 
matter of the appropriate sub-areas of the discipline 
being un-developed; rather, the economic orthodoxy denied 
that it could happen. Clearly it was inadequate, conceptually, 
to its task of interpreting the economic world in 
such a manner as to permit rational action in respect 
of that world. 
D As regards the intent. The matter of 'intent' 
concerns the objectives and evaluations under-pinning 
and guiding the effort. Generally, it seems as if vie 
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confront an is, -: -ue of practicality. 
(a) Intent (External). Is the posited intent tenable? 
Thus ideology as we. understand it is not, for-example, 
religion; it is essentially practical. In this lightýif 
an ideology is intended to secure for its adherents/ 
agents. say, 'eternal cosmic wisdoml, then vie would wish 
-ended to secure, to rank it lower than an ideology int 
say, some piecemeal change in the distribution of 
economic power in society. 
(b)Intent (Internal). Is the intent proper? That is, 
does the moral aspect of the efforts intent coincide 
with or di'ýrerge frorn typically 'Western' views? This 
question arises from those considerations of chaDter tv7o 
'The Idea of Developmentl,, wherein we uostulated a 
general determini-sm in rec-pect df the stances open to 
anylwesternerl. An ideology affirming progresc would 
have to be ranked higher than one denying it. 6 
At this point the coupling of formal requirements 
to sociology of knowledge analyses, to generate a list 
of criteria whereby ideologies miaht be rankedevidently 
begins to look strained. This issue of ranking takes 
us into matters of the philosophy of social science. 
Any further treatment of the matters must await specialist 
input; to that end, and in order to indicate how the 
discussion might be advanced from this point, vie can 
introduce those interpreters of 'critical theory' 
mentioned above. 
Ta begin this area of additional enquiry we must. 
lodge a disclaimer. We are not presenting an introduction 
to 11abermas' work. Otit of the ver,, ý wide-ranging and 
complex issues this theorist treats we are trying to 
pick out one area, that which extends our own immediate 
interests. The aspect of Habermas' work we are concerned 
with is the critique of ideology. and our investigations 
are very much of a preliminary nature. Nonetheless we 
might note that the themes we tackle, in the context of 
ITabermas' work9 are occasioned by general issues of no 
V 
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little complexity and interest. Thus Bernstein argues 
that after the self-conception of mainstream social 
science is challenged and found wanting, a series of 
iesues crop up-, . "these cluster around the interpre- 
tation and understanding of political ond social reality" 
(82),. Bernstein add--: "Looming in the background is the 
central ouestion of how one can rationally adjudicate 
among competing and conflicting interpretations"(82). 
In regard to this enquiry into ideology, vie may note 
that it is not to be taken as ideal-formal but rather 
marxian-critical. As Giddensputs it: "Marx introduced a 
radically new perspective into social theo; ry. Henceforth 
the diagnosis of ideology became a mode of penetrating 
beyond the consciousness of human actors, and of uncover- 
ing the Ireal. foundations' of their activity, this being 
harnessed to the end of Social transformation"(83). This 
is echoed by Bernstein:. "An ideology must be deciphered"(84) 
That, this process of 'deciphering' is taken to be 
emancipatory is revealed in Bernstein's detailing of the 
functions of ideology critique. He begins with injunc- 
tions as to how it should proceed in terms of providing 
descriptions of its object, and moves to indicating 
how it should serve to actively dismantle its object: 
"The critique of ideology has several inter-related 
functions: (1) It must describe and accurately charact- 
erise the ideology, and be wary of caricature. (2) It 
seeks a depth interpretation of the ideology which will. 
at once reveal '. ',. ow the ideology reflects and distorts 
an underlying social and political reality. (3) It 
seeks to discover the material and psychological factors 
that reinforce and sustain it. (4) It seeks to isolate 
the fundamental beliefs and interpretations that are 
the basis of the ideology, and to criticise them in order 
to expose their falsity. (5) It seeks to dissolve the 
legitimizing power of ideologies by overcoming resis- 
tance in the ideologies' defenders"(85). This describes 
a substantive task; above, we pursued formal criteria. 
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If this tells us why we should conduct critiques 
of ideolqgy and in what areas we should develop our 
analyses, it does not tell us how it is to be done. 
The answer from Habermas seems to be that ideology 
critique is a matter of argumentation. This apparently 
rather di sappointing contribution is, characteristically, 
lodged within a wider frame; that of a general theory 
of communication. Here Habermas makes a distinction 
between 'speech action' and 'discourse', where the 
former supposes a consensus and the latter is the 
realm of argumentation. This work is veryabstract and 
according to Bernstein, "what Habermas seeks to esta- 
blish in his theory of communicative competence. 4 ... 
parallels what 1,11arx sought to accomplish in his 
ov;,, n critique of political econor. y. Marx argues that 
implicit in the concrete historical forms of alienation 
and exploitation that now exist, are real dynamic 
potentialities for radically transforming this existing 
historical situation ...... In a parallel manner Habermas 
argues that human discourse or speech -even in its 
systematically distorted forms -both presupposes and 
anticipates an ideal speech s-ituation in which both the 
theoretical and practical conditions exist for unrestr- 
ained communication and dialogue" (86). 
This n9tion of an 'ideal speech situation' seems 
to serve two functions. Firstly, it provides a regulative 
ideal for discourse; that is, when consensus has broken 
down and argumentation: is occurring,. there is a common or 
universal inherent goal of language which serves to 
regulate and order argument.. It is rather anal 
* 
ogous to, 'say, 
Popper's notion of objective truth, where this is taken 
as a regulative ideal of scientific endeavour: it is the 
goal we collectively agree to work towards. In Habermas' 
proposals for ideology critique, the 
ý'ideal 
speech situation' 
plays the came role: it is the fixed point around which 
debate can be organised. Secondly, this equation of 'open 
debate' with 'open societyl. so to sayg provides the 
integral value aspect of the work, * As Marx fused matters 
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of fact and value, so does Habermas, arguing that the 
fundamental otructure of language su-pposes a free society. 
11ore generally, ideology critique fits into a wider 
schema which serves to locate the theorist and his effort 
in the 'real world'; the metaphor invoked is that of 
the therapeutic exchange of psychoanalysis. The scheme 
is presented as a tripartite process whereby the efforts 
of the critical theorist are 'authenticated'. We begin 
with the debate internal to the scholarly community. 
Both Bauman and Bernstein read Habermas as making this 
the ambit of positive science(not positivist, they insist). 
Bauman observes. "It is by the positive analysis of 
reality, which seeks its legitimation in the sedulous 
application of the ordinary fact-finding means of posi- 
tive social science, that the hypotheses of critical 
knowledge, aimed at the restitution of undistorted 
dommunication are first advanced" (87). This seems to 
be ambiguous; for whilst we can grant that there is a 
'moment' of disciplinary engagement, the orthodox methods 
of social science are lodged within a view that denies 
the propriety of value engagement. Yet by invoking 'ord- 
inary fact finding methods of positive science' Bauman 
at once grants plausibility to orthodox claims and 
seemingly reduces critical theorizing to a matter of an 
affirmation of the orthodox plus something. Bernstein 
even talks of causal analyses; which, recalling YlacIntyre 
(87a)on the appropriate ambit of Humean causesq must be 
a nonsense. 
The second stage of this process is the exchange 
between the theorist and his tarUet. T'his encompasses 
a dialogue of theorist and target/subject, with the 
objective of transmitting to the subject the habit of 
critical investigation of assumed commonsense. Here the 
exchange is theorized by direct reference to the ,, neta- 
phor of psychotherapy. Finally, the third stage sees the 
subject engaging in critical theory-informed political 
activity. Thus critical týeories'efforts are authenticated 
to the extent that they become significant cultural 
objects. 
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There is much to question in these schemes. Yet 
our business is not a critical exposition of Habormas' 
scheme; it is rather the matter of ideolor,,, y rdnking. 
In this context-we can offer two preliminary general 
conclusions. 
(i) If we take competition between ideologies a-- 
being 'distorted communicationl2then invoking the notion 
of Idiscouroel seems not inappropriate. But the question 
remains% just how helpful is it. in contrast to more 
familiar patterns of marxian- informed ideology critique? 
It is not immediately clear, in respect of ranking 
ideologies of development, that we gain all that much 
from Habermas' subtle schemes. Treating the clash of 
ideological lines as a matter for the deployment and 
counter-deployment of arguments would seem to be a very 
narrow treatment of these issuestfor, after all, these 
are real political issues ann exemplify the conflicts 
of actual groups in society. Habermas, we may say, argues 
for the situation of mature western capitalism and 
its-social science and other ideologues/critics. Thus 
we derive themes of legitimation crisis. 
(ii) Insofar as we are treating, in our study, 
We!; tern efforts to make sense of the Third 17orld then 
Habermas' line helps us. In the sections above w'e have 
treated various stances which we took to be legitimnting/ 
ordering particular politicallY-informed departures. 
The critique of ideology would seem to be a prerequisite 
of any defensible and coherent conception of the nature 
of the exchange between the Third World, as is, and 
Western academics with their social science. 
,' The permissible intent and scope of the efforts of 
social science and academics remains an open question. 
The attempted export of techniques (growth theory), or 
recipes (modernization theory), or methods. (neo- 
institutionalism ), have been criticised in various ways. 
What has to be asked is, crudely: just what do western 
social scientists think they can and should do in their 
discussions and writings on 'development studies'? 
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Habermas offers a theory which locatec- the theorist in 
the world in aplausible fashion, -and goes on to provide 
him with a speqified job to do . This invitation to 
consider the precise role of theorist is probably 
Habermas' general lesson to us for the precent. 17e will 
return to matters of 'critique' in Chapter Eight. 
In regard to ranking ideologies, per se, we have not 
here drawn much from his work which ,!., e can add to our 
tentative exploration of the criteria whereby -v.., e may 
rank ideologies save for an idealist and problematic 
scheme for ordering debate. 
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Section Four: The 'Plarxists' 
ChaDter Seven: Elements of the renewal of interest in 
marxian scholarship; the treatments of the Third World. 
1.0 Introductory Remarks. 
On the relationship of Section Four to the study as a 
whole: this may be elucidated in three ways, 
(a) Section Four nay be taken to represent the third 
instantiation of the notion of progress in this 'career' 
of 'development-studies'. Thus etage 
. 
one, dealt with in 
Section Two, equated progress with securing economic 
growth; stage two, dealt with in Section Three, equated 
progress with securing reasonable and rational programs 
of social reform; and now with stage three we find 
progress equated with revolu 
, 
tionary change oriented to- 
ward the extension of democracy. 
(b) Section Four represents our third distinguishable 
answer to the question of our : Prologue as to the 
intellectual/disciplinary status of 'development-studies'. 
Where the-'positivist C-471 of Section Two answered that 
'development-studies' should be regarded as an element 
of, or application of, a primarily economics-based 
social science; and the 'radicals, of Section Three that 
'development-studies' was both independent and novel 
in regard to a supeiýseded economic C-W; thelmarxists' 
would submerge the interests of 'development-studies' 
within a very much wider set of politico-historical 
concerns. 
(c) Section Four may also be taken to represent the 
third stage in our reconstruction of the poc,, t-,, I, ar 
'career' of 'development-studies'. That Icareer'spans 
the Deriod from the end of the Second World War to the 
end of the US war in SE Asia. This encompasses the 
occasion for the establishment of US hegemony and the 
occasion for its dissolution. The efforts subsumed 
under the label 'development-studies' reflect these 
wider issues. Thus stage one sees the establishment of 
an optimistic 'positivistic' line that peaks with 
Kennedy's 'New Frontier'; stage two sees a reaction and 
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the emergence of various 'radical' schemes. Stage three 
sees the decline of consensusq the end of the post-war- 
economic boom, the fatal embroilment of the USA in 
Vietnam, and a rediscovery of marxian scholarship. 
In sum, Section Pour can be taken as providing the 
third instantiation of the notion of progress, the third 
distinguishable conception of the nature of 'development- 
studies' , and the third stage in our reconstruction of 
its post war history. 
As regards the strategic issues that confront 
and thereby shape Chapter Seven, we may note that the 
renewal of interest in marxian scholarship that we will 
here refer to has been general; but our major interest 
at this juncture is in finding out what is to count as 
a marxian analysis of the Third World. We are isolating 
one aspect of the revival of scholrirship and submitting 
it to a specific enquiry. 
Our trentment differs from that which we would 
expect to produce if we followed the routine schema of 
milieu, demands9 resources and product; in that whilst 
it takes off from a discussion of milieu, as is usual, 
it then Dresents the product(that is, lneo-marxism') 
via a review of typical criticisms of it, thereby 
sketbhing in some aspects of the issue of re * 
sources. 
Thuss the matter of the proper nature of a marxian anal- 
ysis of the Third World is kept central. We select our" 
material and order it around our interest in the pract- 
ical efforts of present-day theorists. The revision in 
procedure isq arguably, minor: instead of pursuing an 
extensive(and supposedly exhaustive) sociology of know- 
ledge treatment of the newly presented marxian schemes,, 
we offer a self-limiting enquiry that is compatible with 
the dictates of the logic of the study (a9b, and c, above) 
and our over-arching concerns in respect of the nature 
of social theorizihg per se. 
. Three strategic issues confront us as we ask what 
is to count as a marxian analysis of the Third World. 
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(1) Dynamic of society: just what occasioned the re- 
surgence of interest in-marxian scholarship anjd analysis, 
and how were matters in and of the Third World involved? 
(2)Dynamic of theory I: how has this renewal of interest 
in marxian work manifested itself in the context of 
discussions of the Third 1', Torld., * what have activists said? 
(3)Dynamic of theory II: what is the scope of these 
discussions of the Third 'Norld. within marxian scholar- 
ship; that is, what are the resources invoked$and how 
are they revised in works of scholarship? 
2.0 Dynamic of Society: the occasion for the renewal of 
interest in marxian scholarship 
Kay, writi 
, 
ng in 1973, begins the preface to his book in. 
the following way:! 'Since 1968 the myth that Capital is 
unreadable has been exploded. Marxist literature, incl- 
uding Marx's own writings, now proliferate as never 
before. This recrudescence has a real basis in develop- 
ments during the sixties: the collapse of consensus 
politics; the decomposition of the affluent society and 
the failure of the Americans to win a decisive victory 
in Vietnam. It also has ideological roots, for as the 
world has moved on academic social science has stood 
still"(2). The distinction drawn between 'real basis' and 
, ideological roots' seems both unneces-sarily orthodox 
and somewhat ambiguous - what is an ideological root? 
The metaphors seem confused; nonetheless Kay provides 
us with a 6tarting point. We will consider the 'occasion 
for renewal' under two headings: firstly looking at the 
circumstances internal to the developed societies of the 
'westl(though. New Left upheaval extended to Eastern 
Europe); and theng secondly, we consider those events 
in the Third World which permitted the cooption of the 
experience of revolutionary groups by New Left thinkert. 
2.1 Pressures for renewal of interest in Marx I: 
Internal / Immediate. 
If we approach these matters via the idea of the dissol- 
ution of consensus politics, we can ask after the occasion 
I 
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of this dissolution. This is to present the New Left(3). 
We canheýe note some of the main elements in their 
activities and doctrines: that is, we offer a very 
tentative sociology of knowledge note. It is tentative 
for two reasons: one, that for our present purposes we 
require little more; and two, the history of the 1960's 
and early 1970's is too new, too undigested (indeed it 
is largely unwritten). 
The dissolutionof consensus wa s abrupt and siirprising. 
Birnbaum, writing in 1969, observes that "It was only 
yesterday that we were asFured that our restern societies 
were immune to severe disruption"(4). He goes on to 
report that liberals saw a secure pluralism, socialists 
a solidl-y engineered consent, and conservatives a vulgar 
con-siinierism. Interertingly he also mentions radicals, 
taking them to perceive an iron cage of bureaucrPtic 
rationality. Birnbaum nsks, "What were the signs we 
missed? "(5), and answers: "In the first place, of course, 
we under-estimated the significance of the Third World's 
struggle against the older and newer forms of imperialism, 
or ratherg its multiple meaning and consequences. On one 
level the success of the Algerians and Cubans in liber- 
ating themselves .......... caused the imperialist powers 
to change their strategies. The French and British(with 
the 71est Germans in tow) abandoned military occupation 
for economic penetration*and manipulation ..... The US, by 
contrastgafter the Cuban trauma went over to ever more 
naked military intervention in the Third World, culmin- 
ating in the Vietnamese horror"(6). The example of the 
wars of liberation are one side of the experience of the 
Third World coin; the other is the reflexive self- 
examination occasioned by Vietnam. Thus it is said 
"mobilization for the war in Vietnam has exposed for 
all the world to see ...... the brutal vi, -age of our 
qmbiguous society: a monstrous technological apparatuc 
tended by moral divarfs-11(7). 13irnbaum pushes his point home: 
... what has occured is not a distortion 
but the ultimate 
truth about our relation to the world"(8). In the US the 
collapse of consensus and the gradual awakening 
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of critical scholarship from the predornilant quietude 
of the Eitenhower era is intimately bound up with the 
experience'of Vietnamg but it has for the US radicals 
a domestic anticipation/parallel in the Civil Rights 
Movement. 
We can note here one or two significant points in 
respect of the genesis of civil rights in the US. The 
first was the Supreme Court desegregation of schools 
decision in 1954, and the second was the Greensboro 
actions of 1960 where a sit-in at a Woolworths lunch 
couninr snowballed into very large demonstrations. 
Students came into the South to aid civil rights activ- 
itie-s. Goode reports that "The first organisation of 
the sixties to address itself to these mundane problems 
was the Student Non-violent Coordinating Committee ... 
... The 
S!, TCC represented the earliest actual appearance of 
the New Left. It was established in 1960 to organise the 
numerous white and black civil rights. workers who had 
gone to work with"the people in the south"(9). Goode 
traces the efforts of SITOC-associated groups, seeing 
them absorbed by. the status quo and eventually issuing 
in the radical positions of Stokely Carmichael and 
Black Power. In 1962 SDS is inaugurated at Michigan(9a) and 
advc-nces the notions of participation and community; 
and community-based initiatives become widespread. 
Goode notes a third strand, the attention paid to 
reform of the universities. Here we may note with 
Birnbaum that ".. the New Left to a considerable extent 
has been transmuted into a youth r. ovement"(10). Birnbaum 
also avers that "At the moment Herbert Marcuse ... is the 
most influential-of New Left thinkers on both continents" 
(11). Ple may now turn to the situation of that other 
continent. 
. -Stateralin what appears to be a Mannheimian infor- 
med analysis of European student movementspargues that 
the prototype was German. In particular he cites the 
students of the Free University of Berlin(12). This 
institutiong'. Sfatera reports, was established as a 
propaganda exercise aimed at the University in East 
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Berlin(Yumboldt), and its constitution was extremely 
liberal. Through the late 1940's and 1950's itz organis- 
ational liberties were increasingly brought into line 
with those of other universities in `: 7. Germ,,; ny. This was 
the immediate occas-ion of protest - the loss of insti- 
tutional liberties. Concomitantlyin 1959 the SPD 
revised its marxian constitution and expelled the German 
students union( also called SDS), which promptly 
became the sole repository for socialism in Germany(13). 
From this point the scope of protest was ever widen- 
ing. _9tatera remarks that "Roth chronologically and 
ideologically West T3erlin was the birthplace of European 
student protest"(14). -sesooe"Vietnam was the crucial 
issue; but from the attack on American imperialism prot 
est extended to the repressive nature of capitalism, to 
authoritarianism, to the 'manipulation of consciousness! " 
(15). In Germany- Statera reports that Rudi Dutschke 
presented a Marcusian view; in France, Daniel Cohn-Bendit 
simDlified-the anti-authoritarian nspect. and Marcuse 
was run together with Sartre and Fanon. It was in France 
that the Few-Left/Student movement attained its European 
apotheosis. From an occupation of administrative offices 
in Nanterre by a few hundred radica. 1s, France moved to the 
verge of revolution. Gross reports, "It was in fact 
precisely in the social science departmente at Nanterre 
that the revolutionary student movement was born"(16) 
He continuesq "In May 1968 the student movement in 
France mobilized tens of thousands of students and 
acted as the detonator and catalyst of a chain reaction 
which eventually brought 10 million workers out on strike, 
thus precipitating a situation in which, for the first time 
in the history of an advanced capitalist country, a 
revolution might have been possibl4'(17). If that seems 
_overstatedg 
or even false if one thinks of, say, the General 
Strike of 1926, then Galbraith can offer a milder, still 
apposite view; 'May 1968 showed what had come to be 
doubted through the years of the end of ideology, that 
history had not stopped' (17a). 
-271- 
Young, tresting the matter of the core identity of 
the New L6ftqgrants that much crystallized around the 
universities. Thus he says: "The structure of the Univer- 
sity was viewed, in its paternalism and hierarchy, as 
a microcosm of power in the larger society. Its author- 
itarianism might be less naked, its elites less irres- 
ponsible but such organisations still appeared essent- 
ially undemocratic"(18). 
The loss of institutional liberties which occas- 
ioned trouble in West 'Berlin was one factor amongst 
others in a wider trena. Thus all the, treatments of 
'student protest' that we have consulted refer to the 
massive expansion-in stuaent numbers in the 1950's and 
1960's Provision for these extra numbers seems to have 
been uneven; thus in Italy at Rome University and in 
Paris at Nanterre there were Very large numbers and a 
low level of provision. Hore generallyit seems to be 
the case that authoritarianism and hierarchical patterns 
of organisation preaominated. A final often noted 
matter of the universities themselves was the shift 
from 'scholarship' to 'expertise': notions of the pursuit 
of liberal scholarship gave way to demands that univer- 
sities provide skilled experts. At this point the issue 
of the role of the university in late capitalist socie- 
ties was raised. 
Much of the ideology of the Few Left seerns to have 
revolved around the notions of technical-rational 
knowledge and its increasingly central role in society. 
S-tatera notes*that "False consciousnessq manipulated 
consensus. 9 authoritarianism, and imperialism were conc- 
epts which gave shape to the developing utopia of the 
German students"(19). Again, "Authoritarianism and 
repression were regarded as dominant themes in the 
social, political and cultural life of industrial soc- 
ieties whose aim is to establish an immutable order 
both internally and internationally. The extra-parlia- 
mentary oppositiong and the students above allq could 
therefore become the counterpart, on the internal 
political level, of the V: Uetcong"(20). 
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To summarize: thus far we have considered the New Left 
in America. and in Europe. In the US we identified three 
themes: - (a)Third Vlorld/Vietnam; (b)race/poverty; (c) 
university expansion and the slide from scholarship to 
expertise. In Eur-ope we identified two themes: _ (i) 
Third 17orld/Vietnam ; (ii) university reform Birnbaum's 
reference to Marcuse as pre-eminent figure is appropr- 
iate. Marcuse links matters of the Third World, the 
revision of Marx and the analysis of mature capitalism. 
Similarly influential figures are Debray and Fanon. 
We will come back to their work after. ýrevibwing* .. the: 
circumstances of the Third 'World through this period of 
the I. Tew Left. We can ask just what was going on in the 
Third World that resulted in the incorporation of the 
Third World as an aspect of the ideology of the New 
Left? Our interest lies neither in the elucidation of 
the doctrines of Third Worldism , nor in the presentation 
of some general(Ineutrall) history of the period. Rather, 
we are interested in noting those events which rendered 
the experience of the Third World assimilable to the 
New Left ideology. Additionaly we should note that 
the division between 'Pressures for 1ýenewalI and III 
reflects our particular interests, rather than any judg- 
ment on the relative strengths of'the various elements 
taken into the New Left positions. 
2.2 Pressures for a renewal of interest in Marx II 
External / Adoptive. 
In the works of not a few students of African and 
Third World affairs there is pervasive sense, of dis- 
appointmentg of promises unfulfilled. This is perhaps 
unsurprising. It is not restricted to members of the 
Yew Left. Hargreaves writes: ". During the 1950's many 
who wrote enthusiastically about the triumph of 'African 
Nationalism' were excited by the creative possibilities 
of the period. Europeans with varied Political convictions 
welcomed the spectacle of resisters turning into coll- 
aborators in expectation of harmonious benefits all 
round"(21). But it is clear from the works of Davidson 
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that such optimism was misplaced. Far from it being the 
case that-pationalist elites were inevitably innovative$ 
they were If anything the reverse; and circumstances 
consDired to reinforce any such tendencies. Hargreavest 
remark that "European expectations in the later 1970's 
are less euphoric"(22) is apposite. His further obeer- 
vation that "hopes for vital and authentically African 
political life have receded even further"(23) may be 
taken to reflect the naivete of the original hopes2 
rather than any unproblematic judgement upon the dyna- 
mism(or otherwise) of precent African societies. 
DaviOson analyses the circumstances of decolonization 
with reference to the p, ýrticular expectations of the 
principal actors. (groups). Thus he distinguishes the 
Ifenrl from the 'many' . The former are the Woestern 
educated elite; of these, those present around the 
turn of the century, in the full flood of jingoistic 
'new imperialism', established the basis of the sub- 
sequently successful line of response. Davidson makes 
this their legacy: "That influence established the 
world of the European nation state as the manifest dest- 
iny of the colonial state, just as the colonial system 
itself would do the same in other and less obvious 
ways, so that decolonization, when it came, was bound 
and fettered within the terms of this nationalism"(24). 
As for the latter group. the 'many', Davidson reports 
that they were detached from the nationalists and made 
a variety of accommodating-responses to colonial rule. 
Durring the years of the great slump and the Second 
, orld War the 'many' saw their established practices 
totally swept awRy. As Davidson notes, "Every feature 
of dislocation stamped into the African scene by the 
great depression was enlarged and sharpened: the impo- 
verishment of rural populations, the flight to -urban 
slums and shanty towns, the dismantlement of traditional 
communities"(25). 
The two groups came together, briefly, in the 
early post-war period. "The new parties mobilized the 
clamour in the sireets. They became movements of mass 
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su 1A rt or mass acclaim. They did not become movements of 
mass participation. The distinction is important"(26). 
The intere sts of the nationelicts in political po, -, er 
and the interesýs of the masses" in social reform came 
together: "This convergence of the 1950's between 
struggle for nationhood, the 'national-struggle', and 
struggle for social gains, thelsocial struggle', thus 
r 
occuVe%d as a mutual opportunism. The nationalists need- 
ed the masses and the masses needed the nationalists, 
but for purposes by no means necessarily identical"(27). 
This is the gap that Davidson sees opening up later, so 
that. the new ruling group quickly comes to stand in 
the same relationship to the masses as did the old 
colonial authority. The imported model collapsed and 
DaVidson, adding that this is not suprising, locates 
the historical interest elsewhere: ".. in the working 
out of confrontation between the colonial heritage and 
the pre-colonial heritage now that the second is free 
to challenge the first; and along with that the result- 
ant development of ideas concerned with searching for 
a different model"(28). 
Davidson argues that the spectacle of corrupted 
elite groups and successions of military coups led to 
the recognition that any affirmation of the notion of 
democracy would entail a sharp revision in political 
theory and practice(29). This new politics slowly 
began to emerge. It proposed ditching elite-ordered 
capitalist nation building in favour of an identific- 
ation by leaders with the problems of the masses. 
"This new politics could be called the politics of mass 
participation. Increasingly, as it continued to unfold 
it became known as the politics of liberation. Its 
development after 1966 occured in many forms"(30). The 
examples of the independent states of Tanzania and 
Somalia are cited; and the efforts of the then non- 
independent are noted. T' hus Cabral and PAIGC, Mondlane 
and FRELIM0. and the MPLA in Angola are listed. Of 
themgDavidson observes that they ".. may be said to have 
been the first in Africa. to have fully indigenized a 
marxist analysis ..... But what their evolution really 
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displayed was an African politics of mass participation 
in a matulre phase"(31). 
The struggle against a repressive and often brutal 
and . unjustifiable colonial authority; the creative 
revision of democratic/socialist/marxist theorems; the 
identification with the masses. with the corollary of 
the affirmation of the centrality of social reform; 
all these, it would seem, are the bases whereby activ- 
ity within the Third World might be embraced by radicals 
in the developed nations. Both Hargreaves and Davidson 
focus their attention on sub-Saharan Africa, but the 
claim may be extended to the Third World in general. 
Thus Cha, liand follows Davidson in making Cabral and 
PAIGC genuinely revolutionary; he also adds China, 
Korea, Vietnam and Cuba as places where political and 
social revolution has occurred. We can note Chaliand's. 
agreement with Davidson in respect of the distinction 
social/politicaltand of the crucial nature of the social 
struggle . The precise contents of Chaliand's list we 
will not debate. There is a further matter to note, and 
this is the manner in which revolutionary struggle in 
the Third 11ýTorld was taken on board by the New Left. 
The clue has been offered by Birnbaum: the circum- 
stances of war. The experiences of Vietnam, Algeria 
and Cuba are central to the manner of cooption by the 
Few Left of the experience of groups in the Third 
World. Chaliand treats it as myth making; he observes 
11 A sort of Third World euphoria began to be felt at 
the close of the 1950's, during. the Algerian war, and 
it was soon given a boost by the radical turn of events 
in the Cuban revolution in 1960-61 ....... the Algerian 
revolutionlo geographically so close to Europe, came 
to symbolize the anticolonialist strugele"(32). In the 
case of Vietnam : "The war in Vietnan embodies the very 
model of the Third World myth: a war of the people 
victoriously resisting the most powerful irAperialism"(33). 
Cuba is seen as the source of the 'ludicrously voluntarist, 
theories of the guerilla foco, propounded by Guevara 
and Debray. In sum, we may say that it would seem to 
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be the case that the pervasive activism of the New Left, 
when confr. onted with genuinely relevant events, in the 
lurid, light of ýhe circumstance of brutal warfare,, 
isFued inýan anguished, and inevitably over-emphatic, 
cooption of the proffered lessons. The quixotic behav- 
iour of Guevara provided the excuse for fixing in 
place. a romantic interpretation of events; hence 
Chaliand's 1myth'. 
Of the myth, Chaliand notesg"Third Worldism saw 
the revolutionary potential of the Third Vorld as 
deriving from-two main factors: on the one hand, the 
grinding, humiliating poverty of the masses, and the C-3 
contradictions that-produced it, and on the other 
hand, the crisis that could not fail to erupt in 
industrial countriesq once revolutionary regimes put 
a stop to their pillage of Third 17orld materials"(34),, 
He adds that "Third 'Worldism was a phenomenon born 6f 
the crisis of Stalinism and fed by a Policy of peace- 
ful coexistence. It prospered in the 1960's because of 
the new hopes in the spread of socialist revolution 
in and by the Third 'World. But it has turned out to be 
a myth"(35). Myth it may have been, and Chaliand's 
argument is pers 
- 
uasive. Yet this is not to say that the 
original impulse to embrace these novel contributions 
to theorizing/reforming mature capitalism were wrong- 
headed. They ivere not, as we tee below. 
Our general interest in Section Four is in identif- 
ying the proper nature of a marxian analysis of the 
Third World. It would-be appropriate to begin with the 
efforts most closely associated with the general ren- 
ewal of interest in marxian scholarship: theorists 
associated with or embraced by the New Left. This will 
be our point of departure for considering some of the 
various post-war efforts to present a marxian analysis 
of the Third World. 
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3.0 Dynamic of_Theory I: New Left theorizing and the 
Third World. 
Young, who argues that 11 ... it would be quite erroneous 
to suppose that the NL was ever a marxist movement.. " 
(36), tends to follow Chaliand in regarding the coop- 
tion by the New Left of struggles in the Third World as 
(at best) ill-advised. He is less sympathetic to the root 
of the interest than is Chaliand ; though ironically 
his style of enquiry ought to make it easy to answer the 
question of why the cooption was attempted, because he 
uses sociology of knowledge descriptions and concerns 
himself with how the New Left constructed their ideol- 
ogical efforts. Young reports that : "Factually and 
ideologically the division between the urban advanced 
sector and peasant society was a world wide division 
that cut across national boundaries. An imagery was 
needed to express this opposition, and the images of 
Panon-and Mao were combined with dreams of a Third 
World peasant revolution strangling and dispossessing 
the exploitative metropolitan areas. In the West this 
was an imagery compounded of romanticism, guilt, com- 
passion and pure misunderstanding about the relation- 
ship between the peasants and their liberators .... The 
character of these superficial identifications can, it 
is also arguedg be explained in their association with 
a more generalized attack on Western values, mounted 
both by the counter-culture and black American writers, 
in common with both African and Asian theorists and 
ýNvrestern metropolitan intellectuals like Sartre"(37) 
We may begin a reply to Young's dismissive line by 
enquiring into the similarities between New Left and 
Third World work and circumstances. Are there signif- 
icant analogies UDon which the attempted cooption might 
be seen to have been based, or was the whole episode 
simply and-essentially'a fatuous passing intellectual 
fashion? Above (in 2.2) vie offered general remarks 
relevant to this que stion; here we are trying to be a 
little more specific. The followinglwould seem to be 
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the central analogieo,: (i) the struggle against a repre- 
ssive and-unjustifinble authority; (ii) the centrality 
of the task. of social reform; (iii) the creative revision 
of marxian/democratic/socialist theorems. We shall 
consider each of these areas of analogy in turn, and 
refute Young's claims that the. attempted cooption was 
foolish. (Our position, however, is a comment upon one aspect 
of the occasion of renewal-of i. nterest in marxian 
scholarshipland not a commitment to Third Worldism 
(i) The struggle against a repressive and unjustifiable 
authority. That this circumstance holds (or held) in the 
colonial teritories ought not to be in doubt. With 
Davidson in the case of Africa, and Frank in the case of 
Latin America2we have seen the suggestion that the history oJ 
the-exchange of rich and poor nations has been one of the 
largely unprincipled exploitation of the latter by the 
former. An exchange that Davidson, and Frank report 
issued in the-complete destruction of pre-contact 
social forms and the absorption of the native population 
into colonial forms of life. Panon(recalling the style 
of our Chapter Five characterization of the options 
open to the colonial power confronted by 'nationalist 
developmentalism') characterizes the. relationship of col- 
onial power and native thus: "The colonial world is a 
world cut in two. The dividing line, the frontiers are 
shown by barracksand police stations"(38). Fanon goes 
on to distinguish between the circumstances of the 
exercise of power in metropolitan and colonial areas: 
"In the capitalist countries a multitude of moral 
teachers, counsellors and lbewilderers' separate the 
exploited from those in power. In the colonial count- 
ries on the contraty the policeman and the soldier, by 
their immediate presence and their frequent and direct 
action maintain contact with the native and advise him 
by means of rifle-butts and napalm not to budge. It is 
obvious here that the agents of government speak the 
language of pure force"(39). The bifurcation of the 
colonial world is absolute: "This world divided into 
compartments9 this world cut in two is inhabited by 
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two different species"(40). F*anon treats the matter of 
repression: that the colonial authorities! behaviour is 
unjustifiable he, takes to be luminously celf-evident, and 
we can follow the historians vie have cited and grant 
that claim. The question that is crucial i-s: to what 
extent can it be argued that the masri of the people in 
the rich nations stand in relation to their rulers as 
the natives to the colonial authorities? This is the 
claimed analogy. 
"In New Left sources, the slenderness of the analogy is 
granteO (tacitly) insofar as notions of repression are 
presented less in terms of economic disparities and 
mechanisms of force and more in cultural terms. Thus we 
have notions of, say, "repressive tolerance' or the 
'engineering of consentI. The precise extent and nature 
of the comparison's implausibility as an analogy is a 
matter for debate. At the most general level it may 
be observedboth that the majority in the nations of the 
West do in4abit an ine, ý, alitarian, unequal, class society, Co 
and that their absolute level of living is far superior 
to that of the mass of people in the UDC's. The resem- 
blance seems to be one of form rather than substance. 
On the other hand the issue is easier to tackle in 
respect of the linked point about justifiability. since 
this is more of a formal matter anyway. That the beh- 
aviour of the colonial authorities is(was) unjustifiable 
we granted above. What then of the theorems of legitimation 
presented in and for the rich nations? Here we can 
observe that the balance of the argument lies heavily 
in the left's favour. The New Lefts critique of the pre- 
tensions to liberal scholarship of Western universities 
are a case in point; the critique of the slide from 
scholarship to expertise is clearly of continuing 
relevance. ', ',: ore generally the justifying theorems of 
Western nations - 'liberal democracy' - have been effec- 
tively demolished by Macpherson whose arguments we 
rehearsed in chapter two. In the case of the justifiab- 
ility of authority in metropolitan and colonial areas, 
the analogy is to our mind a signiýicant one. 
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(ii) The centrality of the task of social reform. This 
point reqN. ires that we make clear the distinctýons 
between-, the stances of the Rew Left and the reformist 
or-social democratic left on the one hand, and on the 
other, between episodes of decolonization and revolution- 
ary wqrs of liberation. 
Young distinguishes between an 'old' New Left and a 
'new' New Left. One could associate the 'old' New Left 
with the bourgeois nationalist episodes of decolonization. 
Hargreaves apparently does this -. rhen he speaks of the 
disappointment of those who looked to fruitful collabor- 
ation (seen above, 2.2). Pursuing this line vie would then 
wish to associate the I new I New Lef t with the experience 
of, the revolutionary , nars of liberation. But this might 
be held to involve a wrong association, based upon an 
unjustifiable fusion of 'old' New Left and reformist 
elements . Both the 'old' and the 'new' New Left looked, 
to both social and political change. But as Davidson has 
argued, in respect of the African situation, the coinci- 
dence of interest on the part of nationalist elites and 
impoverished masses was brief and unusual. The intereste 
of those two colonial groups are taken to be divergent. 
Thus the disillu 
, 
sionment of the reformers is explained 
(41); as is the attention given by the New Left to the 
wars of liberation, where mass social reform is made 
integral to political activity. 
Davidson treats these matters in broad historical 
terms. Distinguishing the Ifewl and the Imanyl, he obs- 
observes of the populist nationalist movements of the 
early postýsecond world war years that. 1'.. this converg- 
ence of the 1950's between struggle for nationhood ... 
.. and struggle for social gains ... occured as a mutual 
opportuninm"(42). This gap then opens up. 'Davidson is un- 
surprised, and compares the popt-independence confusion 
of Africa with the period following the di-solution of 
the Austro-Hungarian Empire. He concluder--. "Once again 
it was shown that this iiay of solving the national 
problem could not solve the social problem; that the 
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colonial state turned*nation state could not be usefully 
reformed, -but must be revolutionized; and that, only a 
clearýpriority to the soving of the social problem by 
whatever means the future might reveal, would be able 
to fulfil the promises of national freedom"(43). This 
affirmation of the centrality of the 'social problem'- 
that is, of the circumstances of the mass as opposed 
to the elite-is seen by Davidson as the core of the 
politics of liberation: the abandonment of notions of 
elite-ordered modernization, and the acknowledgment that 
the genuine pursuit of democracy would, entail sharp 
revisions of conception and strategy. Davidson says: 
"This new politics could be called the politics of mass 
participation. Increasingly as it continued to unfold 
it became known as the politics of liberation"(44). 
Davidson's list of those states attempting new dep- 
artures has been noted; so too has Chaliand's scepticism. 
Thus Chaliand reports that the ".. term socialism has 
been widely abused"(45). There have been many bourgeois 
revolutions and ".. these regimes differ markedly from 
the three of four really radical revolutions that havý 
occured in the Third World since the end of 't7orld War 
Two: in China, Horth Korea, Vietnam, and Cuba"(46). 
This however seems to be a difficult line of enquiry., 
$ets of lists can always be disputed, the more so when 
those. nation states likely to be listed are also those 
where any changes in policies are going to be acco-mp- C) 
anied by elaborate, revisions of justificatory schemas. 
V-1hat we want to take from all this is the association 
of democracy in the Third World with 'liberation pol, 
itics1j which attempts to fuse matters of social reform 
and political organisation. There is undoubtedly such 
a distinction to be drawn, and for the present this is 
all we need. Just how and where it should be drawn in 
practice need not detain us. ýZatherwe ask%how plausible 
is the analogy between such New Left -cited 'liberation 
politics' and the nature of New Left political activity 
and doctrinal statement? 
Youngs work shows how confused was the brew 
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of social criticicm labelled the New Left. We can pick 
out some CýIements. Thus orgenisationally and genera- 
tionally there is 11 ... a vision of youpg activists 
facing middle aged quietist leaderships, permeated by 
compromise and opportunism"(47). Young picks out the 
SNCC and Committee of 100 as key groups in the New Left, 
and of them reports that neither ".. believed in compr- 
omise; both believed in merging aims and methods, 
including the use of participatorydemocracy in meetings. 
Both were infused with an anarchistic spirit of decen- 
tralism, direct action at centres of power, propaganda 
of the deed, norrcooperation with unjust laws, and 
symbolic revolution"(48). The movement regarded itself 
as. a community and as an alternative in embryo. Young 
, goes on: "The dominant NL themes of the mid-1960's were 
those which linked decentralization and comnunity 
decision making in a participatory democracy"(49). 
With the New Left there is an internal/external 
distinction that can be tentatively made in order to 
help grasp what they were about . Thus the 'internal' 
aspect of their line wns the existentialist' insistence 
on authenticity. All the while, with the New Left, political 
action was interpreted as integral to life in general; 
'personal liberation' was taken to be firmly bound up 
with 'social liberation', and political activity ordin- 
arily understood was removed fromthe centre of the stage. 
We may compare this with, say, Panon on the social- 
psychological redemptive value of revolutionary violence 
- when the black revolutionist kills a white, settler 
he destroys two men etc. Or againgDebray's elucidation of 
the dictum that 'it is the duty of the revolutionary to 
make the revolution'. Nonethelessq political action 
ordinarily understood (albeit reworked) is fully present 
in the New Left, and here is the 'external' aspect. 
Thus the New Left as a political movement pursues notions 
of community/participation/democracy in-the areas-of 
civil rights and poverty programs, in university reform 
rind in the anti-war moverment. Similarly tAe guerilla 
movements pursue a goal of independent and democratic 
statehood. States of affairs rather than states of mind. 
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The analogy invoked, or claimed, equates Iliberationl 
in the col. onial or neo-colonial territoriesq with its 
concern for the , 
'social question', with 'porticipatory 
democracy' and libertnrian/socialist ideas about 
people taking control of their own lives. The analogy 
would seem to be a good one. 
(iii) The creative revision of democratic/socialist/ 
marxian theorems. Cranston, touching upon this issue, 
remarks thet ".. this associption of the New left with 
the reformulation of Migrxipm. may accouhtin part for its 
appeal"(50). This seems to be a grudging acknowledgement 
of the obvious. Tlore informative is Young's report that, 
"It is rather amongst the dissident communists of the 
West ..... that the intellibctual origins of the New Left 
are usually first discerned. Politically isolated and 
alone, searching for a third way beyond the 'empty cant' 
of current liberalismg and the'l-larxist-Sta. linist orthod- 
oxies, some vacillated closer to Anarchism and Pacifism" 
(5l)- Young regards this searching as issuing in a 
catholic internationalism, and notes that "In particular 
Third 'World movements did not seem to be slavishly 
following previous revolutionary models"(52). Here then-is 
. one acknowledgement 
of a clear similarity between New 
Left and liberation movements: both affirmed notions of 
democracy/socialism/marxismg and both offered substan- 
tial revisions to the established orthodoxies. 
This is a claim that can either be left at this' 
simple level or extended into a detailed debate. 17e 
will leave any consideration of the revisions made by 
Fanon and Debray until- later; here we can note that 
both are taken to be idiosyncr9tic in their marxism(s). 
Thus of Fanon Caute says that "[he] was not a marxist in 
any traditional sense"(53). Blackburn, noting the infl- 
uence of Cuba on Debray argues that 11 11 "hat abome all 
distinguishes these writings is their relentlessly 
Tieninist focus on making the revolution, as a political 
technical and military problem"(54). 
As regards the New Left-, we have seen that Young takes 
them to be non-marxian and follows Stratera in regarding* 
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the decline of the Yew Left as asFocioted with its 
turning toward marxionformulations. Yoting discuuses the 
available languages of dissent and takes marxism as 
ready made. Ile argues thus: "The NL has often 
been interpreted as a further revision of ITarxist ideas. 
...... of course any search for a new revolutionary 
strategy had inevitably involved dialogue with Tlarx, 
as well as Lenin's and various other European revision- 
isms . But it would be quite erroneous to suppose that 
the NL was ever a Imarxist' movement - even after 
196811(56). Young grants its interest but feels that 
11 ... the principal impression remaining is of wide 
ranging ideological eclecticism"(56). This lack of any 
clear and coherent self-image is cited as the root 
cause of the eventual collapse of the New Left. 
Young continuesq "The crude conceptualizations that 
later emerged, the piecemeal strategies, were an inev- 
itable counterpart to the anti-intellectualism, prag-, 
matism. and moralism of the movement; as a result they 
left a vacuum that would be filled by concepts and 
strategies drawn from dated or external models"(57). Hence 
the collapse into marxism. In reply we can note that, 
even granting all the diffuseness of the Yew Left elem- 
entsv if it had a core then that core was a libertarian 
marxist humanism. Claiming otherwise is simply tenden- 
tious, and indeed this last quotation from Young rather 
tends to contradict the earlier ones cited above. 
If we compare the revisions to respective orthodoxies 
on the part of the New Left and Fanon/Debraywe get 
something like the following: presented diagramatically. C 
IC 
ontinues overleaf] 
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81 
Revision Fanon/Debray New Left 
Activism Oithodox OP line dropped Orthodox political channels 
in favour of vanguardist ignored in favour of direct 
activism. action. 
` _ Violence- Orthodox ambiguity Un-orthoi5 oxdI_rT ct action 
dropped in favour of a becomes increasingly viol- 
central affirmation of ent. 
role of violence. 
Agency of Proletariat dropped in Proletariat dropped in fav- 
Change favour of peasantry and our of marginal groups. 
lumpenproletariat. 
Organisation Mlilitary/political are 11eans exemplify ends: the 
and strategy fusedq and liberation monolithic party is eschewed 
is to be formative for for anarchistically diffuse 
the new nation. activity. 
Moralism Voluntarist making of Self and social liberation 
the socialist revolution are taken to be inter- 
Redemptive violence of linked. 
zero SUM game, 
I 
practicality CubaAlgeria focus University/anti-war focus 
On these bases the claimed analogy between 'liberation 
politice-t and Hew-Left efforts must be seen to be 
plausible. It is here that the general renewal of inter- 
est in marxian scholarship and radical interest in the 
Third World coincided. From this point the'marxian inter- 
est-in the Third World generated its own momentun, so tb 
S. Py; and from here on the material we treat becomes 
increasingly specialist and increasingly technical. 
JTow as this matter of the revision of Marx is of general 
interest to us, we will consider further those revisions 
effected by the early theorists of the Third ', 71'orld, 
Panon and Debray. In addition to the issue of the pro- 
duction of circumstance-relevant general statements, 
attempted by Fanon and Debray, we nust note that the 
particular notion of 'learning the lessons of experience' 
will exercise us. 
3-9- -. 'FCL%\04\, awk_, ý4, rCLVA 
. 
2.21_117e may now turn ýo the doctrines of these early 
theorists of the circumstances of the Third World. We 
begin by noting that both Debray and Fanon (58) are 
reporting on the lessons of exp. erience. With Dobb vie 
presented one unpacking of the view that social- 
theorizing was essentially a matter of the construc- 
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tion of ideological schemas. We made use of a, model of 
the theorist which permitted analysis of social-theoretic 
efforts un. der-the four headings of milieu, demand, 
resources and product. The theorist was presented as 
responding to political demands to provide interpretive 
guides to action. This raises, familiarly, questions 
of validation and notions of a process theory of truth. 
But also it is evident that if we regard theorizing as 
a social activity then we can introduce matters pertain- 
ing to time-scales. Theory and event can be related in 
more-than one fashion (59). ý, Iith Dobb (reading him 
naively) we have the following implied scheme: (A) 
circumstances; (B) produced theory; (C) event, called forth 
by theory-informed action; (D) new circumstance. 
Continuing in this simple fashion, another way in 
which theory and event may be related is presented by 
the case of Debray, who is taken by Minogue to be the 
exponent of the Cuban revolutionary process. The dis- 
tinctive revisions of Harx that are made here revolve 
around the practical activity of being a revolutionary. 
Mlinogue comments: " It is here - in the area where theory 
is related to practice - that the Cuban revolution has 
made its major contribution to Marxism"(60). Minogue 
goes on to explain as follows; "Che's Marxism, like 
everything else about him, is concrete and practical. 
We hear little about historical epochs and very little 
analysis of class relations. We do hear a great deal 
about the guerilla. Developed into a theory (61) the 
guerilla generates the idea of the foco, the process 
of revolutionary detonation by which a small band of 
guerillas set up a centre of attraction in the sierraS 
and bring the capitalist or neo-colonialist regimes to 
its knees. It is essential to this theory, certainly 
as developed by Debray that the foco be regarded as 
simultaneously military and political"(62). 
Minogue reports that those who generalize from the 
case of Cuba use 'inductive reasoning' and produce 
-false theories as a result. -Hinogue argues thus: 'if we 
see marxism as a social p, benomenon then its history is 
marked by its hereti6s. They are the ones who have dis- 
-regarded established party lines and gone abead and 
6 
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forged new cchemes of revolution, This is seen as pre- 
senting the problem of general theoretical interpretation: 
".. each change has been followed by a development of 
theory which purports to learn the lessons of the new 
experience"(63). Nori clearly learning these lessons is a 
real task, and thus Minogue has a genuine point. Yet he 
hints thcrt the task is of adapting dogma( where this is 
taken in its usual pejorative sense)to new circumstances. 
Arguing thus begs the interesting question of how these 
lessons are learnt. 
Debray reports on his own efforts as follows: I'Vle- 
are never completely contemporaneous with our present. 
History advances in disguise; it appears on stage wear- 
ing the mask of the preceding scene, and vie tend to lose 
the meaning of the play. Each time the curtain rises 
continuity has to be re-established. The blame, of 
course. is not history I s, but lies in our vision, encu- 
mbered with memory and images learned in the past. We 
see the past superimposed on the present, even when 
the present is a revolution"(64). Now if we compare this 
with our presentation of Dobb then clearly Debray is 
emphasising the 'retrospective' aspect of theorizing. 
This is concerned with making sense after the event; 
whereas Dobbs schema was forward-looking. whilst invo- 
king the past as an inevitable/enabling jumping-off 
point. Debray in contrast lays a heavier stress on the 
idea of a 'conventional wisdomI. On the radical intell- 
ectual as potential guerilla. Debray recalls Castro's 
view; thusq 11 ... the intellectual will try to grasp the 
present through preconceived ideological constructions 
and live it through books. He will be less able than 
others to invent, improvise, make do with available 
resourýcesq decide instantly on bold moves when he is 
in a tight spot. Thinking that he already knows he will 
learn more slowly, display less flexibility"(65). Two 
points are involved here; one, the matter of the requ- 
isite flexibility of mind required to interpret the 
lessons proffered by events; andqtwoýthe matter of the 
imaginative innovation of the practitioner faced with 
-288- 
responding tog rather than interpreting, events. 
If we distinguish between the roles of on'the one 
hand, 
-interpretersg 
and on the other, theorists and 
Dractit then vie can present the following schema. 
Thus, the revision of theory after the fact of revolution 
is, it seems, the interpreter's task. Revision of theory 
before or during the revolutionary c). iange belongs to 
theorist and practitioner respectively. Minogue fails to 
make this distinction, and he also offers a wrong crit- 
icism. Thus he claims: "The Russians, the Chinese, the 
Yugoslavs and the Cub;: ýns have all indulged in this 
exercise. Its logic is of course inductive. It consists 
in transposing the most striking facts of the successful 
experience into abstract terms and generating theory 
from them"(66). This is false; if the Ilearninglis done 
crudely then the argument-strategy may be taken as 
inductiveg but not the logic. A general objectiori to 
inductive reasoning will not invalidate lessons drawn 
from the experience simply because the elements of the 
experience picked out will be selected in the light of 
established theorizing. The 'learning' is not simply 
inductive. Indeedg returning to Minogue Is 'adapting dogma' 
jibe, we can reply that it might be better to see this 
sort of 'learning' exercise- with say the'case of Debray, 
with its detailed elucidation/celebration of the Cuban 
episode-as casuistry. Indeed at one point Debray quotes 
Althusser, "Marxists know that no tPctic is possible 
which does not rest on some strategy and no strategy 
which does not rest on some theory"(67). It might be said 
that this sentiment rather seems to go against the above 
noted em-phasess, a little like a denial of the 
role of spontaneityt novelty, or plain fluke in practic- 
al activitygin order to speed the re-absorption of the 
novel into the established canon. Althusverian idealism 
and Cubanvoluntari-sm sit uneasily in Debray. Nonetheless 
these remarks do confirm the point that 'learning the 
lessons of experience' involves an accommodating adjus- 
ment to general conceptions, and not any simple process 
of the elaboration of a revised set of generalizations. 
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If Fanon and Debray interpreted their reopective exper- 
iences of revolutionary guerrilla warfare, then'we may 
ask: given that-the term 'casuistry' implies accomodating 
doctrinal revisions, -Just what revisions of marxian 
work do they propose? 
On the part of Guevara/Debrayg taken as represent- 
atives for the Cuban revolutionary experience, we have 
already had occasion to note Minogue's summary:.. 
"It is here- in the area where theory is related to 
practice - that the Cuban revolution has made its 
major contributign to Marxism"(68). Let us turn to the 
work of Debray nnd consider this contribution. We may 
note, incidentally1that Minogue reports that this 
contribution-".. was brought to its fullest maturity in 
the writtings of Regis Debray"(69); and Blackburn too 
observes that I'Debray is a faithful mirror of C-luban 
Yarxism"(70). Debray is evidently an appropriate subject 
for usq the more so in view of Blackburn's report that 
I'Debray left France in the early 'sixties partly because 
of the hopelessness and corruption of the French Left - 
underlined by the abject role of the French CP during 
the Algerian warý In the event he has contributed sig- 
nificantly to the re-birth of a revolutionary left in 
Europe and North America by making available to them 
the experience of the Latin American guerrillas"(71). 
'. Ve may begin this brief treatment of Debray by 
noting his thoroughgoing practical. intent. Ile is concer- 
ned both to interpret and learn the lessons of Cuba and 
to present the actions/theories of the revolutionists 
as practical activity. Blackburn notes this, speal.,. ing 
of Debray's 'technics': a detailed concern for the nuts 
and, bolts of insurrection. 'Rut the matter is also slightly 
brodder. Debray is concerned to interpret the Cuban 
experience; so the 'historyl, as it were, is central 
and thereafter links are made to established areas of 
debate. Debray is to be understood as interpreting the 
experience of-Cuba to us, and not as proposing eome set 
of doctrinal revisions 'contrived by abstract reflection. 
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We. can see this in the case of the matters of violence 
and-volunt. arism. In the case of violence Debray says: "In 
semi-colonial coutries, even more than in developed 
capitalist countries the State poses the decisive poli- 
tical problem"(72). Hitherto that problem has 
been approached via the coup dletat, or by mass inaurr- 
ectionary activity. Debray reads Castroism as having 
solved the problem of the appropriate strategy of active 
revolutionary action in Latin Arierica; presented as the 
theory of the guerilla- foco. He argues as follows 
"To sum up: the entire apparatus of organi-sed violence C. 3 
belongs to the enemy. The violence with which the people 
can strike back, 'mass action', is easily dismC-Antled by 
the enemys organised violence. A military coup can over- 
night, pulverize derjocratic parties,, trade unions, the 
combativity of the masses and their hope; the Brazilian 
example [ presumably the 1964 coup] is valid for the 
whole continent. What then is to be done? "(73). 
The fo-regoing presents Debraýs report of the Fidelists' 
appreciation of the particular circumstances of %luba, and 
arguably of Latin America generally It poses the cent- 
ral, crucialg issue of the appropriate creative response. 
Debrsy continues: "'To Lenin's question, Pidelism replies 
in terms which are similar ..... Under an autocratic 
regime.: only a minority organisation of professional 
revolutionariesq theoretically conscious and practically 
tra, ined-in all the skills of their profession can 
prepare a succesful outcome for the revolutionary 
struggle of the masses. In Fidelist terms, this is the 
theory of the foco, of the insurrectionary centre"(74). 
, :ý 
If we turn to consider Fanon's viork, in particular 
'The Wretched of the Earthlsv.,, e note immediately that it 
grows out of the experience of the Algerian týrar of inde- 
pendence. Caute reports that "Algeria had belonged to 
France since 1830 and it was colonized in dept. -4.11(75). 
When in 1957 the socialist premier Mollet gave way to 
nationalist pressures ".. the scene was set for total 
war ....... which spread from Algeria to France itself, 
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decinated the Algerian people, brou&, ht down the Fourth 
Republic and raised the spectre of military rule or 
fascism in France"(76). In The Wretched of the '"Earthl 
Fanon offers a general treatment of the Third 77orld 
that is didactic, allussive, exho. rtative, "diagnostic" 
as 7orsley has it (77); and which is steeped in Sartrean 
existentialim.. Caute notes that 11 ... the wide canvas of 
the Third World is filled in with sweeping strokes of 
a brush exclusively dipped in African paint.... The 
Algerian revolution is implicitly treated as a model 
for all of Africa"(78). 
So much for the general occasion of theorizing; if 
we now note its character in terms of its appreciation 
of its circumstances and its response theretowe have 
the-following. (I) Fanon analyses the colonial scene in 
terms of a radical bifurcation of society ; as we have 
seen, he speaks of "this world divided into compartments, 
this world cut in two is inhabited by two different 
species"(79). (II) Significant change is taken as a 
zero sum game. It extends to the notions of 'truth' and 
fgoodness'; here Fanon argues iiTruth is that which 
hurries on the break-up of the colonialist regime.... 
.. In this colonialist context there isho truthful 
behaviour: and the good is quite simply that which is 
evil for Ithem"(80). (III) Fanon pr, -)poses action be 
ordered around the revolutionary potential of the rural 
peasantry and the urban Door. 
The rensons behind the affirmation of the need for 
violent revolution are twofold. Firstthis bifurcation' 
of society leaves all we-gpons in the hands ofý the 
colonial Dower. There is a straightforwardly repressive 
government facing the indigenous people; there is, it 
might otherwise be said, no area of 'civil society'. 
Secondly, 'Panon notes the ease of cooption of elite 
nationalists by the colonial regime entails that, if 
there is to be progressit needs must be achieved by 
violent means. Thus whilst granting the usual Leninist 
requirements vis a vis the state, Panon goes on to lay 
heavy stress on the unsatisfactory character of the 
indigenous nationalist parties. Caute reports týis as 
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the last step in Fanon 0s evolution as a social-philosopher: 
thus, "'Fir. st he had assailed prejudice and mystification; 
then he had turped his fire against colonialism itself; 
now he recognised. that decolonization would only be 
authentically revolutionary if it was also authentically 
socialist"(81). The requirement of violence is derived, 
it appearsq from the experience of radicals becoming 
absorbed by neo-colonial circumstances and from his apprec- 
iation of the character of colonial Algeria. Thereafter 
it seems violence is embraced as redemptive. 
Fanon's proposals resemble Debray'S: the nationalist 
party will sooner or later throw off its genuine radicalc, 
and these will discover a home with the rural population. 
Panon celebrates the peasantry as the true source of 
revolutionary power and plots their course through 
revolutionary war. We can here quote at length: 
"The nationalist militant who has fled from the town 
in disgust at the demagogic and reformist manoeuvres of 
the leaders there, disappointed by political life, 
discovers in real action a new form of political activity 
which in no way resembles the old. These politics are 
the politics of leaders and organisers living inside 
history who take the lead with their brains and their 
muscles in the fight for freedom. These politic,, -- are 
national'grevolutionnry and social and these new facts 
which the native will come to know exist only in action. 
They are the essence of the fight which exploaes the old 
colonial truths and reveals unexpected facets, which 
brings out new meanings and pin-points the contradictions 
camouflaged by these facts. The people engaged in the 
struggle who because of it command and know these facts 
go forward, freed from colonialism and fore-warned of 
all. attempts at inystificationginoculated against all 
national anthems. Violence. aloneg violence committed by 
the peopleg violence organised and educated by its 
leaders, makes it possible for the! masses to understand 
social truths and gives the keys I , to them. "'ithout that 
struggle, without that kn-owledge of the practice of action, 
there's-nothing but a fancy dress parade and the blare of 
trumpets. There's nothing save a minimum of readaption, a 
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few reforms at the top, a flag waving: and down there 
at the boltom en undivided mass, still living, in the 
Middle Ages, endlessly marking time"(82). 
$-7-Lt We can nov., offer a comparative summary of the 
themes of Fanon Fnd Debray. 
(1) The Fidelist appreciation of the character of the Third 
World state is echoed by Fanon The power of the 
ruling group is centred on the state and there is no 
effective diffusion of power through 'civil society'. 
The Fidelist reaction to this autocracy is shared by 
Fanon: insurrectionary guerrilla violence and the affir- 
mation of home grown models of action. Thus Debray, 
arguing that the foco is the paradigm of an anwer to the 
problem of the state in Latin America, goes on to insist 
upon-the locally developed links of military and polit- 
ical activity. He is at pains to distinguish it from 
imported models which are not derived from the Cuban 
experience, and which have not proved successful. Fanon 
too insists upon local circumstance-relevant solutions. 
In criticising the bourgeois nationalist parties, he 
observes-. "The notion of the party is a notion imported 
from the mother country. This instrument of modern 
political warfare is thrown down just as it is, without 
the slightest modification, upon real life with all 
its infinite variations and lacks of balance"(83). 
(2) Faving made this fundamental appraisal. much of the 
rest is a matter of tactics. Here Debray offers the 
detail whil"St Fanon contents himself with the broadest 
of sketches. For Fidelism this concerns the role of the 
guerrilla foco; the 'small motor' that occasions the 
activity of the 'big motor' of the masses. Panon too 
offers a vanguardist schema, involving radical groups 
splintering from the nationalist party and finding their 
allies (and the agent of change) in the rural, peasantry. 
In Vanons work there is no counterpart to Debray's 
'technics'; the language is more general. 
(3) Debray and Fanon resemble each other on the related 
point of the dismissal of established radical views and 
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groups. Thus Debray rejects not only 'putschism, and 
'mass actýi. onl but also the line of the CP's inregard 
to the preliminary construction of a bourgeois nation- 
alist state. Fanon follows this, and both condemn estab- 
lished and orthodox asDirant rulers as incompetent to 
the task of initiating autonomous national development. 
(4) Both Fanon and Debray concern theriselves wholly 
with the pursuit of socialism. The circumstances of 
their theorizing are such that the process with which 
they are concerned can be treated as a zero sum garie: 
hence the 'black and -, vhitel style of. their work. The 
corollary of this is their 'practicality' : both are 
absorbed in the circumstances of their res2ective 
strugglesq and general discussions of the conditions of 
successful action. The realm of thelorthodox left', the 
pursuit of a marxivn science of the social is, in their 
work, muted(84). That the 
buban and Algerian revolutions 
in fact represent 'creative responses' is taken as 
evi(lent from their success. Explanations of the condi- 
tions for success of insurrections do not go far beyond 
a description of the circumstances of which they treat 
the histories. 
SUr**,, a_T% tote, 
Against Young. it is clear that the disposition of 
the New Left thinkers to attempt the cooption of the 
'liberation struggles' to their own efforts was based 
on significant analogies in respect both of circumstancds 
and of analyses attempted. The events/theorizing in the 
Third World provided a ready stock of 'examples' that 
could be drawn upon to illuminate the nature of politics 
and the lines of attack upon the status quo. ýVe have 
looked at three such analogies:, that of the struggle 0 
against repressive and unjustifiable authority; that of 
the affirmation of the centrality of social reform; and, 
finally, the creative revision of socialist/democratic/ 
marxian themes. Given the general interests of this 
studythe matter of the third analogy was of particular 
interest. 
Fanon and Debray we took to present circumstance- 
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particular efforts of interpretive writing; -though both 
shade off-into presenting work that is of the practit- 
ioner (partly this is a matter of their own involvement 
and partly of their reception by wider, -western audiences, 
perhaps). Neither Panon and Debray(85), nor the New 
Left, offer any systematically elaborated revision of 
marxian theory. Yonnr, indeed presents it as a crucial 
failing of the ITew Left that it never established its 
ovin distinct critical language, pnd instead rested 
content with the ad hoe adoption of ready made marxian 
notions. 
C4 Subsequent viork (in particular, we now treat 'devel- 
opment, and 'Third World' work rather than "Jew Left 
efforts) has attempted a more systematic and coherent 
revision of Marx, We may note that given that the New 
Left did regenerate an interest in P'lliarx, the echolarly 
efforts at revicion/exposition/cooption have been 
widespread in the 'social sciences'. These general and 
widespread debates we will not attempt to review. Rather, 
againg we narrow our interest to 'development-studies'. 
That our focus has become rather more 'technical' than 
above is further evidenced in the material we consider. 
Whereas Panon and Debray were both (a) anticipators of 
our technical area of interest and (b. ) acknowledged 
influences on the Npiv Left as a whole, the figures of 
Barang Sweezy and Prank(to indicate some key writers) are 
known mainly to the members of the specialist discip- 
lines which treat development matters. In sum, this chapter 
now shif-Lgfrom treating widely noted activists to 
treating comparatively unknown theorists, and more 
particularlyq western academic-based scholars. 
- The issue of the nature of a 'presently relevant 
marxism' is here pursued as a theoretical matter, that 
is, not another exercise informed by the sociology of knowledge 
Iffith 'development-studies' the period sees: (a) the 
occasion of the presentation of the claims of the Ineo- 
marxistsl(to have established a marxian political 
I economy of mature capitalism and of the systems periph- 
eral areas, the Third Vlorld); and (b) a variety of denials 
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of these claims, where these denials revolve aroiind 
the contention that the Ineo-marxists' are not. really 
marxists at all.. We pursue these matters in part 4. 
4-0 : 11 t 
4A 
In terms of the material we have to treat in this 
subsection, the most striking change from what has gone 
before. is this: whereas we have been concerned primarily 
with activistsnow we are faced with scholars. This 
distinction might at first glance seem to be somewhat 
arbitraryg serving only to note a trivial fact in respect 
of the biographies of the various writers whose work we 
look at. Yet it is of rather more interest, and concom- 
itantly more defensible, if we recall our remarks on the 
temporal relation of the engaged subject to his particul- 
ar objects' 0 Here we distinguished between: theorists, 
where we read Dobb naively as making theorists operate 
'before the fact': that is, as preVaring recipes for 
action that were subsequently to be followed; practition 
ers, who we took to be those activists whose very behav- 
iour occasions renewal in established canons of thouýht 
(here the example of the Cuban experience was to the 
fore) and interpretersq who we took to be those writers 
concerned to learn the lessons of such practical exper- 
ience: we instanced Debray. Row given this, by using the 
notion 'scholar' we are presenting, it seems, a variation 
of the idea of 'interpreter'. We are implicitly distin- 
guishing the circumstancbs of an 'interpreter' who to a 
greater or lesser degree shares the experiences of those 
people whose activity he attempts to interpret (the slide 
of role is towards that of spokesman); and an 'interpre- 
ter' who does not directly share the experience of those 
whom he writes about ( the slide of role is towards 
commentator). The 'scholar' belongs to this second cate- 
gory. To put this another way: it is one thing to tramp 
around'the jungle with people whose action you are 
trying to interpret to'those you think-will be sympathetic-, 
but it is quite another thing to discuss in the comfort 
of (say) a university study those self-same people, even if 
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it is done with equivalent sympathy and interpretive intent. 
The material we treat in this section is, gpnerally, 
that of scholars. In particular it is the work of anglo- 
phone academics. Just what the full implications of this 
'reminder' might be taken to be have not thus far been 
discovered. Evidently it involves our disposition to 
consider the role of the academic social theorist in the 
context of the-schema of social theorizing as involving 
the constructionq criticism and comparative rpnking, of 
ideological schemes. These three are a12 tasks that can 
be plausibly allocated to the 'liberal academic', and 
if we invoke Habermas' notion of an 'ideal speech sit- 
uation' then it-can be seen that the critical role could 
count as a practical contribution to the pursuit of 
democracy. 
Putting a gloss on these remarks, it could be said 
that whist it is a familiar injunction in marxian 
writing to remember that theorizing should be concrete 
and historically specific. it is rather less obviously 
remembered that theorizing is both a concrete and hist- 
orically specific activity. In this light it is possible 
to distinguish between what it makes sense for one 
theorist to say and what it makes sense for another to 
say, simply by virtue of their particular circumstances. 
Arising from this, and noted below, is the matter of the 
'slide to the general' that seems to occur in (some) 
academic marxian scholarship. Deference is paid, so it 
seems, to some model of 'properly marxian behaviour', 
where this tends to collapse all radical activity into 
the one mould of Imarxian revolution making'. This has the 
effect of suppressing reflexivity of theorizing. Thus, 
for exampleg we get hugely elaborate, technical, scholarly 
analyses of this or that issue which then conclude in a 
relatively few pages or paragraphs that this or that is 
the proper political course. (See for example Brenner). 
There seems to be a crucial disjunction between 
behaviour, praxis. (which in this case is the pursuit of 
scholarship), and prescriptio0s for action (which in the 
case of those affirming the model of 'properly marxion 
behaviour' looks like a generalized recipe of class war). 
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Reflexivity in theorizing, which here we are taking as 
an injunction for the theorist to locate himse. 1f and 
argue accordinglyg would seem to entail'that there can 
properly be a diversity of contributions to the pursuit 
of democracy. The corollary is that the 'liberal academic' 
should pursue critical theorizing because that is what 
is appropriate to academic practice. 
We can offer a few examples of what we have in mind, 
by way of illustration. It is clear that this change in the 
basic character of the discussions referred to in our 
enquiries has been noted. Negatively, it is invoked by 
Young when he criticises the New Left for : (l) facile 
borrowings of revolutionary models from liberation 
struggles - the Black Panthers being perhaps the 'best' 
example of a group that failed to consider its own 
circumstances and the scope of, the practical activity 
open to it; (2) a catholicity of interest that led to 
the movement collapsing under the weight. of its own 
amorphousness; and (3) the failure to construct an 
autonomous, self-locating and ordering, explanatory frame. 
In sum Young regards the New Left as never knowing 
where they were, what they were doingor where they were 
going. Conversely, others have taken a more positive view. 
Thus Foster-Carter distinguishes Imarxism-as-theorylfrom 
Imarxism-as-history'; which permits, amongst other things, 
the pointing up of the fact that different concerns 
attach to, the practice of abstract theorizing as opposed 
to practical'politicing. So Foster-Carter distinguishes, 
for examplegbetween the historical situation of revolut- 
ionary struggle in the post-second world nar period, on 
the one hand; and on t'., ie otherg academic efforts to make 
sense of it. He notes 11 ... neo-marxism as an academic 
phenomenon is largely a response to the way in which 
people like Mao and Ho have changed the world... 11(86). 
In certain cases we can see the vacillation between 
claims-to the role of scholar and claims to the role of 
activist. Typically these involve the 'slide to the 
general' we mentioned above. We see that the academics 
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exemplify their circumstances in their viork. For instance 
Brenner offers. a. detailed critique of the argument- 
strategy of the Ineo-marxian' work of Baran, Frank and 
Wallerstein. This seems appropriate, thopgh at the end 
-ive essay Brenner offers a series of of this impresc 
concluding remarks thst fudge the distinctions that we 
are trying to point up. He slides from exemplifying his 
circumstances(by presenting detailed historically info- 
rmed viork), which entails some view of the contribution 
to the pursuit of democracy open to the scholar, to 
apparently denying the specific character of his position 
and efforts by suggesting that his work be judged accord- 
ing to how it measures up to some implied general model 
of the proper behaviour of the Imarxian revolutionary'. 
Another example of this lexemplification/deniall 
movement can be found in Taylor's(87) critique of Poster- 
Carter. Taylor conducts a detailed critique of Foster- 
Carter, which we can best regard as 'second order' anal- 
ysis, internal to the discipline. The concern Taylor 
displays for precision in formulation of claims exemplifies 
-his circumstances as an academic. Yet his notion of the 
contribution he is making to the pursuit of democracy 
vitiates this self-exeMDlification. Foster-Carter picks 
out Taylor's view that he, Taylor, is helping provide 
revolutionaries with the best possible, most advanced 
conceptual equipment. So a subtle and complex analysis 
fashion, is to be linked to practice in a crude mechanical 
one which implicitly grants that there is only one 
model of revolutionary change(88). 
The change in the character of the discourses we 
must consider can be exemplified in the case of Frank. 
The fearly' and the 'late' Frank can be compared in 
manner and tone, as he rejigs his schemes in a fashion 
we can regard as rendering them compatible/coherent with 
his circumstances. Frank moves from tending to the role 
of spokesman toward that of commentator. The task pre- 
sents itself as the pursuit of an autonomous theoretical 
base. In general terms, given the context of the recent 
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history of siabEýtantive work in this -area, this pursuit 
presents i, tself as the attempt of ldependency/. ý, JDTI to 
secure for itself an autonomous (1'ýarx-derived) theoret- 
ical base. 
The early work of Prank has been treated above (Ch 6). 
At that tine we noted the circumstances of production of 
the work,; that is, following Booth, that Frank was taken 
to have been abruptly vion over to the radical left view 
following experience of Latin American conditions. We 
reported that Frank offered a polemical critique of an 
orthodoxy that encompassed neo-classical economics, the 
dependency line al-sociated with _*DCLA, and the traditional 
Latin American CP lines. Affirming the principles of 
historical, holistic and structural analysis, Frank 
fo lio,.., ed 13aran in regarding the circumstances of the 
presently 'underdeveloped' as flowing from the debilit- 
ating metropolitan extraction of surplus from these 
long*-integrated peripheries. The solution was the revol- 
utionary removal of an historically incapable national 
bourgeoisie! jand the socialist-governed pursuit of an 
autonomous national development. 
In his later work ( 1978 ), Frank recalls that he 
has contributed to the formation. of the 'dependency' 
schoolland that his early erforts have been heavily 
criticised for tending to the economistic and lacking 
any genuinely dialectical analysis. of the 1978 . -Iork, 
Frank says that it represents ".. an attempt to transcend 
the 'dependence' approachg but without yet abandoning 
it or the focus on underdevelopment, and to proceed on 
towards the integration of dependence and underdevelop- 
ment i-. rithin the world process of accumulation"(89). The 
book tackles a set 
, 
of particular questions of analysis: 
iscues occasioned by the criticism of the earler work, 
though not flowing directly from them. The criticisms 
are treated in'an introductory chapter that indicates 
FranA line of research interest. Thus he declares, 
"This book and these introductory questions to it are 
an attempt to break out of the vicious circle of 
'development theory"(90). The hoped-for replacement is 
characterized in three ways. The first is by reference to 
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method: "To free ourselves from the irrelevance of 
narro,. -., ly limited neo-classical theory ..... vie niny take 
the global historical vision of Adam Smith and the 
dialectical analysis of Karl Marx as points of departure 
in an attempt to advance toward a whole world encompass- 
ing holistic, real world historical, Socially structural 
(and therefore in fact theoretically dialectical) theory 
of development and underdevelopment"(91). Secondly, as 
regards procedure)he says: "This will require the scie- 
ntific examination of the historical evidence and record 
of capitalist development and the better reading(in the 
sense of Althusser) of 'SOmith and DTarx in the light of 
this evidence"(92). Thirdly, Frank indicates the expected 
mapner of emergence of the product: 111,7ith this purpose 
and in this spirit we review the participation of Asia 
Africa and. Latin America in this world wide historical 
process; and we emphasize the subordinate dependence of 
these areas within the process of world capitalist 
development as the cause of their development of under- 
development"(93). 
If in order to fix the position of this later work 
of Frank in relation to the earlier (characte. ristically 
11JDT1) efforts9 vie consider the nature of the procedures 
noted aboveg then what does it reveal? Clearly there is 
no general reconstruction being undertaken; there is no 
abstract consideration of the categorical framework of 
his effort. Rather he continues to use the syntax of the 
natural sciences: thus he seeks to revise his theories 
with a closer, more detailed reading of history in the 
light of concepts that are already established in his 
work- yet liable, he seems to claim, to re-location 
within a subtler frame derived from Smith and Idarx. 
Frank's recent'work seems to represent an intellectual/ 
political relocation. That which was characteristically 
Frankian is not so much lost as partially submerged. 
To put this another way, where Frank 
is 
earlier work 
grasped in one simplifying and synthesising effort the 
'answer' in respect of Latin America, it now seems as if 
he is trying to work backivards, so to say, and discover 
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those arguments that eEtablish the lanswer'. Yet the 
change o. -P*context introduces a subtle shift of-emphasis. 
Frank seeks not-to uncover the arguments specific to his 
'answer' in respect of Latin Americn, but rather to 
uncover a set of arguments productive of a general 
answer'. 1n Pranks case the 'exemplification/denia2 man- 
oeuvre 
' 
entailed by the pursuit of algeneral answer' is 
made all the more easily by Pranks use of the syntax of 
natural science (94). 
In sum: the discourse vie now treat is that of (roughly 
speaking) scholars and not, a! ý was the case, that of 
(roughly speaking) activists. Frank has exemplified this 
shift. He is an appropriate choicet not only for the 
intri nsic interest of the matters arising from his work, 
but more pertinently because his early (and indeed later) 
efforts constitute a familiar and central element of what 
must noxv be treated as the orthodoxy of this area of 
development studies- that is, Ineo-marxism'. 
44- -16- ' 21"ý - "n-v -t -'e, %, A' - 
Thus far vie have been considering the circumstances 
of the theorist,. noting the general constraints that 
particular situations place upon what it makes sense 
for the theorist in question to say. Theorizing has 
been, seen as a practical activity, and we have had little 
to say about its eventual object. Now we dismiss 
direct concern for the circumstances of theorizing 
whether particular workers are taken as activists or 
scholars, and what difference it makes to them and to us- 
and we proceed todiscuss their object, lneo-marxism'. 
Our concern is now couched in terms of intellectual his- 
tory. We look at resources invoked and matters arising 
therefrom. 
We can begin with the useful essay by Palma on the 
character of 'dependency'. Palma is interested in asking 
whether or not Idependencyl is a theory or a method 
and in pointing up its marxian background(95). Where 
Palma uses the term 'dependency' it embraces Pran'k. 
Purtado and Cardoso, so his usage is broader than the 
one adopted here. 
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Palma begins by noting the marxian programme of 
analysis Qf the development of capitalism; he asks after 
the term 'imperialism' and reports that he finds it 
11 ... absolutely 
iegitimate to use the concept of imper- 
ialism to designate only those aspects of capitalist 
development which have related the fortuness of the 
advanced and backward areas within the world capitalist 
system"(96). Regarded thus (that is, taking note of the 
specific sense of 'imperialism' that Palma takes in 
order to get his treatment of 'dependency' underway), 
marxian interest in the relations between centre and 
periphery may be divideý9Yýto three phases. Palma quotes 
Sutcliffe-. -l'One(prominent in 11arx's and Engels's writings) 
involves plunder(of wealth and slaves) and exports of 
capitalist manufactures to the peripheral countries. The 
second (uppermost in Lenin's writing) involves the export 
of capitalg competition for supplies of raw materials 
and the growth of monopoly. The third involves a more 
complex post-colonial dependency"(98). Given these 
three phases in theorizing about the relationship of 
centre and peripheryPalma goes on to attach to each 
a particular view of the role of capitalism in backward 
nations. Thus for Marx and Engels capitalism appeared 
as a wholly progressive force, even if the process of 
dismantling moribund social forms was brutal and incid- 
ental to the exploitative interests of the colonial 
forces. For Lenin capitalism appears as progressive in 
underdeveloped areas, yet presently shackled by the 
demands of the centres. The eventual outcome expected is 
the peripheral development of a capitalism resembling 
that of the centres. Lenin's analysis is complex and is 
intertwined with debates on the possibilities for capit- 
alism in Russia. It is the third reading of the role 
of capitalism in the peripheries that is of particular 
interest to uss . "The third approach was first developed 
in the 1950's and 'took off' with the publication in- 
1957 of Baran's, *'The political economy of growth'; it'is 
characterized by the acceptance, almost as an axiomatic 
truth, of the argument that no'Third World country can 
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now expect to break out of a state of econonic depen- 
dency and'advance to an economic position benide the 
major capitalisýt. industrial powers"(99). 
Palma, treating 'dependency' as a school of anpro- 
aches to political-economy (where marxism, is (a) the 
major school of, political economy and (b) the most signL 
ificant substantive school treating 'dependency' and 
Latin Ame--ica), distinguishes three varieties of 'depend- 
ency' analysis: (1)Frank and notions of underdevelopment; 
(2) Furtado and ECLA revisions' and (3) Cardoso, who is 
characterized as trying to produce a non-mechanico-formal 
scheme. Now Furtado we have treated and Cardoso we will 
come to; here we look at the first, lneo-marxian' line. 
.. In regard to Frank and ITIDT1, 
Palma offers a view that 
is, more immediately familiar than the above noted sub- 
sumption of a, marxian approach in the tradition of . - 
political economy. Palma reports that "There is no doubt 
that the 'father' of this approach is Paul Baran. His 
principal contribution to the general literature on 
development (Baran 1957) continues the central line of 
marxist thought regarding the contra4ictory character 
of the needs of imperialism (and the process of industri- 
alization and general economic developme'nt of the back- 
ward nations"(100). Along with Baran's work we need to 
mention Sweezy and Wallerstein, as well as Frank. 
Briefly reviewing the efforts of these theorists we 
can thereby sketch the orthodoxy of this area of debate; 
that ist the Inbo-marxian' schema. Our review is 
ordered around some criticisms made of the Ineo-marxian, 
schema by those concerned with matters of theoretical 
status. That is, we construct the 'object' Ineo-marxism' 
with reference to-those " 
critics who specifically deny 
that, amongst other things, Ineo-marxism, is marxian. 
This seems an appropriate line5given our interest in 
what has been taken as., or is to count as, a properly 
marxian analysis of the Third World. tittle of what we 
will say in respect of the-constitution/criticism of 
Ineo-marxism' will be new. Discussion has been extensive, 
and here we rely upon it . First we will introduce 
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six'overlapping and cross cutting criticisms made, and 
then we will go on to consider them in turn. , 
1,1e, begin with the seminal work of Baran, who is concerned 
with the inadequacies of orthodox analyses to the phen- 
omena of modern, monopoly capitalism. The dynamic of 
capitalist development has issued in the system of 
monopoly capitalism. Oligopolistic competition character- 
izes the system: 11 ... under oligopolistic conditions price 
competition is at a minimum, but firms still strive 
incessantly-to reduce costs. The inevitable result is a 
strong and persistent tendency for the economic surplus 
to increase both absolutely and relatively as the system 
deyelops" (101). oooose.. "Monopoly capitalism is a self- 
contradictory system. It tends to generate ever more 
surplusq yet it fails to provide the consumption-and 
investment o. utlets required for the absorption of a 
rising surplus and hence for the smooth working of the 
system"(102). The system drifts to stagnation. Efforts 
to stimulate demand (eg. armaments production) evidence 
the irrationality of the system. It is here, Culley 
reportssthat Baran and Sweezys criticisms begin; theirs 
is essentially a moral critique which revolves around 
the issue of the extent of realisation and allocation 
of societies"economic surplus'. The eyaluative moment 
of their theorizing is 'preliminarylto their econom- 
ics: the model of rationalrealisation of surplus and 
its humane allocation is presented as the socialist 
planned economy. Other forms of society are rpeasured 
according to how far they diverge from this model. 
Culley strongly disapproves of this line. Criticism 
number one: objections to moral critinue. 
(2), As regards underdevelopment: "The explanation for 
underdevelopment is to be found in an analysis of the 
development of European capitalism. Baran argues that 
it was the development of capitalism in the West which 
simultaneously produced 'underdevelopment' in Latin 
America, Asia and Africa, and it is the very existence 
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of the advanced countries today that prevents the econ- 
omic development of the 'backward' countriev-. "(, 103). 
The evolution of capitalism in Western Europe, according 
to Baran, depended crucially upon mercantile accumula- 
tion. This irruption of Western European mercantile trade 
initiated both capitalis t development in centres and 
capitalist underdevelopment in peripheries: "Such over- 
seas operations greatly increased the economic Surplus 
of 111estern EiArope. The increase in surplus came into the 
hands of capitalists who could use it for investment 
purposes. The effects of the extraction of the surplus 
from the 'donor' countries provided the basis for under- 
development"(104). The situation of underdevelopment 
continues and is explained, on Culley 0s exegesis, by 
reference to the use of the available surplus. Thus 
"The main cause of continued underdevelopment is not 
simply the 'irrational' use of the actual surplus, but 
the way in which their potential economic surplus is 
used ...... It is absorbed by -various forms of excess 
consumption by the upper classes, by maintenance of 
'unproductive' bureaucracies and redundant military 
establishments9 and a very large share of it is with- 
drawn by foreign capital"(105). The critics of Ineo- 
marxism' object to this scheme, seeing it as a crude 
polemical inversion of the orthodox; criticism number 
two, objectionsto the thesis in respect of the devel- 
oDment of caDitalism: lznd DeriDheral underdevelopment. 
(3) The notion of 'surplus' is taken to be central to 
Baran's work; Pnd-of it, Baran himself notes that he 
considers it to be ".. the key to the understanding of 
the general working principles of capitalismll(106). 0 
The notion of surplusdesignates, as Sutcliffe puts it, 
".. roughly the difference between what a society prod- 
uces and what it actually consumes(actual surplus), or 
the difference between what it could produce and what it 
needs to consume(potential surplus) ...... Under social- 
ism the idea of a planned economic surplus is relevant" 
(107). The major line of objection, from marxists, to 
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this notion off 'economic surplus' has been that whilst 
it recalls Marx's notion of 'surplus value', it-has in 
fact very little to do with it. The notion is aggregat- 
ive, and Sutcliffe records that Baran has been called a 
'Keynesian of the left'. Thus we have; criticism number 
three, objections to the notion of'econonic surplus. 
(4) The link to Prank is clear in the following quotation 
from a 1969 essay: "This essay contends that underdev- 
elopment in Chile is the necessary product of four cen- 
turies of capitalict development and of the internal 
contradictions of capitalism itself ....... Dly thesis is 
that these capitalist contradictions and the historical 
develoDment of the capitalist system have generated 
underdevelopment in the peripheral satellites whose 
economic surplus was expropriated, while generating 
economic development in the metropolitan centres which 
appropriate that surplus and. further that this process 
still continues"(108). Frank goes on to consider the 
three contradictions of : (I)Iexpropriation/appropriation 
of economic surplus', where he introduces the notions of 
monopoly capitalism and the 'expropriation chain'; (II) 
Imetropolis/satellite polarization',, where he makes 
development and underdevelopment -sides of the sarne coin; 
(III) 'continuity in change', irýrhereby the world capitalist 
system is taken to be both long-standing and in fundame-. ý 
ntals unchanging. Brenner's general summary reads as 
follows: 11[Franý.. was unotnbiguous in locating the dynamic 
of capitalist expansion-in the rise of a world comnercial 
network, while specifying the roots of both growth and 
backwardness in the 'surplus appropriation chain' which 
emergod in the expansionary process: surplus appropr- 
iation by the core from, the periphery and the organisa- 
tion of the satellite's internal mode of production to 
serve the needs -of the metropolis"(109). Pranks political 
conclusions are that whereas the present situation offers 
the underdeveloped only a prospect of continuing sub- 
ordinate incorporation in the world capitalist system 
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and consequent mis-development, socialist revolution 
offers the pro-spect of 'genuinel, lautonomouslgdevelopment. 
Setting aside the appropriate objections to 'moral 
critinue'. 1historical thesis' and leconomistic concepts', 
here is'lodged a fourth objection in respect of the 
implied goal of the Ineo-marxians'. We have; criticism 
number four, objections to the implicit model of devel- 
oDmenttjust what is it? 
(5)VIallerstein is taken to complete Frank. Thus Brenner 
reports that 11 Wallerstein straightforwardly defines 
capitalism asa, trade based division of labour, and it 
is here that he locates the dynamic of the capitalist 
economic development"(110). That the Ineo-marxian' 
effort is economistic in that it totallyfails to 
provide a class analysis is a familiar complaint. Here 
then we note; criticism number five, objection to reduc- 
tion of 'class! to 'market': it is neo-smithian. 
(6)The. political line which attaches to the Baran/Frank 
IUDTt approach follows from the above characteristics of 
analysis; the pre-requisite of any development is the 
disengagement from the world capitalist market and a 
pre-requisite of this is the socialist revolutionary 
displacement of compromised local bourgeoisiesfrom 
power. Criticism number six; as the analysis is imDlau- 
siblelso its pronosals are unhelDful. 
In sum, we may constitute the present 'object of debate' 
(that is, lneo-marxisml)according to its major elements as 
identified by its critics. Tle have taken note of the 
following: 
1.0bjections to the moral critique of capitalism. 
2. Objections to the historical schema used. 
3. Objections to the notion of economic surplus. 
4-Objections to the implicit model of development. 
5. Objections to the reduction of 'class' to 'market'. 
6. Object'ions to the political proposals derived therefrom. 
These six may be organised as follows: the aggregative- 
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economic notion of surplus(3) entails an affirmation of 
an econotistic scheme of society(5). This in turn invol- 
ves a wrong historical schema of the rise of capitalism, 
monopoly capitalism and underdevelopment(2). The resultant 
model of what counts as development is untenable(4) and 
the gen6ral moral critique of capitalil-m. unhelpful(l). 
The Dolitical line which follows from (1) through(5) is 
accordingly wrongheaded(and distracts attention from 
questions of the present dynamic of capitalism in these 
peripheral areas- and indeed generally). 
There is one note to be made in the context of this 
focus upon criticisms which is that the Ineo-marxian' 
scheme is a richly developed one. Its critics tend to 
be scathingg suggesting that it is a simple theoretical 
farrago. But even if they turned out to be. correct in 
their atta, ckslit would remain the case that theo-marxism' 
constitutes the orthod , 
oxy of radical thought in this 
period. If the effort were quite so transparently futile 
it would be difficult to understand the attention paid 
to it. one critic lists the virtues of the line as 
follows: ".. it stimulated the empirical study of instit- 
utional and structural mechanisms of underdevelopment 
.. And in the context of the early 1960's when UDT 
emerged as a militant critique of the ruling ideas of 
developmentalismg its thrust was unquestionably a pro- 
gressive one"(111). Leys adds that vie should be careful 
to remember ".. some of the intellectual deserts from 
which UDT rescued us"(112). 
We now turn to treat these objections. Here vie can 
note that treatment of one or other of these 'objections, 
to the Baran-inspired line often involves carefully 
avoiding invoking the linked criticisms of linked notions. 
That isq the whole effort hangs together; and its elements 
overlap in such a 'way as to reveal that if it is all a 
farrago, then it is avery well integrated one. 
4.11 06sectýIpAs bo b4_ M,, roL c. GV,. RVe oý 
Sol&- Baran/Frank may be taken to pre- 
sent an essentially moral critique of monopoly capitalism 
and its claimed corollary underdevelopment. Such critiques 
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are neither marxian nor helpful. 
In the case of Baran/Frank the isl-ue of the moral 
critique of capitalism is coupled up with the issue of 
their notion of'surplus. Culley reports that "The 
second variant of the concept of surplus ie. the potential 
economic surplus, is a most important one in Baran's 
discourse. It is primarily by an analysis of their pot- 
entialities that types of society-feudalicm, capitalism, 
monopoly capitalism- are assesed"(113). The notion -of 
potential surplus is the measure of general efficient 
functioning of the system and is estimated by noting (a) 
present excess consumption, (b) surplus lost in unproduc- 
tive lDbourý(c) surplus lost through simple inefficiency 
and (d) surplus lost through umemployment. Culley notes, 
"The Utopian nature of this conception is quite clear. It 
allows Baran and his followers to launch an attack uDon 
capitalism as an irrational phenomenon with respect to 
his ovin ethical position"(114). Culley takes Barans 
effort to be humanistic, idealistic, relativistic and 
teleological: "The similarity of their discussion wiýh 
the nineteenth century Utopian socialists criticised by 
1, Tarx and Enge16 is striki , ng"(115). 
Culley reduces Baran 
and Sweezy 
0s investigation to the status of an elaborate 
and disguised expression of dis, ýLpproval. Bernstein follows 
this in respect of UDT:, denying that UDT is marxist he 
speaks ofq inter alia, ".. the use of a moralistic and 
idealistic critique of capitalism based on a philosphical 
humanis-mg which condemns the objective efforts of the 
contradictory nature of capitalist development by refer- 
ence to a utopia free of exploitation, oppresion and 
dependence"(116). 
Having affirmed that we take social-theorizing to 
involve the 'deployment of a morally informed categ- 
orical frame19 we are obliged to pursue this matter. So, 
we can perbaps elucidate these matters by proposing the 
following analogy. As Marcuse uses the trio Basic Repr- 
ession/Surplus Repression/ 'Diminished Repressionl(where 
this is implied cgs hold , 
ing for socialist society') to 
ground, in a psychological individualism, a moral 
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critique of contemporary society, so Bay-an uses the trio 
Actual/Potential/Planned Surplus to ground, in. an ag. -re- 
gative and refo37mist 'left Keynesianism', a moral critique 
of contemporary society. 
Marcuse (117) presents the notions of repression/ 
surplus repression. The argument strategy grants, it 
would seemt the (orthodox? ) claim that in any society 
a measure of repression is necessary to establish social 
order. Mercuse begins with individuals as bundles of 
instinctual desires unhappily located in an hostile 
environment of scarcity. The un-repressed, autonomous, 
freely acting, individual is literally asocial. Having 
granted a minimum necessary 'amount' of repression, 
T., 71arcuse then asks after the particular, historically 
specific, repression we have: it is, he reports, that 
which, is required by the'functioning capitalist society. 
To Basic Repression is added Surplus Repression. 
L. R (1) enables the growth of capitalist society's 
productivity, which effort simultaneously tends to the 
impoverishment of the quality of life; and (2) extracts 
a high price in. terms of the suppression of the instinct- 
ual life of the human organism. The general and the 
particular reinforce each other. Two points now follow; 
(a) The whole system tends to collapse; as'the opportu- 
nities for change rise(by virtue of success of capitalist 
production) so too does, the level of SR needed to main- 
tain the status quo. In terms of recent history vie can 
thus interpret the slide into fascism. (b) As capitalism 
has solved the problem of scarcity, SR could indeed be 
eased off. 
It is clear that all. this can be seen as a morally 
informed critique. It revolves around the idea of quality 
of life available to the inhabitants of the society in 
question. What they do have, and what they might have. 
Reflecting upon the above noted strategy of criticism 
vie can make the following points. Recalling the material 
of Section One of this study-we can 'contend that, 
in respect of valuation in social theorizing, what is at 
issue is"not whether or not the effort is 'tainted' by 
61 
valuation; because,,:: s we havd seen,, there will 
, 
necessarily 
lbe. a significant aspect of valuation. Rather, the matter 
is one of tlaechýracter of the valuations madejand the 
manner of their insertion into social theore, tic efforts. 
If the above-noted argivnent took as its moral 
reference point the schemes involved in Macpherson 10 
'reconstruction' of the notion of 'democracy', then it 
would be a moral reference point that we would wish to 
support. If it also inserted such notions via an. explicit 
statement and in an appropriately secondary form, then 
the scheme would have a defensible core and a basis upon 
which to build an appropriate critique of present circum- 
stance. 
But in Marcusels. case he takes as a start-point a 
psychological individualism that is, on the face of it, 
wholly problematical. A criticism of this start-point 
could be mounted by invoking, say, Macpherson on Hobbes 
(118). Now Hobbes strips away the social circumstances 
of bourgeois nan and presents the result - grasping, 
acquisitive greed- as_essential to man; which atom then 
has to be' reintegrated into some sort of social whole. 
So with Marcuse, his start-point offers a version of 
bourgeois mang avoiding work and pursuing, egoistically, 
sensual gratificatiohg which atom is then reintegrated 
into a social whole. Marcuse's start point is apparently 
tainted; it is not defensible, because individualism is 
not. Sog in this way, Marcuse's effort could be seen as 
ideological(pejorative) because it grants as a premise 
an incoherent and obfuscating notion Cý 
7,1ith Baran we seem to hCaAve a similar pattern of argu- 
ment. The notion of 'economic surplus', it is widely 
granted, is not marxian, even though it recalls the term 
'surplus value'. Further. the notion of 'economic surplus' 
is redolent of Keynesian aggregative macro-economic 
analysisq and the treatment of society via the issue of 
the utilization of this surplus (whether rational or 
irrational) is similarly redolent of a 'liberal reform- 
ism'. Myrdal and Galbraith come to mind. It seems as if 
it could be argued that the key idea of Baran's schemel 
7 
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that of leconomic surplus', i, - tainted in the same 
fabhion az. Marcuse's notion of Isur-plus repression'. 
Charges of 'ideology mongering' could be levelled in the 
sane way, 
That Baran's effort is critically engaged is not in 
doubt. Hor is it in doubt that the notion of 'economic 
surplus' will serve as a core element of a political 
economic analysis. What is at issue, for us, is the 
precise nature of the moral core of Baran's effort and 
the manner of its insertion into analysis. 
Výle saw( with Rockmore in Chapter One) in the case of 
Marx'S work that the moral core, a philosophical ahthrop- 
ology issiAng in the notion of alienated labour, was 
ceptral to the machinery of substantive, practical, 
analysis. Here is the key to our suspicions in regard 
to Baran: the evaluative stance, condemning the system's 
present irrationality of use of economic surplus and 
pointing to a possible rationally ordered futureis 
pitched at such a general level as to tend to be indisti- 
nguishable from any other 'liberal' critique. The related 
point (which comes up below, criticism. 3) addresses the 
manner of insertion. It is suggested by Culley that 
Baran's economics is separate from the moral critique. 
The economics is seen as heuristic: a vehicle for cashing 
a moral stance that is presented, in a familiar manoeuvre, 
as a general scheme. 
It might be replied, in regaýrd to 'indistingui- 
shability', that this shows how marxian critique has 
become a part of the'culture (common sense) of the left;. 
and does not. consequently, need spelling out in formal 
mode. But this seems dubious; and it is certainly a pos- 
ition that it would be difficult to grant, in a study 
Dredicated upon the existence of present reflection 
amongst practitioners as to the precise nature'and 
status of social theorizing. 
A better'reply might be to invite critics to recall 
the circumstances of the effort's production; that is, 
the USA in the late 1950's. Against that political 
background, and in contrast to 'modernization-theory' 
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Baran's effort must appear to be hugely sophisticated. 
Leys'remarks should here be borne in mind. I 
So, if we read the critics Culleyq Bernstein et al 
as objecting to 'moral critiquel-where this is charac- 
terized as essentially involving a surreptitious borrow- 
ing from the stance to be attacked- then we would wish 
to grant the argument some force. However, if the critics' 
attack embraces not just this 'surreptitious borrowing' 
but all and any evaluative(moral) stance towards social 
forms and issues, then ive cannot agree. Pollowing 
earlier discussions ( eg. Myrdal) we would have to regard 
the critics as pursuing the chimera of non-engaged 
theory. 
4! 27, Msezcklorý, s bo Vts: ýosl, c& sAse-mZý- ýa-, Q_L 
Criticism number twJ'eA5'*-'%t6$bjections-to the thesis in resp-r 
ect of the rise of capitalism. and withal. the creation 
of underdevelopment. 
Here we invoke the work of Brenner; that is, his essay 
'The origins of capitalist development: a critique of 
neo-smithian M arxism' . ', Ve may focus on three points. 
(a) Brenner says that Ineo-marxian' theorists, in their 
efforts to e: , plain the rise of capitalism9argue in a 
circular fashion. They assume the existence of capitali- 
stic social relations in their efforts to explain the 
rise of capitalism. Brenner analyses Sweezy's work 
(, The transition from feudalism to capitalism') by un- 
packing the proffered model and asking after the plaus- 
ibility and character of the assumptions made in respect 
of the behaviour of the historical actors mentiondd.. He 
concludes: "In sum, Sweezy's entire account of the tran- 
sition from feudalism to capitalism is based on the 
implicit 8-ssumption that capitalism already exists"(119), 
Sweezy's effort is taken to reduce to the view that the 
transition from feudalism to capitalism is a matter of 
the appropriate adjýstment in society to the demands of 
the markete9yet-the market is the sum of social relations. 
Brenner reportsg"In the last analysis, i1weezy's error 
is two-fold. It'is to posit that the producers'relation- 
ship to the market determines their operation and devel- 
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-opment and. 9 ultimately, their relationvhip to one 
another, rather than vice versa. Correlatively, it is 
to locate the system Is potential for development in the 
cripacities of its component individual units (thus the 
emphasis on motivations), rather than in the system as 
a whole--specificallyg in the overall system of class 
relations of production which determine/condition the 
nature of the interrelationships between the individual 
units andp in this manner, their operation and develop- 
ment"(120). 
(b) Brenner argues that the entire Ineo-marxist' line in 
Smith. this area of debate reduces to an inversion of Adam ýJ 
The Ineo-marxists' follow Smith in equating capitalism 
with a trade based division of labour, where innovation 
(and thus growth/expansion) is determined by market 
pressure. 'Class relations just follow on. Brenner speaks 
of 'historical functionalism' and 'a classical form of 
economic determinism', and takes this as wrong. Instead, 
he ,, 7ants to reduce economics to social (class) relations. 
The core of the matter is the conjugation of class 
circumstances that trigger and sustain the innovative 
dynamic of capitalism. 
Wallerstein is singled out: "In lVallerstein's 'The 
modern world system' the E-3mithian theory embedded in 
Sweezy's analysis of the transition from feudalism-to 
capitali-sm is made entirely explicit, and carried to its 
logical conclusion ......... Thus lo7allerstein straight- 
forwardly defines capitalism as a trade based division 
of labourg and it is here that he. locates the dynamic 
of capitalist economic development"(121). There is an 
economic determinism that ".. pervades all aspects of 
Wallerstein's theoretical framework"(122). 
To this Brenner counterposes his own view. Resting 
upon detailed historical exegesis,, he affirms that: 
"Neither development in the core nor underdevelopment 
in the periphery was determined by surplus transfer, 
Eco, riomic development wac a qualitative process, which 
did not merely involve an accumulation of wealth in 
general, but was centrally focused on the development of 
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the productivity of labour"(123)....... "In, short the 
uniquely s, ucceseful development of- capitalism in 17e-tern 
Europe was determined by a class system, a property 
system, a system of surplus extraction, in which the 
methods the extractors were obliged to use toýincrease 
their surplus corresponded to an unprecedented, though 
imperfect, degree to the needs of deVelopment of the,, 
productive forces"(124). It is in this conjunction that 
the search for an explanation of the genesis'of capit- 
alism is to be found, not in any behaviour, of an abstra- 
ctly regarded world market. 
Frank repeats this Ineo-marxian' line; development 
and underdevelopment, are explained by reference to 
international trade-based extraction of surplus, and 
not to the conjunctions of class circumstances and 
technological possibility. 
(c) In regard to the method of analysis of these theorists, 
Brenner reports that their failure ".. to discard the 
underlying individualistic presuppositions"(125) of 
Smith's model has resulted in their erecting a mirror 
version of it. Palma reports of FranA efforts that: 
"Probably still unduly influenced. by his training as an 
economist at the University of Chicago, he constructs 
a mechanico-fornal model which is no more than a set 
of equations of general equilibrium (static and un- 
historical), in which-the extraction of the surplus 
takes place through a series of satellite-netropolis 
relationships, through which the surplus generated at 
each stage is syphoned off"(126). 
The historical material we cannot, and do not want 
to, follow. 17e note it in order to indicate that here is 
a large area of discourse, apparently somewhat remote to 
development studiesq that bears upon our concerns. The 
circularity, inversion of Smith and erection of a 
mechanico-formal model are matters closer to us. Palma, 
we have notedhas evinced an interest in political - 
economy as an argument style., and has approved of Cardoso's 
problem-centred and specific methods. The pursuit of 
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general theory is again shown to be ill-advised; yet 
the issue-, of the proper presentation and use of such 
general. formulations remains to be resolved. The problem 
seems to be that general formulations are called forth 
by specific efforts and that thereafter they are taken 
to be analogous to natural science general formulations; 
efforts being made to develop and present them accord- 
ingly. The result being, in this case, the production 
-of a mechanico-formal system which detracts from the 
original problem. Indeed, at worst, the initial problem- 
specificity is ignored and theorists proce6d straight- 
away to the largely futile effort at the erection of 
general formulations, general theories. 
-, objections to the'notion of 
'economic surý)lusl. The material here largely overlaps 
with that of criticism number one; we have a slightly 
different focus. Thus there seem to be two -ýain lines of 
criticism of the notion of leco'nomic surDlust: (a) criti- 
cisms from within the ambit of the orthodox, that is, 
non-marXian economics; we will not pursue these, noting 
only that they involve charges of ambiguity and diffi- 
culty of measurement; and(b) criticisms in respect of 0 
the notiods theoretical status. 
In respect of this latter line, it is argued that 
Baran's notion of surplus( and thus the notion used by 
the entire UDT-marxian line) owes more to the aggrega- 
tive economics of Keynes than it does to Marx. Sutcliffe 
reports that "The conceptual difference is that Marx's 
'surplus value' is defined in relation to the ownership 
of property while Baran's 'surplus' is defined more in 
relation to consumption needs. It is therefore to Baran 
something which , 
exists in all societies"(127). We can 
offer a preliminary elucidation of this distinction by 
calling upon the work of Culley once again. She argues 
thus: 1"Marxism has always rejected concepts of surplus 
iderived. from the postulate of irreducible needs or con- 
cepts in which surplus is presented as an exceds over 
the, basic consumption needs of society. In Capital the-, 
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concepts of necessary and surplus labour are strictl 
economic concepts and are not flerived from any. extra- 
economic concept of human needs. For Ilarx, surplus value 
is the specifically capitalist mode of appropriation 
of surplus labour ......... Surplus labour, that is, 
labour over and above necessary labour, exists in all 
modes of production, because the conditions of reprod- 
, uction of the labourer are not eauivalent to the cond- 
itions of reproduction of the economy .... Necessary and 
surplus labour must always be defined in relation to a 
determinate mode of production. The precilse form of 
surplus labo, ir is deterrmined by a definite mechanism 
of extraction ....... For T.: arx, surplus value is the mode 
of appropriation of surplus labour specific to the 
capitalist mode of production. The concept of surplus 
value involves a mechanism requiring private property in 
the means of_production and separation of labour powe 
from the o"Iýjective conditions of labour"(128)(our emphasis). 
Culley Is point is that the two versions of 'surplus' 
are quite different in status and working. Baran's is an 
idealistic ndtion derived from abstract notions of ne(ýd. 
That is, his overall scheme is a morally informed crit- 
icism; and his ecoriomics are best taken as derived and 
heuristico in the sense that they serVe to order the 
otherwise generated critique. Marx's concept, on the other 
hand., is central to his-economics and is firmly lodged 
within that scheme of analysis: a scheme whicli claims 
to be a thoroughly developed political economy, 
and which reveals the dynamics of the system rather than 
simply offering a moral critique of it. 
CulleyS point, in the end, is this. Both notions, 
'economic surplus' and 'surplus value', are taken as marxian 
political economy; but only 1,11arx's notion actually is 
that. Baran's efforts may lay claim to justification 
elseWhere - in their morpl sensitivity and critique, or 
in the ease of assimilation of their lessons - but they 
cannot lay claim to justification by virtue of being 
marxian-inforned political economyg'because that, strictly, 
is what they are not. Put another way, if we borrow from 
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Phillips, then we might say that as Baran et 91. begin 
with the desirability of change-rather than, aP with 
Marx, -the real possibility-then to that extent their 
political economy would seem to be impoverished. In the 
end we would pursue this softer line, taking it to be 
compatible with our general orientation ana as fitting 
within the scheme sketched out by Palma which treats 
these particular matters directly and in broad perspec- 
tive. (129). 
cR 
Criticism number four- t6coses- uý)o6z the notion of dev- 
elopment. The notion of 'development' vie take to be'a 
synonym for 'progress'. -Clearly its use is prevalent in 
discussions of 'development-studies'. Both in its general 
and in its local disciplinary use the notion partakes of 
the pre-eminently 'western' set of expectations/assum p- 
tions that attach to the notion of 'progress'. 
'ProgresS' vie take to have been conceptualized in the 18th 
century; it is the heir to notions of perfectibilism, and 
is taken in its 19th century variants as the guarantor 
of continued improvement in man's affairs, The model-of 
man affirmed is optimistic and the politics democratic, 
in 14ac-phersons sense. We take Marx to have been firmly 
lodged in this emancipatory tradition. But if this is the 
core and heart of the notion. it is also true that the 
idea has presented itself in different guises through 
the post viarlcareerlof IdeveloPment-studiesl. 'Initially 
as requiring the application of established economic 
techniq'Res, or subsequently as involving, the reasonable 
pursuit of measured social reform . However it is with 
the Yarxian work studied in Section Four that the no. tidn used 
in the 'career' of 'development-studies' begins to come 
close to the essence of the notion as we have presented 
it . The auestion is, just how close do the Ineo- 
narxists' come? 
Phillips is not sure The InDo-marxists', arguing that 
peripheral countries are condemned to mis-development 
(underdevelopment) by virtue of their subordinate inco- 
rporation, affirm some sort of notion of 'development' 
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as lautocentric capitalism'; which they then indicate is 
impos-sible for peripheral areas to achieve, thereby 
securing the necessity for socialism. Phillip-- sees this 
stance as flowing from Baran et al's having to contrive 
a response to t he apparent post war success of capital- 
ist centres in solving their problems. Thus-they pose ' 
a contradiction between capitalism and development" 
(130); hence progress in the centres could be taken to 
be 'not really' progress at all, and the situation in the 
peripheries as obviously and inevitably other than 
development. Phillips takes this to (a) block all chance 
of change in the centres and (b) obscure the interes- 
ting question of the nature of the capitalist dynamic 
in. the peripheries. 
So what of the notion of 'development' invoked? 
Phillips seems to take it to 'he vacillating, nebulously 
idealist and in the end narrow* Thus she argues: 
"The 'development' againot which 'underdevelopment' is 
conceptualized has tended to become an amalgam of diff- 
erent concepts, such that the theories are partly draw- 
ing a contrast between the process of development in the 
advanced capitalist countries and in the underdeveloped 
countries, but Dartly a contrast between development in 
the underdeveloped countries and an idealized process 
of development which would ensure 'maximum utilication 
of resources' or the 'most rational allocation of surplus'. 
--That emerges'is an ideal type of 'normal capitalist develop- 
ment' which serves as- a- measure by means of which we 
can recognise underdevelopment"(131). This vacillation 
conceals the problems Phillips takes to attach to the 
second element. Here, recalling the strictures noted 
above on the concept of 'economic surplus', we can observe 
that this element is taken as idealist and non-marxian. 
The final point comes out of Phillips' remarke unon the 
sources of the notion of 'development'. The radicals 
simply take what the orthodox assumed; a sort of nation- 
alist capitalism where the -nation. --state was the disc- 
rete unit in receipt of aid and planning interventions. 
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The radicals tnke this in order to deny that it is 
possible. -Phill-igs remarks that this naive ideel, set the 
terms for the debates that followed. 
In further discussing the radicals'dismis-sa-1 of orthodox 
development initiatives, *Phillips shares their scepticism 
but then adds, "... this in no way undermines the argum- 
ent that the development initiative was necesscnry as a 
means to overcoming obstacles to the further accumulation 
of capital"(132). Equally vie may note that granted the 
narrowness of the Ineo-marxian' notion of 'development'; 
granted its idealism, as with 'economic surplus'; and 
granted the vacillation; it remains the case that Ineo- 
marxism' marked a signal advande upon preceding efforts. 
We have cited Leys to this effect. It is not clear in the 
end just what the line of criticism here exemplified in 
Phillips actually achieves, when seen in the context of 
, 
our 
history of the 'career' of 'development-studies'. Tlore 
locallY9 so to say, the criticism might be seen to have 
some force. As Kay argues, taking note of the circum- 
stances of production of UDT and the limitations imposed 
therebyO "The radical critics of orthodox development 
studies were so keen to prove the ideological point that 
underdevelopment was the product of capitalist exploita, 
tion, that they let the crucial issue pass them by: 
capital created underdevelopment not because it expl- 
oited the underdeveloped world, but because it did not 
exploit it enough"(133). This matter of the mal- 
integration of the peripheries and the continuing dynam- 
ism of the , 
world system is tackled by Cardoso ( cf below). 
Any insistenceg by UDT, on the irremediably disfigured 
stasis of peripheral economies is perhaps best seen as 
polemical over-stateme nt. 
k-15 ýO 4A,,, z- re ko ýZklo 4\ 0ý ba 
Criticism numbýr : 4ve_suý%esk5- reduction of 
'class' to 'market'. We have touched upon this material 
in noting criticismý2, treating the rise of capitalism. 
In particular vie referred to Brenners view that Ineo-- 
marxism' is, in this matter, an 'inversion' of Adam, 
Smith. 
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Pursuing this, we may note that Brenner argues that 
... the method of an entire line of writers in the 
marxist tradition has led them to , 
displace cla; s relat- 
ions from the centre of their analyses of economic deve- 
lopinent and underdevelopment"(134). In respect of Frank, 
the im-.? ort of these shifts is presented as entailing a 
diversion of attention fro*m issues of the inherent 
dynamism of the capitalist core to the exchange between 
centres and peripheries; when, additionally, the world 
capitalist syStems dynamism is taken to be fuelled by 
exchange. Thus we have 'Brenner's Ineo-Smithian' charge. 
Wallerstein is taken to systematize Frank, his scheme 
relying upon the 11 ... immanent developmental dynamic of 
unfettered world trade"(135). Again, " ... Wallerstein 
straightforwardly defines capitalism as a trade based 
division of labour, and it is here that he locates the 
dynamic of capitalist economic development"(136). 
ITow these criticisms are indeed persuasive, and Palma 
offers a particularly interesting reading of them(137). 
Recalling Brenner's analysis of Baran/Frank/17allerstein, 
such that they are taken to have provided a polemical 
inversion of Adam'Smith! s scheme, 'Palma observes of Frank 
that he constructs a "mechanico-formal model"(138) of the 
world historical dynamic of capitalism. Thus Palma 
presents a familiar criticism in a fashion that calls 
attention to the issue of argument strategy. Recalling 
our earlier notes on Palma in respect of the 'is it 
really marxian' debate, here clearly is one point at 
which his conception of political economy is being 
invoked. We return to this in part 4.4 below where we 
briefly introduce Cardoso and the point picked up by 
Palma; that is, specificity in 
_engagement and eschewal 
of the pursuit of the general. 
4.2 & 6VV, c-s- 
, 
Criticism number X neo-marxism' issues in an un- 
helpful politics. Thb'above noted criticisms have atta- 
ched to the conceptual make-up of Ineo-marxismi. In nuce 
Ineo-marxism' has been charged with a moralising eclect- 
icism that is, in the end, neither marxian nor especially 
-323- 
6, 
pý-, rase, to 
helpful in respect of matters of the Third World. Here 
we can look briefly at the objections typically brought- 
to bear upon the politics which! 'neo-marxisn' propounds. 
(a) It is claimed that Ineo-marxieml is Third 
Vlorldist and therefore naive in respect of the Third 
Vorld. To this we nay reply that Third r7orldism was 
not, as we saw above when discussing Young, all that naive 
and nor was it unfounded. 
(b) It is claimed that Ineo-marxism' rules out poli--.; 
tical activity in the centre. To this vie may reply that 
insofar as Ineo-marxism' entails, or is associated with, 
an abandonment of orthodox notions of 'prbletarion 
revolution', this is a measure of its sophistication 
rather than anything else. Additionally, insofar as (d)(be?. ow), 
i 
is true, then IneQ-marxism' is an element of political 
activity in the centre. We have called Frank a pamphl- 
eteer, in his early work, and it is to be nnted that much 
of-his impact has been on the perceptions which those in 
rich nations have of the Third World . This is surely 
not inconsequential. 
(c) It is claimed that Ineo-marxism' is liable, in Kay 
sconservative re-absorption'. This seems either. trivial 
or implicitly fantastic. In respect of its triviality 
we can record that there is no ideological effort that 
cannot be 'raided' by those it would criticise . For 
example Middlemas (139) makes use of a simple 'class' 
notion in order to precent his conservative history of 
British politics in the twentieth century. Why criticise 
Ineo-marxism' for a general and inevitable problem? 
Alternatively, we may take the criticism and ask just 
what sort of stance is being invoked in contrast to those 
'liable to re-ýabsorptionl. A political creed that was 
rigorously unacceptable in the realm of the present - 
else how could it avoid Ire-absorption' in some measure 
or other - would admit of no change in the social system 
in question. Rigorous -unacceptability of the creed 
implies total dis-connectedness of that creed; but it 
it is disconnected then how can it ever effect change? 
The only change in the system permitted by a creed that 
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is rigorously unacceDtable (that is, totally closed to 
re-absorption) would be total and immediate change; and 
that'is fantastic. The criticism of Ineo-marxism' to the 
effect that it is 'liable to re-absorption' seems to rest 
on a contrary notion that is itself both practically 
and conceptually unconvincing. 
(d) It is claimed that Ineo-marxism' is the 'un- 
happy consciousness' of left intelligentsia (IýP). This 
is an entireTy plausible claim.; why it is a problem is 
rather less clear to us. Wwe have repeated on several 
occasions that we take theorizing to be a practical 
activity that needs must reflect the circumstances of the 
group doing the theorizing. Cumper, we noted, took Girvan Is 
Idppendencyl to be the self-serving ideology(pejorative) 
of Third World intelligentsia. Cumper Is criticisms we 
dismissed. But the claim vie granted might well be true; 
the fact that TJDT/Ineo-marxism' has tended to tail off 
into a variety of unarticulated aspiring left policy 
science efforts is of interest.. That Ineo-marxism' rnay 
be taken to reflect thd circumstances of the theorist, 
we take to be proper. The real question to ask is: just 
how well do they acknowledge their circumstances? 
The matter of the general nature of social- 
theorizing, and in particular the issue of what it is 
proper for the 'western' academic to say in respect of 
the Third 17orld9will be pursued in the final section of 
the study(Section Five). 
13u-M%AC,. CH WN01ke- 
This discussion olf the 'Dynamic of Theory III was 
intended to review Imarxian' debate on matters of the 
Third World. We have been concerned to present the 
claims of the Ineo-marxists' and the counter claims of 
their critics. 
The central element of this 'area of discourse we 
have taken to be the work of Baran, and the discourse 
itself the iorthodoxyl of the left. The object, Ineo- 
marxisml, we introduced by reference to Palma who is 
concerned with the matter of the character of argument 
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in 'dependency'. 'Neo-marxism' is presented as- the third* 
major effort to theorize the exchange of Centre/Periphery 
within the marxýan line. Originally we have 11arx's 
scattered writings, then Lenin's revisions, and finally 
the Ineo-marxian' effort Pssociated with Baran, Sweezy 
and recently AG Frank. The object Inro-m-rxism' we 
constituted via a review of criticisms of it. The con- 
ventional objections, noted by Sutcliffe, we have not 
treated; but the criticisms of the radicals we have. ý', Te 
, immarized 
them thus. The aggregative economic notion of 
surplus entails an affirmation of an economistic scheme 
of society. This in turn involves a virong historical 
schema of the rise of capitalism, nonopoly capitalism and 
underdevelopment. The resulting model of what counts a-- 
development is untenable and the general moral critique 
of capitalism unhelpful. The political line which foll- 
ows from all this is, accordingly, wrongheaded. 
These critics have tended to fall into the argument, 
'is UDT/Ineo-marxism' really marxian? '. Palma's essay 
implicitly makes the claim that this is an uninteresting 
question. His preferred area of enquiry, and the area in 
which to search for an answer to the question 'what counts 
as a marxian analysis of the Third World? 1, is that of 
political economy. Political economy is taken as that 
characteristic 19th century discipline of whichl1arx 
was the foremost exponent. 
Palma constructs these last noted claims via an 
eNaMination of the work o-r Cardoso (with Faletto'), , r7ho 
is t, -ken to have provided, in his-scheme of Idependencyl, 
just such a 'political economic analysis'. The key, so 
far as Palm2ls exegesis is concerned, is specificity of 
engagement: "It is thus through concrete studies of 
specific situationsg and in particular of class relations 
and class structures in Brazil that Cardoso formulates 
the essential aspects of the dependency analysis ..... 
.. In my view some of the most successful analyses within 
the dependency school have been thosewhich analyse . 
snecific situations in concrete terms"(141). The theorists 
cited here, Cardoso and Faletto, and the mode of enquiry 
-. -b- 
invoked, political economy, will be treated in our final 
section. 
Section four represents the last of the substantive 
sections of this study. In section five we return to the 
abstract level of theoretical discussion adopted in our 
prologue. Vie will be concerned , 'vith abstract issues- 
generally, social-theorizing and the proper nature of 
the 'western' intellectual 0s involvement with the Third 
17orld -and with redeeming the various promises vie have 
made throughout the study. 
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Section Pive: Concluding remarks. 
ChaDter Eight: Social-theorizing-and the matter of the 
Third World. 
1.0 A statement of the concern's of chapter eight. 
Our Prologue began by noting that it had been claimed 
that the 'discovery of the Third World' was as signifi- 
cant for present day social-theorizing as was the 19th 
century 'discovery of industrialization' for the classical 
theorists of political economy and the 'founding fathers' 
of sociology. It has been towards an elucidation of this 
claim that our Study has been directed. The particular 
'object' of enquiry has been taken to be the 'career' 
of-Idevelopment-studies' in the post-Second World 'War 
period. This 'career' is taken to admit of the descrip- 
tion that it involved the attempt to constitute an 
autonomous disciplinev which project collapsed under 
the combined weight of shifting historical circumstance 
on the one hand and, on the other, both its own inherent 
implausibility and its success in occasioning refine- 
ment in argument. We have treated this history in the 
hope of displaying something of the nature of social 
theorizing. 
The particular substantive elements of this history 
have been treated by means of the preparation of socio- 
logy of knoviledge-informed analyses of exemplars, taken 
as representatives of 'schools' within 'development- 
studies'. We have been concerned to display the chara- 
cteristic argument forms of these efforts, and this 
'formal' aspect has provided a means whereby the study 
as a whole could be both integrated as a text and rela- 
ted to recent debate within the social sciences as to 
the precise nature of social theoriging. 
Now as regards social-theorizing per se we have 
had comparatively little to say, save for some prelim- 
inary remarks in our Prologue and scattered comments 
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and observations thereafter. This being so, the'first 
main concern! -of 
this concluding chapter will be. with the 
issue of the nature of social theorizing. We wish to 
consider social theorizing as thd practical activity of, 
in the prime instance, ideology (theory) construction. 
We do so in the context of Dost-war treatments of the 
matter of the development of the Third World. 
The idea that social theorizing was, in its central 
and most unequivocal guise, concerned with the constru- 
ction of ideological schemas whereby action in the 
world might be ordered and legitimated we drew from 
Hawthorne, Gellner, Follis and Nell, and others. Classical 
19th century efforts are paradigm cases of the business 
of. the construction of ideological schemas; that is, 
political economy and marxian analysis. The argument 
mode of this tradition of thought we took to involve the 
'deployment of a morally informed categorical frame'. 
Now, if this indicates the prime conception of 
social theoretic engagement used throughout this study, 
then we can see how the sociology of knowledge work can 
be taken to illustrate the claims made; that is, the 
substantive work offers specific examples of social 
theoretic engagement. Thus 'growth-theory' is seen to be 
derived from the efforts of the 'IVest' to theorize 
'intervention' in the context of the multiple conflicts 
of the USA, UK, and USSR, and the nascent nationalisms 
of the Third World. Invoking Keynesian work. theorists 
construct 'grovith-theoryl; that is, the legitimating 
and ordering theorem of an ideology of 'authoritative 
interventionism'. Empiricist in conception, this takes 
'development' to be a technical matter. It further, 
sees the presently developed nations as having access 
to the requisite technical expertise; that is, orthodox 
economics appropriately extended. A relationship of 
super and sub.! -ordination-is thus legitimated, and respon- 
sibility for the future reserved for the technical 
, experts' of the "West' and their agents. Similar 
analyses wer-e prepared for the other identifiable 
-)- 
Icchools' in the post-war 'career' of 'development- & 
studies' 
This preliminary strategy of enquiry has involved 
the distinction between conception and intent; it is 
under these two'headings that our sociology of know- 
ledge-informed critiques have been produced. This scheme 
of criticism is both an obvious derivation from our 
notion of ideology-construction and a fairly unambitious 
treatment of the idea of critique. Here the scheme of 
social theorizing can be extended. Thus the notion of 
ideology critique is a simple corollary of the notion of 
ideology construction. Now9as the latter has been taken 
to be best exemplified in the tradition of political 
economy where we lodge Marx as the most subtle practiti- 
oner, so we take the former to be best exemplified in 
that tradition of marxian theorizing called the Frankfurt 
Schoolq which c6mes down to us with Habermas and critical 
theory. Within the scheme of critical theory the notion 
of ideology-critique is extended. Here the ideas of 
democracy9critique, and ideology-ranking come together, 
in that the latter pair suppose an 'ideal-sDeechl 
situation which in turn supposes a democratic society. 
This notion of critique we take to be a circumstance- 
and problem7specific extension of marxian analysis, with 
continuing relevance to the circumstances of mature 
capitalismIand having implications for 'Western' thinkers' 
treatments of matters of the Third World. We take the 
critique of ideology to be compleinelitary, and secondary, 
to political economic enquiry. Both derive from Marx. 
We can now present a wider view of the scope of social 
theorizing. Social theorizing we take to be involved with 
the constructiong and then the criticism and comparative 
ranking of ideological schemes. This stance informs our 
first main concern in this chapter. 
As regards our 'first main concern', we want to 
considerg in the company and in the light of our sub- 
stantive investigationsg the nature of the prime case of 
social theorizing. Originally given by the circumstances 
and problems attendant upon 19th century industrializa- 
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-tion, vre confront the business of ideology construction, 
characterized as entailing the 'deployment of a morally 
informed categorical frame', and discuss the mode of 
argument called 'political economy'. Followingon from 
this we consider the logical corollary of ideology 
critique, and the atta. ched issue of comparative ranking. 
We look at the notion of critique in the tradition of the 
Frankfurt School. Again we make these notes in the 
company of illustrative material drawn from our substa- 
ntive analyses. 
From this point we turn to our 'second main concern' 
which is the question of social theoretic engagement 
with matters of the Third World. Thus Palma has advocated 
the mode of argument called 'political economy' for 
those who would grasp the circumstances of Third World 
societies : it is implicit that this is the business of 
Third World theorists and their allies. (This notion of 
'allies' is ambiguous in regard to the nature of the 
social theoretic engagement being invoked. 17e can here 
recall the link, pointed out by dependency theorists, 
between centres of metropolitan power and their per- 
ipheral 'agents': here there was an obvious econoTftic 
coincidence of interest. But in the case of 'allies' 
invoked by Palma, the link is not the same; it isq 
rather, political sympathy most directly. The role of 
the 'allies' would seem to be distant and in terms of 
engagementg attenuated). Political-economic work accor- 
ding to Palma is to replace current varieties of mechanico- 
formal theorizing. 
Our second area of concern in regard to treating 
matters of the Third World involves asking after the 
'Western' thinkers'engagement wi , 
th all these issues. 
Asking, . just what does it make sense to say, the general 
strategy of reply must be to invoke those dictums we have 
prepared in the light of reflection upon social theorizing 
as suchiand granting these (reflexivity, problem 
SDecificity, circumstance relevance, etc etc ) endeavour 
to indicate what this means in practical terms. Thus 
may recall that Habermas's scheme of critical theory 
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bids us recreate the sphere of the IpublicI. This rather 
implies that the task of the 'Western' thinker is the 
critical ýcrutiny of specific exchanges between rich and 
poor, and the dissemination of the recults of such 
enquiries. 
Diagrammatically we have this: 
(The numbers in brackets indicate sections in the cha-pter) 
Social theorizing 
Abstract points 
(First main concern) 
Matters of Third World 
cond main concern) 
(2) Prime case ................ Political economy of 
(Political economy) 
Third World 
(Cardoso & Faletto) 
Specific case ................ Democratic critical 
(Critique of ideology) scrutiny 
Illuminated by examples from our 
substantive analyses. 
In sumq having at the outset of the study under- 
taken to bonsider. the post-war history of 'development- 
studies' in such a fashion as to reveal something of 
the nature of social theorizing itself, we are now 
obliged to redeem that promise. We attempt to do this in 
two ways: by recording, in the company of illustrative 
material drawn from our substantive analyses, our general 
views on the nature of social theorizing; and by noting, 
again with reference to our stocks of examples, the 
implications of these views on social theorizing for 
those treating matters of the 'development' of the Third 
World. 
By way of a disclaimer, it should be made clear 
that the remarks in this chapter are tentative only. 
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That the remarks in the Prologue, those scattered 
through the study, and those. presented here, together 
imply a dýveloped scheme covering the nature of social 
theorizing"and its deployment in matters of thý Third 
World we grant. That the remarks in this chapter const- 
itute a first approximation to such a general scheme 
we deny. Our observations on the 'career' of 'development- 
studies' serve to indicate only in very general terms 
how the lessons of this episode for ideas about the 
nature of social theorizing might be set out. 
2.0 Political Economy. 
We now discuss what we take to be the central, para- 
digm, case of social theoretic engagement; that is, 
political economy. It should be made clear at the outset 
that our remarks are limited; we come at political 
economyg as an argument mode, from out of-our readings 
of the 'career' of 'development-studies'. As with 
Palma we take the 'career' of 'development-studies' 
to have issued in the requirement that we consider the 
broadest and richest intellectual tradition available: 
this we suppose to be political economy. We do not 
claim the status of Mary-scholar, nor do we claim to 
be widely familiar with the history of economics; 
consequently our approach to the detail of political- 
economic argument is specific also, We follow the lines 
of interest seemingly growing within the ambit of 
'development-studies' (or, if you like, on the ruins of 
'development-studies') rather than tackling the exeget- 
ical works of the more straightforwardly political 
economic writingg be it orthodox or Marxian. Thus our 
view of the mode of argument at issue will be distinctly 
isociologicalltand will focus upon methodology. 
We have taken political economy as representing the 
central guise of social theoretic engagement,, and have 
said that this ideology construction involvet the 
'deployment of a morally informed categorical frame'. 
This slogan is the 'real' which we here wish tolrecons- 
tructIXe takle the problem via three inter-related 
issues: (i) just what is special about the mode of 
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enquiry -called political economy; (ii) what is there 
to note in respect of this tradition of enquiry; (iii) 
and how do the various efforts we have treated in our 
substantive analyses stand up to the criteria bf 
explanatory adequacy implied? 
political economy as a general style is touched 
upon by Carver. He notes that "much of the effort of the 
political economists went into what appears today to be 
a very general enquiry, with statements and defences of 
their views on, definitional questions, and some of the 
moral and political issues entailed"(l). In addition to 
this catholicity of intellectual interest involved in 
the construction of their effort (2) we must also note 
their thoroughgoing practical intent. Thus of Marx's work 
Carver, whom we here take to be offering a contrast 
with abstract and general work, observes that I'Miarx-does 
not seem to have set out to write a work of p6litical 
economy ......... rather he aimed to study social produc- 
. 
tion ....... by looking critically at 
the contemporary 
science of social production"(3). It is reported that the 
critique of the orthodox had a two-fold aim: to contri- 
bute to the central problems of the tradition, and to 
reveal the logic of enquiry in concert with deciphering 
the 'mysterious'-categories of the orthodox. In connection 
with this second aspect Carver offers a summation which 
will stand as general. Noting that Marx's critique is 
subtle and allusive and consequently none too easy to 
followg he remarks "Also, he does not limit himself to 
criticism9'but investigates the questions which interest 
him,, and then develops his own point of view -a charac- 
teristic Marxian procedure"(4). 
This characteristic breadth of SCODe is picked up 
by those who wouldýaffirm the propriety of this mode of 
enquiry. The explicit contrast is often drawn with the 
restrictedg partialg institutionalized discources of the 
various orthodox sciences of the social. This rejection 
of compartmentalism. is the most general starting point 
for Cardoso and Falettowho in recording. in most 
general terms their intellectual history, take note 
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of the impact of US academic social science and detail 
their response to it. They state: "We attempt to 
re-establish the intellectual tradition based on a 
comprehensive social science. We seek a global'and 
dynamic understanding of social structures .. "(5). 
Beyond this they lodge themselves specifically within 
a tradition; thus 11 ...... we stress the socio-political 
nature of the economic relations of production, thus 
following the nineteenth century tradition of treating 
economy as political economy. This methodological 
approachg which found its highest expression in Marx, 
assumes that the hierarchy that exists in society is the 
result of established ways of organising the production 
of material and spiritual life"(6). 
This point in respect of breadth of scope is echoed 
by-Paimalwho reviews the 'school of dependency' and 
accords Cardoso pride of place. At the end of the review 
it is observed that "The prýncipal common element'in 
thece approaches is the attempt to analyse Latin American 
societies through a 'comprehensive social science,, which 
stresses the socio-political nature of the economic, 
relations of production; in short the approach is one of 
political economy, and thus an attempt to revive the l9th 
century tradition in this respect"(7). 
-political economy-not only differs from orthodox social 
science in the case of the catholicity of its intellec- 
tual interest and practicality of intent, but it also 
differs in the overall 'shape' of its method. According 
to Carver, Marx draws a distinction between logical 
analysis "in which something complex is resolved or 
broken up into simple elements"(8), on the one hand; and, 
on the otherplogical synthesis-which "proceeds in the 
opposite direction in order to reproduce the concrete in 
a conception"(9). It is the second procedure that is 
taken by Marx to represent the proper direction of 
enquiry for political economy(and Carver taking note 
of the approaches in Grundrisse regards these as foll- 
owing more or less this Idirectionl(ga) 
The effort is one of the intellectual 'reconstruction of 
the real,. Thus it is noied that I'Marx develops the 
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vievi that his concrete result, achieved by a process of 
synthesis, is also. the 'actual starting point', the 
starting point which actually exists; in other words 
to perform the synthesis properly he must, at the 
beginning, presuppose actuality in order to arrive at 
the summarized conceptualized cohcrete"(10). It would 
seem that Cardoso and Faletto have absorbed this point, 
a port of strategic teleology of argument, for they use 
the otherwise curious phrase "Our approach of course 
assumes and demonstrates that ..... "(11)(-ouremphasis). 
Vie take them to be invoking the idea of logical synth- 
esis: they reconstruct the real in a disciplined fashion 
in the hope of uncovering its inherent possibility for 
the future, and the'reall they identify is an inegalita- 
rian and exploitative social organistation of dependent 
capitalism. 
As a scheme of enquiry/explanation, political economy 
is clearly sharply distinct from the orthodoxy. Enquiry 
does not, proceed by abstraction from. the given, general- 
ization and model building; and nor is explanation linked 
with, or made in some fashion analogous tocausal pre- 
dictiveness. Instead enquiry proceeds by the technically 
explicitg categorical 'reconstruction of the real'. To 
explain is to make sense. Of Marx's notion of 'science') 
Carver notes: "The searching process for Marx was essent- 
ially activeg investigativeg critical and practical;. a- 
scientific presentationg in his view, seems to have 
been one which solved conceptual mysteries and presen- 
ted -the human world accurately, intelligibly and 
politically"(12). 
The differences just noted have been represented 
in ýrecent critical-theory-inspired work in the guise of 
a distinction between validation and authentication; 
which notions we took note of in our Prologue. Cardoso 
and Faletto seemingly anticipate this distinction v.. ihen 
they treat the issue of Imeasurement'. They reject the 
model of social scientific explanation presented in 
orthodox US work, and assert that "The accuracy of a 
historical-structural interpretation has to be checked 
by 'confronting its delineation of structural conditions. 
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and trends of change with actual sOcio-political processes" 
(13). They speak of two elements "@*... construction of 
interpretation and ....... its practical validatýon'1(14), 
and note t hat ".. the demonstration of an interpretation 
follows real historical process very closely and depends 
to some extent on its own ability to show socio-political 
actors the precise solution to contradictory situations" 
(15 - 16) 
2.2 the- CVomcý-ev 0ý QXO, %3Mt-NkL C'4- Rok: *UZ,, _-L 
If vie note briefly the detailed character of argument 
in political economy, we can introduce a discussion of 
the substantive efforts we have treated earlier in the 
study and show the link to our third concern for this 
chapter: the political economy of dependent capitalism. 
At the same time we can add some more specific criteria 
of evaluation to our 'examples'. 
Here Rockmore can aid us. We have seen earlier that 
he is concerned with the extent to which philosophy 
informs Marx's work, and at one point he asserts that in 
order to grasp the scope of 11arx's effort it is proper 
to regard it ".. as a unity in terms of its philosophical 
aspect"(17). Revi, ewing these matters moves him to the 
conclusion that ".. three of marxian philosophy's 
distinctive characteristics are monism, a categorical 
scheme and philosophical anthropology, all of which are 
general features of 19th century philosophy"(18). 
Expanding upon these points, Rockmore moves to consider 
the realization of philosophy% a matter necessitating, 
as a pre-requisite, an analysis of socialcircumstance. 
The shaDe of this, so far as he is concerned, flows from 
the philosophical scheme just noted: it is observed that 
"Marxian politico-economic theory in general can be 
accounted for solely in terms of two elements drawn 
from Marxian philosophy, the general categorical 
approach and the specific category of activity, which 
derives from his philosophical anthropology"(19). In 
regard to this category 'activity',, we read it as invoking 
the notion of homo faber(20) ) presented 
in capitalist 
society as alienated labour. This scheme for encapsula- 
ting the fundamental character of marxian (and thereby 
i- I 
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all, if its good) political economy vie have borrowed 
and presented in the simplified form of the slogan 
'deployment of a morally informed categorical frame', 
which we iake to describe the general process bf this 
style of theorizing. 
The matter of the politico-ethical orientation of the 
distinguishable efforts within the 'career' of 
tdevelopment-studies' was dealt with in Chapter Two. Hence 
we will not ask after Marx's philosophical anthropology; 
the locus, we have supposed, of his ethic. Howeverwe 
can ask after the Icntegories' used in 'reconstructing 
the real'. What is their character, just what categories 
are usediand where do they come from? Iluch of this has 
been anticipated above. 
Carver notes of Marxs 'Introductionl(1857) that "A great 
deal of his workin this text is an effort to investi- 
gate a number of fundamental questions - particularly 
questions ebout the logical relations that obtain among 
the concepts and 'categories' of political economy"(21). 
Of the term tcategoryl itself we find, in a note, that 
"Marx sometimes uses 'category' to cover both the 
sense of 'concept' as the idea of a thing in general 
and in the sense of the more. specific term 'category' 
as a class or division formed for a particular dis- 
cussion or inouiry"(22). This double aspect seems to come 
out in the section of the Introduction(1857) which 
treats the method of political economy: the generality 
of ideas and their specificity in respect of sone 
particular economic form. 
This treatment of the method of political economy 
presents, as we have seen, the idea of logical synthesis 
as the proper direction of explanation. This direction 
of explanation reconstructs the real, from the sinple 
and abstract to the complex and concrete, but it is not 
to be confused with the actual genesis of the real. 
These two aspects, explanatory categorical reconstruc- 
tion of the real and the actual history of the real, 
are 'related' in subtle and diverse ways: the relation 
is occasioned by Marx's view ('language is practical 
consciousness') that economic categories are expressions 
of social relations. The scope for confusion is wide; 
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Marx concludes that economic categories can appear more 
or less elsborated in more or less developed economies, 
but clarity in formulation and grasp of simple categories 
only comes in modern, industrial, society. I 
Marx discusses Ilabourl, and indicates that discover- 
ing economic categories is not just an intellectual 
effort: it depends upon change in society. Carver sees 
. this as a 
".. specification of his general thesis on 
social determination of ideas... "(23). Marx congratulates 
Adam Smith on coming up with the idea of Ilabourl, but 
adds: "Indifference towards any specific kind of labour 
presupposes a 'very de , 
veloped totality of real kinds of 
labour of which no single one is any longer predomin- 
ant"(24). Labourýas such, only becomes a plausible elem- 
ent of discourse when actual social labour attains a 
certain character a general interchangeability 
within the division of labour. 1darx notes-. "This example 
of labour shows how even the most abstract categories 
despite their validity - precisely because of their 
abstractness - for all epochs, are nevertheless, in the 
specific character of this abstraction, themselves 
likewise a product of historic relations, and possess 
their full validity only for and within these relations" 
(25). 
Cardoso and Faletto grant this notion of specificity 
of concepts;. and read it as an injunction to specificity 
in their enquiries; they seek the intellectual frame of 
dependency in specific economic forms. Presuming a 
comprehensive social sciencelthey note that "... the 
crucial methodological question was to delineate moments 
of significant structural change in countries character- 
ized by different situations of dependency"(26). Or, 
againg "Our analyses of concrete situations requins us 
to find out what forms of social and economic exploita- 
tion there are"(27). Of their entire effort they observe 
that: "If the analytical effort succeeds, general plati- 
tudes and reaffirmations about the role of capitalist 
modes of production can turn into a lively knowledge of 
real problems. It is necessary to elaborate concepts and 
exDlanations able to show how general trends of capital- 
ist expansion turn into concrete relations among men, 
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clasces rand states in the peri-phery. This, is the meth- 
odological movement constituting what is called the 
passage, from ; an 'abstract' style of analysis into a 
'concrete'-form of historical knowledge"(28). 'it is 
this element- specific enquiryfor the intellectual 
means to reconstruct the real-that is heavily stressed 
by Palma. As he says .: "In my view come of the most 
successful analyses within the dependency school have 
been those which analyse specific situations in conc- 
rete terms"(29). 
Cqrver summarizes thus: 1111arx declares that the 
most abstract categories though valid (in the sense 
that they are logical universals) for all forms of society 
are nevertheless very much the products of a long 
historical 
* 
process of development. They can only be 
formulated at a late historical stage when social life 
has become diverse and complex, and only in a developed 
society do they posses their 'full validity', their 
full range of connotations and denotations"(30). 
The vantage point of a developed society permits 
the analysis of the economic forms of the less developed: 
"The bourgeois economy thus supplies the key to the 
ancient, etc. But not at all in the manner of those 
economists who smudge over all historical differences 
and see bourgeois relations in all forms of society"(31). 
Marxq quite clearlyg would not have been too pleased 
with 'modernizers' such as Rostow: "The so called 
historical presentation of development is founded, as 
a rule, on the fact that the latest form regards the 
previous ones as steps leading up to itself, and since 
it is only rarely and only under quite specific condit- 
ions able to criticise itself ........ it always conceives 
them one-sidedly"(32). 
Marx concludes his discussion of the method of 
political eco 5 
nomy by noting that in any society one 
particular form of production is the key to grasping 
the essence of that society. He says, "In all forms of 
society there is one specific kind of production which 
predominates over the rest, whose relations thus assign 
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rank and influence to the others "(33). In regard to 
modern society 11 ... capital is the all dominating econ- 
omic power of bourgeois society. It must form the starting 
point as well as the finishing point.... "(34). *The 
detail of Marx's pblitical economy is beyond our scope, 
but we may note with Rockmore that "Marx began his inves- 
tigations with commodity. analysis, out of which he then 
generated the remaining portions of his politico-economic 
theory" (35). Ilere the notion of commodity analysis is 
taken to derive fron the "general categorical approach 
and the specific category of activity"(36). If the 
notion of 'commodity' see-ms to be the key Marx uses for 
grasping the nature of the capitalist economythen 
Cardoso and Paletto similarly pursue an essential chara- 
cterization of their task. Thus granting the notions of a 
1comprehensive social science' of political economy, 
and taking 11arx as the pre-eminent figure in the trad- 
ition, they seek to understend the set of social relation- 
ships typical of dependent capitalism as these present 
themselves in particular specific circumstances. 
-In the light of Marx's notion of social determination 
of ideasq and his view of the core of his society,, we 
can understand his undertaking the critique of political 
economy. As Carver says: "There were two advantages 
for him in starting his study of capitalist production 
by investigatingg in a critical way, the concepts and 
theories of politictil economy: they attempted, with a 
certain amount of success to describe and explain econ- 
omic activity in capitalist society; at the same time 
they were markedg in his view, as products of that soc- 
iety"(37). Carver takes Marx to have a dual objective: 
he is aiming to iMDrove political economy, to actually 
comprehend in an adequate fashion the dynamic of social 
production in bourgeois society; and concomitantly, he 
is aiming to unravel the intellectual machineries of the 
bourgeois theoristg to reveal their conceptual equipment 
as being adequate, at least to some extentto a social 
world itself mis-shapen (38). This intellectual/practical 
discovery is Marx's contribution to the struggle of the 
historically progressive class, the proletariat. The 
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effort in the end is resolutely practical in intent. 
In this veing', gicolaus argues thnt Marx began his theor- 
etical rezearches after the failure of the revolutions 
of 1848 under the leadership of the petit bourgeoisie: 
11 ; the defeat of this influence, next time, and the .. a 
elevation of the working class to the position of lead- 
ership of the revolutionary camp as a whole, next time, 
was the overriding aim of Marx's studies"(39). 
Cardoso and Faletto appear similarly practical. 
After the failure of nationalist developmentalism in 
Latin America in the early 1960's. and in the case of 
Cardoso's homeland, Brazil, the anticipated collapse 
into authoritarianismg they seek to identify the poss- 
ibilities for the future. In sum , they aver thCat: 
"It is not realistic to imagine that capitalistic dev- 
elopment will solve basic problems for the majority of 
the population . In the end, what has to be discussed 
as an alternative is not the consolidation of the state 
and the fulfilment of 'autonomous capitalism', but how 
to supersede them. The important question, then, is how to 
construct paths towards socialism"(40 - 41). 
From the foregoing notes on the matter of the 
nature of the mode of enquiry called political economy, 
taken here as the central example of social theoretic 
engagementg ive can derive a set of criteria of adequacy 
with which to judge such efforts. This issue of judging 
competing ideological schemes has been touched upon 
earlier. At the very outset of the study(in chapter two) 
vie contrived a 'model of the crude' as a reference point 
nround which distinguishable efforts in the 'career' of 
'development-studies' could be placed. This 'model of the 
crude' was generated by negating, on a most, general 
level, the requiremente of reflexivity of thinking on 
matters social. Thus a 'crude' effort was unreflective 
in matters of conception and intent. This is how we 
located' various efforts relative to one another. 
The notions of conception and intent were deployed 
throughout the study as the( sociology of knowledge- 
informed) keys to the analysis of specific social 
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theoretic efforts. At the came time our Prologue had 
established the idea that social theorizzing entailed 
the 'deployment of a morally informed categorical 
frame'. We ran these together at the end of Chýpter Six 
and we identified three sorts of reflexivity in concep- 
tion: value-sensitivity, engagement(a notion of agent- 
of-theory-execution was involved), and self-disclosure 
(the effort explains itself). In respect of the exchange 
of conception/intentwe gestured to notions of concep- 
tual richness and appropriateness of categorical frame. 
In the case of intent, we read this as a matter of 
practicality: is the intent tenable, is it proper? It 
was with reference to this set that we suggested that 
ideologies might be ranked according to rational critý_ 
eria. We now have a third line of approach to this 
general issue of weighting competing alternatives; it 
flows from our notes on political economy.. Appropriately, 
given the 'balance' of the earlier work (that is, 
moral intent has been discussed at length, especially in 
Chapter Two; self-reflexivity was stressed in Chapter 
One), this lets us focus on the 'categorical' part of the 
slogan 'deployment of a morally informed categorical 
frame'. 
The criteria of adequacy implied in our discussion of 
political economic argument can be taken as treating the 
matters ofthe problem appropriateness and conceptual 
richness of categorical frames of enquiry. Thus the first 
criterion to be drawn from discussion is that of breadth 
of scope. We havep in political economic enquiry, typic- 
ally, the pursuit of 'comprehensive social science': 
the approach is general in the sense of its 'level' of 
treatment and in the sense of the resource base used. 
The second criterion indicates that political economic 
argument must be practical in intent; the attempt to 
construct abstract and neutral social. technologies is 
deemed unsati. -factory. (At this point we might note that 
one area of development of these particular remarks 
would be to ask how this 'Practicality' sits with the 
notion of lengagementl; that is, an effortIs having an 
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agent-of-theory-execution, noted above). The third criter- 
ion of ranking which derives-from our discussion of 
political. economy-concerns the strategy of argliment 
adopted: the 'reconstruction of the real' is taken as 
appropriate and scientific, and consequently familiar 
scientistic modelling schemes are rejected as falsely 
conceived. 
The above noted criteria may be taken as somewhat 
'formal'. To these we add two further criteria, which 
involve wider commitments in respe-ct of the nature of 
the world and the relation of thought to it. The 
fourth criterion recalls that conceDts are occasioned 
by specific economic forms; and that whilst their 
application is inevitably going to be general, their 
fullest expression is going to be specific to some 
historical economic form. The fifth criterion derives 
from the argument that the economic form 'bourgeois 
capitalism' is complex enough to occasion a set of 
economic categories adequate to the comprehension of 
all otherg existing and preceding, economic forms. 
We can consider our illustrative material, in the 
light of the above, around the questions of (a) 
practicality of intent(engagement); (b) strategy of 
explanation; (c) substantive categories used(whe. re the 
use of such notions as 'capitalism' is taken as proper). 
(a)Practicality of intent we have come across at 
several stages in the study. We have argued, following 
Dobb, that a social theoretic effort of ideology const- 
ruction needs must specify an agent of theory execution, 
else the effort does not engage with the world; it 
becomes ideological in the familiar pejorative sense, or 
(as vie should say) tends to Ilow grade ideology'. In the 
'career' of 'development-studiesl. a variety of 'engage- 
ments' have been noted, and in the ambit of the orthodox 
interventionist schemes this is typically a matter of 
adopting. the role of 'the expert'. So we have the expert 
as technician in the case of the Harrod-Domar informed 
1growth-theory'. Development is equated with economic 
Growth, identified by the movement of statisticc-1 econ- 
omic indicesq and is to be secured by the implementa- 
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tion of policies identified in accord with the results 
of the (natural)science of economics. Policy generation 
tends to become a simple (if hugely elaborated) technical 
matter of professional problem solvingt ThiC1 general 
pattern is repeated, in more grandiose fashion, in the 
case of Imodernizntion-theory'. Here engagement is 
conceirved as technical but the role is that of expert 
as master scientist. Development is still taken as a 
matter of promoting economic growth, but this is lodged 
within a frame claiming to treat wider matters of social 
change. 
We have argued that the role ofithe expertlis an 
evasion of matters of valuation: writers using this 
stratagem pretend neither to complete neutrality-for 
that would be both immediate. 1y implausible and, taken 
more the6retically, 'manifestly absurd(involving a 
denial of relevance) - nor do they explicitly argue 
a case. The role of expert, as a claim to a particular 
status in the political process, is grasped as the 
social science analogue of the role of the natural 
scientist; it serves to provide a legitimating scheme 
allowing the 'expert' to adopt, or aspire to, the - 
position of extra-systemic cause (42). 'Theory' becomes 
technical manipulative summary of the results of 
modeling the world. 
With 'Neo-Indtitutional social theory' (NIST) we 
confronted a third variety of the role of the expert, 
and this time v,, e also find an argued case With ITTISTI 
the expert ac planner' was lodged within a view of the 
world which argued that in periods of social crisis 
valuation matters become obvious, and indeed politics 
reduces to planning. This scheme we found to be deeply 
plausible, infact the most plausible of all these 
earlier efforts, but at the same time deeply flawed. 
Its solution to the problem of values- that is, the 
appeal to crisis-occasioned 'obviousness'- was deemed to 
be sophistry; and the engagement of the scheme, via the 
actions of the 'reasonable men' in charge of a reforming 
state, was taken to be implausible, an implausibility 
that was announced by the notion of the 'soft state'. 
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With Idependency, the engagement issue was rather 
more involved. Thus Furtado (our exemplar) begins by 
affirming'. the pursuit of relevance (problem specificity) 
and casts the effort within the frame of an orthodox 
empiricism. His early work is dominated by the idea 
of a typology of models of structures of dependent 
economies. The later work broadens the project: thus Marx 
is invoked in a' distant fashion, and thelhistorical/ 
institutional/ structural methodlis affirmed. The 
familiar 'dependency' line now emerges. Furtado 
conceives his effort as an interpretive interventionism; 
the engagement is thus close to that of the expert, yet 
also politically nationalist in a general way. More 
difficulties of interpretation arise when we discover 
thpt. this 'dependency' scheme is taken by Furtado to 
be thebasis not only of an economics relevant to Latin 
America but also of an economics relevant to the cir- 
cumstances of the developed, ih contradistinction to 
an orthodoxy perceived as generally irrelevant. The 
vacillation in Furtado's work between problem specifici- 
tY', on the one hand, and the urge to generality(take'n. 
it seemsv from orthodox notions of propriety of scienti- 
fic explanation) recurs throughout his work and through- 
out the work of týe 'school' of which we have taken 
him as exemplar. 
This slide to the general reAppears it may be 
arguedq in the related line which we labelled 'under- 
development-theory'. Here our exemplar was AG Frank 
and his surplus appropriation scheme, and the Baran- 
inspired line of which it is a part. Palma argues that. this 
is Imechanico-formalIq in the end aninversion of the 
orthodox. This criticism has some point; yet contrariwise 
we have argued that Franke earlier work, in particular, 
. 
is coherently engagedq in the mode of the pamphleteer. 
That is, Frank's agent of theory execution is the political 
activist, who is omni-pr-esent in his work pr 
I 
ecisely 
because he casts himself in that role. Franks work is 
transitionaltbetween an orthodox-derived 'structuralism' 
and. a marxian-inspired scb. eme of. ldependent capitalism'; 
and it seems to us that both readings , though apparently 
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contradictory, are tenable in that the work of any one 
theorist must present itself in. diverse aspects. Palma 
is concerned less with the immediate circumstapces of 
production of work and more with an abstract and general 
discussion of method. Indeed this last point, is perhaps 
the key to the cogency of Palma's attack. For in his 
later work Frank is, it would seem, concerned to re- 
construct the marxian-theoretical base invoked (in very 
general terms) in the early work; there is, that is to 
say, a shift from activism to scholarship. It is in 
connection with the later area that Palma's attack strikes 
home. 
With the later work of Frank we come across the last 
area of effort in the history presented in this study: 
Ineo-marxism'. The matter of engagement is again complex: 
with Debray/Fanon we found it useful to dic-tioguish the 
three roles of practitioner/theorist/commentator, and 
argued that with the later Frank and Ineo-marxism' there 
was a shift from activists to scholars, where scholar- 
ship was taken as a, variety of commentary. The engage- 
ment of the scholar we suggested, following Habermasq 
centred upon the critique of ideology; but in the work 
of the Ineo-marxists' we found evidence of a slide to 
generality that issued in what resembledg in some cases, 
a nascent 'left policy science, (see the critic Taylorg 
for example); which notion clearly is not marxien. As 
regards political economy, it would seem that the adop- 
tion of this mode of enquiry in the circumstances of 
mature capitalism would constitute, on the critical 
theory line's vievi, an indirect engagement at best. 
And when this mode is adopted in respect of the Third 
World,, it involvesq it might be argued, the not altog- 
ether obvi. ously satisfactory analogy of agentAlly. Thus 
it is implied that Third World theorists and their 
allies needs must use political economic argument. But 
now plausible is this role of ally? 
(b) The efforts of the orthodox and, in various 
ways, of those calling themselves marxist, adopt what 
Hindess dubs the 'epistemology of models'. In our sub- 
stantive analyses this matter of the impact of the 
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common sense notion of scientific explanation vies a 
principal concern. Again, as vrB move through the period 
of our hi6tory, the examples of the unfortunate effects 
of this mistaken acknowledgement of the supposed pro- 
cedures of natural science become increasingly subtle. 
Thus the earliest efforts at grasping the nature of 
the exchange of rich and poor nations revolve around 
the Harrod-Domar model. We argued that H-D was a narrowly 
conceived effort in that its empiricism and aprioristic 
model buildingg together with its use of the syntax of 
natural science, issues in policy science. Modelling- 
the pursuit of some analogue of reality, corresponding 
to how things really are- we take to be a fallacious 
procedure because descriptions of the world are theory- 
informed; that is, 'facts' are 'brute-relative'. 
Consequently a 'general description' or 'model' properly 
conceived can only be regarded as the sum of the commit- 
ments entered into by'the theorist insofar as he affirms 
some frame or other of analysis. If his effort is to 
be plausible this, we might expect, would encompass the 
world of common sense (that is, what the realistic 
model builders begin and end with), but it would not 
be bound by it. In the present case, via a formal consi- 
deration of certain aspects of the Keynesian scheme, 
Harrod proceeds to execute an elaborate series of manip- 
ulations of certain notions and to derive from them 
policy conclusions. We have noted Robinson's scepticism, 
both of Harrod"S effort and the strategy1tself as sympto- 
matic of certain bad habits in economics. The scientism. 
of modelling was something we have stressed: abstraction 
and generalization from common-sensically read experience, 
coupled with formalism in presentation and more or less 
explicit claims to the status of (natural)scienceall 
issue in efforts that are scientistic. The syntax of 
natural science compounds errors of conception. and any 
residual sensitivity on the part of the theorist as to 
what is involved in social theoretic work is dissipated. 
The theorist comes to take his efforts as analogous to 
those of the natural scientist, and the'role of the 
expert' thus emerges. 
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To our mind this is all very low grade ideology. 
This is very clear in the case of 'modernization-theory' 
where a m6del of the modern is affirmed that is transpar- 
ently a general. characterization of the USA, according 
to the orthodox view. This model of the modern is contr- 
asted with a model of traditional society - called forth 
b7 negating the former - and this fundamental dichotomy 
is elucidated by reference to a further set of dichot- 
omies: rural/urban, agrarian/industrial etc. The process 
of Inodernizing' entails losing one set of attributes 
and gaining the other, thus effecting the shift from 
'traditional' to 'modern'. The basic crudity is appalling, 
even in its elaborated versions. 
More sophisticated in comparison are the efforts of 
ITTISTI. Again modelling is the basic approach, but here 
there are additional stresses on problem specificity, 
realism in modelling and reflexivity in engagement. 
INISTI represents what can be called a Isociologised 
economics', and we considered at some length the use made 
by INISTI of the resources of social science. We found 
that, epistemologicallyg fine-grained data was necessary 
for the construction and checking of concepts; methodol- 
ogicallyg social science data establishes the possibility. 
of realistic models and social science concepts their 
general structure; and finally, procedurally, the habit 
of reflexive scepticism is used to generate criticisms 
of proffered formulations. This reflexivity does not 
extend to reading social theorizing as a matter of ideo- 
logy makingt but rather it is a partial effort : reflex- 
ivity appears as an additional technique which serves 
to permit better modelling. ý`! e reported that we took 
this to be the most sophisticated and plausible inter- 
ventionist scheme. 
When it comes to marxian-informed exercises, the 
issue of whether oe not a correct strategy of explana- 
tion is being used becomes rather more cloudy. ýVith 
Furtad 
* 
o, who makes play in his late work with a re- 
habilitated Marx, the tensions between problem specif- 
icity and generality of formulation colour his entire 
approach. In the endlwhat began as the search for an 
economics relevant to Latin America is taken to -issue 
V 
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in the construction of a new, and generally applic-able, 
economics. The effects of the epistemology of models 
conception of enquiry continues in avowedly ! narxian 
efforts. Prank, for example, is taken to be pursuing 
Imechanico-formal models' by Palma; and Frank's use of 
a simple explanatory frnme and the syntax of the natur- 
al science orthodoxy permits thic reading. An analogous 
slide to the general can be detected, it would seem, in 
some academic marxian scholarship; there is a retro- 
gressive collapse into the orthodoxy, which, issues in 
general schemes thatignore the matter of the necessary 
specificity of the theorist's engagement. G. eneral models 
of 'the one revolutionary path' are of little use. 
Turning directly to the matter of the procedure of 
the 'reconstruction of the real', in contrast to modell- 
ing, then in respect of the strategy of explanation 
adopted by Ineo-marxism' we find ourselves in a quandary, 
In respect of the(sometimes furious) debate about whether 
or not Baran et al are really marxists we 
are agnostic. Barang the 'father' of the Ineo-marxist' 
approach, begins with the notion of surplus, which is 
both an economic and an ethico-political evaluative 
notiong and proceeds to account for the present circum- 
stances and future possibilities of Third World 'dependent 
capitalism'. This on the face of it looks like logical 
synthesis; but Ba ran has been called a 'left-Keynesian', 
and the effort of Ineo-marxism' subjected to detailed 
and extensive criticism. Equally these criticisms tend 
to focus on showing now Baran's substantive analytical 
machineries diverge from those deployed by Marx; which 
strictly would seem to be a largely irrelevant issue 
unless we are to suppose that the world has more or 
less stood still over the last century. The-more appro- 
priate question, suggested by Palma, is not whether or 
not this or that approach closes with , or diverges 
from, the substance of Marx'swork, but rather whether 
the effort is good or bad political economy. It would 
seem to be difficult to deny that Baran's work is polit- 
ical economy; and if its reception says anything about 
its problem appropriateness Ithen evidently we must grant 
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it that also. 
(c) In. respect of the substantive categories deployed 
we can, at a most general level, note a shift from 
narrowly conceived technical schemes of economics-based work 
(growth theory, modernization) through elaborated 
sociologised economics (NIST, dependency) to full-blown 
marxian-informed efforts. The seouence 'orthodox', 
Iradicall,, Imarxist' is taken by us to represent an 
increasing richness of elements of categorical frame. The 
ideological schemes become subtler as attempts to cons- 
titute an aut6nomous discipline of 'development-studies' 
fail. 
_-_-To 
recapitulate; social theorizing as it presents 
itself in-the business of the construction of ideologic- 
a! schemes, considered here in the context of the Drime 
case of political economy, may be taken to entail the 
fdeployment of a morally informed ca6egorical frame'. 
In terms of a check list of attributes that slogan can 
be unpacked as follows: theorizing must be (i) problem 
centred; the pursuit of academically bounded scientis- 
tically conceived general schemes is disavowed; (ii) 
circumstance specificý that is, acknowledging that its 
business is with particular problems in particular 
places at particular 
, 
times; (iii) reflexive(and this can 
be read as the methodological corollary of ii), as a, 
routine matter of course rather than occasionally or as 
technique for improving orthodox efforts; (iv) engaged, 
(where this can be read as a methodological corollary 
of i ); unless the theoretical efforts specify an agent 
of theory execution, the work cF-nnot be taken to latch 
onto the world; (v) categorical-morally informed; so most 
generally we affirm that 'theory' is central to explan- 
ation. 
3.0 Critique 
If the foregoing indicates what can be taken as the 
prime conception of social theoretic 'engagement, then 
what of the corollary, ideology-critique? Ideology 
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critique. ' as it presents itself in the tradition of the 
Frankfurt ýchoolq may be taken as a circumstance/problem- 
specific extension of marxian enquiry: it is moreover 
well suited to the academic institutional location of 
many 171estern' social theorists. Three elements order 
our remarks: (a) the backdrop of this tradition of critique 
(b) the critique of ideology; (c) comparative ranking. As. 
we have already had occasion to make reference to 
Habermas we will approach these matters through consid- 
ering his work, and only thereafter will we make any 
wider references to the Frankfurt School or 'humanist' 
marxisms. Yet at this point it must be clearly under- 
stood that our remarks are preliminary, tentative and 
largely untutored; that is, we make no pretence to a 
developed grasp of Habermas, much less do we take our- 
selves to be contributing to the further elucidation of 
the ideas of this tradition. Our interest is narrow 
(i) a circumstance and problem specific extension of 
Marx? (ii) with implications for 'Vlesternl(aca*demic) 
theoretic engagement with the Third World? 
(a) McCarthy argues that the treatment of the relat- 
ionship betwpen theory and practice has been an "abiding 
concern"(43) of Habermas. Observing the decay of the ' 
classical notion of politics (in Aristotle, politics did 
not pursue the rigorous understanding of science; rather 
it sought phronesisq a prudent understanding) into 
positivist-informed schemes of technical control, 
Habermas speaks of a 'technocratic consciousness'; where 
this pursues an ideal of the effective abolition oi 
politics in favour of "objective necessity disclosed 
by experts"(44). The crucial question becomes the establi- 
shment of a politics appropriate to scientific civil- 
ization; and the key to that would seem to be the recon- 
struction of the public, a sphere of free discussion. 
According to McCarthy an outline of Habermas' scheme 
is to be found in his 'Knowledge and Human Interests'. 
Ifere we find the tri7partite scheme of 'interests': the 
technical interest of the empirical analytic, presently 
cast in logical empiricist(positivist) guise; the pract- 
-ical interest of the historical hermeneutic sciences 
concerned'with rendering the social world intelligible; 
and thirdly the, emancipatory interest of critical theory. 
Now of this last, Habermas makes Marx's materialist 
presentation of the Enlightenments stress on reason the 
prototype - although., never developed by Marx, who regrettably 
collapsed into scientistic political economy. 
At this point we may note two things. (i) Of Habermas' 
fellow Frankfurt School marxist M-arcuse, MacIntyre has 
suggested that far from 'up-dating' Marx, what Marcuse 
accomplishes is the re-invention of that Young Hegelian 
'critical criticism' which 111arx was at pains to break 
from. ("Is the resemblance between Marcuse and the 
Left or Young Hegelians whom Marx criticised super- 
ficial? " Answering'ndg MacIntyre suggests that ".. vie 
ought at least to consider the hypothesis that TrIarcuse 
is not a post-marxist, but a pre-marxist thinker who 
has regressed to just that practice of 'criticism' ...... 
.. which Marx criticised" 
45-46) MacIntyre lster confirms 
the suspicion and observes that Marx's view of the fate 
of critical criticism is appropriate to Marcuse also). 
This, or some analogous suspicion must attatch to the 
work of Habermas. If, as seems to be the case, Habermas 
wants to make 'criticism' not only the presently relevant 
mode of social theoretic engagement for the European 
left, but alsog furtherg the paradigm of social theoretic 
engagementg then this, on our view of political economy 
as prime form of social theorizing, must be regarded as 
problematical. 
Putting this in a slightly different way, we find that 
there are two elements in this general reading of Habermas. 
There isq first, the specific critique of scientism, 
in its various ramifications, taken as the appropriate 
mode of action (be it a pre-requisite to something else 
or self sufficient) for democratic thinkers in mature 
western capitalist society. Put simply, class conflict in 
the sphere of the cultural. This would seem to be accep- 
table and compatible with more orthodox notions of marx- 
ism. But then, second, there is the claim that critique 
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, 
the model of social theoretic engagementq anticipated 
but not developed by 15arx. Now here, to our miiýd, is the 
beginning*-of a collapse into the general; and 14cCarthy 
even hints at an 'early' and a 'late' Habermas, where 
only the former has much claim to any obvious contact 
with either the world or the marxian tradition. 
(ii) The second, linked, note concerns Marx's 
dealings with political economy. In contrast to Carver 
(et al), treated above9who make Marx's work a unity, Habermal- 
seems to present a dictinction between the critical and 
the political-economic. The latter is read as scientistic 
reduction;. that isq vie have the familiar Frankfurt A`33chool 
motif of the division between genuine marxists concerned 
with praxis and the mechanistic and wrongheaded follow- 
er. s of the Engelsian lin. e of 'scientific marxism'. This 
reading of Marx -that insofar as he is involved with 
political economy he is tainted- is one that, in the 
light of our notes on political economy, and in the 
light of our arguments (illustrated from the 'career' 
of 'development-studies') to the centrality of political 
economy in ideology making, we can not share. 
Returning to the project of Habermas, critical 
theory, drawn from undeveloped elements of Marx, 
McCarthy reports that this is accomplished with a 
Freudianized historical materialism. Thus 'distorted 
communication', ideology, is regarded as a block to 
rational behaviour and supportive of the status quo. The 
., 
y fractures such common sense and critique of ideolorg 
contributes to change'in society. Moreover the ideal 
of an autonomous self-hood and free exchange is antic- 
ipated in the structure of language itself; so commun- 
ication anticipates and implies free communication. The 
pursuit of open debate, a reconstructed 'public', is 
compatible with scholarship, appropriate to scientific 
civilizationg and tends to the realization of democracy. 
Giddens treats this in the for1lowing way. In respect 
of Habermas' notion of ideology as distorted communic- 
ation, he notes-. "There are two strands in Habermas' 
writing relevant*to the dharacterization of ideology- 
and its critique.... The first is part of HabermaEl 
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discussion of the development of modern society and 
politics,. the second locate. s ideology on the level of 
methodological analysis"(47). The former is the critique 
of technocratic consciousnesp, the reduction of politics 
to technical expertise; whilst the second presents 
ideology critique as the central node of enquiry for 
social science. The social scientist analyses the process 
of creation and maintenance of structures of meaning, 
and their extension in the social world. These proced- 
ures and their results are presented in a fashion anal- 
ogous to the therapeutic exchange of psychiatry. In this 
, second phase' matters of plausibility, accessibility 
and problem appropriatene*ss will be relevant to the 
acceptance(authentication) of the proffered schemes, 
The therapeutic process is governed, so Habermas argues, 
by the notion of an 'ideal speech situation'. intrinsic 
to languageg which serves as a regulative ideal for 
discourse (as opposed to speech where consensus holds)s 
and as an ethico-political engagement in that an 'ideal 
speech situation' supposes free debate, an 'open societyt. 
Speaking of these three linterestsIg Bernstein remarks 
that "Habermast synthesis comes into sharp focus when we 
,. amine the third type of knowledge eX -constitutive interest: 
the emancipatory interest. It is at once derivative, and 
the most basic cognitive interest. If we reflect upon 
the forms of knowledge and rationality guided by the 
technical and practical interests, we become increasingly 
aware of the internal demand of reason for free, open 
communidationg and for the material conditions permitting 
such communication"(48). 
McCarthy goes on to review the subsequent progress 
of Habermas' thoughtland regards the increasingly 
abstract treatment of these issues as resulting in a 
situation where an tearly' and a 'late' Habermas can 
be identified. Bernstein too sees this problem; lie notes% 
if .... the very self-understanding of the nature of a 
theory with practical intent by critical theorists 
requires the existence of a group or class of individ- 
uals to whom it is primarily addressed, and who will 
be the aCents of revolution. But as critical theory 
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becane more sophisticated, this central political demand 
played leýs and less of a role. No critical theorist, 
including Habermasq has been absolutely clear on this 
point in the way Marx was. To whom is critical theory 
addressed ...... 1,11hat difference is there between the 
rarefied conception of critical theory, and the errors 
of the Young Hegelians that Marx so ruthlessly attacked 
and exposed? "(49). 
So much for the most recent and elaborated scheme 
of critique: in terms of the division identifiable in 
Habermas' efforts, we wish to consider the early notions 
of critique. In particular we wish to see if they 
extend the ideas of criticism developed in treating 
substantive work in a sociology of knowledge-informed 
fashion in any useful ways. 
(b) In regard to the 'critique of ideology', we need 
to take note that the term ideology figures in this 
area of-debate in several senses. Thus in the Prologue 
to this study we made the notion of ideology the key 
methodological device for social theorizing. Weý began by 
citing 14acIntyre's view that the limits of thought 
equal the limits of my world, and the limits of thought 
represent my exchange with my social world. Social 
enquiry thus appears as the investigation of language 
games, in the first instance. This scheme is affirmed in 
contrast to orthodox scientistic schemes of modelling. 
From this point two lines diverge. Firstly there is the 
methodology adopted in this study; that is, we have 
attempted to grasp the nature of a series of 'language 
games' via a sociology of knowledge-informed scheme; we 
have asked after the nature of a series of ideological 
statements. The second line involves a stronger devel- 
opment of the ontological asnects of the ideas; that is, 
rather than treating 'ideology' as an invextigative key, 
it is used as a means of constituting more general 
characterizations of the social world. Vie took note of 
this when we referred to Giddens in our Prologue. 
In his work we find that the notion of 'language const- 
ituting the world' can be reinterpreted in a sociological 
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and dynnmic fashion: thus we have the cluster of notions 
affirming that reality is structured, that these struc- 
tures are the product and ground of social interaction, 
that these structures are maintained and change, and that 
ordinarylanguage itself reflects power distributions. 
Clearly, in this fashion our. simple sociology of 
knowledge-informed scheme of criticism, in terms of the 
conception and intent of identifiable social theoretic 
efforts, can be extended into a scheme that is radically 
different. In nuce, the difference appears to be between 
a. delimited -formal notion of ideology, which attacý\es 
to those e. fforts of political economy we have instanced 
as paradigmatically social theoretic engagement, on the 
one hand; whilst, on the other, we have a pervasive-informal 
notion of ideology which permits the ideological aspects 
of diverse language games within society to be un- 
covered. 
We have not had occasion to use an extended notion 
of critiqueg one resting upon this 'pervasive-informal' 
notion -of 
ideology. In the Frankfurt School line the 
critique of ideology is taken as a prerequisite of 
social change where culture is repressive and the 
economic form advanced; in such circumstances(mature 
western capitalism) the critique of ideology in this 
elaborated sense does indeed make sense as a proposal. 
In the Third World, where the economic form of capitalism 
is of a different, ldependentl, type and the polity is 
rarely equivalent to that of the 117estl, the critique 
of ideology in a more classically marxian guise seems to 
make better sense. Thus Cardoso and Faletto, treating 
Latin Americag invoke a tradition of. political ecohomy 
best exemplified in the work of-Y-arx. They do not 
invoke the language- sensitive schemes of critique as treated 
by Giddens and the other thinkers we have noted. 
In a recent essay Giddens reports tha, t the notion 
of ideology appears in Marx's work in two guises. 
One revolves around the ideology versus science polarity, 
and the other(if we understand Giddens rightly) revolves 
around the sectional interest versus ideology(pejorative) 
polarity. Now, in our sociology of knowledge-informed 
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critiques we have followed a line which reflects this 
division. I; Ie have been interested in conception and intent. 
Of the former we have considered scientismg cohcerning 
-ourselves iriith, the pervasive impact upon social theorizing 
of the inage of the natural sciences; and with the 
latter we have asked to what extent do our exemplars of 
schools actually come clean and argue coherent cases. 
At this point we could present a resume of the results 
of our substantive analyses,, in order to illustrate 
these points; howeverIthis would involve a virtual 
repeat of ret)tarks. made in the -section on political economy 
above. Here we will rest content with two illustrations 
of the debilitating effects upon analysis of the self- 
deluding affirmation of the general propriety of the 
(natural) scientific mode of enquiry. 
, The confusion possible when the image of (natural) 
science is invoked is illustrated well by the debate, 
treated in the study, between Girvan and Cumper. These 
two thinkers debate the charadter and status of 'depen- 
dency'. Girvan has noted in Furtado's work the basis of 
a claim, on the part of the 'dependency' line, that an 
independent, novel and coherent 'development-studies' 
has been established. Cumper disagrees and dismisses 
Girvan as a self-seeking ideologue. The strange claim 
to disciplinary independence and the subsequent confused 
debate between Girvan and Cumper flows from the mistake 
of presenting a new ideological departure as an advance 
in conceptualization within an established scientific 
area of enquiry. This particular fracas reveals that 
disciplinary indepencence in 'development-studies' is a 
chimera that comes from accepting the model of the 
natural sciences: the real issue between Girvan and 
Cumper is the comparative ranking of two competing 
ideological schemes. 
A similar confusion is present in the 'argument 
from a sequence' propounded by Ehrensaft. In trying 
to secure the claim that there has, in the 'career' of 
'development-studiesl, been progress in conceptualization, 
Ehrensaft runs together matters of sequences, of arguments 
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and truth status. The former is taken to secure the 
latter byvirtue of an increasingly subtle gre-sp of the 
external world. -Here again is the image of the natural 
sciences at work: to our mind, 'Ehernsaf, ts argument reduces 
to a covert appeal to common sense. Citing Dobb, we can 
see that there is no reason to look for this sort of 
progressivity in social science where we have competing 
ideologies. Now9whilst it is easy to conceive of con- 
ceptual progressivity within an ideology, between 
ideologies it becomes a matter of better or worse schemes. 
-In terms of judging what is good and what is not so 
good in the way of analyses of the circumstances of 
peripheral economies within the world capitalist system, 
that is,, Idevelopmentl- then it seemsto us, in the 
light of the foregoing reflections, that the line of 
critical theory which culminates in Habermas is overly 
concerned with the subtleties of the investigation of 
meaning systems within the develoned countries. I. LC however 
our ,: aim is to. grasp the issue of Idevelopment', then 
the simpler notions of critique -those flowing from 
consideration of ideology-making- are likely to be more 
fruitful. 
In summary: ive have taken the production of elaborated 
and extensive ideological schemes to be the prime case 
of social theorizing. The efforts of the l9th century 
political economists are taken as best examples, with 
Marx pre-eminent. This mode of engagement is displayed 
in the work of Cardoso and Faletto, to whom vie will 
shortly turn. The notion of ideology-construction - 
readily calls forth the notion of critique, and we have 
been concerned to look at this In the Prankfurt School- 
derived scheme of critical theorywe have taken note of 
what claims to be both a circumstance-specific extension 
of Marx and the establishment of a sophisticated scheme 
of critique. Both claims are problematical; and whilst 
the questions-raised are absorbing, vie tend to the view 
that discussion has become increasingly detached from 
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the'real world', and is, in any case, overly self- 
absorbed insofar as matters of the development of the 
Third Vilorid are concerned. (For example, a. democrat 
confronted byv say, a General S-'omoza might be well 
advised to set aside anxieties in respect of elucidations 
of Habermas in favour of securing a ready supply of 
Kalashnikovs. We do not want to say that the pervasive- 
informal idea of ideology cannot be used in Third World 
politiesl but that if theorizing is practical, then maybe 
delimited-formal schemees will be more immediately use- 
ful ). However, there may be one area of enquiry where 
a critical theory-informed line might be appropriate. 
This is the area, internal to the developed, oflpop- 
ular perceptionslof the Third World and the relation- 
ship of these perceptions to the behaviour of rich world 
gove rnments/business. This question we treat in part5-0 
of this chapter. 
4.0 The political economy of_dependent capitalism. 
A matter that we have had occasion to touch upon earlier 
reappears at this point. It is the question of what is 
to count as a properly marxian analysis of the Third 
World. Debate is occasioned by the blurred lines between 
'dependency' and Ineo-marxism'. and by the questioned 
status of the latter scheme. 
In regard to discussions of 'dependency', an embr- 
acing term for Palma, who argues that the line's ".. roots 
in the tradition of marxist thought"(50) have not been 
properly brought out. This tradition he then proceeds 
to review. It is an illuminating effort and presents 
the analysis of the exchange of centres/peripheries as 
a legitimate area of enquiry into the dynamic of capit- 
alism. Three attempts to theorize the' exchange are 
identified. First we have those of Marx and Engels, 
where ".. capitalism(is seen) as a historically progre- 
ssive system which will be transmitted from the advan- 
ced countries ..... and which will spread through the 
backward nations"(51). Following this we have the 
'classic' theorists of imperialismg treating the circum- 
stances of Russia and regarding Third World possibilities 
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as . 11 ... 
limited by the new imperatives of the advanced 
economies"(52). Third in this schema we have the work 
of the Ineo-marxists' followinggpre-eminentlyg Baran. 
These works are'pessimistic in regard to the posSibil- 
ities of development of Third World economies so long 
as they remain incorporated within the world capitalist 
economy. 
Of this last group, Palma notes. -"It is in this third 
phase that the analyses of the dependency school emerge 
"', ... The core of these analyses 
is the study of the 
dynamics of individual Latin American societies through 
the concrete forms of articulation between 'external 
factors' ..... and 'internal factors' ... They are therefore 
a'part of the theory of imperialism"(53). Thus does 
Palma locate Idependency19 as fathered by Baran, in the 
line of marxian efforts to grasp the exchange of centres/ 
peripheries. 
The central figurev for Palma, in this 'dependency' 
line is Cardoso We saw above that Marx could be regarded 
as'the pre-eminent figure in the important line of 
enquiry called political economy. This was a view Palma 
took: he goes on to claim. that Cardoso(with Faletto) 
is a political. economist treating 'dependency'. That 
Cardoso and Faletto, whose joint text we have looked at, 
are treating 'dependency' is evidently the case. Whether 
they are. adopting the mode of political economy 
raises less obviously soluble questions. That they take 
themselves to be political economists working within a 
marxian line seems on 1, he face of it to be clear. Thus 
they remark 11 ... we stress the socio-political nature of 
the economic relations of production, thus following the 
nineteenth century tradition of treating economy as 
political economy"(55). They continue: "This methodo- 
logical, approachg which found its highest expression in 
Marxg assumes that the hierarchy that exists in society 
is the result of established ways of organising the 
production of material and spiritual life .... we attempt 
to analyse domination in its connection with economic 
expansion"(55). So where is the problem-have we not 9 
found the properly marxian approach to theorizing, devel- 
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-opment ?. The problem presents itself via two thoughts: 
the one concerning Baran and Imechanico-formal 
I 
analysis', 
and the other concerning Cardoso and Faletto's self- 
positioning in respect of Marx. 
Palma, in his treatment of the third distinguishable 
line of enquiry into the exchange of rich/poor within 
the marxian tradition, has occasion to argue that Baran, 
Frank, lVallerstein et al, present impoverished and there- 
fore questionable explanations. Briefly sketbhing the 
Frankian scheme of the 'surplus extraction chain'. estab- 
lished over centuries and now serving to fix peripheral 
economies in a condition of underdevelopment, Palma raises 
objections in respect of the argument strategy. He obser- 
Ves that "Frank's error.... lies in his attempt to explain 
this phenomenon using the same economic determinist 
framework of the model he purports to transcend; in fact 
he merely turns it upside down: the development of the 
'core' necessarily requires the underdevelopment of the 
'periphery' ..... he constructs a mechanico-formal model"(56). 
Contrasting this with the Cardoso line, Frank's 
approach is condemned for a failure to analyse these 
matters in terms of the specifiý characteristics of 
such societies: "The place which should have been 
occupied in their analyses by the study of the specificity 
of capitalist development in Latin America has unfortun- 
ately been occupied by easy but misleading concepts 
such as 'active development of ultra-underdevelopment', 
, sub-imperialism' and 'lumpenbourgeoisid"(57). This call 
for attention to the specificity of the intersection of 
particular peripheral economies with the world capitalist 
economy is repeatedly made by Palma; and recalling our 
earlier remarks on Cardoso and Faletto it evidently 
derives from them Additionallyit is clear that in the 
light of our review of the nature of poltical economy) 
calls for circumstance/problem7specific formulations are 
appropriate. If we take Frank straightforwardly as a 
political economist then Palma's critique is apposite; 
but as we have seenFranko work is a little more complex 
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than this simple view allows. 
, 
In regard to Palma's 
exposition, it seems that he pursues a sociologist's 
political economy, concerned that analyses shoUd 
display the exchanges through time of identifiable class 
groupings. If we now turn to -economics-minded think- 
ers, these oýjections to what we have termed Ineo-marxism' 
are presented in considerably more abrupt fashion. 
Kay takes the whole Ineo-marxian' effort to have 
been incorrectly formulated: the claims of the orthodoxy 
that underdevelODment was an 'original condition' and 
that the historical development of capitalist metro- 
poles had nothing to do with it were disproved. "But 
this is as far as it went. As none of the major works 
produced by this school was firmly based on the law of 
value which. Marx discovered and elaborated, little, progress 
could be made beyond this point ...... they let the 
crucial issue, pass them by: capital created underdevel- 
opment not beca, ise it exploited the underdeveloped 
world, but because it did not exploit it enough"(58) 
This concern for the deployment of the Itheory of valuel_ 
is also shown by Desai: of the general Ineo-marxian' 
stance of Baran it is observed that , Baran and Sweezy 
in the Monopoly Oapital do not use the value system at 
all"(59). Desqi, like Kay, takes this as the key to 
marxian economics. The following dismissive conclusion 
is offered: "Baran and Sweezis analysis is then a 
combination of Neoclassical micro-economics, without 
the assumption of perfect competition, and orthodox 
macroeconomics. The question whether Marxian economic 
theory is relevant to contemporary capitalism can 
easily be answered in the negative after reading TTlonopoly 
CaDital"(60). 
If Cardoso and Faletto are in the line of Baran then 
they must be making large alterations to the economics 
and procedural aspects of that scheme. The procedural 
shifts, from Imechanico-formall generality to circum- 
stance and problem-specificity, we have noted. But 
Cardobo and Faletto arý, so far as can be seen, silent 
on matters of economics. The procedural and sociological 
(class analysis) and poltical. revisions to Ineo-marxism, 
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made by Cardoso and Faletto seem, at least in outline, 
to be clear; but what they would use to replace the 
economic substance of the dismissed Imechanicolformall 
surplus extraction scheme with is-not clear. A doubt 
arises then, at this point, as to whether or not the 
scheme advocated by Palma is in fact marxian. 
If we shift to our second area of unease we note 
that Cardoso and Faletto do not, so far as can be seen, 
actually claim tobe marxists. They distance themselves, 
in a way that the academic Althusserian critics of Baran 
noted in Chapter Seven do not, from 14arx's detailed 
engagement with the economic substance of the classical 
tradition of political economy. Marx is taken as an 
exemplar of a procedure they would affirm to be approp- 
riate to grasping the nature of Latin American economies. 
They subsume him within a tradition of enquiry in 
which they lodge themselves. 11owever, the political 
economy presented by Cardoso and Faletto seems-devoid 
of any economics, save for general elements ipvoked from 
time to time in a treatment that seems heavily ! sociol- 
ogicall; thus they discuss the behaviour of interacting 
groups through history. 
Now this is a problem for this study also. We have 
come to take up a position that resembles Cardoso and 
Faletto's vis a vis Marx and method. So Marx is taken 
as exemplar of a tradition of enquiry into which we 
lodge ourselves., insofar as that tradition and that 
exemplar are made the paradigm case of social theoretic 
engagement; -against which we locate our own different 
and restricted -critical efforts. Concomitantly we 
may note that we have come at these matters of political 
economy out of 'dependency' debates, and not by consider- 
ing economists on political economy. The suspicion must 
remain, for the present, that a fully explored political 
economic analysis of some circumstance or other must 
involve a significantly larger element of the familiarly 
economic than Cardoso and Faletto, or ourselves (so far 
as it might be appropriate) have displayed. 
To recapitulate, briefly: given our remarks on Marx 
and on political economy, the treatment of the detailed 
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economic espects of Marx and the marxian tradition, and 
present discussions of these and their extension to 
matters of Third World, are outstanding questions. 
Neverthelessp if we consider the business of revising/ 
recasting/fitting to new circumstances an intellectual 
scheme, then the work of Baran et al would seem, prima 
facie, to have been seminal. Palma, let us recall, for 
all his doubtst does make the Ineo-marxian' scheme the 
third major effort to comprehend the nature of periph- 
eral economies in the history of the marxian tradition. 
Subsequent to. Baran's early formulations the Ineo-marxian' 
line has been revised, polished and ad-justed over some 
considerable length of time. That all this work'is in 
error, or is a passing intellectual fashion, seem to be 
implausible claims. Rather, in line with our above 
remarks on the nature of social theoretic engagement, 
we would wish to take the variant of t-h-e-Ineo-marxist' 
line presented by Cardoso and Faletto as having establ- 
ished- at least in political, sociological and general 
economic respects -the essential nature of an elaborated 
ideological engagement with the Third World. Vie can now 
turn to the work of Cardoso and Faletto directly, and 
take note of Cardoso's career via the exegesis provided 
by Kahl. 
Paina characterizes what he takes to be the third, and 
L1,0st convincing9type of Idependencyl analysis 
(the 
others being Baran et al; and the reformulations of 
ECLA, Furtado and Sunkel) by noting three points. Firstly, 
that this approach slots the Latin American economies 
into the world economy, and takes itself to be a re- 
worked theory of imperialism. Secondly, the internal 
dynamics of dependency are treated at greater length. 
Thirdlyg there is a thoroughgoing insistence upon 
the importance of specificity in enQuiry. In respect 
Palma criticises preceding efforts of this third point 
as 'partiall., and urges that attention must be focused 
on 11 ... how the. general and specific 
determinants interact 
in particular and concrete situations. It is only by 
understanding the specificity of movement"in these 
societies as a dialectical unity of both, and as a 
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s-Kinthesic of these 'internal' and 'external' factors, 
that one cnn explain the particularity of social, 
political'and economic processes in the dependent 
societies"(61).. 
The career of Cardoso we can briefly present by 
citing the sketch made by Kahl, who is an American 
sociologist. His stance toward Cardoso recalls strongly 
that of Gruchy to the linstitutionalists'; that is, the 
treatment is suffused with an apology for his subject Is 
radicalism. Nonetheless it provides a convenient thumb- 
nail sketch. 
Of Cardoso's early workKahl sayst IIS? hree major 
influences converged during those years in the mid-1950's. 
The first was the direct study of the Negro situation in 
Brazil; the second was a theoretical study of Marxist 
literature; and the third was participation in radical poli- 
tics"(62) The early(more orthodox) work treated the position 
, c)ýthe Negro in Brazil. but in the early 1960's it is rupor- 
ted that Cardoso's interests shifted. At this time there 
was a spell of vigorous growth and high optimism.. Kahl 
notes: "There was a widespread feeling that the economy 
had1taken off' and that the nation was now engaged in 
self sustained economic development. Many believed that 
the business leaders or 'national bourgeoisie' were 
heroes who were moving the country.... toward ... an indep- 
endent industrial economy and a modernized democratic 
polity... 11(63). In this period Cardoso investigated the 
community of entrepreneurs who were, according to the 
orthodoxy of development theory, the key groups in 
matters of economic progress. It is reported that all 
this material persuaded Cardoso that the position of 
the entrepreneurial group in respect of other major 
groups was fundamentally unstable. "The new industries 
turned out to be unable to stand on their own feet and 
were forced to seek external help from international 
enterprises; the state was 
, 
too weak to make the reforms 
that were necessary to widen political participation 
without creating turmoil"(64). When the US-backed coup 
of 1964 came Cardoso was not suprised. The next three 
years were spent with an ECLA group in Chile where 
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Cardoso worked with Paletto. In parallel with a gene7-al 
reworking. of the survey 
- 
material gathered in respect 
of the study of industrialists, the notion of 'dependency' 
was revised and elaborated. In 1967 Cardoso and Paletto 
published their work 'Dependency and development in Latin 
America'. 
Turning to that enquiry we will now consider specimens 
of their writing, rather than go on with any more 
general exegesis. We can look at their, study and see 
how it presents a political economic analysis of the 
circumstances of Latin America ( as seen by theorists 
actually resident there). In the new (1976) preface to 
their book2 the authors remark that (i)"If the-. analytical 
effort suceeds9 general platitudes and reaffirmation. s 
about the role of capitalist modes of production can turn 
intoa lively knowledge of real processes"; (2)"It is 
nece8sary to elaborate concepts and explanationsýrjble 
to show how general trends ofýcapitalist expansion turn 
into concrete relations among men, classes and states- 
in the periphery" .... "This is the methodological move- 
ment constituting what is called the passage from an 
'abstract' style of analysis into a 'concrete' form of 
historical knowledge"(65). We treat the two elements 
we have marked in turn; the last quotation recalls the 
notes of section 2.0 of above. 
An example of (1) might be this. Discussing the post- 
Second 'Jorld War adjustments in societies to shifts in 
pre-war class alliances occasioned by changes in relat- 
ions with the world economy, Cardoso and Faletto make the 
following report. "In Argentina, where the agro-export 
sector c9ntinued to be'ec6nomi*cally ýmportant, industr- 
ializationg although', accompanied by substantial re- 
distribution, was not significant, especially in the 
basic industries. The new situation of the world market 
presented the alternatives most dramatically: to hold 
down wages and public expenditures at the expense of 
the worker-popular classes; or to re-organise and raise 
the productivity of the agro-export economy in order ' 
to use it to continue long term financing of the modern 
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industrial sector. After the fall of Peron in 1955, the 
anti-populist opposition chose the latter policy. Never- 
theless, the export sector could not by itself impose 
this objective on the rest of the country, nor cou ld 
it counteract the pressure of the masses through an 
alliance with the politically weak industrial sectors, 
as was attempted by the Frondizi government(1958-62). 
Military intervention became frequent both as a form 
of arbitration and as an open reaction against a 
return to populism. This course of economic development 
was vigorously blocked by broad sectors of waýge earners. 
It could not be imposed as a policy that, if not legit- 
imate, was at least efficient. Therefore, there was 
neither development nor political stability"(66). 
An example of (2) might be found in their effort 
to characterize 'the new dependency'. Of this they note 
that it could be the ".. most significant contribution 
by Idependistas' to the theory of capitalistic societies" 
(67)They offer the following: " ... peripheral industrial- 
ization is based on products which in the centre are 
mass consumed. 9 but which are 
ýypically luxurious cons- 
umption in dependent societies. Industrialization in 
dependent economies enhances income concentration as it 
increases sharp differences in productivity without 
generalizing this trend-to the Aole of the economy... 
.. accentuatýng what 
has been called in Latin America 
structural heterogeneity"(68). 
The elucidation of the various emerging class pos- 
itions -and their relationships over time constitutes 
the key to Cardoso and Faletto's effort. So they argue 
as follows: "Inward development in Latin America depen- 
ded on an improvement in the terms of trade and on 
some participation by the population in the benefits of 
development. Momentarily favourable circumstances made 
it possible to incorporate the masses without excluding 
the dominant sectors and strata of the period of outward 
expansion. This incorporation took place through the 
national populist version of the Idevelopmentalist alli- 
ance' in Brazil under Vargas, and in Argentina under . 
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Peron, and through the Idevelopmentalist ctntel in 
Mexico. When an attempt was made to satisfy the press- 
ures from'the peasant and urban popular sectorit for 
greater incorporationg the capacity of accumulation was 
lowered. This broke an important link in the alliance 
of political hegemony: the agrarian sector, especially 
the, latifundistag turned against those urban industrial 
sectors that might support the demands of the masses; 
at the same timq, the agrarian groups found allies in 
the industrial and financial groups that could not meet 
the pressures of the urban popular sectors for higher 
wages"(69). Thus do Cardoso and Faletto trace the 
tensions within the typical Latin American ecorlomy: a 
shifting scene of competing, cooperating, cohabiting and 
mutually un-connected groups, the whole subject to the 
impact of the world economy, largely beyond any groups 
control. 
This ostensive presentation of Cardoso and Faletto follows 
our earlier remarks on political economy. Excepting the two 
problematical points noted, these specimens reveal a Marxian 
argument strategy: particularlygclass analysis. And Cardoso's 
recent concerns (if Kahl's reports are true) - with the spon- 
taneous modes of organisation of the masses, their potential 
for efl"ecting changeý and the intellectuals ordering/inter- 
preting task - recall the claseic statements of the 1848 
'Manifesto' on the role of the communist party. It is such 
specificity of engagement - the element stresCed by Palma - 
which is surely the key to political-economic analysis of 
Third 1,7orld societies. 
5.0 Democratic critical engagement 
This section will be the most programatic and speculat- 
ive of this chapter. The earlier sections have been 
ordered bý7 discussions of particular materials, but 
here our effort is more prospective. We seek to offer 
a first approximation of what, in effect, is a frame 
whereby present engagements m ight be ordered in the 
form of a series of study-derived prescriptions as to 
how democratic-critical engagement treating Third World 
matters should proceed. 
I 
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Phrasing a starting question is difficult. If, on the 
one hand, we proceed by asking just what does it make 
cense for the 'western' thinker(who will be an'academic 
as like as not)'to say about matters of the Third 1, "ilorld, 
then discussion will tend to the epistemic. It will 
recall the issues associated with our 'first main conc- 
ern' of this chapter. If, on the other hand, we ask just 
what is the nature of. the social-theoretic engagement 
with the Third World that could call itself (scholarship- 
relevant)ldemocratic-critica: 
ý)then discussion tends to 
the practical. It invites concentration on points falling 
within the ambit of our 'second main concern'. Here vie 
elect to focus upon the 'pra. cticall; and the lepistemic' 
remarks we have made at various times above are here 
supposed. We will take note of four issues: (1) ideology 
critique, (2) counter-information, (3) left scientism, 
and (4) political economy and the matter of agents/ 
allies. 
(1)Ue have taken social theorizing to be a generic 
term, and would regard the examples and instances of 
social theorizing to be many and diverse. Each mode we 
take, ideallyg to be circumstance-specific, problemr- 
centred, and occasioning its own typical manner of 
enquiry. To help us 'fix' debate in position we have 
offered, 'and made use of, two exenplars. The idea that 
social theorizing wasý in its most central and un- 
equivocal guiseq the construction of ideological schemes 
whereby action in the world might be ordered and legit- 
imatedg we drew from Hawthorne, Gellner, Hollis and I-Tell, 
Carver and Giddens. Clascical 19th century efforts are 
paradign cases of the business of constructing ideological 
schemas: political economy and marxian analysis. 
Our second exemplar was the mode of social theoretic 
engagement called critique. This was taken to be the mode 
appropriate to mature capitalism, ind best instanced in 
the marx-derived work of the Frankfurt School. 
If we consider the notion of critique, then its 
character has been approached from several directions in 
the course of this study. The principal reading of 
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critique was established with reference to a simple, 
of knowledge-informed, scheme of conception and sociology. 
intent. This was taken from Dobb and was a straightforward 
corollary of the notion of ideology-construction which 
we drew from the above-noted theorists. This reading 
was, subsequently joined by schemes serving to enrich the 
notion of critique thus far used. The work of Habermas 
and the commentator Bernstein was noted, as was the 
analysis of the nature of political economy offered by 
Carver. Although these three, or four, lines were not 
assembled into one coherent statement)we have taken them 
to be compatible. However we have granted one distinction 
which does seem pertinent to the present discussion. 
Critique, substantively, vie took to be best exempl- 
ified by 'Critical-Theory'; taking this to be the cir- 
cupstance-sensitive and problem-relevant extension of 
Marx to the situation of mature(hegemonic) capitalism. 
The specificity of this Marx-derived effort is evidenced 
not only in its chosen 'target', cultural criticism, but' 
also in its mode of enquiry. The simple notion of ideol- 
ogy invoked above is capable, when coupled up to analyses 
of languageg of pervasive deployment. The critique of 
ideology9 in our examination of particular distinguish- 
able elements in the 'career' of 'development-studies',, 
we have taken to mean the more familiar exami-nation of 
self-conscious(more or less) delimited schemes of .. 
ideology. The critique of ideology can thus proceed by 
considering either the delimited and formally elaborated 
schemes ordinarily understood as ideologies, or it 
can roceed by considering the pervasive and informal p 
ideological schemes which present themselves as un- 
remarkable common sense. 
Iý the body of this study we have concerned ourselves 
with the elucidation of a series of ideologies, taken 
as extensive formal efforts. So we looked at : 'growth- 
theory,, ImodernizationIq Ineo-institutionalism', and so 
on. This seems to be a perfectly proper exercise for a 
'western' thinker. In terms of judging what is good and 
what is bad analysis of the Third World, the narrow notion 
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of critique of ideology seems appropriate and the 
scheme associated with Habermas seems over-subtle. 
However we can also note an area of enquiry where 
attention to pervasive informal ideology critique might 
be useful. 
If we were to consider 'development'. laid', 'the 
underdeveloped' etc. just as elements of contem-, )orary 
societies'common sense explanations of how the world 
is, then the richer schemes of critique might be useful. 
We could ask from whence came 'popular' notions of the 
exchange of 'rich' and 1poor19 How were these imaýres 
maintained? Which groups'interests do prevalent notions 
serve, if any? The pursuit of possible means of changing 
stereotypical ý, iews would be the practical intent of 
these enquiries. To put this another way: whilst the 
realm of political economy continues to present itself 
as thn crucial explanatory area in treating matters of 
the Third World, it is nonetheless possible to conceive 
of an emancipatory critique of 'popular' views of the 
Third VTorld; seeing this as a pre-requisite to effecting 
change in the behaviour of powerful groups in society. 
(2) A question that follows from the above remarks 
concerns the extent of critical work. Does the critique 
of (delimited formal) ideology imply that we should move 
beyond the displaying of elements of ideologies to 
the presentation of 'corrected' schemes? That is, should 
we move from scholarly critique of the efforts of the 
conventional wisdom to the preparation and dissemination 
of counter-information? 
Counter-information could include, for example, 
treating the involvement of the UK (taken for the present 
as a unitary 'thing': the government/business establish- 
ment, say) with the Third World. Here it would seem that 
four areas of enquiry present themselves. (a) The UK as 
an element of the world economy; here political and 
trading link! § to the Third World might be examined. 
For example in the case of UK firms working in S. Africa 
this is often done, (b) The UK as'a member of the Common- 
wealth, here the political and trade linKs to the Third 9 
World can be read in the context of 'residues' of Empire. 
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Recalling the work of some of the historians of colon- 
ialism we, noted, viho spoke of periodic re-workings of the 
relationship of. centres/peripheries, this might be a 
fairly central area of enquiry. (c) More prospectively,, 
we have the UK as a member of the EEC, a group having 
extensive contncts with colonial residues, formalized 
through the Lome Convention. (d) The-UK as a member of 
the UN. Here ive have the 'international-general' level 
of debate around development issues. Vee have noted such 
instances as Bretton V-Voods, IMF and 'World Bankiand to 
these iue can add a series of ! TTTCTAD conferences and so on. 
This is an entire area of rich/poor exchange which we 
have Aot treated, save in pascing. 
Rernsteinýs list of elements of the critique of 
ideology might be taken to permit such an extension 
It was indicated that the critique of ideology invol- 
ved: (a) a characterization of the effort in question 
plus a detailing of the means whereby it was sustaine 
, 
d; 
(b) this analysis served to permit efforts to destroy 
the legitimizing power of the ideology. Indeed, it would 
seen curious to restrict the efforts of scholarship to 
the narrowly academic realm. Critical theory, as prop- 
ounded by 'Rauman and Fay (amongst others we have mentio- 
ned), would certainly expect this mode of social theoret- 
ic engagement to present the fruits of its enquiries, at 
leest in the end, in a gener ally assimilable form. This is 
essential if the reconstitution of the 'public' is to 
be effected. ' 
(3) The critique of the ideologies of the orthodoxy 
of development-studies13 and the suggestion above that C> 
counter-information schemes might consider the position 
of the UK in the world economy, recalls the, matter of 
general schemes. Vie have seen that Cardoso and Paletto 
argue strongly-for specificity in economic/political/ 
social enquiry and reject the pursuit of general 
explanations. In this - we would agree with them. In 
the light of this vie can present one mode of scholarly 
engagement with the Third World which is spurious. 
The manoeuvre oflexemplification-deniall has been 
noted in Chapter Reven,, when we-looked at some marxian 
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informed work. We suggested that these scholars exemp- 
lified thpir circumstances in offering subtle and det- 
ailed analysess, but then denied their circumstances by 
collapsing, apparently, into a wholly mechanical politics. 
Hugely elaborate analyses were taken to have practical 
lessons, where the measure of practicality was, it 
seemed, provided by the invocation of the model ofIthe 
one revolutionary sequence'. 
The worst case of what might be called 'left-. 
scientism' was exemplified by Taylor. Posster-Carter 
drew our attention to Taylor's self-conception of 
academic enquiry as being concerned with the provision of 
the best possible tools of revolutionary analysis to the 
theoretically under-developed revolutionists of the 
Third World. ' This problem of the ease with which the 
'slide to the general' can be effected -even if vie do 
not, like Taylor, embrace it -crops up in our last issue: 
that of the uce of the analogy'agents/allies. ' 
(4) The notion of 'agents' is presented in depende- 
ncy analysis. Tt serves to underline an obvious, but 
nevertheless crucial, coincidence of interests between 
two groups: on the one hand the managements of major 
mlilti-national firms; and, on the other, those members of 
Third World bourgeois industrial and commercial groups 
with whom they deal. The coincidence of interests admits 
of a general description based on resemblance; but the 
crucial point is that this mutuality of interest is 
occasioned by9 and cemented-in, their routine business 
Dractices. So much for 'agents'; what about IalliesI9 
This question arises from considering the efforts of 
Cardoso and Paletto. They producd a political economic 
analysis of the circiimstances of Latin American econo- 
mies; andfinding that their present dependent incorp- 
oration offers little scope for the future. they turn 
to the spontaneous organisations of the mass of the 
populace and ask how these might aid the movement 
toward s, )cialist change. So 'who can take on this 
particular role, this engagement? That their effort is 
engaged has to be granted; and if we take engagement to 
be circumstance-specific and problem-relevant2then 
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it is difficult to see a theorist based in the. lwest' 
being engaged in quite the same wtLy as Cardoso and 
Faletto. 
If we recall the schema of roles which-we drew from 
Debray ( in Chapter Seven), then given the trio 'theorist', 
'practitionerlp 'commentator' the v,, ork of Cardoso and 
Faletto entails taking the fi rst two roles; whereas it is 
at least plausible to suggest that the thinker based in Cý 
the #west' will tend to have open only the role of 
'commentator'. So even if both pursue the 'political 
economy of Latin A'merical they must do so in different 
ways. At this point the notion of allies might be intro- 
duced; as the multi-nationals have local agents, might 
not the locally based political economists have inter- 
national allies? 11ow might this relationship be occasio- 
ed and cemented in routine practice? One reply might, be 
to invoke the notion of an international communtity of 
scholarship. But this seems dubious: - we may grant 
that there is a single world 
, 
economy. but we are none- 
theless fixed in specific situations. Invoking such 
general and abstract coincidences of circumstances runs 
the risk of turning into an excuse for academicism. If 
we recall our discussion of Young6 attack on the New 
Left cooption of liberation struggles, we can also point 
out that in rejecting Young's attack we nonetheless 
insist. ed upon the significance of the analogies asseted 
by the New Left. Yet, the notion of an 'ally. ' clearly 
is a matter of political sympathy rather than any 
immediate, routinegcoincidence of interest based on 
routine interaction. 
The pu rp it of political economic enquiry, it seems 
to us, mus, t be restrained by insistence upon circum- 
stande-specificity and problem-relevance if the tempting 
6: 3ýror of the pursuit of the general is to be avoided. 
This rather sugge sts that for all the international 
traffic in ideasthat undoubtedly exists, general state-. 
ments to the effect that 'we are all concerned with 
world capitalism' must be. regarded as declarations of 
solidarity rather than the basis of a potentially 
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unified programme of enquiry and action. 
In summarylthe burden of this section is that social 
theoretic efforts needs must be sensitive to what it 
makes sense to say. In political economy this rather 
implies, in recqpcct of Third World*material, adopting 
,a role of commentator and eschewing claims to status of 
superior theorist. It is true that 111,,! arx, argued that the 
more advanced econanic form offered the more subtle 
conceptual armoury; but vie cannot see that the circum- 
stances of, say, Cardoso and Faletto, on the one hand, 
and Taylor on. the other are that different. If we want 
a general summary, then as regards political econom. tc 
analyses (and excluding the work that fails for the 
sorts. of reasons discussed throughout the studyý we are left 
with a family of them. To attempt to redude these to one 
all-inclusive effort would seem to us to miss the point 
-they 6re practical, first and last. 
', Vith this injunction in mind, we can see that our 
history of the 'career' of 'development-studies' has 
shown that a fairly simple notion of critique is usable. 
Holvever- and here is the corollary of the above notes- if 
we sharpen this engagement and affirm ou-,,, insistence on 
specificity of engagement ) then the extended scheme of 
criticAl-theory invites study of the obfuscating chara- 
cter of the common sense view of matters of the develop- 
ment of the Third "Uorld. The themes are familiar: the 
Third World is starvingi incompetent, tribal, ungrate- 
ful etcgetc. It would seem to be appropriate to ask: 
from whence came these images? How are they maintained, 
and whose interests, do they serve? Again this presenta- 
tion of critical theory casts the engagement as circum- 
stance specific and problem centred: that is, practical. 
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6.0 Rnilogue. 
'Ce began this study by undert,, iking--to prepare an analy- 
tical history of, the post-war 'career' of 'development- 
-C the s-tudies' in such a way as to reveal something o. A 
nature of social-theorizing itself. This has been our 
strategy for elucidating the claims made by Hilal to the 
importence, for sociological enquiry, of the 'discovery, 
of the Third ', 1,1orld. The substantive work of the study 
has been concerned with the preparation of sociology of 
knowledge informed analyses of identifiable 'schools' via 
exemplars. In this present, concluding, chapter we have 
tried to go come way towards redeeming our general 
promises. 
. 
V1hat are the main lessons of our enquiry? Considering 
the question most generally we can briefly note the 
following. 
_(l)That 
social-theorizing is practical. 
We grounded our study (in the 'Prologue) in a set of 
claims that made social-theorizing concerned with 
fmaking sense'. Subsequently we have (a) illustrated this 
claim with our substantive work and (b) used this claim 
to give shape to our treatments of the historical-material. 
The practicality of social-theorizing is revealed in 
the substantive work. Each 'school' has been shown to 
have been producing situation sensitive and problem 
specific efforts. We have taken this cituation/problem 
specificity to be both (a) the key to displaying the 
nature of the practicality of the various efforts and 
(b) as requiring discussion and legitimation in its own 
appropriate terms and not in terms borrowed from the 
natural sciences. 
After reviewing the 'career' of 'development-studies, 
jt seems quite clear that social-theorizing is fairly 
directly practical. In general we want to claim that 
circumstances and problems call forth engagements and 
that particular sorts of-engagements have corresponding 
forms of enquiry (70). 
(2)That social-theoretic efforts are assembled or constructed 
We take the business of social-theorizing to be with 
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'making sen-sel and this manufacture is effected by 
particular theorists in particular places, at particular 
times, in response to particular demands. Consequently 
vie think it most-fruitful to analyse each distinguishable 
effort with this in mind. Any effort is taken to be 
reducible to more or less clear 'pieces of argument'. 
The reflexive corollary is that as our present works are 
similarly 'lodged in history' so they too are composed 
of 'pieces of argument' and that intra-disciplinary, 
or academicq or 'theoretical' treatment of any given 
issue should be pursued in a way that makes this obvious. 
We takq this stance to run counter to the, arguably 
essentially scientisticq common sense of sociology in 
that the pursuit of a smooth seamless web of description 
and-analysis of the r-ocial world is not sought. Instead 
yre look to a mode of enquiry that displays its ovin pres- 
ently deployed 'pieces of argument'. Crudely, we take 
social-theorizing to be more like philosophicn: 2 than 
natural scientific enquiry. 
Given this dis-integrating view we need to either (a) 
identify exemplars so as to 'fix' debate (this casts the 
business voluntaristically) or (b) identify those exemplars 
which our given social world, or, more narrowlyg-disciplin- 
ary traditiong bequeathes to us. In this second vein vie 
have identifiedg on the one hand, Marx and Classical 
political economy and, on the other, Habermas and the 
tradition of Critical Theory. These we have taken as 
our two main examples of social theoretic engagement. 
They locate particular argument-forms in history as a 
means to 'fix' subsequent, present, discussions. It is 
principally with the material provided by these two 
argument-strategies that we have analysed*our series of 
substantive efforts within Idevelopment-studies'. 
(3)That treatments of Third VVorld material should Droceed 
in a similar fashion. 
As regards social-theoretic engagement with matters of the 
Third World this too should be specific. Directly engaged 
work, vie viant to claim, should specify the problems it 
oddresses, the methods of enquiry adopted and what could 
count as a solution. (Work claiming to offer ways of 
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effecting social-cI, &ange needs must order it. -lelf in 
accord wit4 a specified agent). On the other hand, 
intra-disciplinary or 'theoretical work', ordinarily 
understoodg must'eschevi the pursuit of the general and 
attend to arguments. (71) 
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Yotes 
lJoter to chaDter one. 
I. Given that we take enquiry to be a complex exchange 
between theorist; discipline and society, the language 
of 'objects' is perhaps unhelpful. The implicit dualism 
of --ubject/objectg and its requirement that the exchange 
pf subject/object be taken to be essentially one of the 
accommodation of the forner to the dictates of the nature 
of the latter, is here denied. The review vie prerent of 
the process of 'object' constitution ains precisely to 
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LhTfTirvan, "The Development of Dependency Economics 
in the Caribbean and Latin America: Review and Compar- 
ison" in Social and Economic Studies Vol. 22 JTo, I 1973. 
p. 12. 
2 11TIST1 is Ineo-institutional social theory'. 
3 That distinctive efforts in social theory (ie. Itheorits' 
ordinarily understood) are properly and most fruitfully 
to be regarded as ideologies is a position that has 
been argued for in our studyl-C Prologue, and is thus 
an assumption of our more substantive analyses. Jýn 
formal terms we offer here a further example of, and it 
is hoped a further elucidation of, that view. 
4. We present this ideology ('dependency') with a vievi 
to considering its claims(and similar ones from other 
sourcps) to independence as a discipline. The effort is 
illustrative, and it can only be illustrative as we 
have denied at the outset claims to independence by 
treating it as ideology, in, a double sense: (i) of the 
ideology in itself and (ii) of the explanatory charac- 
teristics of our stance. That our stance has been argued 
for in the study Prologue is all that disarms a charge 
of question begging in respect of the strateb-y of this 
section. 
In part (2 . 14 ') we ask whether or not our sketch 
offers any reasons to treat 'dependency' as independent 
and adequate. If vie go on to ask independent of what? 
and adequate for what?, we open a route to a treatment of 
the ideology of 'dependency' that is comparative. Thus 
we slide towards the question of ranking ideologies, 
which we have reserved for part 3 of this chapter. It 
is very easy to slip from considering these odd claims 
to ais6iplinary independence to the intelligible matterv 
of r. ndnking . but the two are distinct issues. We must 
first establish the plausibility'of taking 'dependency, 
as an ideology (and thus not intelliýibly independent) 
before going on to treat the matter of rdnkiý,, g in the 
company of the Frankian part of this general area of 
debate. 
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5 O'Brien, in I'lleyond the Sociology of -Development" 
ed. I. Oxaal (1975) p. 9. 
6 C-Furtado "Economic Development of Latin-Americall 
Second Bdition. 1976. p. 298. 
7 PurtCado (1976). p. 299. 
i 8 Furtado (1976) P. 299. 
9 Girvan U973) P. S. 
10 'Whether Brookfield is right to stress this shift 
quite as mudh as lie does is debatable. Brookfield presents 
his exegesis under t he sub-hee-ding 'Towards a nev., para- 
digm : Prebischg ECLA and industrialization'; which rather 
suggests that he follows, say, O'Brien, in regarding the 
'dependency' position as representing some sort of 
break with the earlier structuralict line. Its not clear 
that this is so - the change in tone thot Brookfipld 
rightly picks up could as easily be taken to reflect 
Furtados diminishing worries in regard to the presentatioh 
of the other than orthodox elements inherent in the 
original Centre/Periphery notif. 
II Furtado (1976) p. 126. 
12 Brookfield(1975) P-147. 
13 Furtado'(Ig. 76). p. 300. ' 
14 Girvan (1973) p. 12. 
15 Furtado (1964) p. I. 
Ib Furtado (1964) P. I. 
Jea Furtado (1964) P. I. 
17 Furtado (1964) p-4- 
IS Purtado (1964) P. I. 
Ig Furtado (1964) P. I. 
20 Furtado (1964) p-3- 
21 Purtado (1964) P-4. 
22 Furtado (1964) p-4. 
23 Furtado (1964) P. vii. 
24 Furtado (1964) P-Vii- 
25 Furtado (1964) p. 127. 
26 Furtado (1964) p. 127. 
27 Furtado (1964) p. 127. 
28 Furtado (1964) p. 129. 
29 Purtado (1964) p. 127. 
30 Furtado (1964) P-136. 
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31 Furtado (1964) P-136. 
32 Furtfado (1964) P-138. 
33 Furtado (1964) p-138- 
34 Furtado! S early work cones from his tine as an ECLA 
economist, an(3 the expectation of the nature of policy 
prescription resembles the Myrdalian scheme. Thus in 
policy terms the focus is on the governments planning 
and organisation of 'industrialization', where this is a 
notion flowing from a revised orthodox definition of a 
UDC. Thus Furtado argues, "we may define an underdeveloped 
structure as one in which full utilization of available 
Capital is not a sufficient condition for complete 
absorption of the workforce at a level of production 
corresponding to the technology prevailing in the dynamic 
sector of the system" ! 964 p14I. ), Subsequent discussion 
of policy is couched in familiar ECLA terms9with a 
focus on import bottlenecks and ba-lance of payments/ 
inflation problems attendant upon rapid structural change. 
35 Furtado (1965)"Diagnosis of the Brazilian Crisis" p47, 
36 Brookfield p. 145. 
'blFurtado I co treatment of Marx seems to involve two somewhat 
incompatible aspects: firstly, at a vrry general level 
there is an affirmation of what Furtado takes to be the 
basic Marxian project - that is, a developmental reading 
of history which utilizes the base/superstructure distýn- 
cti on in pr6viding the social dynanic; and secondly, 
and subsequently, a systematic rtjection of distinctively 
m8krxian notions and argument in favour of a simple and 
fairly orthodox sociology presented in the guise of 
political economy. 
38 ýurtado (1965) p. 62. 
39 Furtado (1976) p-300. 
40 Furtado (1976) p-300. 
41 Furtado (1976) p-300. 
42 Furtado, (1976) p. 301. 
43 Furtado (1976) p. 301. 
44 Furtado and Girvan claim that 'dependency' is the 
basis of a 'truly adequate' economics, just as Myrdal 
did in respect of his own work. These 'radicals' present 
-the second general answer to the question in the Prologue 
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about the nature of 'development studies#: they take 
themselves to have established it as an independent 
discipline adequate to its object. 
45. ... as opposed to, say, left politics in V1.1jurope, or 
marxian exe3esis in respect of this or that matter of 
political theory. Here the lines of debate are well 
establiched and*disputants can agree on much. -This is 
not the case in endeavouring to present a marxian analysis 
of development. 45a. Girvan(1973) p4. 
46.0'Brien P. 46. 
47. O'Brien p-47. 
47a. Girvan p. 4. 
48. One comparison that we have not spelt out is that 
between circumstances of production in respect of the 
theories 11TIST1 and 'dependency'. Furtado touches upon 
this when he observes. -I'Within the group of nations termed 
the Third '-Vorld...... Tatin America occupies a special 
position in view of the peculiarity of its relations 
with the US" v(V. 61 in'Latin American Radicalism" 
edited. by Horowitz and Castrol969 ). The optimism of the 
newly independent is contrasted with, the Latin American 
'ore clearly expressed is the view of IJJ. Hor_ pessimism. IN! 
owitz; "liberation from colonialism is radically different 
from liberation from imperialism" (*, *p. 21 as above). If 
we re, -, ard the histories of the two areas over the last 
century, then we can record that colonialism and decolon- 
ization in Africa and Asia are not the same sort of 
historical e: -. perience as that nominal - independence 
experienced by Latin America. 
4 8a. See. Girvan pp. 23-24. 
49. Brookfield notes this debate. 'Classieldualists, Boeke 
and Furnival)nrgue for a special, second, economics 
designed specifically for the Third World; the reply 
from the 'Economic dualists, Arthur tewis is cited as 
an early voice, involves a return to classical notions 
and pacro-economic aggregative analysisi this is the worlý 
Kregel treats in his discussion of lgrowthl . Purtado 
clearly places himself in this linc, so this it-, where 
we must place Idependencyl. It is the manner in which the 
nature of this line is conceivea, and subsequent claims 
made, that cause the problems. 
1. 
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50. - the locution 'must involve the comprehension' is, 
on our poxt, an evasion of the issue of the dubious 
logic of this argument. If we recast this in lerms of 
the schema of ideology construction, then the requirement 
to comprehend thelwholel which governs the 'part' that 
we are interested in can be satisfied with a series of 
general declarations or statements . Casting the effort 
in a natural science-aping style makes for terrible 
problems-how independent is this sub system do 
system and sub-vystem share a set of common laws ,. 
how do 
they interact, .... etc -which fortunately we do not 
have to pýxrsue. 
51. see O'Brien, p. 9.51a. See Ch. 8. 
52. Girvan p. 24. 
5'3. The notion that generality of formulation is to be 
pursued isq as we saw in the case of Furtado 
Is work, best 
regarded as an ill-digested borrowing from the common 
image of the natural sciences. What the role of general 
theory might be in social theorizing we have yet to 
determine. 
54. Cumper in Gocial and Economic Studies 23 1974. P-467 
54a. Cumper(1974) P-468. 
55. That some argument-schemes are better than others is 
undoubtedly true; but this we take t. o be a matter of 
ranking ideologiesiand not of recording some development- 
al sequence. Any e. ample of this latter phenomena could 
only be historical2and this'is not the time-scale charac- 
terlstically invoked by those who argue for progressivity 
in argument. Thus, for ex,. mple, the sociology of the 
present day is, generally speaking, taken to be bette57 
than that of the philosophes, say. 
56. or, at least, its general shape may be derived. 
The basic conception of the exchange of rich and poor 
is transmitted. Emphasis on this or that element in the 
set of arguments comprising theL! conceptiongplus the 
presentation of this or that set of data%can result in 
a variety of. d. eveloped lines of argument. 
57. Girvan(1973) p. 4. 
58. P Ehrensaft 11 Semi-Industrial Capitalism in the Third 
World: Implications for Social Research in Africa" . in 
"Africa Today" Jan. 197I. 'P. 40. 
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59-. Ehrens--ft P-41. 
59a. Ehrensaft p. 41. 
60. Ehrensaft p. 60. 
61, Alternatively, instead of trying to. make essentially 
practical sense of the idea of progressivitywe could 
look-for an entirely formal sense, Thus any movement 
from premises via deductions to a c. onclusion would be 
counted as-evincing progreasivity . Yet, clearly, such 
a formal notion would be no basis for claims to the 
status of end products of progressive sequences, 
62. R. Bernstein "The Restructuring of Social and Political 
Theory" 1976 p. 90. 
63. 'Bern-stein's examples happen to be political science 
but his point is general to social science. 
63a. Bernstein p. 98. 
64. Again, the material used in preparing this sketch 
is derived from. those same writers who provided the 
material for the analogous exposition of Furtados work. 
65. Brookfield p. 163. 
See also Booth, p. 61. "A brief spell of teaching and 
reseqrch in Latin America in the early 1960's sufficed 
to convey to Frank the largely fictional character of 
of what he had been taught...... and to convince him of 
the importance of familiarity with the actuC-41 structure 
and, still more imoortant, the history of underdeveloped 
economies 66. We follow C. Leys(197-7). 
67. A. G. Frank (1975-) "On Capitalist Underdevelopment" 
p. 9b. 
b7a. Ehrensaft p-50- 
68. A. G. Frank (1969) "Latin America: Underdevelopment or 
Revolution" P. 9. 
69. Frank (1969) p. 16. 
70. This resemblance ofFrank to. the structuralist line 
is close. IndeedtFranks early work can to some extent be 
seen as sketching one version of-what Furtado Is early 
programme might have looked like if it were executed. 
Furtado observes that a most i'mportant task is the 
"progressive identification of fact ors thnt are specific 
for. each structure. That effort will subsequently serve 
as a basis for establishing a typology of structures". 
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( Furtado 1964 p. vii)Frank- scheme rests on the location of 
each sub-System within the world sy. -tem; os Broolfield 
notes "In one sense, Frank elaborates dependency econom- 
ic. - into a world wide interdependent system" (Brookfield 
p. 164). Brookfield also refers to the marxian asnect-- of 
Frank's work as "a derived frameviork". (Brookfield p. 165) 
AGFs scheme can readily take on the guise of an outline 
for a set of models. 
7T. How marked these differences are is a matter for 
debate. On this point Týooth, quoting an ECLA document 
that takes note of the restrictions placed upon its 
proposals by present institutional structurescomments 
th&t: "it is only necessary to lift the veil of diplomatic 
lan, gunge which enshrouds otate, nent-s of this type to 
understand why it is that ECLA studies have influenced 
revolutionaries as well as reformers" (Booth P57. )ThiE! 
hints at ideological convergence. 
72. On this Doint , see Booth pp65-66. Booth reports 
that the f-, rst conference of OLAS (Latin American Solid- 
arity Organisation) held in Havana in 1567 propounded 
the vievi that the Latin American bourgeoisie were in- 
capable of ordering developmentand th&t a socialist 
route to development was the only possibility. Booth 
notes tha_t: 11 It was with the theoretical elaboration 
and documentation of this proposition th; -, t Pranks work 
was very. largely concerned 11 (Booth p. 66. ) This is to 
locate the germ of the characteristically Frankian effort 
in a political stance whose derivation is precisely 
mapped. This is the key to Booth's reading of Frank. That 
Frank's effort is crucially deternined by its political 
engagement is a line we affirm. U 
73. AG Frank"Latin America: Underdevelopment or Revolution 
1969 peixe 
74. AG Frank I'Lumpenbourgeosie: Lumpendevelopment" 1972 
p. 145. 
75. See Parkin on the role of 'left intelligentsia' for 
example. "Class Inequality and Political Order" 1972. 
76. As*Myrdals agent of theory execution was modelled 
upon himself, in the sense thcst his agent was an instattiat- 
ion of the principle of 'reasonableness'; so Prank 
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ic his effort Is own agent, a political activist; and this 
concurre7nce explains tbe omni-presence of tl-. c- 1"rankian 
agent end the reason for labelling him a pamphleteer 
(in contradistinction to a political theorist, Tdarx, 
or administrntj-VP tý, chnicinnq TTYrdal). 
77. Compare with our treatment of -the. idea of develop- 
ment, 'or againt-if we recall Hobsbawm and his introd- 
and the Capitalict Economic Form&tions",, uction to "Pre-. 
way in -, rihich -Ch. 
2 translated an ethical question 
into a practical one, then we can say that there is 
a way of treating moral/political engagement as, so to say, an 
-ut not the way Frank does it, or empirical matter; 11 
says he'e doing it. 
78. -*! e can see this seemingly 'ready-made' view presented 
in Frank very clearly. His general orientation, 'vision' , 
emerges apparently from nowherejthough he rather seems 
to want to claim it emerges from either a critique of 
the orthodox or historical analysis or both, (see the 
essay 'The Development of Underdevelopment' ). Frank, 
adopting the syntax of science, wrongly presents his 
gestalt as a hypothesis: that is, as something to be 
tested via derived empirical propositions . We want to 
say thi, t analysis of the gestalt is in large measure 
internal; that is, it is a matter of elucidating the 
moral an6. cntegorical frame that is supposed by the 
gestalt - it just is not an empirical matter, in this 
sense, at all. Again, A-1k; is. arguably clear in 1. ý-. e case 
of Frank since tT. Lrouf,, 1-iout the period of ',! is early ýý, rork 
the furv3F,.!,,, ental orientation, the 'vision' , 
is not revised in any significant way-notwithstanding 
a plethora of empirical/historical researches. 
79. In the case of AG? this Ivisionlyinsofar as it 
entails an argument structure, is minimally developed; 
hence, perhaps) all the criticisms of Frank's 'simplistic 
schemas'. 
80-A. Giddens "Central Probleps in Social Theory" 1979. 
p. 175. 
81. Girvan p. 12. 
82. Bernstein P-114. 
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83. Giddens p. 166. 
84. Berne. tein p. IO8. 
85. Bernstein p. jos. 
86. Bernstein p. 209. 
87. Bauman "Towards a Critical Sociology" 1976. P-105. 
Notes to Chapter Seven. 
I. This notion ne use here for purposes of offering a 
general resume: our history has treated the construction 
of a series of ideological effort. r3and -. -rhilst they can be 
distinguished and lodged in a sequence, they cannot, with- 
out doing absurd violence to the material, be designated 
a fixed series of 'stages'. 
2. G. Kay "Development. and Underdevelopment" 1975 p. T8. 
3-Compare with A. Arblaster (NS 30/11/79) who observes 
that there is an 'old Few Left' and a Inew New Left'. It 
is the second grouping that we are concerned with. Crouch 
writing in 1970 (C Crouch "The Student Revolt") observes 
that, "Although political philosophies are couched in univ- 
ersal language, their contents are usually. much influenced 
by major incidents"(p. IB). Referring back to -Arblester, 
the proximate sources of action would be Hungary/CND for 
the 'old New Left', and Vietnam plus disillusionment with 
institutionalized socialist parties for the 'new New 
Left'. The general line must remain the same, and Crouch's 
list of formative elements will serve, thus he reports 
that "The Few Left stands very firmly in the localist 
community-oriented, near anqrchist tradition of left wing 
politics, in firm opposition to the other dominant theme 
- that o. I the strong centralized statell(p! 8). The dist- 
inction and vievi of core elements is shared by Young., who 
adds a general perspective when he reports that 11 The 
political movement of the Few Left emerged from a situa- 
tion of global tension dominsted by two vast military 
industrial-blocs. To a considerable degree these anta- 
. 
gonistic blocs depended for their maintainance of 
internal pacification and legitimacy on ideological 
contrast. As this contrast diminished domestic cbhesion 
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declined; this was reflected. in the declininf.; unity of 
parties commited to support of each of the blocr"(p8) 
4. TT. Birnbcqum "The iStaggering Colossus" in "Stuaent 
Power"(ed) J Nagel 1969 p. 142. 
5-Birnbaum(I969) p-143- 
6.13irnbaum(I969) P-143. 
7. Birnbaum(I969)p. I44. 
8. Birnbaum(1969) P-144. 
9. J. Goode "Affluent Revolutionaries" 1974 P-33. 
IO. Birnbaum(I969) p-149- 
II. Birnbaum(I969) p-149- 
12.1, lso noted are the students in Frankfurt, 'though they 
are described as being more 'theoretical'. 
13. Presumably Stratera meanss marxian socialism, for the 
SPD at least claims to be socialist. 
14. G. St/atera "Death of a Utopia,, 1975 p. 88. 
15-Stýatera(I975) p. 97. 
16. G. Gross "France, May 196811 in "'SItudent Power"(ed)lTagel 
p. 96.17. Gross(1969) p. 91. 
17a. paraphrase from-TV series "The Age of Uncertainty". 
18.1T. Young "An Infantile disorder" 1977 p. 27- 
Ig. St/atera(I975) p. 89. 
20. St/atera(I975) P-93. 
21. JJ). Hargreaves "The End of Colonial Rule in West Africa, ' 
1979 p. 83- 
22. Hargreaves(I979) P-83. 
23. Hargreaves(I979) P-83. 
24. B. Davidson "Africa in 17odern History" 1978 p. 178. 
25. Davidson(I978) p. 20I. 
26. Davidoon(I978) p. 227. 
27. Davidson(I978) p. 227. 
28. Davidson(I978) p. 295. 
29. See for example CB LIacpherson "The Re,, -, l World of 
Democracy 11(1965). 
30. Davidson(I978) P-328. 
31. Davidson(I978) p. 353. 
32. G. Chaliand . "Revolution in the Third World" 1977 Pxiv 
33-Challand 
. 
(1977) p. 23. 
34-Chali-dnd (1977) p. 184. 
35. Chalidnd . 
(1977) P-I84- 
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36. Youn, -(I977) p. 133. 
37. Young(1977) p. 166. 
38. F. Fanon "The Wretbhed of the Earth" 1961 p2q. 
39. Fanon(I96I) p. 29. 
40. Fanon(I96I) P-30. 
41. Indeed Davidson, observing that the imported political 
models collapsed spectacularly, explicitly makes this un- 
surprising and uninteresting. The real area of interest 
lies in the ".. resultant development of ideas concerned 
with searching for a different modelII(p295), which intro- 
duces the interest of the New Left noted below. 
42. Davidson(I978) p. 227. 
43. Davidson(I978) p. 293. 
44. Davidson(I978) p. 328. 
45. Chaliand (1977) p. IOI. 
46. Chaliand (1977) p. IOI. 
47. Young(I977) p. 28. 
48. Yoiing(I977) P-48. 
49. Young(I977) p. 48. 
50-M-Cranston(ed) "The New Left" 1970 p-7. 
51. Young(I977) p. I. 
52. Young(I977) P. 16. 
53. D. Caute "Panon" 1970 P-70. 
54. R. Blackburn (ed) in R Debro-y "Strategy for Revolution" 
1970 P. 9. 
55. Young(I977) p-132. 
56. Young(I977) P-133- 
57. Young(I977) p. 254. 
58. Again the question of who to treat presents itself. 
With Debray or Chal, liand we can see that there were many 
active groups of revolutionaries . We are interested in 
those invoked by New Left theorists. We can here claim 
that they fall into three sets: (I) -2anon (2) Guevara/ 
Debray (3) Mao/Giarp; of which we will look at I&2, as they 
seem to be the principal 'theoretical' influencec-5where 
(3)rather tends to become assimilated to the circumstances 
of the Vietnam war. 
59. This is a strategem to illustrate a point, not the 
first anticipation of an abstract theory: though the 
distinctions we use here might well form an element of 
an abstract theory of social theorizing. 
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60. K. Minogue in Cranston(ed)(1970) p. 26. 
61. This introduces a second i,: ýsue; if the first is about 
the matter of learning the lessons of experien-ce, then 
the second is about presenting these insights as a theory. 
62. 'jqinogue(1970) p. 26. 
63.!,, Tinogue(I970) p. 28. 
64. R. Debray "Revolution in the Revolution" 1967 p. 17. 
65. 'Debray(I967)'p. 2I. 
66. Minogue(I970) p. 28. 
67. Debray(I970) p. 27. 
68.11inogue(I970) p. 28. 
69.14inogue(I970) p. 26. 
70. 'Blackburn(I970) P. 13. 
71. Blackburn(I970) p. 22. 
72. Debray(I970) p. 28. 
73. Debray(I970) P-33. 
74. Debray(I970) p. 33. 
75. Caute(I970) P-41. 
76. Caute(I970) p-41. 
77. P. 7Torsley in Mlonthly Review vol21 1969 p-32. 
78-Caute(I970) p. 68. 
79. Fanon(I96I) P-30. 
80. Fanon(I96I) P-39. 
aj. Caute(1970) p. 61. 
82. Fanon(I96I) p. 117-IIS. 
83. Fanon(I96I) p-47. 
84. This is one line of criticism that is developed in 
regard to the Ineo-marxism' we treat below. Roxborough 
exemplifies the criticism, "The final abandonment of 
revolutionary theory conceived as an analysis of the 
dynamics of the social structure which could serve as a 
guide for revolutionary action, came in the aftermath 
of the Cuban Revolution and the Algerian independence 
movement. It was the task of theorists like Franz 
Fanon and Regis Debray to divorce revolutionary practice 
totally from revolutionary theory" (P134). This judge- 
ment we find bizarre. 
85. lTeither present detailed academic-type revisions. 
Debray offers a systematic re-write around the notion of 
the foco, but it is a 'reading' of the marxist canon 
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rather th-n genernl revision. Panon's work i-- even lesý, ý 
of a 'revision of IJarxI. 
86. A. Foster-Carter "Neo-ITarxist Approaches to Develop- 
! nent and Underdevelopment" 1974 p. 68. 
87. J. Taylor "IýTeo-marxism and underdevelopment: a socio- 
logical phantasy" 1974 
88. In their defence. it should be said that in each case 
they could reply that (a) these criticisms we have pre- 
sented are not enough to 'secure conviction'; they are 
really just notes - precisely who, for example, do we have 
in mind?; (b) in any case the authors cited had fairly 
narrowly technical issues to debate and were, under- 
standably, not bothered about displays of reflexive 
consistency; (c) anyway, the sorts of points we have 
made are routinely granted in these sorts of ditcussions: 
it is a part of disciplinary commonsense. - 
89. A. G*Frank I'Denendent Accumulation and Underdevelopment" 
1978 P-xiii. 
90. Frank(I978) p. l. 
91. Frank(I978) p-I. 
92. Frank(I978) p. 2. 
93. PrBnk(I978) 
94. There seens to be another point to be made in this 
connection: that is thnt philosophical reflection upon 
assumptions (governing method and procedure. and purpose) 
cannot be initiated simply by abstracting from work that 
has been routinely engaged with the world (that'is, more 
or less empiricist). The impulse to philosophical type 
reflection is understandable(given that these people 
are scholars5and that the 'movement' they consider has 
seemingly lost impetus), and to our mind appropriate 
(given our scheme of construction/criticism/ ranking 
but it has to be tcknowledged as a distinct intellectual 
endeaVo-orwhich requires, pre-eminently, that specific 
questions be put. Treating philosophical-type analysis 
as glorified tinkering with presently un-happily regarded 
, models of reality' cannot generate any useful answers. 
Roxborough! s'effort is maybe a case in point here; he 
presents a very abstract and general treatment of the 
pursuit of a model of development, but he never manages 
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to pose a s. -)ecific quection, or set of them, which 
would get his aspiring nhilosophizing going. 
95. 'Dependency iý taken, by Palma, to emerge in phase III 
of marxiah treatments of centre-periphery relations. 
Whether 'dependency' is or is not taken as marxian is 
not stated. In the end it seems as if Palma sidesteps 
the issue by (1) making 'dependency' a school, that is, 
a collection of differing analysesland (2) making the 
school one of -political economy. !!, Iarx i-- subsuned undpr 
the tradition of political economy, though granted a 
major place in that tradition, and 'dependency' is taken 
av a modern specimen of political economy. The question 
'is dependency'narxian' is sidestepped. Additionally, 
there is a somewhat confusing tension between 'dependency' 
as a v2riety of (necessarily) marxian-infor. med political 
economy, on the one hand, and 'dependency' as an analysis 
of Latin America. on the other. 
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